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The legitimate scope of a court's authority to make law where
a legislature has spoken by enacting a statute relevant to a case before
that court is a recurring issue in American legal thought. The usual
assumption entertained in debates over legitimate scope is that a court
is bound by the principle of legislative supremacy. Absent unconstitu-
tionality, an applicable statute's command must be enforced whether
or not the enforcing court agrees with that command. But the assump-
tion masks substantial difficulty and is controversial at any level of
abstraction more concrete than the very general. On what bases should
applicability be determined given that the factual patterns confronting
a court are susceptible to many alternative legal theories for resolu-
tion of the disputes generated by those patterns? On what bases
should the meaning of the statutory command be determined? What
is the relevance of the court's independent authority to make law to
the task of application?
These questions may be viewed as asked and answered by courts and
legal academics within the framework of two competing versions of institu-
tional role paralleling similar competing versions of interpretative role1
1. But see Abraham, Statutory Interpretation and Literary Theory: Some Com-
mon Concerns of an Unlikely Pair, 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 676, 680 (1979);[hereinafter cited
as Statutory Interpretation and Literary Theory]. Abraham, Three Fallacies of Interpreta-
tion: A Comment on Precedent and Judicial Decision, 23 ARIz. L. REV. 771, 776-77 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as Three Falacies of Interpretation]. Abraham rejects the Cartesian distinc-
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in the arts' and in literature.3 One version grants primacy to the legislature
as the author of the statute and therefore emphasizes the statutory text
or legislative intention. A court on this view is the mere agent of a
legislative principal; its task is accurate duplication of legislative command
within the actual context of particular cases. The necessary assumption
underlying this first version of judicial role is that accurate duplication of
author's meaning is possible; the court's perspective can be suspended in
interpretation. The second version grants primacy to the judicial reader
or interpreter of the statute and therefore emphasizes the creative role
of common law courts. A court on this second view creates the statute in
interpreting it; the court's task is to fill an empty vessel with principles
or policies' appropriate to a dynamic society. The assumption often underly-
ing this second version of judicial role is that accurate duplication of author's
tion between subject and object he thinks implicit in the distinction made in the text here
and largely adopts Stanley Fish's notion of interpretive community. See infra, note 3.
2. For a classic survey of the debate in music that emphasizes creative
interpretation and draws an analogy to law see Frank, Words and Music: Some Remarks
on Statutory Interpretation, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 1259 (1947).
3. The legal community's interest in contemporary thought in literary criticism
has recently become intense. That interest has predictably focused upon the work
of E.D. Hirsch (who grants the author primacy) and Stanley Fish (who grants the reader,
as limited or defined by the interpretive community in which the reader is "embedded",
primacy). E.D. HIRSCH, JR., THE AiMs OF INTERPRETATION (1976)[hereinafter cited as THE
AIMS OF INTERPRETATION].; E.D. HIRSCH, JR., VALIDITY IN INTERPRETATION(1967); S. FISH, IS
THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? THE AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES (1980). For an
attempt at applying Hirsch to statutory interpretation, see McIntosh, Legal Hermeneutics:
A Philosophical Critique, 35 OKLA. L. REV. 1 (1982). Legal commentators who have adopted
Fish's insights have either attempted to utilize the interpretive community notion as a
constraint on judges that warrants the creativity such commentators otherwise advocate
or have utilized Fish's attack on the authority of the text and his recognition of the
multiplicity and diversity of interpretive communities to adopt a neo-realist stance. For
examples of the former, see Statutory Interpretation, and Literary Theory, supra note.
1; Three Fallacies of Interpretation, supra note 1; Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, 60 TEX.
L. REV. 527 (1982) also in THE POLITICS OF INTERPRETATION. 249 (W.J.T. Mitchell ed. 1983)
[hereinafter cited as Law as Interpretation]; Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN
L. REV. 739 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Objectivity and Interpretation]. For examples of the
latter, see Brest, Interpretation and Interest, 34 STAN L. REV. 765 (1982); Levinson, Law as
Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 373 (1982). For Fish's responses, see Fish, Working on the Chain
Gang: Interpretation in Law and Literature, 60 TEX L. REV. 551 (1982) [herinafter cited as
Chain Gang]; Fish, Wrong Again, 62 TEX L. REV. 299 (1983). For responses to Fish, see, e.g.,
Dworkin, My Reply to Stanley Fish (and Walter Benn Michaels): Please Don't Talk About
Objectivity Any More in THE POLITICS OF INTERPRETATION supra at 287 [hereinafter cited
as My Reply to Stanley Fish]; White, The Text, Interpretation and Critical Standards, 60
TEX L. REV. 569 (1982).
4. The distinction between principles and policies, if there is a viable distinc-
tion, has itself at least two distinct versions. Dean Wellington identifies policy with
instrumentalism and principle with ordinary or common morality. Wellington, Common
Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE
19851
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meaning is not possible; statutory meaning is a function of reader
perspective.
One or the other of these competing versions of institutional role
has dominated distinct regimes of academic thought and these regimes
have at least influenced judicial behavior.5 There are three such
regimes. The first regime, which shared some of its values with legal
positivism, prevailed in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Under
L.J. 221 (1973). Wellington's distinction therefore treats a policy justification for a legal
rule as a justification from the consequences or presumed effects of the rule. Pro-
fessor Dworkin treats a policy as a device for furthering community goals or interests
and a principle as the source of individual or group rights. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY 82 (1978). Dworkin denies that his version of the distinction is that between
"consequentialist" and "non-consequentialist" argument or between teleological and
deontological theory. Id. at 295-97, 313-15. Moreover. Dworkin assigns policies to
legislatures and principles to courts. Id. at 84-86. Wellington, by contrast, recognizes
both common law policies and legislative policies and assigns institutional roles with
respect to policies by insisting that common law policies must be both widely sup-
ported and relatively neutral (in the sense that a common law rule may not dispropor-
tionately burden or benefit interest groups). Wellington, supra, at 238.
Contrast all of this to the law and economics school whose reliance on a policy
(or is it a principle?) of wealth maximization relies on consequentialist technique for
its implementation. Courts on wealth maximization premises are the competent forum;
policies of redistribution are for legislatures. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW 399-40 (2d ed. 1977).
What is interesting in these distinctions is the relationship between critic's
preferences and that critic's version of institutional role. Given a preference for wealth
maximization, legislation where possible is to be given a narrow construction. See Easter-
brook, Statute's Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983). But see Posner, Statutory
Interpretation-in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 821-22
(1983). Given a preference for individual or group rights, the legislature's policy pro-
nouncements are to be trumped by an expansive version of constitutional law,
DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 149, or are to be limited by language, id. at 109, or judicial
methodology, Law as Interpretation, supra note 3, or by a court's choice of a best
fitting theory of political morality, Dworkin, How To Read The Civil Rights Act, N.Y.
REV. BKS, Dec. 20, 1979 at 37[hereinafter cited as Civil Rights Act]. Given a preference
for the grandeur of the common law method, legislation is to be trumped by rules
of "clear statement" where "principles" are at stake. See Wellington, supra at 262-64.
5. There are a number of versions of the history of intellectual thought on
the questions raised here from which the present scheme is loosely and eclectically
derived. See generally, G.E. WHIrrE. PATTERNS OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 97-191 (1978);
Statutory Interpretation, supra note 1, at 682-88; Ackerman, Book Review 103 DAEDALUS
119 (1974); Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1685 (1976); Witherspoon, The Essential Focus of Statutory Interpretation, 36 IND.
L.J. 423 (1961); Witherspoon, Administrative Discretion to Determine Statutory Mean-
ing: "The Middle Road" 40 TEX L. REV. 751 (1962); [hereinafter cited as Middle Road]
Witherspoon, Administrative Discretion to Determine Satutory Meaning: 'The Low Road,"
38 TEX L. REV. 392, 572 (1960, Witherspoon, Administrative Discretion to Determine
Statutory Meaning: "The High Road," 35 TEX. L. REV. 63 (1956).
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it, courts, at least as a matter of the rhetoric of their supposed
methodology,6 were to emphasize the plain meaning7 of statutory text
and to therefore apply legislative commands as relatively passive
agents of the legislative sovereign." Although the text had primacy
under such a view, its primacy was a matter of its availability as
the mechanism by which the sovereign's commands could be known.9
6. Perhaps the most notorious statement of this methodology is Justice
Roberts' with respect to constitutional interpretation:
When an act of Congress is appropriately challenged in the court as not
conforming to the constitutional mandate the judicial branch of the Govern-
ment has only one duty-to lay the article of the Constitution which is
invoked beside the statute which is challenged and to decide whether the
latter squares with the former.
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936). Such sentiments are not time-bound;
they appear in the rhetoric (not necessarily the actual thinking) of courts in all of
the periods under discussion. See, e.g., T.V.A. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
7. "Plain meaning" has come to have at least three meanings in legal
discourse. It is sometimes used to refer to literalism: the literal words of the statute
rather than its purpose or spirit, control. It is sometimes used as a basis for rejecting
an argument that an interpreting court should avoid applying literal meaning when
application would produce absurd or unreasonable results. It is sometimes used to
refer to ordinary meaning, as when a court says that its task is to construe a statute
as whole, giving the words that meaning an ordinary speaker of English would give
them. See R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 286 (1975).
As the phrase is used in this paper, it encompasses all three of these potential mean-
ings, on the grounds that all three are expressions of a particular perspective regard-
ing the judicial function and are at least generally consistent with each other given
that perspective.
8. There is however some danger in too readily attributing passivity to the
academic thought of the period. The risk lies in the fact that the most descriptive
statements of "mechanical jurisprudence" are not to be found in the alleged practi-
tioners of that methodology but in the realists' attacks on the methodology. It is for
example possible to view both Landis and Pound as "literalists," albeit literalists who
rely in part on notions of legislative purpose or intent. See Landis, A Note on Statutory
Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 886 (1930); [hereinafter cited as A Note on Statutory In-
terpretation]. Pound, Spurious Interpretation, 7 COLUM. L. REV. 379 (1907) [hereinafter
cited as Spurious Interpretation]. Yet both were concerned with judicial use of statutes
as sources of law for courts to fashion. See Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law,
HARV. LEGAL ESSAYS 213 (1934); [hereinafter cited as Statutes and Sources ofLaw] Pound,
The Theory of Judicial Decision 36 HARV. LAW REV. 641 (1923); Pound, Common Law and
Legislation, 21 HARV. LAW REV. (1908) [hereinafter cited as Common Law and Legislation].
9. Although it is believed that this view of the authority of language is
generally attributed to positivists, the positivist-utilitarian position on the question
was more a matter of aspiration than description. Both Bentham and Austin desired
codification from which judicial decision could be deductively derived. Neither thought
language so precise in actual usage to permit such a procedure. See J. BENTHAM, OF
LAWS IN GENERAL 241 (H.L.A. Hart ed. 1970); 2 AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE
997-98 (5th ed. 1885). Kelsen is perhaps a better example of an exponent of the view
which gives text primacy. See Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law, 51 L.Q. REV. 527-28
1985]
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Ironically, however, the judicial subserviance to legislative command
implicit in the first regime's reliance on the authority of the literal
language of statutes very often coexisted with a judicial tendency to
confine the operative force of statutes to their language and, therefore,
to ensure the widest possible room for the operation and develop-
ment of legal principle as legal principle was identified by the courts."
Legal academics within the tradition of the first regime who were
critical of this tendency to limit the potential force of statutes
sometimes supplemented reliance on the literal meaning of language
with reliance on legislative intent as the mechanism for ensuring
judicial adherence to the will of the legislative author of statutory
text.1
The second regime, which may be identified with legal realism,
undertook a sustained attack on the first regime by rejecting the sup-
posed passivity of courts." The realists denied the authority of text
by demonstrating the indeterminacy of the meaning of language and
denied the authority of legislative intent by pronouncing it a fiction.
Judges on these premises are largely free from legislative will. 3
Indeed, in its most extreme versions, realism emphasized the primacy
of the interpreting court over the enacting legislature: judges created
the law of a statute; legislatures merely provided the occasion for
creation."
(1935). And given an emphasis upon the primacy of text, it is possible to treat ad-
vocates of the text as distinct from and opponents of advocates of author's meaning,
particularly when the latter emphasize author's intent. See THE AIMS OF INTERPRETA-
TION, supra note 3, at 20-27, 50-73.
10. See Spurious Interpretation, supra note 8; A Note on Statutory Interpreta-
tion, supra note 8.
11. See A Note on Statutory Interpretation, supra note 8, at 887.
12. The classic statement of the argument is J. FRANK. LAW AND THE MODERN
MIND 131-33, 200-09 (1970). See also Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Deci-
sion and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV.
395 (1950); Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863 (1930) [hereinafter cited
as Statutory Interpretation]. Radin, A Short Way With Statutes, 56 HARV. L. REV. 388 (1942).
13. Ironically, the realist strategy was itself incoherent in one important
respect: it sought to free the New Deal Congress from a Supreme Court which employed
the first regime in constitutional interpretation in overruling legislation and
simultaneously to advocate judicial recognition of and use of judicial freedom to make
law. See Kennedy, supra note 5, at 1757. Realism therefore found itself on the horns of
the standard dilemma of skepticism: if legal rules do not legitimate judicial action, is the
judiciary to abdicate power or use it freely? The skeptical argument itself provides no
criterion for this choice.
14. See Statutory Interpretation, supra note 12. The classic statement, much
approved by the realists, was Gray's: "[In truth, all the Law is judge-made law. The
shape in which a statute is imposed on the community as a guide for conduct is that
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 19, No. 2 [1985], Art. 1
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The third regime, perhaps best represented by the Legal Process
School,'5 sought to reconstruct in degree the first regime while
accommodating the insights of the realist attack. Although it
recognized the freedom of judges to choose between alternative
interpretations of a statute, the third regime nevertheless denied that
this freedom was unconstrained. The language of statutory text, while
not controlling, limited possible choices.'" Appropriate principles of
adjudication implicit in the judiciary as an institution were similarly
confining. 7 Moreover, in place of language, the third regime
substituted legislative purpose as the fundamental basis upon which
a modified judicial "agency" could be predicated. Judicial decision
according to purpose would at least in degree reestablish the impor-
tance of the author of statutory text even though "attribution" of pur-
pose was to be the judiciary's task." Indeed, the third regime may
be viewed as compromising" the view that the author of text has
primacy and the view that the interpreter of text has primacy by
treating author and interpreter as rough equals.'
There is at least some doubt that the third regime may be said
to enjoy current dominance. Indeed, we may have entered an era of
the fourth regime, the regime of chaos. It is perhaps true that there
is a "new legal process school"'" whose adherents seek to extend the
statute as interpeted by the courts. The courts put life into the dead words of the
statute." J. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 119-20 (1909).
15. See generally H. HART & A. SACKS. THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS
IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (Tent. ed. 1958).
16. See id. at 1218-26.
17. See generally HART & SACKS, supra note 15; A. BICKEL. THE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962); L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW, (Rev. ed. 1969); Wechsler,
Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959); Wellington,
supra note 4. Reconstructed realists might also be placed in this category. See Llewellyn,
supra note 12, at 400; W. TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT, 321-22
(1973) (Llewellyn's reliance on purpose in drafting the Uniform Commercial Code). It
should be noted that, while academics devoted to the legal process school often utilized
their theories to constrain judicial role by treating the question of the substantive
content of social policy as a question best left to other institutions of government,
judges very often use legal process concepts for "activist" ends. See Ackerman, supra
note 5, at 124.
18. See HART & SACKS, supra note 15, at 1413-16; FULLER, supra note 17, at 82-91.
19. See Kennedy, supra note 5, at 1764-65.
20. For example, Hart and Sacks insisted upon the continued viability of
legislative supremacy (by confining attribution of purpose to the words statutory
language can bear and by recommending judicial humility) and insisted upon the
independent responsibility of the judiciary to preserve legal principle by making assump-
tions of reasonableness and rationality about the legislature consistent with such prin-
ciple. See HART & SACKS supra note 15, at 1156-57, 1410-17. Legislative command was
therefore to be interpreted explicitly from the peculiar value premises of the judiciary.
21. See Weisberg, The Calabresian Judicial Artist: Statutes and The New Legal
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life of the third regime in the face of attacks by neo-realists. Such
diverse constraints on judicial freedom as interpretive community,'
dialogue,' statutory language,' moral principle,' and legal topography"
are currently invoked to distinguish law from "politics." But neo-realist
attacks on the third regime have been at least damaging.' And the
primary intellectual competition confronting neo-realists are systematic
theories" whose prescriptions for statutory interpretation and for law
in other contexts have more in common with the conceptualism of
the first regime"M than with the third regime's reliance on process
as a source of value.' For example, both devotees of moral philosophy
Process, 35 STAN. L. REv. 213, 240-49 (1983).
22. See generally Objectivity and Interpretation, supra note 3.
23. See generally Fiss, Forward: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1979).
24. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 109.
25. See generally Id.
26. See generally G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982).
27. By neo-realists, I mean both critical legal studies adherents and self-
proclaimed relativists or nihilists, despite the distinctions which divide them. See, e.g.,
Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative
Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063 (1981); Kennedy, supra note 5; Kennedy,
Legal Formality 2 J. LEG. STUD. 351 (1973); Levinson, supra note 3; Tushnet, Following
The Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV.
L. REV. 781 (1983). The term may also be taken to include, however, those scholars who, al-
though generally devoted to systematic theories for purposes of deriving policy recom-
mendations, employ skepticism in the context of interpretation to recommend judicial
restraint in the use of statutes. See Easterbrook, Legal Interpretation and the Power
of the Judiciary, 7 HARV. J. LAW & PUB. POLICY 87 (1984).
28. See generally B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1977).
Ackerman's distinction between the "scientific policymaker's" reliance upon an inter-
nally consistent comprehensive view and the "ordinary observor's" reliance upon com-
mon thought and speech (and therefore upon the primacy of the common law method
or the virtues of process) suggests the point made in the text. The "scientific
policymaker's" comprehensive view is incompatible with the third regime's reliance
upon the virtues of neutral process, particularly where those virtues are thought to
include the incrementalism of case by case common law method. It is nevertheless
possible to view some scientific policymakers, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, as advocates of
an evolved version of the third regime's insistence upon the neutrality of legal principle
if that insistence is itself viewed as mandating the internal consistency of principle.
See Weisberg, supra note 21, at 234.
29. See G. GILMORE. THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 107-08 (1977Y, G.E. WHITE. TORT
LAW IN AMERICA 211-43 (1980).
30. It is true that adherents of wealth maximization as a "comprehensive view"
often derive precepts of institutional competency from that view. See R. POSNER, supra
note 4, at 399407. Questions of institutional competency were at the heart of the third
regime. See HART & SACKS, supra note 15, at 662-69. L. FULLER, supra note 17, at 152-86.
And Judge Posner, at least, has advocated positions which suggest a willingness to
suspend wealth maximization in favor of deference to legislation. See Posner, supra
note 4, at 821-22. The substantive recommendations of economic analysis are, however,
derived from its comprehensive view rather than from a theory of adjudication, and
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 19, No. 2 [1985], Art. 1
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and devotees of economics rely upon "comprehensive views"3 indepen-
dent of legal process and statutory text both in prescribing substan-
tive resolutions of legal issues and in characterizing legislative and
judicial competencies. ' Interpretive strategies are then derived from
those characterizations. Interestingly, both practitioners of moral
philosophy and practitioners of economics, albeit for distinct and
inconsistent reasons, have recommended strategies which confine the
operational scope of legislation"-a position reminiscent of one of the
tendencies of the first regime.
If there is therefore no currently dominant interpretive regime
in legal academe, it has nevertheless been recently claimed that a
particular interpretive strategy has come to prevail in what is loosely
termed the Burger Court: the strategy of literalism., If so, the Court
has returned full circle to a version of the first regime and to the
contradictions of that regime: the text has primacy, but its force is
to be strictly limited to the language employed by the national
legislature."
There are a number of grounds upon which this claim might be
disputed. In the first place, it is at best unclear whether "Burger
Court" is an appropriate label. One ideological axis of the present
Supreme Court, the "conservative" axis generally disfavored in
academic circles, no doubt more often than not exhibits the supposed
sins of literalism. But the composition of that axis is notoriously
the institutional competencies recommendations of the analysis are derived from
arguments about the compatability of particular institutions with that view. The tenden-
cy of the third regime, by contrast, was argument from theories about institutional
competency to substantive recommendations.
31. See ACKERMAN, supra note 28, at 11.
32. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 4, at 399-418; DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 81-130.
33. See Easterbrook, supra note 4; DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 109-10. But see
Posner, supra note 4, at 821-22.
34. See Moore, The Semantics of Judging, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 151, 281 (1981);
Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory Interpretation in the
Supreme Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 892 (1982). Cf. Fiss, supra note 23, at 4-5, 46-50 (Burger
Court's assault on structural reform by invoking new formalism); Luneburg, Justice
Rehnquist, Statutory Interpretation, The Policies of Clear Statement, and Federal Jurisdic-
tion, 58 IND. L.J. 211 (1982) (characterizing the approach as an insistence upon clear con-
gressional statement and a refusal otherwise to make law). Nowak, Resurrecting Realist
Jurisprudence: The Political Bias of Burger Court Justices, 17 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 549
(1983) (arguing that Burger Court methodology resembles mechanical jurisprudence
methodology because its political values resemble the values of the Court in the late
19th and early 20th centuries).
35. See, e.g., Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630
(1981); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); F.C.C. v. Midwest Video Corp.,
440 U.S. 689 (1979); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
19851
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unstable.' The maximum descriptive content of the phrase "Burger
Court" must therefore be limited to some of the justices of the recent
Supreme Court some of the time. In the second place, individual
justices within one or another of the ideological axes of the Supreme
Court are and have been capable of adopting literalism in different
cases at different times.37 One is tempted to suggest that the inter-
pretive strategy which will be employed in any particular case by
any particular justice is that which best fits a particular desired result.
A less cynical and perhaps more accurate suggestion is that there
is currently no authoritative theory of statutory interpretation against
which the performance either of the Court or of individual justices
might be measured.38 It is therefore presumptuous to criticize any
justice or group of justices either for inconsistency or for heretical
methodology.
The purpose of this article is nevertheless not to challenge the
claim that the Burger Court has in at least the sense of a general
direction adopted a version of literalism as interpretive strategy. That
claim is for present purposes assumed. The purposes of the article
are instead to explore the reasons which might justify such a strategy
and, therefore, to state an argument in partial defense of it. The article
will proceed in four parts.
First, the Burger Court's methodology will be examined in an
effort to identify the sense or senses in which it is labeled literalism
and to identify the values it serves. Second, critical responses to
literalism from the perspectives of the second and third regimes will
be explored and attacked from the value premises identified as
underlying the Burger Court's version of literalism. Finally, the con-
temporary debate among literary and legal theorists over the notion
that reader perspective governs the interpretive enterprise will be
examined in an effort to defend the Burger Court's methodology (or,
36. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982);
Northwest Airlines v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77 (1981); Cannon v. Univers-
ity of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979); T.V.A. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
37. Compare e.g., United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (Brennan,
J. delivering opinion for the Court) (spirit or purpose of legislation controlling); Inter-
national Bhd. Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979) (Powell, J. delivering opinion
for the Court) (purpose controlling) with, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co.,
424 U.S. 747 (1976) (Brennan, J. delivering opinion for the Court) (language and struc-
ture of legislation controlling); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (Powell,
J. delivering opinion for the Court) (language and structure of legislation controlling).
See Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court
Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 215 (1983).
38. See, e.g., DICKERSON, supra note 7, at 1-6; HART & SACKS. supra note 15, at
1201; Wald, supra note 37, at 215-16.
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at least, an interpretation of that methodology) against the claim that
it constitutes a mere means of enforcing a controversial substantive
political perspective.
I. THE BURGER COURT'S INTERPRETIVE STRATEGY
A. In What Sense Literalism?
The most incriminating item of evidence supporting a literalism
characterization of the Burger Court's interpretive strategy is T.V.A.
v. Hill.9 That case involved the question of the application of the
Endangered Species Act40 to a federal project threatening an
endangered species of fish. Two portions of the majority opinion in
Hill are instructive. The first invokes the "plain meaning" rule to
interpret the statute:
This language admits of no exception. Nonetheless, peti-
tioner urges, as do the dissenters, that the Act cannot
reasonably be interpreted as applying to a federal project
which was well under way when Congress passed . . . the
Act. . . .To sustain that position, however, we would be
forced to ignore the ordinary meaning of plain language.41
The second portion of the majority opinion in Hill responds to Justice
Powell's dissent, which had invoked third regime arguments concern-
ing the independent responsibility of courts to reconcile legislation
with reasonableness:
[I]n our constitutional system the commitment to the separa-
tion of powers is too fundamental for us to pre-empt con-
gressional action by judicially decreeing what accords with
'common sense and the public weal.' Our Constitution vests
such responsibilities in the political branches."
One would be hard pressed to find a clearer statement than the
first of these excerpts of literalist methodology understood as reliance
both on the possibility of plain meaning and on plain meaning as itself
establishing the application of statutory language to the facts of a
case. And one would be equally hard pressed to find a clearer state-
ment than the second of these excerpts of the rationale underlying
39. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
40. Pub. L. 93-205, S 7. 87 Stat. 892 (Dec. 28, 1973). The Act was subsequently
amended to relax the requirements imposed by the Court's interpretation in Hill. See
16 U.S.C. S 1536 (1982).
41. 437 U.S. at 173.
42. Id. at 195.
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literalist philosophy. Both excerpts taken together suggest the
characterization of the Burger Court apparently intended by a
literalism label: the Court views itself as a reader of statutes with
an obligation to rigidly enforce them as written; creativity-even
creativity understood as the conscious consideration of principles and
policies underlying or competing with a statute-is a function for the
legislative author of statutes. The question posed here is whether the
Burger Court's rhetoric ought itself to be taken literally.
Despite the Burger Court's repeated invocation of plain meaning,'
there are reasons to question a characterization of its methodology
which attributes to it a naive reliance upon the authority of language.
First, any judicial statement that the plain meaning of language con-
trols decision in a case must itself be interpreted as a statement made
within the context of a legal culture which is and which has been
for some time critical of the authority of language.
It is true that there remains room within the legal culture for
quite distinct degrees of skepticism. Respectable opinion within that
culture argues that language, the meaning of which is largely sup-
plied by convention," has standard instances of application and nonap-
plication so that skepticism should be limited to recognizing that
application outside the area of standard instances is not controlled
43. See, e.g., American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 75 (1982); Rubin
v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1981); Aaron v. Securities Exchange Commis-
sion, 446 U.S. 680, 690 (1980); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580-87 (1981);
Jefferson Co. Pharmaceutical Ass'n., Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, 103 S. Ct. 1011, 1015-16
(1983). But see, e.g., Bob Jones University v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017, 2025-26
(1983); Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 266 (1981).
44. There is a continuing debate on the question whether meaning is a func-
tion of convention in the use of language or a function of speaker's intention (Alice's
debate with Humpty Dumpty in "Through the Looking Glass"). Compare, e.g., Grice,
Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning and Word Meaning, in 4 FOUNDATIONS OF
LANGUAGE 225 (1968) (intention) with J. SEARLE, EXPRESSION AND MEANING, STUDIES IN
THE THEORY OF SPEECH ACTS 117-136 (1979) (there is such a thing as literal sentence mean-
ing distinct from speakers utterance meaning and this literal meaning is a matter
of convention, but literal meaning is context dependent); Id. at 1-29 (Wittgenstein was
wrong in suggesting that there is a limitless number of uses of language; there are
a limited number of uses). The debate in legal discourse has often taken the form
of objective versus subjective theories of interpretation of statutes, contracts and wills.
See Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417, 419 (1899): "We
do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means." The
issues are reflected as well in the Hart-Fuller debate. See Hart, Positivism and the
Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958) (viewing convention as par-
tially controlling) Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law A Reply to Professor Hart,
71 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1958) (viewing purpose as controlling).
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by language." There is also respectable opinion which claims that there
are no guaranteed standard instances of the application of language
to facts sufficient to permit deduction from statutory language; the
link between the language of a statute and the facts of a case which
permits application of law to facts is necessarily created by the judge."
Between these views lies respectable opinion which suggests either
that statutory language establishes broad limits to its possible
application and that application within these limits is a matter
requiring judicial choice47 or that language augmented by judicial iden-
tification of the context and purpose of its use determines application."
None of these views denies the force of the ordinary meaning of
statutory language in judicial decision, but all are in degree skeptical
of the capacity of language to determine its own application to facts
in at least some "hard cases."49
If this is an accurate portrayal of the range of respectable opinion
within current legal culture, it is at least doubtful that Burger Court
45. See H.L.A. HART. THE CONCEPT OF LAW, 124 (1978); Hart, supra note 44;
Williams, Language and the Law, 61 L.Q. REV. 179, 181-85 (1945). But see, Hart, Problems
of Philosophy of Law, 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL., 264, 271 (P. Edwards ed. 1967). Despite
their differences on the question of how legal principles are or ought to be derived,
Professor Dworkin's view of the limits statutory language imposes on judicial decision
has some similarity to H.L.A. Hart's view that some factual instances are clearly within
or without the core of meaning of the words used in the statute. In Dworkin's view,
the "cannonical terms" of the statute place limits on its scope. DWORKIN, supra note 4,
at 109. Moreover, Dworkin apparently thinks that, although a judge must identify the
political theory which best fits statutory language in determining what rights the
legislature created, id. at 109, 111 n. 1, there will in some cases be only one such theory
permitted by that language. See Civil Rights Act, supra note 4, at 41.
46. Moore, The Semantics of Judging, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 151 (1981). Moore's
analysis of language is at once more radical and less radical than the arguments of
the legal realists. Realists thought at least some cases controlled by statutory language.
See Statutory Interpretation, supra note 12, at 879. Moore argues that there are no
"easy cases," Moore, supra at 271-91, in part because no word "has a set of conditions
that are necessary and sufficient for its correct application." Id. at 272. At the same
time, Moore rejects the occasional realist claim that words have no objective meaning
and that meaning is therefore solely a matter of context; for Moore, convention sup-
plies at least a range of possible meaning. Id. at 275-77. For examples of such a realist
claim, see Cohen, Field Theory and Judicial Logic, 59 YALE L.J. 238, 240-41 (1950);
Fuller, supra note 44. Moore's argument therefore relies less on the proposition that
language lacks objective meaning or that the defects of language (e.g., ambiguity or
vagueness) preclude such meaning than upon the incapacity of language to determine
its application to a set of real world facts.
47. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 81; HART & SACKS, supra note 15, at 1412;
Statutory Interpretation, supra note 12, at 879. See also supra note 45.
48. See, e.g., DICKERSON, supra note 7, at 54-56; HART & SACKS, supra note. 15, at
1410-17; J.W. HURST, DEALING WITH STATUTES, 31-66 (1982); Fuller, supra note 44.
49. See supra notes 45-46.
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literalism may be accurately characterized as the heresy of "mechanical
jurisprudence;"' such a characterization would place the justices at
the fringes of that culture. Given that the justices are products of
and practitioners within the legal culture, their occasional reliance on
plain meaning can at most be interpreted to itself mean that they
are less skeptical of the authority of language than some of their fellow
skeptics some of the time. The rhetoric of literalism remains a
legitimate mode of argument which will be heard, understood and not
be taken literally within a legal culture unsure of the degree of its
language skepticism. It is a particularly appropriate mode of argu-
ment for judges who, although they may be skeptics outside the con-
text of particular cases, think the correspondence between the par-
ticular facts before them and the particular statutory language before
them an easy question.51
The second reason to doubt that a naive literalism characterizes
Burger Court methodology is derived from attacks on such literalism.
One such line of attack-the language skepticism surveyed above-
denies at least in degree the capacity of statutory language to identify
the facts to which it applies; a judicial decision that particular facts
fall within or without some statutory command is therefore at least
often an act of judicial creativity dependent upon the judge's values
rather than the mechanical application of the statute's "plain
meaning."52 The skeptical line of attack does not deny that statutory
50. The phrase is of course Dean Pound's. Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence,
8 COLUM. L. REV. 605 (1908). Pound was himself later attacked for his own brand of
literalism. FRANK. supra note 12, at 151, 221-31; Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-
The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 435 (1930).
51. One difficulty with criticism of literalism is that it is typically two-pronged.
The first prong attacks literalism descriptively by claiming that language cannot in
fact control decision. The second prong attacks literalism normatively by arguing that
literalism produces immoral, unreasonable or absurd results. To the extent that the
critic concedes the possibility of hard and easy cases-easy in the sense that language
clearly contemplates the easy case and that decision according to statutory language
produces no absurd or immoral results in such a case-he is subject to the rebuttal
that the case decided on a plain meaning rationale was easy in both senses for the
judge who decided it. Moreover, the rebuttal is consistent with that version of skep-
ticism which emphasizes the primacy of reader over both text and author: easy and
hard cases are in the eye of the beholder (or, at least in the eye of the shared perspec-
tive the reader brings to the text). In this debate, the critic adopting skeptical premises
is at a distinct disadvantage. His relativism makes his claims about appropriate classifica-
tion within the hard and easy case structure suspect and it is the judge, after all,
who possesses power to direct the violence of the state. Cf. Levinson, supra note 3,
at 396-402 (treating Professor Fiss' attack on Justice Rehnquist as necessarily political).
52. See supra text accompanying note 46.
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language may have an objective meaning or range of meaning sup-
plied by practice or convention apart from its application to particular
facts;' it denies only that statutory language itself can determine
whether particular facts are identified by that language.' However,
a second line of skeptical attack on literalism does deny the possibility
of objective meaning apart from application. By the terms of this
second argument, meaning is determined by the perspective of the
interpreter of meaning: statutory meaning is interpreter's meaning
and interpreter's meaning is a function of the interpreter's context
or ideology or world view.5
The distinctions between these lines of attack are that the first
tends to distinguish between the possibility of objective meaning in
the abstract and the possibility of objective meaning within a situa-
tion and argues that judicial creativity is a necessary aspect of the
latter;' the second tends to collapse abstract and situational meaning"'
and argues that plain meaning is necessarily in the eye of the reader
53. See Moore, supra note 34, at 181-202. Moore argues that such features of
language as ambiguity and vagueness make questionable the possibility that there are
necessary and sufficient conditions governing the correct application of statutory words.
He may therefore be thought to question the possibility of objective meaning, even though
he concedes that such matters as linguistic context can alleviate ambiguity. Id. at 272.
But Moore appears to concede the possibility of an objective meaning in the highly limited
sense of paradigm items believed by a linguistic community to be within the meaning of
a word. Id. at 287-92. Moore's primary concern is therefore a matter of application within
the context of a case.
54. See generally Moore, supra note 34. Cf. Statutory Interpretation, supra note
12, at 879-81. (The Judge must make a choice as to what facts fall within and without
the statute within a wide range of discretion).
55. See, e.g., Statutory Interpretation and Literary Theory, supra note 1; Brest,
supra note 27; Brest, supra note 3; Levinson, supra note 3. It is of course apparent that
this view was in degree the view of the legal realists. See, e.g., FRANK, supra note 12, at
62-74; Statutory Interpretation, supra note 12, at 881. Its present popularity with legal
academics is attributable, however, to their borrowing from certain and controversial
literary theorists and philosophers. See FISH, supra note 3; H. GADAMER, PHILOSOPHICAL
HERMENEUTICS (D. Linge, ed. & tr., 1976).
56. See DICKERSON, supra note 7, at 13-33, 238. (distinguishing between ascer-
tainment of meaning as a "cognitive function" highly dependent upon context and
application of a statute "whose revealed meaning fails to dispose of the case at hand"
as a creative function). Cf., THE AIMs OF INTERPRETATION. supra note 3, at 2-3, 4849, 85-92
(distinguishing meaning and significance); Moore, supra note 34, at 276, 292-93 (words
have conventional meanings independent of speaker's intention, but Judge must always
create in determining which factual pattern falls within words of a statute).
57. See H. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 275 (1975); Cohen, supra note 46, at
240-41. Cf. Jones, The Plain Meaning Rule and Extrinsic Aids In The Interpretation
of Federal Statutes, 25 WASH. U.L.Q. 2, 8-9 (1939) (interpretation of statute cannot be
separated from the facts of the case); Llewellyn, supra note 12, at 397-99 (court responds
to words of statute in part on basis of its sense of the situation and the case); Nutting,
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because the reader is predisposed by his perspective to see a par-
ticular meaning.,' The first line of attack therefore views the reader's
perspective as a crucial element of application of statutory language
to the facts of a particular case. The second line of attack views reader
perspective as controlling both the reader's perception of the mean-
ing of statutory language and the reader's perception of the
significance of that meaning in the context of a particular case. Both
nevertheless share a common theme: statutory interpretation cannot
be controlled by the objective meaning of statutory language because
it is in degree controlled instead by the value system of the judge.
Given this common theme as a premise, Burger Court use of the
plain meaning rule does not betray a belief that meaning somehow
resides in language. It betrays instead mere agreement, at least
between five of nine justices, about the meaning of particular statutory
language in the circumstances of a particular case. 9 Upon the assump-
tions that language is incapable of controlling decision and that the
perceived meaning of a statute is, at least in the circumstances of
a particular case, a function of reader perspective, judicial perception
of meaning as "plain" is merely agreement about a meaning. The
relevant question for a critic of literalism is, on such assumptions,
the identification of the judicial perspective within which agreement
The Ambiguity of Unambiguous Statutes, 24 MINN. L. REV. 509 (1940) [hereinafter cited as
The Ambiguity of Unambiguous Statutes] (rejecting distinction between interpretation and
application); Nutting, The Relevance of Legislative Intention Established By Extrinsic
Evidence, 20 B. U.L. REV. 601,610 n.41 (1940) [hereinafter cited as The Relevance ofLegislative
Intention] (same). Contrast Fuller's contextualism, which appears to have placed more em-
phasis upon the legislative context (purpose) and linguistic context of the text (structure)
than. upon the reader's context (the case). Fuller, supra note 44, at 669.
58. See, e.g., Statutory Interpretation and Literary Theory, supra note 1, at 686;
FISH, supra note 3, at 318. Cf. T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed.
1970) (accepted paradigms as structuring scientific thought); J. ROYCE, THE PROBLEM OF
CHRISTIANITY, 273-362 (1967) (relying on Charles Pierce) (communities of interpretation).
Both Fish and Abraham, relying on Fish and Royce, refer to reader perspective as an
"interpretive community." They believe that such a notion, although it eliminates the
authority of the text, precludes idiosyncratic judicial decision because there cannot be
idiosyncratic perspective in a judge "embedded" in such a community. Unfortunately, the
efficacy of this limitation is a matter of one's understanding of the breadth of idiosyn-
cratic perspective. See My Reply to Stanley Fish, supra note 3, at 295; infra, text ac-
companying notes 318-34.
59. See Llewellyn, supra note 12, at 396-97. Cf. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT
OF LAW, 134-35 (1961) (arguing that people treat law from an "internal point of view" as
an authoritative standard of behavior); Moore, supra note 34, at 233 (from judge's in-
ternal point of view a legal rule is described as "true"). But cf. My Reply to Stanley
Fish, supra note 3, at 298-303 (rejecting internal point of view/external point of view
dichotomy on the theory that skeptical argument about law remains a legal argument).
60. See Three Fallacies of Interpretation, supra note 1, at 777.
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concerning meaning could be reached. It is that perspective, on these
same assumptions, which is the real target of the criticism. In short,
if perceived meaning is even partly a matter of the perspective
brought by the judge to the tasks of interpretation and application,
there cannot be a naive lit ralism. There can only be a complex value
structure which enables a justice to adopt literalism as a mode of
argument."
The third reason to question a literalism characterization is that
the Burger Court, even the Burger Court as that label has been here
narrowly defined, does not in fact rely invariably on the plain mean-
ing of statutory language. It relies, rather, on the usual variety of
tools in the judicial arsenal -legislative intent, 2 legislative purpose, 3
rules of clear statement,6 canons of statutory construction, 5 its con-
stitutional veto over legislation" - as well as the plain meaning of
language. 7 If a literalism characterization of Burger Court
methodology, even the self-proclaimed characterization evident in
T.V.A. v. Hill, purports to accurately describe an even relatively con-
sistent judicial behavior, it must accommodate the apparent capacity
of the particular behavior described by that characterization to be
implemented by a variety of devices. It is submitted that the literalism
characterization cannot accommodate that capacity unless the
characterization is understood not as a reference to a particular
device-the plain meaning of language-but as a reference to the
underlying normative position of the Burger Court on the question
of the proper relationship between courts as readers of statutes,
legislatures as authors of statutes and text as the physical embodi-
ment of statutes.
61. See Statutory Interpretation and Literary Theory, supra note 1, at 685-86. But
see infra text accompanying notes 284-413.
62. See, e.g., Potomac Electric Co. v. Director, Office of Workers Compensa-
tion Programs, 449 U.S. 268 (1980); Andrus v. Shell Oil Co., 446 U.S. 657 (1980); Univer-
sity Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 782-84 (1981).
63. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979);
Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582 (1973).
64. See, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. Illinois and Michigan, 451 U.S. 304 (1981);
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
65. See, e.g., Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 102 S. Ct. 1883, 1890 (1982);
Texas Industries v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981).
66. See N.L.R.B. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979). But see
Edward J. De Bartolo Corp. v. N.L.R.B. 103 S. Ct. 2926 (1983).
67. See, e.g., Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807 (1980); Aaron v. S.E.C.,
446 U.S. 680 (1980); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); T.V.A. v. Hill,
437 U.S. 153 (1978).
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It is important that this claim not be misunderstood. It is not
a claim that concepts as distinct as intent, language and clear state-
ment rule are consciously manipulated by the Burger Court to reach
predetermined substantive results."8 Nor is it a claim that each such
concept is value neutral and therefore available in any particular case
as a means of articulating whatever view a judge might entertain
about the proper relationship between courts, legislatures and texts.
Indeed, each such concept is identifiable, in degree, with quite distinct
views about that relationship. A rule of clear statement is by defini-
tion a device for ensuring the conditional primacy of reader over
author and text where the judiciary's independent view of the impor-
tance of some legal principle or policy is threatened by a statute.69
Legislative intent understood as the immediate legislative objective
of a statute is in degree conducive to an interpretive perspective which
emphasizes author's meaning; legislative purpose, understood as
ultimate legislative objective, is in degree conducive to an interpretive
perspective which emphasizes reader's meaning."0
The claim made here is, rather, that no tool in the judicial arsenal
is so well constructed as to capture the complexity of the underlying
normative position a court takes on the question of proper relation-
ship. One such tool will seem to that court to fit best that underlying
position in the circumstances of one case and another tool will seem
to fit best in the circumstances of another case.71 The claim is therefore
in a limited sense a version of the view that statutory meaning is
best understood as reader's meaning: the concepts employed in par-
ticular cases to describe meaning, even concepts which purport to
68. The possibility of conscious manipulation is not denied here. It is merely
assumed away for present purposes, in part because it cannot be either proved or
disproved absent judicial confession, but also in part because the possibility is largely
irrelevant. The possibility is largely irrelevant because, even if it is assumed that
a conscious result-orientation governed resolution of a particular case, the Supreme
Court opinion explaining the result in that case must employ modes of argument
acceptable within the legal culture. And it is the mode of argument selected to explain
the result which will be confronted and used by the lower courts in subsequent cases.
69. See, e.g., HART & SACKS, supra note 15, at 1412-13; Bickel & Wellington,
Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REV.
1 (1957); Wellington, supra note 4, at 262-64; Wellington & Albert, Statutory Inter-
pretation and the Political Process: A Comment on Sinclair v. Atkinson, 72 YALE L.J.
1547 (1963).
70. See infra text accompanying notes 235-81.
71. Cf. Civil Rights Act, supra note 4 (best fitting political theory in inter-
preting a statute); Law As Interpretation, supra note 3, at 543-46 (best fitting inter-
pretation depends, in hard cases, on judge's political theory); Dworkin, The Forum
of Principle, 56 N.Y.U.L. REV. 469, 476-82 (1981) [hereinafter cited as the Forum of Princi-
plel (choice of which sense of author's intention is best depends on judge's political theory).
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describe author's meaning or literal meaning, are chosen as best fitting
expressions of the underlying normative premises of the reader and
these normative premises are sufficiently independent of the logic of
the concepts themselves to often permit a choice of concepts. The
plain meaning rule provides the most flexible example. That rule may
be characterized as precluding resort to reader preferences when used,
as in Hill,72 as a reason for rejecting a proposed limitation on the
reach of a statute and may be characterized as enforcing reader
preferences inconsistent with the principle or policy underlying the
statute7 3 when used as a reason for refusing to extend the reach of
a statute.74
However, this is not to suggest acceptance of the argument that
statutory meaning is either descriptively or normatively best
understood as reader's meaning. It suggests only acceptance of the
notion that legislatures as authors are at the mercy of courts as
readers75 and, therefore, that a court's normative perspective on the
question of the relationship between author, reader and text will con-
trol the theories of statutory meaning employed by that court. A
court's normative perspective controls its choice of interpretive
strategy and the varied concepts it may employ in service of that
strategy, but the strategy chosen might well be that of seeking,
whether or not it is descriptively possible to seek, author's meaning. 6
On these premises, the Burger Court's literalism is best
understood not as its general reliance on the plain meaning of
statutory language, but as its underlying view of itself as a reader
and of Congress as an author; reliance on plain meaning is but a
manifestation of that underlying view. The question raised by such
an understanding is the content of that view.
B. The Content of the Burger Court's Underlying Normative View
The Burger Court's formal statements of its interpretive strategy
may be summarized as composed of four propositions: (1) the Court's
72. 437 U.S. at 195.
73. See Johnson v. United States, 163 F. 30, 32 (1st Cir. 1908).
74. See, e.g., Texas Industries Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630
(1981); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618 (1978). The flexibility of canons
of construction is classically demonstrated in Llewelyn, supra note 12.
75. See HART & SACKS, supra note 15, at 1411.
76. It is possible to characterize this position as in fact full acceptance of
the descriptive claim that interpretive communities govern meaning. See Statutory In-
terpretation and Literary Theory, supra note 1, at 685-86. Whether this is the case depends
upon which of several possible versions of the interpretive community claim one accepts.
See infra text accompanying notes 318-34.
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responsibility is to enforce the intent of Congress;77 (2) the intent of
Congress is to be discovered from the words of the statute understood
in the lingustic context of the statute read as a whole and as they
would be understood by the "normal speaker" of the English language
unless extrinsic evidence clearly indicates a contrary intent;78 (3)
although the purposes of the statute understood as the ultimate
objectives of the statute or the effects intended by Congress, may
aid in its interpretation, purpose may not be used to vary the mean-
ing disclosed by an analysis of the language of the statute;"9 and (4)
the Court should employ clear statement rules-requiring a clear and
express Congressional decision-to narrowly construe statutory
language where a broader interpretation would supplant state law"
and where the Court is asked to supplement federal statutes by
creating interstitial federal common law."1
The first two of these propositions are boilerplate judicial
homilies which may be found in one form or another in opinions writ-
ten both by justices sharing the Burger Court's normative view and
justices opposed to that view.82 What distinguishes the Burger Court
77. See, e.g., Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 986, 994 (1983);
Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 378 (1982); Chapman
v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U.S. 600, 608 (1979).
78. See, e.g., North Dakota v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 1095, 1102-03 (1983);
American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68-69 (1982); Consumer Product Safety
Comm'n. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. 447 U.S. 102, 108-10 (1980); Perrin v. United States,
444 U.S. 37, 42-45 (1979). As it is used here, "linquistic context" means the language
context within which particular words or phrases appear. Thus, although a particular
word way have an infinite set of possible conventional meanings in isolation, that set is
reduced when the word is considered in the context of the sentence, paragraph or entire
text in which it appears.
79. See, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. Illinois and Michigan, 451 U.S. 304 (1981);
Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Cenance, 452 U.S. 155, 158-59 (1981); United States R.R. Retire-
ment Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S.
193, 216-19 (1979) (Burger, C.J. dissenting); Id. at 228-30 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting); Ernst
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 198-201 (1976).
80. See, e.g., Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1,
16 (1981); Employees of Dept. of Public Health & Welfare v. Dept. of Public Health
& Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973); New York Department of Social Services v. Dublino,
413 U.S. 405, 413-14 (1973).
81. See, e.g., Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353,
395409 (1982) (Powell, J. dissenting); City of Milwaukee v. Illinois and Michigan, 451
U.S. 304, (1981); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of America, 451
U.S. 77, (1981); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 730-49 (1979) (Powell,
J. dissenting).
82. See, e.g., Complete Auto Transit v. Reis, 451 U.S. 401 (1981); Mohasco Corp.
v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807 (1980).
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is that it appears to take seriously the identification of congressional
intent with statutory language' and is therefore more reluctant to
inquire beyond the meaning supplied by reference to the conventions
of ordinary usage than was typical of the Warren Court era." That
distinction is made more apparent in the third and fourth proposi-
tions. The Burger Court, in sharp contrast to its predecessor, declines
to attribute general purposes to statutes and to then reason from such
purposes when asked to make law interstitially; it relies instead upon
its sense of or intuitions about the ordinary or plain meaning of
statutory language even though its sense or intuition may be
influenced as much by its understanding of the historical context of
enactment as by its understanding of language conventions.85
There is an apparent contradiction in this description between
the Court's literalism when it is asked, as in T. V.A. v. Hill,"6 to create
exceptions to apparent meaning to avoid "absurd" results and the
Court's use of clear statement rules to require express statements
of Congressional intent to alter the status quo in cases in which the
Court is asked to create interstitial federal common law.8" That con-
tradiction may be reconciled by reference to underlying normative
83. See, e.g., Aaron v. S.E.C., 446 U.S. 680 (1980); Mohasco Corp. v. Silver,
447 U.S. 807 (1980).
84. Compare Potomac Electric Power Co. v. Director, Office Workers Com-
pensation Programs, 449 U.S. 268 (1980) with Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc.,
398 U.S. 375 (1970).
85. Compare Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970); J.I.
Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S.
448 (1957) with Mobile Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618 (1978); Touche Ross
& Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979). It is of course the standard wisdom that Erie
R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) does not eliminate the possibility of federal
common law. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943). The question,
nonetheless, is the scope of federal common law, interstitial of otherwise. See Merrill,
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 395409 (1982) (Powell, J. dissen-
ting); City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 311-13 (1981).
By "ordinary meaning" I do not mean that the Court engages in a sophisticated
effort to parse ordinary language in the manner of the ordinary language philosophers.
See J.L. AUSTIN. SENSE AND SENSIBILIA (1962); J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS
(1962). The Court is a participant in communication, not an observor. I mean instead that
the Court believes that there is an ordinary meaning supplied by convention even though
it may at least intuitively recognize that a legislature may engage in a number of distinct
"speech acts" in enacting a statute and therefore that convention may be complex.
Ironically, reliance on supposed convention is in some tension with the Court's insistence
that it must follow the intent of Congress, for an intention theory of meaning sug-
gests that convention is not controlling. The Court purports to resolve that tension
by suggesting in effect that convention as modified or identified by the context of
enactment is good evidence of intention.
86. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
87. See, e.g., Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S.
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view. As the Burger Court perceives it, the Court's role is to enforce
the congressional balance or political compromise reflected by a statute
and to require clear congressional decision where an issue appears
unresolved by that compromise or where fundamental questions appear
not to have been considered by Congress in formulating a
compromise.' The Burger Court's tendency to employ clear statement
rules is consistent with the view of those theorists who advocate
"judicial activism" to preserve legal principle from legislative encroach-
ment absent a clear legislative decision to abrogate principle. But the
Burger Court adopts that view in support of "fundamental values"
or "principles" which tend to restrict federal judicial authority.
These points may be made more concrete by examining the
excerpts from the majority opinion in T.V.A. v. Hill quoted above.
These excerpts reject the notion, common to anti-literalist theories,
that courts should avoid an application of a statute which would pro-
duce absurd, unreasonable or unjust results. 9 Such theories typically
proceed from either of two arguments: either the legislature could
not have intended absurd, unreasonable or unjust results" or courts
have both the authority and the duty to maintain the integrity of
law independent of their obligation to respect legislative supremacy."
These arguments contain a series of implicit judgments about the
proper relationship between reader, author and text which inform
characterization of the underlying normative view implicit in the
Burger Court's rejection, in some cases, of these arguments.
One common feature of both arguments is that they implicitly
assume that the statutory text can and does convey a meaning distinct
from the meaning judicially desired. Neither argument is therefore
wholly skeptical about the authority of the text;" it would otherwise
77 (1981); Sante Fe Industries v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
88. See Lundeburg, supra note 34, at 269.
89. See, e.g., Fuller, supra note 44, at 663; HART & SACKS, supra note 15, at
106-10; Moore, supra note 34, at 277-81. The literalist view is defended in, e.g., Spurious
Interpretation, supra note 8; Kelsen, supra note 9, at 527.
90. See, e.g., Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892);
United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.)482 (1868); Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506 (1889).
Cf. Fuller, supra note 44, at 661-69 (relying on purposive interpretation).
91. See, e.g., HART &SACKS. supra note 15, at 101; Moore, supra note 34, at
277-81. Cf., R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 480 (1959) (absurd results to be avoided by indepen-
dent application of judge-made remedies after statute is literally interpreted).
92. Although such an argument may be framed as a language skepticism argu-
ment, it must at least implicitly concede that an ascertainable meaning is communicated
by the text (or that some authorial intention is expressed by text); it is the "significance"
or reach of that meaning which is in dispute. Cf. THE AIMS OF INTERPRETATION, supra,
note 3, at 49 (distinguishing meaning and significance). Assume, for example, the pro-
blem of determining whether the "rule" of the opinion in case 1 is to be applied to
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be unnecessary to provide a justification for rejecting the meaning
thought to be conveyed by the text.93 The postulated anti-literalist
arguments and the Burger Court's literalist argument therefore pro-
ceed from an at least similar premise-the text conveys an ascer-
tainable meaning which could be applied in a case in which absurd,
the facts of case 2. Application is dependent upon whether the inevitable differences
between the facts of case 1 and the facts of case 2 are thought to be important. Cohen,
The Ethical Basis of Legal Criticism, 41 YALE L.J. 201, 215-19 (1931). What is an impor-
tant difference is a matter of choice-perhaps of moral choice. Id. But if importance
is a matter of moral choice, that choice presupposes an understanding of the "moral"
meaning of the "rule" of case 1 and of the moral implications of that rule in the cir-
cumstances of case 2.
93. It is perhaps possible to distinguish a case in which the problem is thought
to be that of the absurd or unjust result-which problem presupposes an ascertained
meaning-and a case in which the judge is simply unsure whether the facts before
him are within the statute's meaning and therefore grasps for the dictionary or for
legislative purpose. Compare Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S.
457 (1892) (The problem of absurd result) with Interstate Commerce Commission v.
Kroblin, 113 F. Supp. 599 (ND. Iowa 1953) af'd. 212 F.2d 555 (8th Cir. 1954) (the problem
of ascertaining meaning of words used in a statute).
It is however also possible to view these cases as presenting the same problem:
in both cases, a choice must be made between possible meanings as a first step and
a choice must be made about absurdity of result under a chosen meaning as a second
step. The opinion in the case decided in terms of absurd result does not expressly
focus on the question of the meaning of words because first step choice is unconscious
or automatic (e.g., because the judge comes to the words of the statute with a precon-
ceived notion of meaning he attaches to the words of the statute). The opinion in the
case decided in terms of ascertaining the meaning of the words of the statute focuses
on the question of meaning because the judge does not come to those words with
a preconceived notion of meaning and must therefore confront a choice of meaning
directly and because, in the process of excluding some possible meanings, he is likely
to consciously or unconsciously take into account his preconceived notions about
absurdity or injustice. Cf., Fuller, supra note 44, at 663 (obvious linguistic answer does
not mean that the judge did not ask a question about statutory purpose); Moore, supra
note 34, at 279 (there may be easy cases in the sense that there are cases both
linguistically and morally easy, but the judge must ask a normative question in every
case to determine whether it is easy).
The cases are however different in precisely this important sense: that the
judge perceives the dilemma confronting him as a different dilemma in the linguistically
difficult and morally difficult cases. In the morally difficult case, the judge may either
conclude that an absurd or immoral result is a price which must be paid for achieving
the general justness of statutory rules predictably applied or conclude that an excep-
tion to the statutory rule is necessary to avoid an unjust result. Either decision pro-
ceeds from the judge's perception that he understands the statute's meaning. The
linguistically difficult case is different because the judge does not perceive that he
understands the statute's meaning. The dilemmas perceived by the judge are distinct
whether or not the problems presented are distinct, and it is this difference in the
judge's perception which permits him to speak intelligibly of the vagueness or ambiguity
of language in the linguistically difficult case and of absurd results and the appropriate
roles of the judge and legislature in the morally difficult case.
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unreasonable and unjust results might follow; application is therefore
a matter of judicial choice. Although the Burger Court occasionally
denies that it has such a choice, it in fact always has the choice; it
merely exercises the choice more often than not in favor of dis-
regarding the consequences of literal application." But that implicit
decision, like its alternative, merely makes the point made above-
the decision is made on the basis of some underlying normative theory
about proper relationship and literalism is best understood as one such
underlying theory.95
94. See, e.g., United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980);
Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. G.T.E. Sylvania Inc., 447 U.S. 102 (1980); Mobil Oil
Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618 (1978); T.V.A. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). But see,
e.g., Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris, 103 S. Ct. 1236, 1248 (1983) (Powell, J. con-
curring and dissenting); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979).
As Professor Moore points out, the Holy Trinity "escape hatch" must always
be confronted so long as its doctrine remains an option. Moore, supra note 34, at 280
n.281. See Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892). That
is, if there is a possibility that a court will disregard its linguistic sense of the mean-
ing of statutory language in cases of absurdity or injustice (or even in cases of
outrageous absurdity or injustice), that inquiry must be made in every case. That results
are obviously not absurd and, therefore, that linguistic sense is controlling in a given
case does not mean that the absurdity question was not asked. See id. at 279.
This logic nevertheless ignores questions of degree. If the Court does not very
often invoke Holy Trinity, infrequency of use does not necessarily mean that the Court
seldom perceives the results it views itself as compelled by its linguistic sense to
reach as absurd or unjust. It may instead suggest a tolerance of absurdity. And tolerance
of absurdity is in operation an approximation of a literalist philosophy.
95. It is for example possible to justify a conclusion that a court should not
disregard apparent linguistic meaning in cases of absurd results and should be wary
of finding "gaps" in statutes so as to permit interstitial judicial lawmaking on the
theory that the predictability and consistency generated by following rules is preferable
to "doing justice" in individual cases. See, Kelsen, supra note 9, at 528. Rawls, Two
Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3 (1955). Cf. G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW,
170-71 (1978) (rejecting purposive interpretation); Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort
Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 542-53 (1972) (rejecting case by case or contextual and
utilitarian approach to justice); Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEG. STUD. 151
(1973) (similar rejection). It is no doubt true that a decision to adopt this viewpoint is a
normative decision. See Kennedy, supra note 5, at 1760-62. It may also be true that the
realization of such a view is dependent upon it being possible to deduce right answers
from statutory language. See generally Moore, supra note 34. But it is not necessarily true
that the impossibility of such a deduction renders the decision itself impossible or the
effort to implement it self-delusive. To the extent that a judge is committed to the deci-
sion to adopt such a normative viewpoint and seeks to implement that decision the deci-
sion is approximated in practice. Cf. Moore at 167 (suggesting that formalism's ideals can
be realized to the limited extent made possible by his argument that deduction from
authoritative language is not possible in any case).
[Vol. 19
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A second feature common to both anti-literalist arguments is that
they assume a rational, reasonable legislature seeking just results."
That assumption is expressed as a descriptive claim in the argument
from legislative intent or purpose: a reasonable legislature could not
have intended absurd or unjust results. It is expressed as a normative
claim in the argument from independent judicial responsibility:
whatever the actual character of the legislature, courts ought to
demand reasonable and just legislative commands.' If the Burger
Court is more often than not inclined to reject these claims,98 what
is its view of the national legislature? The view implicit in that rejec-
tion is that the legislature both descriptively can be and normatively
may be irrational, unreasonable and tolerant of unjust results. At least
it can and may be these things where irrationality, unreasonableness
and injustice are- assumed to be institutionally relative epithets."
Reasonableness and rationality from the perspective of a process
which purports to decide cases on the basis of principle have different
meanings than reasonableness and rationality from the perspective
of a process understood to make law prospectively through the
mechanism of compromise and bargain between conflicting interest
groups."' And the injustice of particular results is equally a question
of perspective. Unjust results in particular cases are just results if
justice is understood from the perspective of various versions of rule
96. See HART & SACKS. supra note 15, at 1157, 1415.
97. See, e.g., HART & SACKS, supra note 15, at 101; Civil Rights Act, supra note 4,
at 41; Fiss, supra note 23, at 17; Bickel & Wellington, supra note 69 at 7-8.
98. A difficulty with a claim that the Burger Court rejects the noted anti-
literalist arguments is that it occasionally utilizes such arguments in opinions which
might otherwise be characterized as literalist in orientation. See American Tobacco
Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 70-71 (1982).
99. Compare J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST. 251 n.69 (1980) (legislative
classifications are rationally related to the "cross-purposes" that give them birth); Neal,
Baker v. Carr: Politics In Search of Law, 1962 SuP. CT. REV. 252, 289-91 (suggesting
that, although the process of political compromise in operation may appear irrational
from a judicial perspective, that process viewed as an institution is rational) with Dixon,
The Supreme Court and Equality: Legislative Classifications, Desegregation, and Reverse
Discrimination, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 494, 497 (1977) (legislatures are by their nature
irrational); Posner, The De Funis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential Treat-
ment of Racial Minorities, 1974 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 16-31 (legislative process cannot be
judged by standard of rationality).
100. See generally R. DAHL, DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES (3d ed. 1976); L.
FROMAN, THE CONGRESSIONAL PROCESS (1967); W. KEEFE & M. OGUL, THE AMERICAN
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS: CONGRESS AND THE STATES (5th ed. 1981). For commentary
advocating judicial recognition of the realities of political compromise and judicial
enforcement of such compromise, see Easterbrook, supra note 4, at 540-41; Posner,
supra, note 4 at 819.
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utilitarianism.01 A judicial decision declining to apply a statute for
the reason that application would generate an unjust result in a par-
ticular case, even if expressed in terms of the inconsistency of such
a result with the principle, policy or purpose thought to underlie the
statute, is necessarily a decision to reject one version of justice and
to accept another."° In short, the Burger Court's view of the legislature
is less a matter of its tolerance of legislative unreasonableness than
a matter of its tolerance of reasonableness legislatively defined."3 It
is also a matter of a version of justice tolerant of occasionally unjust
applications of that legislative definition grounded on the potentially
erroneous assumption that the legislative definition has been judicially
ascertained.
The third feature common to the postulated anti-literalist
arguments is that courts are capable of making the judgment
regarding rationality, reasonableness and justice demanded by anti-
literalist theory. The literature supporting this assumption is exten-
sive. Reason, rationality and justice are said to be the products of
minimum legal principles which define legal methodology," of institu-
tional constraints,0 5 of binding principles of popular morality," 6 of
internally consistent moral philosophy and, perhaps, even of economic
"science."108 To the extent that the Burger Court rejects an anti-
literalist argument, it implicitly accepts a far less optimistic view of
Modern decision theory would suggest that the process of political compromise,
particularly when characterized by logrolling, is rational in the sense, at least, that
it is necessary in a collective decision making process which preserves democratic
values. See generally K. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963);
J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1965). Moreover, judicial
rationality understood as consistency may be an illusion. See Easterbrook, Ways of
Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802 (1982); Farago, Intractable Cases: The Role
of Uncertainty In the Concept of Law, 55 N.Y.U.L. REV. 195, 229-31 (1980).
101. See note 95 supra.
102. See note 95 supra.
103. See, e.g., Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 102 S. Ct. 3245, 3252-53 (1982);
Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 244 (1981) (Powell, J. dissenting); Fullilove v.
Flutznick, 448 U.S., 490 (1981) (plurality opinion by Burger, C.J.); Mohasco Corp. v.
Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 826 (1980); Mobil Off Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 623 (1978).
104. See, e.g., FULLER, supra note 17, at 81-91; HART & SACKS. supra note 15, at
1410-17.
105. See, e.g., FULLER, supra note 17, at 168-81. Fiss, supra note 23, at 12-13.
106. See generally Wellington, supra note 4.
107. See Forum of Principle, supra note 71, at 471-76.
108. See Easterbrook, supra note 4, at 545-47; Posner, supra note 4, at 819; Posner,
Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REV.
263, 278-80 (1982). Although both Easterbrook and Posner adopt an agency theory of
the judicial function in interpreting statutes, they both utilize economic theories of
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judicial competence. °9 The reasonableness and justice of an applica-
tion of a statute is a characterization requiring an at least implicit
reference to some value system, and it is rare that such a value system
is uncontroversial. The Burger Court's uncertainty about its capacity
to discover and apply an uncontroversial value system may constitute
the grain of truth supporting the conservative characterization with
which it has been labelled. The conservatism of literalism is poten-
tially less the conservatism of an ideological commitment than the
conservatism of an uncertainty about judicial competence to enter-
tain such a commitment.11
The final feature common to the postulated anti-literalist
arguments is that they base the legitimacy of statutory law primarily
upon a process of judicial validation of a statute as law rather than
upon the legislative source of that statute.' That is, a statute derives
its legitimacy from the judicial act of fitting it within a rational,
reasonable and just legal fabric on the value premises of that fabric
(or of the judge's perception of those premises)."2 To the extent that
majoritarian values contribute to the legitimation of the statute, the
judicial act of fitting the statute to the fabric is viewed as an inci-
dent within a process of on going communication with the legislature;"'
democratic values are therefore expressed through this process rather
than exclusively embodied in the legislature.
To the extent that the Burger Court rejects the postulated anti-
literalist arguments, it implicitly rejects the notion of legitimacy
underlying these arguments. The Burger Court's version of legitimacy
may instead be viewed as compartmentalized: the statute's legitimacy
legislation to limit, in distinct degrees, the scope of legislation, thereby arguably leav-
ing greater room for the operation of judicial "rationality".
109. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, 52
U.S.L.W. 4845, 4853 (U.S. June 25, 1984) Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v.
Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 408 (1982) (Powell, J. dissenting). Northwest Airlines, Inc. v.
Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 97-99 (1981); Texas Industries v. Radcliff
Materials, Inc. 451 U.S. 630, 646 (1981); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S.
618, 625-26 (1978).
110. See Note, supra note 34, at 901-02. But see id. at 908-12. It is of course possible
that this is a false dichotomy; it may be impossible to escape ideological commitment.
See infra text accompanying notes 284-413.
111. See id. at 903-05.
112. See, e.g., FULLER, supra note 17, at 226-27; HART & SACKS, supra note 15, at
1413; Fiss, supra note 23, at 11-17; Moore, supra note 34, at 277-81.
113. See, e.g., G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES, 166 (1982);
E. LEVY, AN INTRODUCTION To LEGAL REASONING, 32 (1949); FULLER, supra note 17, at
226-27; Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and Judicial Process, supra note 69,
at 34-35; Fiss, supra note 23, at 13-16.
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is derived from its legislative source and that source is the sole
repository of democratic values; the Court's function, as a sort of agent
of a legislative principal,114 is not to legitimate that which comes to
it legitimated. 115 Under this view, legitimacy is a function of process,
but, in contrast to the anti-literalist view, is a function of the
democratic pedigree of legislative process rebuttable only in the event
that values of constitutional dimension are threatened. Under the anti-
literalist view, judicial values not of constitutional dimension are
largely the source of legitimation.11
II. A CRITIQUE OF OBJECTIONS TO THE
BURGER COURT'S INTERPRETIVE STRATEGY
There are four traditional objections to literalism applicable to
the Burger Court: the objection from the limitations of language, the
objection from the fictional character of legislative intent, the objection
from the normative character of formalism, and the normative objection
to formalism. The first three of these objections are descriptive in the
sense that they claim that the Burger Court's methodology is implaus-
ible either because its analytical tools are inadequate or because it can-
not escape responsibility for the political character of its judgments. The
response argued here is that the methodology is plausible despite its
conceded defects and that objections to it are in fact normative.
The last objection is self-evidently normative: it claims that the
Burger Court's methodology is grounded upon an inferior version of
the moral responsibility of the judge. There will be no response here
to the last objection both because the values reflected in Burger Court
literalism are sufficiently well recognized as legitimate in American
legal culture that they cannot be dismissed as alien to that culture
and because the objection presents merely an alternative conception
of the moral responsibility of the judge. A choice between concep-
tions cannot be other than an arbitrary exercise of power-the power
114. For explicit invocations of agency notions see Easterbrook, supra note 4;
Posner, supra note 49; Landis & Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-
Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875 (1975). A court on such an analysis is the agent
of the Congress which enacted a statute (rather than a subsequent congress or the
current congress) and is to emphasize the legislative compromise rather than the hopes
or goals of the interest groups which bargained for the compromise. See Posner supra
note 108, at 820.
115. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, 52
U.S.L.W. 4845, 4853 (U.S. June 25, 1984); T.V.A. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978).
116. See generally Wellington, The Nature of Judicial Review, 91 YALE L.J.486
(1982).
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of a judge to adopt a conception and to impose its consequences on
others and the lesser power of the writer or of the reader to express
argument or disagreement.11 This article assumes that it is usefully
possible to argue about the plausibility of method or the internal con-
sistency of alternative conceptions of judicial responsibility. It further
assumes, as an exercise of power,11 that it is not possible to
successfully argue about right thinking, or even about the morality
or plausibility of internal consistency. The central theme of the
response may therefore be taken as a claim that the Burger Court's
version of the moral responsibility of the judge can be plausibly
approximated in practice whether or not normatively inferior to its
alternatives.
A. The Objection From The Limitations Of Language
It may be argued that statutory language cannot serve as a
source of authority for an interpretation because the meaning of
language within the context of a particular case is indeterminate. This
is the objection from one of the two forms of language skepticism
surveyed above."' The rejoinder submitted in the first section of this
article was by way of confession and avoidance. Upon the assumption
that the meaning of statutory language is indeterminate as a matter
of its application to particular facts, its indeterminacy does not matter
both because the Burger Court's literalism is not a naive reliance on
the determinacy of language meaning and because it is the Burger
Court's underlying normative view which is the real target of
criticism." But this rejoinder cannot serve as complete defense if that
underlying normative view relies in part upon a belief that congres-
sional intent is to be discovered from the words of a statute
understood in their linguistic context and as they would be used by
a normal speaker of English. Whether or not the Burger Court is naive
about literalism, that reliance requires that the Court believe it
possible in some sense to determine whether the facts of a case fall
within or without the "plain" meaning of statutory language.
It is however crucial that the Court be recognized as believing
in the possibility that the language of a statute determines its
117. Cf. J. ELY, supra note 99, at 58 (there is no single sound method of moral
reasoning); Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1229, 1245-49
(although the Constitution may serve by assumption as an ultimate evaluator, it pro-
vides inconsistent commands, and choice between these commands is arbitrary).
118. Cf. Knapp & Michaels, Against Theory, 8 CRITICAL INQUIRY 723, 73840 (1982)
(a theory that interpretation is a function of interpreter's beliefs is itself a mere belief).
119. See supra notes 52-59 and accompanying text.
120. See supra text accompanying notes 59-76.
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application to facts only in some sense. The Court need not believe
in the possibility of plain meaning in the sense demanded by a pristine
positivism and therefore often demanded by language skeptics intent
upon attacking positivism. It need not, for example, believe that
statutory language "has a set of conditions that are necessary and
sufficient for its correct application"'' to believe that such language
has a plain meaning. Nor is it necessary for the Court to believe that
some fact or set of facts before it are necessarily in or guaranteed
to be within the core of meaning of statutory language."2 It is merely
necessary that the Court believe that the facts before it fall within
the meaning of statutory language and that such a belief be viewed
as plausible, as a matter of plain or ordinary meaning, by "normal
speakers of English" for the Court to employ "plain meaning" as an
argumentative strategy for application of a statute to the facts of a
case.'3 It is, in short, not necessary that Burger Court literalism satisfy
the demands either of the positivist or the language skeptic; it may
predicate its literalism on its "intuitions" '24 about plain meaning in,
at least, those instances in which it perceives that the facts of the
case clearly fall within or without plain meaning and in which this
perception is, as a matter of plain meaning as distinguished from the
moral or practical implications of that meaning, generally shared.
121. Moore supra note 34, at 272.
122. Id. at 287.
123. See id. at 287-92. Moore accepts as plausible a version of H.L.A. Hart's
"core meaning" and "standard instances" arguments. See Hart, supra note 44, at 606-08.
Moore refers to that version as a "weak paradigm" argument under which "an item
is a paradigm if the linguistic community, or any speaker or listener in it, believes
the item is in the extension of a predicate." Moore, supra note 34, at 287-88 (emphasis
in the original). He contends that this argument is plausible only for "natural kind
words", as distinguished from theoretical terms, nominal kind words, dispositional terms
and ethical words. See id. at 202-03. He further argues, however, that "all words are poten-
tially natural kind words" in his refutation of the criterial theory of meaning, id. at 217,
and argues that theoretical words in law are infected with the frailties (e.g., vagueness
and ambiguity) of ordinary words because the former are defined by the latter. Id. at 23547.
Note that Moore's limited adoption of H.L.A. Hart's theory is predicated in
part on his rejection of Fuller's linguistic attack on Hart's theory of core meaning
as the "pointer theory of meaning." See Fuller, supra note 44, at 668. In brief, Moore
attacks Fuller's contextualism on the common sense basis that "words must have some
objective (i.e., non-context-dependent) meaning if communication is to exist at all."
Moore, supra note 34, at 276.
124. "Linguistic intuition" is Professor Moore's terminology. Moore, supra note
34, at 293. Moore argues, however, that intuitions are not adequate to satisfy the
demands of positivism. See id. at 281-93.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 19, No. 2 [1985], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol19/iss2/1
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
The plain meaning of statutory words understood in the linguistic
context of the statute read as a whole and as they would be used
in that context by a normal speaker of English suffices as a justifica-
tion for literalism on the common sense ground that it suffices as the
basis for communication in human intercourse. The language skeptic
cannot go so far as to deny the efficacy of plain meaning without
denying the common sense observation that human beings com-
municate by means of their shared perceptions of the meaning of the
language they employ in communicating. It does not matter that com-
munication in human intercourse is often imperfect; a plain meaning
approach does not necessarily require perfection, and a court's "plain
meaning" interpretation of a statute may be viewed as analogous to
elements of communication between human beings-as an hypothesis
communicated to the legislature and subject to correction by the
legislature as an act of perfecting the communication. '
Nor does it matter that such communication is possible only
because speakers and listeners or authors and readers are members
of speech, 2 ' linguistic,"' or interpretive'28 communities -communities
which share the concepts, values, knowledge and habits assumed by
a communication. It does not matter so long as it is plausible to sup-
pose that the justices and legislators share a common membership
and that the justices, given their dependence on community, at least
unconsciously take into account both language conventions and the
dependence of meaning upon the historical context of congressional
use of language." All that is required to make literalism plausible
is that it resemble human communication in sufficient degree that it
may be said to generally work as communication.
125. Cf. THE AIMS OF INTERPRETATION supra note 3, at 32-35 (arguing that under-
standing entails a process neither wholly intuitive nor wholly governed by convention).
It is quite possible to object that the dialogue contemplated by this analogy
is rendered improbable by institutional limitations on communication: Congress may
not be able to respond. See Note, supra note 34, at 905. This however, is an argument
about the efficacy of the institutional arrangement within which communication must oc-
cur. It succeeds or fails as an argument about efficacy rather than an argument about
the implausibility of ordinary usage as a criterion of meaning. it is moreover vulnerable
to the rejoinder that alternative theories of interpretation presuppose a communication
between Congress and the Court and are themselves subject to a similar objection.
126. See, e.g., DICKERSON, supra note 7, at 106.
127. See Moore, supra note 34, at 287.
128. See FISH, supra note 3, at 303-71.
129. See J. SEARLE, supra note 44, at 117-136 (literal meaning, although distinct from
utterer's meaning-or intended meaning-is nevertheless dependent upon context). In
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There nevertheless remain two difficulties with a plain meaning
approach. The first is that statutory language will often not seem to
convey a plain meaning at least in the sense that it will often not
seem to supply a determinate answer to the question of statutory
application."' The second is that reliance on a belief in or intuition
about meaning may be thought to undermine the Court's underlying
normative view: if the Court does view itself as the mere agent of
the sovereign legislature faithfully duplicating that sovereign's com-
mands, it may be thought to require the capacity to be certain of
its deductions from language; perhaps mere belief or intuition will
not do.'
1. The Indeterminate Answer Difficulty
The indeterminate answer difficulty arises in one or both of two
senses. Either the words of the statute are so vague or ambiguous
or open textured"M that the Court perceives that it is unclear whether
the facts of a particular case fall within or without the meaning of
these words or the Court perceives some moral objection to the
application of the plain meaning of the words of the statute to the
facts before it."M
(a). The Breakdown of Plain Meaning
The first of these possibilities presents a problem of the
breakdown of plain meaning as a strategy; the shared belief or percep-
tion which gives ordinary usage efficacy as a strategy is missing. The
fact, the Burger Court seeks intended meaning but treats literal meaning as evidence
of intended meaning and repeatedly resorts to context in an effort to grasp the latter.
See infra text accompanying notes 177-282.
It is occasionally not possible to make the supposition of common membership,
as where Congress employs technical language and experts are consulted. See, e.g.,
Dowson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 187 (1980); Corning Glass Works
v. Brennan, 417 U.S. U.S. 188, 201-02 (1974); Bradley v. United States, 410 U.S. 605,
609 (1973). It is arguably not possible to make the supposition in the case of old statutes
on the ground that historical perspective cannot be recaptured. Despite the latter dif-
ficulty, it is possible to attempt to enter the historical community of past legislatures-
that is the attempt of originalists. See AIMS OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 3, at 36-49.
130. See supra notes 93, 94.
131. See Moore, supra note 34, at 281.
132. On the distinctions between ambiguity, vagueness and open texture, see
Moore, supra note 34, at 181-202. It has been said that a word is vague "when it
is used in a fluctuating way"; but the open texture of a word is a matter of our inability
to define it by specifying all of the situations in which it is to be used. Waismann,
Verifiability, 19 ARISTOTELIAN SOC'Y SuPP. Vol. 119, 124-25 (1945).
133. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
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traditional judicial response to such a breakdown is to resort to a
search for legislative intent or purpose, often in the materials of
legislative history. The Burger Court's response is no different.
An example may illustrate this point. The National Labor Rela-
tions Act requires that an employer bargain in good faith with a labor
organization certified or recognized as the exclusive bargaining
representative of the employer's employees regarding "wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment.""' Is the decision to
close down part of a business a subject matter within the meaning
of this language such that an employer must bargain over that deci-
sion? There is surely no guarantee that a partial closure is within
or without the necessary meaning even of "terms and conditions of
employment." And there are grounds both for a belief that a partial
closure is within those terms and for a belief that a partial closure
is not within those terms. To the extent that a partial closure is
characterized as a termination of employment, it would seem within
the meaning of "terms and conditions of employment." To the extent
that a partial closure is characterized as a decision regarding the com-
mitment or withdrawal of capital, it would seem without the meaning
of "terms and conditions of employment."
A typical judicial response to this problem of characterization
is to resort to an analysis grounded upon an identification of the pur-
poses underlying a statutory command and therefore upon an inquiry
independent of any close examination of language. The Burger Court,
in First National Maintenance Corporation v. NLRB' 5 did precisely
that: partial closure decisions are not mandatory subjects of bargain-
ing because the purposes the Court chose to identify as the purposes
underlying the statutory bargaining obligation would not be furthered
by mandated bargaining.
If there is a distinction between the Burger Court's response
to breakdown and, for example, the Warren Court's response to
breakdown, it is in the Burger Court's tendency to be less inclined
to perceive a breakdown and in its tendency to resort to extrinsic
evidence of immediate legislative intent rather than ultimate legislative
purpose when it does perceive a breakdown.' First National
134. See 29 U.S.C. SS 158(a)(5), 158(d) (1976).
135. 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
136. Compare, e.g., J.I. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Textile Workers
Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) with Aaron v. S.E.C. 446 U.S. 680 (1980);
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618 (1978). See Schweiker v. Wilson, 450
U.S. 221, 244 n.6 (1981) (Powell, J. dissenting).
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Maintenance is merely a counterexample. Both tendencies follow from
the Burger Court's underlying normative view: plain meaning ought
to be enforced as the best evidence of legislative intent whenever
possible and resort to ultimate purpose implies too expansive a role
for the Court in law making.
From the point of view of those critics of the Burger Court who
attack its reliance on plain meaning, the objection to these tendencies
is that the Court too seldom perceives a breakdown because it is
insensitive to the dependence of language meaning on context, func-
tion or purpose.137 The meaning of words varies with the context of
the use of those words because meaning is a function of shared
assumptions about use; meaning resides not in words but in an
understanding of how words may be employed or the roles they may
perform within a practice of language use."
This objection has merit, but exploits an ambiguity in the notion
of context. The context of statutory words might be thought to mean
linguistic context or the historical context of enactment and therefore
to refer to the problem of the meaning of statutory language indepen-
dent of its application-the concepts or range of concepts conveyed
by statutory language. 9 The Burger Court rather clearly is aware
of context at the level of the conceptual meaning of a statute, for
it employs the technique of ordinary or conventional usage of statutory
137. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHAEAN ETHICS Bk V ch. 10; GADAMER, supra
note 57, at 289-94, 470-73; Note, supra note 34, at 904-07. Cf., e.g., Bishin, The Law
Finders: An Essay In Statutory Interpretation, 38 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 6-7 (1965) (generally
attacking literalism on this ground); Cohen, supra note 46, at 537-38 (same).
138. See L. WITTGENSTEIN. PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS SS 193-98 (G.E.M.
Anscombe ed. 1963). See also Ryle, The Theory of Meaning in BRITISH PHILOSOPHY IN
THE MID-CENTURY (C.A. Mace ed. 1957). The basic insight of this view is that meaning is
a matter of use within a situation; the content of a rule is a matter of what is done
with it and understanding is a function of competence in the game in which language
is employed. This does not mean, however, that there are no rules; rules exist in the
sense that there is agreement about what is to be done in particular cases-a shared
reaction to the question of the proper use of the rule.
139. See Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bandurant, 257 U.S. 282, 293 (1921)
(Brandeis, J. dissenting) (distinguishing construing and applying a statute); DICKERSON.
supra note 7, at 13; de Sloovere, Textual Interpretation of Statutes, 11 N.Y.U.L. 0.
REV. 538, 553-58 (1934) (distinguishing interpretation and application); Graff, "Keep Off
The Grass", "Drop Dead", and other Indeterminacies: A Response to Sanford Levison,
60 TEX. L. REV. 405, 411 (1982) (same); supra note 56. The distinction resembles the distinc-
tion between connotation and denotation. See J.S. MILL, A SYSTEM OF LOGIC, 20-26 (1864).
The distinction has however been criticized. See, e.g., The Ambiguity of Unambiguous
Statutes, supra note 57; The Relevance of Legislative, supra note 57, at 610 n. 41.
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words in the linguistic context of the statute read as a whole to nar-
row the range of the possible concepts conveyed by statutory words...
and refers to legislative history in an effort to invoke congressional
intent as the arbiter of that range of concepts."' In this sense, the
Burger Court is fully aware of the characteristic of language that its
meaning is a matter of its use within a situation,42 but views the ques-
tion posed by that characteristic as the meaning of the legislature's
use of language within the situation of enactment.
The context of a statute might alternatively be thought to mean,
however, the context within which the statute is to be given concrete
meaning in the situation of the facts of a particular case.' The latter
notion refers to the problem of application: do the facts fall within
the range of concepts conveyed by statutory language? Although the
Burger Court's practice of examining the context of enactment
establishes the range of concepts from which an argument that the
facts of a case fall within or without the plain meaning of a statute
may be based, there is no doubt that such a claim is insensitive to
the problem of the context of use of language within the situation
of the facts of a case.
The problem of the context of use within the situation of a case
is perhaps best illustrated by the example of a statute enacted in
response to a set of historical conditions which do not exist at the
time of application.' The Norris LaGuardia Act'4 5 was enacted in 1932
in response to judicial use of the labor injunction to preclude organiza-
tional efforts of labor unions. It withdraws jurisdiction from federal
courts to issue injunctions in a "labor dispute." Later labor legisla-
tion enacted in 1935, 1947 and 1959 created a system of labor law
The distinction is not necessarily defeated by Wittgenstein's claim, supra note 138,
that knowing the meaning of a rule is knowing its use. That claim may be understood
as a claim that one cannot know a rule apart from its use, but the point of the distinction
made here is that there are two uses of a statutory rule, only one of which entails applica-
tion of the rule within a set of specific facts. Cf. Luban, Epistemology and Moral Educa-
tion, 33 J. LEGAL ED. 636,63940 (1983) (there are two uses of rules: application and the logical
interconnection of rules "to form theories").
140. See, e.g., Aaron v. S.E.C., 446 U.S. 680 (1980); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185 (1976).
141. See, e.g., County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 184-88 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J. dissenting); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 219-50 (1979)
(Rehnquist, J. dissenting); T.V.A. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
142. See Graff, supra note 139, at 408-12.
143. See supra note 139.
144. See Bishin, supra note 137, at 7.
145. 29 U.S.C. SS 101-115 (1976). This is the example analyzed in Bishin, supra
note 137.
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which encourages organization, collective bargaining and enforcement
of collective bargaining agreements. Should the Norris LaGuardia Act
be applied to preclude enjoining a strike in breach of a no strike clause
in a collective bargaining agreement in 1970?
A purposive interpretation of the Act's withdrawal of the jurisdic-
tion of federal courts to issue injunctions in "labor disputes" would
take into account the differences between the historical context of
enactment and the historical context of application and would decline
to apply the Act in part by emphasizing a current policy favoring
enforcement of collective bargaining agreements." A literal interpreta-
tion would treat an employee strike in protest of employer practices
in 1970 as a "labor dispute" within the plain meaning of the Act. It
would therefore enforce the arguably irrelevant historical intent of the
Congress which enacted the Norris LaGuardia Act to preclude federal
court interference in such disputes.147
However, insensitivity to the problem of the context of applica-
tion is a matter of degree. There is no guarantee that a strike in
1970 is necessarily within the meaning of the phrase "labor dispute,"
but it is by no means implausible for the Burger Court to believe
that such a strike is within the plain meaning of that phrase, par-
ticularly where a congressional intent to foreclose judicial regulation
is emphasized in assigning meaning to it. Such a belief is not wholly
insensitive to context. It requires a judgment that an economic strike
in breach of an agreement not to strike is a labor dispute-a judg-
ment influenced by judicial identification of immediate congressional
intent at the time of enactment. But it is a belief insensitive to the
question of the consequences of application for some potential defini-
tions of underlying statutory purpose.
The argument that an economic strike in 1970 is not within the
meaning which should be attributed to the phrase "labor dispute" is
a normative argument which proceeds from a distinct premise about
judicial function; courts ought to apply statutes by reference to that
underlying statutory purpose which best fits the current state of the
law or the current needs of society and therefore ought to be sen-
sitive to the context of use. Such an argument has merit if viewed
as a normative argument, but it does not establish the impossibility
146. See Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970);
Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 215-29 (1962) (Brennan, J. dissenting).
147. See Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 205-08 (1962). See also
Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397 (1976). But see Jacksonville
Bulk Terminals v. International Longshoremen 102 S. Ct. 2673, 2687-89 (1982) (Burger,
C.J. dissenting); Id. at 2689-90 (Powell, J. dissenting).
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of reliance on ordinary meaning in application or the implausibility
of insensitivity to the context of judicial use. Indeed, the primary
objection to such an insensitivity is that it is in many cases successful
as a strategy for enforcing plain meaning; what is objectionable is
the threat of that success.
(b) The Moral Objection to Plain Meaning
The possibility of moral objection to the application of plain mean-
ing is typically described as the possibility of the absurd, unreasonable
or unjust result." 8 It may also be viewed, however, as including the
possibility of the inadequacy of plain meaning to accomplish a statute's
underlying purpose.149 Both versions of the moral objection possibility
may be framed either as an argument consistent with the Burger
Court's normative view or as an argument inconsistent with that view.
Either the Court must, to adhere to its role as the agent of the Con-
gress, ignore ordinary meaning to enforce its principal's intent or the
Court must ignore that meaning to be faithful to its independent role
as a court in ensuring the reasonableness, justice and efficacy of law.' 50
Notice that both arguments assume that meaning has been ascertained;
the question posed by the arguments is whether that meaning should
be ignored. 15' Given its underlying normative view, the Burger Court's
tendency is to tolerate absurd, unreasonable and unjust results and
to reject arguments grounded upon notions of independent judicial
responsibility for reasonable and just laws on the theory that
absurdity, reasonableness and justice characterizations are matters
of perspective best resolved by the political branches.152
This does not mean either that the Burger Court does not ask
itself a question in every case about such matters as reasonableness
or justice or that it will not occasionally reject plain or ordinary mean-
ing on moral grounds.1" It can be described as rejecting an
148. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
149. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Kardon v. National Gypsum
Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
150. See supra text accompanying notes 89-91.
151. See supra note 93.
152. See supra notes 89-103 and accompanying text.
153. It is at least arguable, for example, that the Burger Court has chosen
between alternative "conceptions" of the "concept" of discrimination in Title VII in
part on the basis of its perception that a particular conception would better preserve
employer interests in predictability and efficiency- moral grounds within the mean-
ing of "moral" as it is used in the text. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440,
456-64 (1982) (Powell, J. dissenting); General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
A better example of a plain meaning approach to Title VII ignored the problem of
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"unreasonable and unjust result," as unreasonableness and injustice
are defined from a controversial perspective, in First National
Maintenance Corporation, discussed above."54 It is unreasonable to
require bargaining over the decision to close part of a business because
such bargaining may impede the efficient movement of capital to
higher uses. It is moreover unjust to do so because management has
a "right" to unilaterally determine the scope of an enterprise, and
that "right" may not be impaired absent a clear congressional state-
ment that it shall be impaired.
The Burger Court therefore necessarily chooses plain meaning
when it enforces plain meaning because it retains the option to deviate
from plain meaning on moral grounds where it finds the moral argu-
ment supporting deviation convincing.5 ' However, the difficulty
presented by convincing moral arguments supporting deviation is that
they cannot often be credibly characterized as politically neutral
arguments. The intuitive appeal of a court's claim that a legislature
could not have intended an absurd application of an understood or
"plain" meaning is a shared understanding of absurdity; s the shared
assumptions which enable communication include assumptions about
what applications of communicated meaning would be absurd,
unreasonable or unjust. But shared understanding is very often not
universal; a management "right" to unilateral decision regarding the
scope of an enterprise is controversial. That is the normative ground
for the Burger Court's tendency, suspended in First National
Maintenance, to tolerate absurdity and injustice; controversy is for
the Congress.
The moral objection to the Burger Court's tendency to tolerate
absurdity and injustice is at bottom that some meaning other than
"unreasonable" or "immoral" consequences, but did not enjoy the support either of
Chief Justice Burger or of Justice Rehnquist: Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power
v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
154. See supra text accompanying notes 134-35.
155. See supra text accompanying notes 98-103.
156. See F. LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS 28-30 (1839) reprinted
as 5 Classics in Legal History (1970); MacCallum, Legislative Intent, 75 YALE L.J. 754,
771-74 (1965). Cf. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 138, at 33e (Wittgenstein's well known ques-
tion whether exclusion of the game of dice must have been in the mind of a speaker
who says "show the children a game" to warrant the speaker's protest when the children
are taught dice); DICKERSON, supra note 7, at 105-116 (treating these questions as a mat-
ter of context and therefore as a matter of ascertaining meaning). But cf. Findlay,
Use, Usage and Meaning, THE THEORY OF MEANING 116-27 (G.H.R. Parkinson ed. 1968)
(use theory errs in supposing that use may be wholly explained in terms of public
or interpersonal use; it must also be explained in terms of internal or personal use).
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plain meaning or literal meaning is the meaning the justices ought
to seek because the justices are responsible for the results they reach
and cannot shift that responsibility to the Congress. 7 The difficulty
with that objection is that it assumes agreement both about the
character of absurdity and injustice and about the moral weight of
absurdity and injustice.
The Burger Court's tolerance of absurdity and injustice may often
constitute disagreement with the critic's version of absurdity and
injustice. To the extent that the Burger Court would agree that it
has in any particular instance tolerated absurdity and injustice in the
name of plain meaning, it necessarily differs with its critics over the
weight absurdity and injustice should be assigned when measured
against the Court's understanding of institutional role. Both of these
forms of disagreement are about the morality of judicial decision. They
are not about whether judges are responsible for the results they
reach, but about what results ought to be reached. Even an argu-
ment which claims that congressional decision must be respected
despite injustice is an argument that the moral responsibility of the
judge compels him to reach such a result. The moral objection to the
Burger Court's tendency to tolerate absurdity and injustice cannot
therefore claim that the Court has abdicated responsibility; it can at
most claim only that the controversial moral premises of its objection
to results reached in particular cases or of its objection to the Court's
understanding of institutional role are preferable to the Court's con-
troversial moral premises. There is, despite pretentions to the con-
trary, no high ground to this debate; there are only inconsistent ver-
sions of the content of the moral responsibility of the judge.
2. The Necessity of Certainty Difficulty.
The second difficulty with reliance upon plain meaning understood
as that meaning which is supplied by a court's intuitions or beliefs
about meaning in the circumstances of a case is that it may be viewed
as undermining the Burger Court's normative position. If the Burger
Court's normative position was some version of an idealized positivism,
this difficulty would be fatal, for idealized positivism surely requires
that judges be capable of deducing results from statutory language
with certainty. Linguistic intuitions about the meaning of ordinary
language cannot satisfy such a criterion.1"
157. Professor Moore, at least, repeatedly recognizes the necessity for and sup-
plies normative arguments. See Moore, supra note 34, at 277-81.
158. See id. at 281-92.
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The Burger Court's rhetoric sometimes suggests that it claims
adherence to an idealized positivism; the Court says that it faithfully
enforces the plain meaning of the legislative sovereign's commands.
But the Burger Court more often treats language as an expression
of legislative intent and very often seeks to confirm its perception
of the meaning of such language in legislative history.'59 This treat-
ment distinguishes its approach from pristine positivism in the crucial
respect that statutory language and legislative history are mere
evidence. For pristine positivism, meaning resides in language. 60
The distinction is important because, although the Burger Court's
rhetoric treats application of a statute as a matter of deduction, the
premises for the Court's syllogisms are supplied by its intuitions about
congressional intent derived from the evidence before it. 6 ' A pristine
positivism would, by contrast, insist upon logical deduction from what
the words of the statute must mean, without reference to intent, and
it is such a deduction which is not plausible. Moreover, there is no
more reason to presume that the Burger Court's rhetoric states the
realization of an ideal than there is to presume that a court bent on
achieving reasonable and just results has attained a state of perfect
moral knowledge. The Burger Court's rhetoric is argument favoring
a point of view which it seeks to approximate by the means available
to it;'"' the question is whether imperfections in those means doom
the enterprise.
Critics of Burger Court literalism appear to think the enterprise
doomed,"e but their arguments often fail to account for the possibility
of approximation. Certainty of deduction from language is an
impossibility, but this does not leave only the possibility of judicial
decision by reference to moral principle."" A judge's moral intuitions
are quite likely to consciously or unconsciously enter into his percep-
tions of plain meaning,'65 but this does not compel a conclusion that
159. See, e.g., Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S.
77 (1981); T.V.A. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
160. But see supra note 9.
161. That is, the mechanism of shared intuition necessarily supplies the premises.
See generally Moore, supra note 34. The fact that the Burger Court employs the rhetoric
of deduction does not mean, however, that it is necessarily unaware that it is guessing.
162. See text and notes 62-70 supra.
163. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 34, at 281; Nowak, supra note 34, at 561.
164. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 45, at 135-37; Cf. THE AIMS OF INTERPRETATION,
supra note 3, at 82-84 (attacking Heidegger's version of the hermeneutic circle, which
version would render interpretation a function of the interpreter's historical perspec-
tive, on the ground that it fails to account for questions of degree).
165. It is no doubt the case that one's moral biases influence one's perceptions
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the conventions of ordinary usage cannot substantially influence deci-
sion. The Burger Court's normative position can be approximated
through reliance on ordinary usage supplemented by references to
linguistic context, extrinsic evidence of legislative intent, et cetera,
even if it cannot be realized by such a reliance.
The proof is in criticism of the Court's methodology. To the
extent that criticism of Burger Court literalism is not criticism of the
Burger Court's literalist rhetoric,"' it is criticism about the effects
of that rhetoric- effects such as the Court's refusals to extend the
plain meaning of statutory language by creating judicially implied
remedies and the Court's tolerance for "absurd" and "unjust" results.16 7
But such effects, at least if they are not traceable to political
ideology," 8 are the products of an approximated positivism - a
positivism which treats plain meaning as presumptively controlling
despite its defects rather than as command from which deduction is
possible.
T.V.A. v. Hill"' provides perhaps the best example of the
possibility of approximation. In Hill, suit'was brought to enjoin com-
pletion of the Tellico Dam, a federal project, on the ground that com-
pletion of the dam would impound the waters of a river inhabited
by the snail darter, an endangered species of fish, and would cause
the extinction of the species by destroying its habitat. The Endangered
Species Act provided in relevant part that "federal departments and
agencies shall ... utilize their authorities in furtherance of the pur-
poses [of the Act] ... by taking such action necessary to insure that
actions authorized, funded, or carried out by them do not jeopardize
the continued existence of . .. endangered species and threatened
species or result in the destruction or modification of habitat of such
species .... "I70
of ordinary meaning. It is at least questionable that they wholly control perception.
Cf. THE AIMS OF INTERPRETATION. supra note 3, at 49 (distinguishing meaning and
significance). And if it is a fact that they wholly control perception, the importance
of that fact lies less in its power as a basis for criticizing the Burger Court than in
its power to deny the possibility of law as distinct from the mere exercise of political
power. See generally Nowak, supra note 45.
166. Professor Moore's arguments appear to be addressed to that rhetoric, taken
(by Professor Moore) literally. See Moore, supra note 34, at 281.
167. See, e.g., Fiss & Krauthammer, The Rehnquist Court, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar.
10, 1982, at 14, 20; Note, supra note 34, at 904-07.
168. See infra text accompanying notes 284-413 for discussion of this possibility.
169. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
170. Endangered Species Act, Pub. L. No. 93-205, S 7, 87 Stat. 892 (1973)
(amended 1978, 1979, 1980) (current version at 16 U.S.C. S 1536 (1982).
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On the assumption that the snail darter was an endangered
species, the Court concluded that the "plain meaning" of the statute
required enjoining completion of the Tellico Dam, despite its recogni-
tion that construction of the dam commenced some years prior to
enactment of the Endangered Species Act, that Congress continued
to appropriate funds for the project following that enactment, that
the dam was virtually complete at the time suit was brought, and
that the consequence of its holding, absent new congressional action,
would be the waste of many millions of dollars in incurred construc-
tion costs. 7' The Court bolstered its plain meaning analysis with
references to legislative history indicating congressional rejection of
proposed statutory language which would have rendered protection
of endangered species a priority subordinate to the primary purposes
of an agency or department.' The Court therefore concluded that
the plain meaning of the statute was consistent with a congressional
intent "to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction,
whatever the cost."'173
The crucial issue of application in Hill was whether the comple-
tion of the Tellico Dam was within the meaning of the words "actions
authorized, funded, or carried out" by federal agencies. Resolution of
that issue required, despite the Court's literalist rhetoric, a choice
between possible meanings of "actions." That term could be argued
to mean prospective actions (construction decisions not yet made at
the time of enactment), actions constituting some change in the status
quo (continued implementation of an existing plan is not an action),
actions the abandonment of which would not require waste of substan-
tial funds, actions the benefits of which do not outweigh the benefits
of the continued existence of an endangered species, or any action. 4
The Court chose the last of these meanings by rejecting resort
to inquiry into questions of the absurdity or reasonableness of the
consequences of its choice and by referring instead to its perception
of ordinary usage in the linquistic context of the language of the
statute read as a whole. To the Court, that language appeared both
broad and mandatory and contained no explicit reference to the ques-
tion of the consequences of its mandatory command.' 7 '
171. 437 U.S. at 173.
172. 437 U.S. at 176-84.
173. 437 U.S. at 184.
174. See 437 U.S. at 205 (Powell, J., dissenting).
175. See 437 U.S. at 187-88.
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It is true that the Court resorted to legislative history in search
of congressional intent, but it did not purport to seek an intent about
the resolution of the case before it; rather, it sought merely to con-
firm its perception of the broad and mandatory character of the words
of the statute.'6 It is equally true that the term "actions" in the statute
is susceptible to the alternative interpretations suggested above; the
Court had a choice between interpretations and there is no guarantee
that completion of the Tellico Dam is within the necessary or intrinsic
meaning of "actions" even when that term is read in the linguistic
context of the statute as a whole. But the fact remains that the choice
made by the Court was made on the basis of a set of criteria -ordinary
meaning as confirmed by legislative history-which had the positivistic
consequence that the "unreasonable" effects generated by plain mean-
ing were left to the Congress to resolve.
If the Court's conclusion in Hill is objectionable, the objection
is not viably that the broad interpretation the Court gave the language
of the Endangered Species Act lacks support in the evidence of
legislative history or that completion of the Tellico Dam is not within
some core meaning of the term "actions." The viable objection, rather,
is that the Court should have considered the consequences of a literal
interpretation, and that objection is not an objection to the possibili-
ty of literalism.
B. The Objection From The Fictional Character of
Legislative Intent
If the Burger Court relies on ordinary meaning as expressive
of or the best evidence of legislative intent,' its literalism is in fact
a device for ascertaining author's meaning. From the normative
perspective of the Burger Court, the potential advantage of legislative
intent is obvious: if it can be ascertained, it ensures legislative
supremacy. The crucial question for present purposes is whether
objections to legislative intent as a means to achieving these ends
preclude resort to intent.
Although legislative intent and legislative purpose are often used
interchangeably in judicial opinions, both potentially refer to a number
of distinct concepts. For present purposes, these distinct concepts may
176. It is interesting to note that Justice Powell's dissent cites the absence
of a specific congressional intent with respect to questions of the abandonment of pro-
jects as a reason to reject the Court's interpretation. 437 U.S. at 207-09 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
177. See cases cited supra note 67.
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be labeled (1) legislative intent as the inconsequential admission of
the interpreter, (2) legislative intent as the subjective desires of the
legislature or of particular legislators discovered by the interpreter,
(3) legislative intent as the immediate intent attributed to the
legislature by the interpreter, (4) legislative purpose as the ultimate
objective attributed to the legislature by the interpreter. In academic
discourse, these distinct concepts are often treated as mutually
exclusive categories in arguments which seek to establish that only
one of the categories can exist or that only one is judicially usable.'7'
The most typical of such arguments is that there is no such thing
as a collective subjective intent and that courts must therefore
attribute a purpose to the legislature as an act of creation.' It is
submitted here, however, that each such concept represents a factual
possibility in at least some cases and that judicial reliance upon one
or another of such. factual possibilities is a function of the evidence
available in a given case and of the interpeting court's underlying
normative view of the relationship between itself as a reader and the
legislature as an author of the statute interpreted.
1. Legislative Intent As Inconsequential Admission
It is sometimes conceded that texts, including statutes, are the
products of intentional acts without attributing anything of importance
to the concession."' Legislative intent is in this sense analagous to
the concept of a voluntary act in the law of torts or crimes; it says
nothing about motive or objective and is therefore ignored as a sub-
ject of inquiry or basis for argument in an interpretation. This ver-
sion of legislative intent therefore renders such an intent
inconsequential."'
The concession theory of legislative intent has both factual and
normative sources. It is likely to be at least tacitly employed in a
case in which none of the usual forms of evidence from which other
178. Cf. Forum of Principle, supra note 71, at 476-500 (postulating alternatives
and insisting upon a choice between them).
179. See, e.g., L. FULLER, supra note 17, at 86; R. KEETON, VENTURING To Do
JUSTICE 81-82 (1969); Bishin, supra note 137; Forum of Principle, supra note 71, at 476-500;
Moore, supra note 34, at 246-70; Statutory Interpretation, supra note 12.
180. See Statutory Interpretation, supra note 12, at 871; Radin, A Short Way
With Statutes, supra note 12, at 410-11. This view is particularly evident in the writings
of some literary theorists (and anti-theorists). See Chain Gang, supra note 3, at 563;
Knapp & Michaels, supra note 118, at 725-30.
181. See My Reply to Fish, supra note 3, at 308-10, 313.
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concepts of intent or purpose are discovered or implied supply an in-
telligible answer. A court, given such a factual state of the evidence,
might rely on the ordinary meaning of the language of the statute
as the best (or only) reliable evidence of Congressional intent.182 The
court might alternatively seek to limit the reach of the ordinary mean-
ing of the statute on the theory that, if there is no discoverable in-
tent or purpose, the statute should be presumed on a form of clear
statement principle to be merely precatory.'1 Or the court might treat
the absence of a discoverable intent as a delegation of law making
authority to the judiciary by invoking, for example, the attribution
of purpose concept and defining the attributed purpose in the most
general terms available.'" Which of these responses to the absence
of evidence a court chooses is a function of its normative view; given
the Burger Court's view, it is more likely to choose the first or se-
cond than the third.
An alternative source of the inconsequential admission version
of legislative intent is underlying normative view itself. To the ex-
tent that an interpreter adopts a stance of extreme reader
contextualism -that meaning is wholly a function of reader
perspective-he requires a means of neutralizing the common percep-
tion that authors write intentionally. The inconsequential admission
serves this function by denying either that the content of the conced-
ed intent is discoverable or, if discoverable, its importance. This nor-
mative view is inconsistent with the view attributed here to the
Burger Court, but it is important to recognize that the Burger Court
can come to a similar conclusion in a given case from factual assump-
tions rather than normative assumptions.
182. This is not to suggest that the court in such a case will not seek a
legislative intention. It suggests that the court will imply an intention from its
understanding of the words of the statute. And that understanding may itself be
influenced by the intentions the court thinks it would be reasonable, just and not
absurd for a legislator to entertain. The possibility also suggests, however, that there
may be a meaning to the words of a statute apart from the meaning inferred by
reference to the intention with which a legislature enacted the statute. Cf. Knapp
& Michaels, supra note 118, at 726 (criticizing Hirsch on the ground that Hirsch's notion
of author's intention is really a notion of information about author's intention).
183. See Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
184. A candidate for an instance of such a technique is the Supreme Court's
resolution of the choice of law issue in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353
U.S. 448 (1957).
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2. Legislative Intent As Subjective Intent Discovered By The
Interpreting Court
The subjective intent concept might be taken to mean one of
three things: (1) the objectives, hopes, or fears of individual legislators
or of the Congress as a collective body which motivated passage of
the legislation; (2) the factual situations or hypothetical cases in the
minds of individual legislators or in the mind of the Congress as a
collective body which motivated passage of the legislation; or (3) the
meaning attributed to the words of the statute by individual legislators
or the Congress as a collective body at the time of passage. The third
of these possibilities, although framed as a subjective perception of
the "plain meaning" of language, may perhaps be viewed as influenc-
ed, if not controlled, by elements of the first two possibilities.
Critics of subjective legislative intent theories employ a number
of well worn descriptive arguments in attacking such theories. Because
proposed legislation can become an authoritative statute only by for-
mal collective action, subjective intent must refer to a collective sub-
jective intent-at most, the subjective intent of a legislative majori-
ty (in combination, perhaps, with the subjective intent of the Presi-
dent who signed, or declined to veto, the legislation). There is,
however, no such thing as a collective mind capable of entertaining
any of the stated versions of subjective intent.' Even if collective
intent is to be taken as some combination of the subjective intents of
individual legislators who voted in favor of the legislation, the result,
aside from insurmountable difficulties in discovering such an intent,"
is likely to be unintelligible. The hopes, fears and objectives of in-
dividual legislators include not only the laudatory (or perhaps not so
laudatory) general welfare objectives of the sponsors but also such
states of mind as ignorance, indifference, vote trading and personal
political advantage.'87 The factual situations (and their resolution) in
the minds of individual legislators are likely to be distinct, inconsis-
tent and of no help to a court confronted with a case never con-
templated by a majority of legislators or even by one legislator.'88
185. See, e.g., Forum of Principle, supra note 71, at 488; Statutory Interpreta-
tion, supra note 12, at 870.
186. See, e.g., Brest, The Misconceived Quest For the Original Understanding,
60 BoSTON U.L. REV. 204, 212-17 (1980); Moore, supra note 34, at 266.
187. See MacCallum, supra note 156, at 756-62.
188. See, e.g., Forum of Principle, supra note 71, at 48; Moore, supra note 34, at
266-69;
A variation on this theme is the argument that it is inherently impossible to
combine the preferences of individual legislators into a coherent group decision, in
part because agenda control precludes ordering of individual preferences in terms of
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The meaning of the words of the statute in the minds of the legislators
at the time of passage may differ from legislator to legislator and
is, like other versions of subjective intent, subject to an insurmoun-
table burden of discovery. Even if discoverable, the meaning assign-
ed the words of the statute by legislators is in any event of no help
in the task of application because the plain meaning of language can-
not itself serve to establish the link between language and fact essen-
tial to application.'89 Indeed, unless the legislature had the resolution
of the particular case before the court "in mind" at the time of passage,
it cannot be said to have had any intent whatsoever about applica-
tion of the statute to that case.' 90
Aside from these descriptive objections to subjective intent, there
is a normative objection. The normative premise underlying the search
for subjective legislative intent is that courts in a democracy ought
to follow the "will" of the legislative sovereign. The normative objec-
tion to that premise is that it treats law as whim. The legislature
ought to be treated as passing laws, not its desires, and the concept
of law in a democracy is at least more complex than mere legislative
desire. 9 '
The relevance of these arguments about subjective legislative
intent for the present inquiry into the methodology of the Burger
Court is two-fold. The Burger Court often inquires into legislative
history (albeit usually to bolster an interpretation founded upon literal
meaning) in a fashion suggestive of inquiry into subjective intent 9'
and the Burger Court's normative view may be characterized as
resembling the view underlying inquiry into subjective intent.' It
is therefore necessary to identify similarities and dissimilarities
between the Burger Court's approach and subjective intent theory
and to defend that approach against both the descriptive and nor-
mative arguments outlined above.
the intensity of those preferences and in part because evidence of operation of the
mechanisms for avoiding these difficulties (e.g., logrolling) are not judicially discoverable.
See Levine & Plott, Agenda Influence and its Implications, 63 VA. L. REV. 561 (1977);
Easterbrook, supra note 4, at 587-88.
189. See Moore, supra note 34, at 270.
190. See Jones, Statutory Doubts and Legislative Intention, 40 COLUM. L. REV.
957, 967 (1940); Payne, The Intention of the Legislature in the Interpretation of Statutes,
8 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 96, 101 (1956); Statutory Interpretation, supra note 12, at 869-70.
191. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 34, at 257; Statutory Interpretation, supra note
12, at 871.
192. See, e.g., American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63 (1982); United
States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
193. See T.V.A. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
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(a) The Descriptive Objection
These tasks are approached here by means of an hypothetical
case. The Equal Pay Act of 1963 provides that it is unlawful for an
employer to pay unequal compensation on the basis of sex "for equal
work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort
and responsibility" unless such unequal compensation is paid pursuant
to a seniority system, a merit system, a system which measures
earnings by quantity or quality of production or unless the differen-
tial is "based on any other factor other than sex." '194 In 1962, the
Kennedy administration had proposed legislation prohibiting sex
discrimination in compensation "for work of comparable character on
jobs the performance of which requires comparable skills."195 The
administration bill was amended on the floor of the House of Represen-
tatives by deleting the "comparable" language and inserting equal
work language,'" but the bill was not passed. In 1963, the bill which
became the Equal Pay Act was reintroduced in a form which omitted
the "comparable character" and "comparable skill" language of the
administration's original proposal and retained the "equal work"
language of the 1962 amended bill. 91 The legislative history of the
1963 legislation includes statements by sponsors and proponents of
the bill that their reason for rejecting a comparability standard was that
such a standard would permit government regulation, by means of ad-
ministratively or judicially imposed standards of job comparison, of ques-
tions of pay equity.'
Suppose that a particular airline compensates its pilots at a rate
five times the rate it compensates its flight attendants and that the
composition of its pilot workforce is entirely male and the composi-
tion of its flight attendant workforce is entirely female. Assume fur-
ther that the airline has on its own initiative undertaken a job evalua-
tion study which indicates that pilots should, on the basis of a com-
parison of skill, effort and responsibility, be paid twice the compensa-
tion of flight attendants. The airline has not, however, followed this
194. 29 U.S.C. S 206(d)(1) (1976).
195. H.R. 8898, 87th Cong., 1st. Sess. (1962) and H.R. 10266, 87th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1962) in Hearings Before the Select Subcommittee on Labor of the House Committee
on Education and Labor on H.R. 8898, 10266, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-10 (1962).
196. 108 CONG. REC. 14767-69 (1962).
197. See 109 CONG. REC. 9197 (1963) (remarks of Rep. Goodell, co-sponsor of the
bill); 109 CONG. REC. 9195-96 (1963) (remarks of Rep. Frelinghuysen).
198. See 109 CONG. REC. 9196 (1963) (Rep. Frelinguysen); 109 CONG. REC. 9208-09
(1963) (Rep. Goodell). See also Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 199-201
(1974).
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recommendation. A flight attendant employed by the airline sues the
airline under the Equal Pay Act claiming that the airline's refusal
to follow the recommendations of its own job evaluation is attributable
to intentional sex discrimination: but for the gender of flight atten-
dants, the recommendation would be followed. On the stipulation that
pilot jobs and flight attendant jobs are unequal, the defendant airline's
motion for summary judgment is granted and this result is affirmed
on appeal.
On the assumption that the Supreme Court reviewed this
hypothetial case,199 two of its potential approaches are of present
interest. The Court might conclude that the plain meaning of the
language of the statute precludes liability; the jobs in question are
not equal. It might bolster this conclusion with references to the
legislative history in which legislators emphasized that the statute
would reach sex based differentials only in cases in which the equal
work standard was satisfied. Alternatively, the Court might conclude,
again with appropriate references to the statements of legislators, that
Congress intended to prohibit intentional sex discrimination in com-
pensation and that Congress intended to qualify this prohibitory intent
only by precluding resort to compensation standards imposed by
government. The reason for the equal work standard, fear of govern-
ment regulation, is absent in the hypothetical case because the plain-
tiff relies on the inference of discrimination generated by the defen-
dant's failure to adhere to its own job evaluation study. The plain-
tiffs action should therefore proceed, at least so long as the plaintiff
relies on direct evidence of intentional discrimination and does not
seek to impose an externally developed standard of pay equity on
the employer. °9
What should be made of these alternative potential references
to legislative history in the hypothetical case? The cynical answer is
that the Court manipulates legislative history to bolster predetermined
results and that it can do so for precisely the reason that subjective
legislative intent is indeterminate. A less cynical and more viable
answer is that a court that resorts to legislative history in an effort to
199. The hypothetical case resembles County of Washington v. Gunther, 452
U.S. 161 (1981), but that case was decided as a question of the interpretation of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
200. Cf. id. at 166 (adopting such a standard for Title VII purposes). For a
discussion of this rationale, see Cox, Equal Work Comparable Worth And Disparate
Treatment: An Argument For Narrowly Construing County of Washington v. Gunther,
22 DuQ. L. REV. 65, 105-14 (1983).
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find congressional intent confronts all of the difficulties of interpreta-
tion faced in interpreting a statute when it seeks to interpret legislative
history."'
There is no doubt that legislative history provides no relief from
the difficulties of the task of interpretation, but what is interesting
in the hypothetical is the plausibility of the practice. That is, it is
plausible that the legislative history be given either of the interpreta-
tions suggested as potential resolutions of the case and it is plausible
that the legislative history be taken as evidence of the subjective in-
tent of the legislature. Moreover, suggesting plausibility in each of
these senses is not equivalent either to suggesting that the Court
has attributed whatever intent it desires to the Congress or to sug-
gesting that the Court has discovered a subjective congressional in-
tent about the facts of the case before the Court. It is true that a
majority of the Court chooses one or another of hopefully plausible
interpretations of the "state of mind" of the Congress, but it does
so on the basis of its reading of the statements of congressmen in
combination with its intuitions about the ordinary meaning of words
like "comparable" and "equal." It does not necessarily attribute an
intent wholly formulated outside these statements, and it does not
necessarily attribute an intent or purpose on the basis of its moral
judgment about what intent or purpose best fits its conception of the
good society. Rather, it chooses a subjective intent on the basis of
its estimate of a balance of probabilities given the evidence before it.
It is tempting to argue that, because the Court chooses between
interpretations of intent and interprets the statements of legislators,
the thing it seeks to discover cannot be subjective legislative intent.
That argument is persuasive if what is meant by "subjective intent"
is the "true" intent in the collective mind of a legislative majority.
But such a definition is so confined that it ensures the success of the
argument. A court self-consciously seeking the intent of the legislature
in the evidence of legislative history surely seeks the legislature's
state of mind in some sense. The question is whether this sense may
be given a content which does not suffer from the improbabilities
exposed by the descriptive critique of subjectivism.
The key to the question of content lies in what some have termed
the delegation theory of subjective legislative intent: the legislature
delegates to a committee, or the committee's staff or the sponsor of
legislation the tacit authority to construct legislation, and it is the
201. See DICKERSON, supra note 7, at 137-97.
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intent of these "agents" which is the relevant intent. ' As so for-
mulated, the theory suffers from two defects: there is neither a for-
mal delegation in fact nor a basis in the democratic theory which
motivates resort to legislative will for relying on the intent of agents.3"
But the traditional formulation adopts from the law of agency notions
resembling the concepts of actual or apparent authority. If the delega-
tion theory has validity as a description of plausible legislative prac-
tice, the relevant analogy from the law of agency is ratification of
an unauthorized act with notice or knowledge of the act."4
This version of delegation is plausible because, absent substan-
tial floor amendment or compromise within conference committee, most
of the work of the Congress in formulating a statute is undertaken
by sponsors and committees.10 It is surely absurd to think that the
individual members of Congress who vote in favor of legislation have
a single motivation or a single set of hypothetical cases in mind at
the time they vote, and it is therefore absurd to assume that a court
seeking the subjective intent of Congress is seeking the resolution
of the case before that court in the collective mind of the Congress
at the time of passage. But it is not absurd to assume that the
members of Congress who voted for legislation shared a concept of
the effect, purpose, and limitations of proposed legislation and an
understanding of the political compromise reflected in that proposed
legislation at the time of their vote, that they derived this concept
from the obvious sources available to them, the sponsors and commit-
tee reports, and that they acted on that concept. 6
202. See S.E.C. v. Robert Collier & Co., 76 F.2d 939, 941 (2d Cir. 1935); HURST.
supra note 48 at 37-38; McCallum, supra note 156 at 780-84.
203. See, e.g., Bishin, supra note 137, at 14-15; Brest, supra note 186, at 215;
Moore supra note 34, at 267.
204. See Jones, Extrinsic Aids In The Federal Courts, 25 IowA L. REV. 737 (1939);
Landis, supra note 8, at 889. Cf. Civil Rights Act, supra note 4, at 38-39 (postulating the
possibility of "conventions" to which legislators might be judicially held, but rejecting
actual existence of such conventions).
205. See DICKERSON. supra note 7, at 71-73; HURST, supra note 48, at 37.
206. See HURST, supra note 48, at 34-37. Cf. L. HAND. THE BILL OF RIGHTS 18-19
(1979) ("I cannot believe that any of us would say that the 'meaning' of an utterance
is exhausted by the specific content of the author's mind at the moment.") MacCallum,
supra note 156, at 771-73 (arguing that there can be a generalized intent which counts
as an intent regarding specific instances even where those instances were not themselves
contemplated). Cf. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 138, at 33e, (raising this question).
Notice that is is irrelevant for purposes of the ratification model that some
legislators voted for the statute for political reasons or other "unworthy" motives.
What counts is that there was a general subjective understanding of the effect of
the statute and the objectives the statute was designed to achieve and that legislators,
whatever their motives, voted for the statute knowing of that general understanding.
It is the general understanding the court seeks, not the secret preferences in the
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Nor is it absurd for a court, with due caution for the limitations
of legislative history, 2 7 to attempt to grasp the concept or concepts
in the minds of legislators in an effort either to verify its intuitions
about the plain meaning of the language of a statute or to clarify
plain meaning where the court is unsure of its intuitions."0 The degree
to which a court that makes such an effort can be confident of its con-
clusions is no doubt a matter of the volume and quality of the evidence
from which it infers subjective intent, but the possibility of low volume
and questionable quality does not guarantee that the object of the ef-
fort is illusory.
Shared concepts in the minds of legislators at the time of enact-
ment must be distinguished from the hopes or wants of individual
legislators regarding legal results in particular cases yet to be decided,
even if the evidence of legislative history includes statements about
the proper resolution under a proposed statute of cases closely
resembling a case before a court post-enactment.' The subjective
intent of Congress in the form it is used here is that meaning or sense
in which legislators expected the words used to be understood;210 it
minds of legislators. See United States R.R. Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166,
179 (1980).
207. See DICKERSON, supra note 7, at 137-97.
208. Although it is sometimes said that extrinsic evidence of legislative intent
will be examined only where ambiguity is discovered, Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert
Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 395-97 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring), the ease with
which ambiguity may be discovered or manufactured renders the statement a ques-
tionable description of judicial practice. See United States v. American Trucking Assoc.,
Inc., 310 U.S. 534 (1940); Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die: The "Plain Meaning" Rule
And Statutory Interpretation In The "Modern" Federal Courts 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1299,
1315 (1975).
209. See de Sloovere, Extrinsic Aids In the Interpretation of Statutes, 88 U. PA.
L. REV. 527 (1940). Cf. Landis, supra note 8, at 887 n.5 (legislature's hypothetical provides
basis for reasoning from similarities).
210. See Forum of Principle, supra note 71, at 483-84; MacCallum, supra note
156, at 757-63. Dworkin relies on Grice for this formulation of one of the alternative
psychological states he discusses. See Grice, Utterer's Meaning and Intentions, 78 PHIL.
REV. 147 (1969); Grice, supra note 44, at 225; Grice,Meaning, 66 PHIL. REV. 377 (1957). In over-
simplified form, Grice argues that the meaning of a speaker's statement is the effect
the speaker intended the statement to have on an audience-e.g., the beliefs the speaker
intended to induce in an audience. Dworkin treats this notion as the speaker's expec-
tations about what an audience would understand a speaker would have expected it
to understand. Forum of Principle, supra note 71, at 483-84. He also appears to treat the
notion as synonymous with or at least similar to "abstract meaning" or "concept" and
therefore perhaps as similar to ultimate legislative purpose. See id. at 489-90. It is however
doubtful that Grice was referring to the ultimate objectives of a speaker. See Moore, supra
note 34, at 250-51. As used here, expectations refer neither to "hopes" about particular
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is not the will of Congress regarding the proper legal result in the
case before a court post-enactment. The latter understanding of sub-
jective intent suffers both from the evidentiary difficulty that there
is seldom evidence of what Congress thought to be the proper legal
result in a case before the court post-enactment and from the difficulty
that the hopes or wants of individual legislators regarding particular
applications of a statute are of problematic value in understanding
a collectively enacted text.
A legislative history which includes statements about resolution
of hypothetical cases under a statute is useful as evidence of the sense
in which the Congress used statutory language for the reason that
examples are often helpful as a means of communicating an
understanding."' That such cases are also evidence of a sponsor's or
committee's hopes about hypothetical applications of a statute known
to Congress at the time of enactment should not divert attention from
the version of subjective legislative intent that more often than leg-
islative hopes has plausible content; legislators can share an understand-
ing of the sense in which proposed statutory language is used, even if
they disagree about the potential significance of that language in the
context of potential facts.212
Shared concepts in the minds of legislators at the time of enact-
ment must also be distinguished from legislative purpose understood
as aim or objective. It is arguable that aims or objectives, because
often stated in sufficiently abstract terms to ensure agreement about
aims, are shared concepts in the minds of legislators."' Indeed, shared
aims, like hypothetical applications postulated in legislative history,
are evidence of the sense in which legislators expected statutory
language to be understood. Legislative objectives are nevertheless far
more abstract than the relatively concrete sense in which legislators
expect the statutory language used will be understood. Neither shared
aims nor shared expectations constitute an intent about the correct
application of a statute to the facts of a case before a court post-
enactment. But a shared expectation about how statutory language
will be understood is normally more concrete than a shared objective,"'
applications nor to ultimate ends; it is a notion both more concrete than objectives
and more abstract than a hope regarding particular applications.
211. Cf. A Note on Statutory Interpretation, supra note 8, at 887 n.5 (Court
may reason from legislature's hypothetical cases in applying a statute).
212. See MacCallum, supra note 156, at 771-75.
213. See LEVY, supra note 113, at 30-32.
214. But cf. Forum of Principle, supra note 71, at 489 (apparently treating ex-
pectation as abstract intent).
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because statutes which do more than delegate broad lawmaking
authority to an administrative agency or court establish the means
by which objectives are to be achieved, and these means are often
indirect and inefficacious.215 Indeed, shared aims may be inconsistent
with shared expectations because the abstract terms in which aims
are formulated often ensure that a statute is enacted to serve objec-
tives which are incompatible in the context of particular cases.
If it is correct to believe it plausible that legislators can collec-
tively share expectations about how statutory language will be
understood, that legislators can collectively share an understanding
of the abstract objectives of legislation, and that a court may infer
these expectations and understandings from available evidence, there
is nevertheless a difficulty presented, not by the implausibility of sub-
jective legislative intent, but from the necessity of choice between
plausible intents. At a minimum, a court confronted with credible
evidence of legislative expectations must choose between those
expectations and legislative aims as potential reference points in
application of a statute in the context of the facts of particular cases.
The hypothetical Equal Pay Act case illustrates each of these
points. Either of the postulated legislative states of mind, the intent
to insist upon the equal work standard and the aim of precluding
governmental regulation of pay equity, are plausible interpretations
of the legislative history of the Equal Pay Act. Indeed, it seems
probable that congressmen had both concepts in their minds at the
time of passage, and it seems probable that at least most never con-
templated a case in which these intentions might lead to distinct
results. Both concepts are, moreover, subjective legislative intents in
the only sense in which intent can be a fact discovered by a court:
215. The Burger Court's treatment of implied private causes of action sug-
gests the point made in the text. Its fairly consistent refusal to imply private causes
of action from regulatory statutes reflects (1) an unwillingness to assume that incomplete
legislative schemes may be made more rational, reasonable and just by judicial sup-
plementation without upsetting the "irrationality" of the legislative compromise com-
prising such legislation; (2) a distrust of the Court's capacity to determine an appropriate
level of enforcement; (3) an assumption that the incomplete character of the statutory
text conveys a message of incompleteness not to be altered absent some clear evidence
of a contrary congressional assumption; and (4) a notion, derived expressly from separa-
tion of powers doctrine, that the legitimate scope of statutory enforcement is the scope,
however incomplete or ineffectual, "democratically" determined. See, e.g., Middlesex
County Sewage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n., 453 U.S. 1 (1981); California
v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981); TransAmerica Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis, 444
U.S. 11 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979); Universities
Research Ass'n. v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754 (1981); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National
Ass'n. of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, (1974).
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they are characterizations inferred from available evidence. It is true
that neither concept constitutes the legislature's subjective will regard-
ing the resolution of the case before the Court, and it may therefore
be permissible to claim that a court looks to legislative history to
discover what the statute means rather than what the legislature
meant," 8 but it is at least difficult to treat the thing inferred as other
than an intent."1 ' Furthermore, both concepts supply reasons for
adopting one or another interpretation of the Equal Pay Act. It is
true that the Court must choose between interpretations of the statute
and between alternative characterizations of the subjective intent of
the Congress in the hypothetical case. But this truth does not alter
the further descriptive truth that the Court might choose to treat
the subjective intent it selects as the more probable intent or even
the more moral intent as a good reason for its decision because it
is the subjective intent of the legislature.
The final point illustrated by the hypothetical case is that the
problem of application is not resolved by adopting an interpretation
of the Equal Pay Act, even an interpretation supported by reference
to subjective intent. Subjective intent could resolve the problem of
an application only if it could be shown that the Congress had a
collective intent about the proper resolution of the problem whether
the flight attendants in question may sue the airline in question.
Application continues to require an argument by which the facts of
the case are characterized as within or without the meaning assigned
the statute by interpretation. Indeed, the Burger Court's notion that
statutory language is the best evidence of congressional intent may
be read as a recognition that the problem of application is not resolved
by assigning a meaning to statutory language, even if that assign-
ment entails a reference to subjective intent.218 That is, the notion
may be read as a rejection of the possibility that Congress had a
discoverable "will" with respect to the case at hand and therefore
as relying instead on the Court's sense of the meaning of statutory
language as that meaning is informed by congressional intent inferred
from legislative history.
(b) The Normative Objection
If the preceding argument has validity, there is a descriptively
viable content to subjective legislative intent. On that assumption,
216. See Holmes, supra note 44, at 418, 419.
217. See de Sloovere, The Equity and Reason of a Statute, 21 CORNELL L. 0.
591, 599-600 (1936); de Sloovere, supra note 139, at 542-43.
218. Cf. Moore, supra note 34, at 268 n.249 (one can be sure of legislative agree-
ment only with respect to the words of the statute itself).
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the normative question must be confronted: ought subjective legislative
intent be treated as a good reason for an interpretation? In large
measure, the force of the normative attack on subjective intent has
been dissipated by the descriptive argument made above. Only a com-
mitted ideologue of one stripe or another could characterize either
the intent to insist upon the equal work standard of the Equal Pay
Act or the aim of precluding government regulation of questions of
pay equity a mere whim of the sovereign not entitled to be
characterized as law. Moreover, the descriptive argument recognizes
the necessity of judicial inference and choice and the reality of judicial
argument from an inferred legislative intent to an interpretation of
a statute. To the extent that the normative argument against subjec-
tive intent is an objection to a judiciary passively complying with a
legislative sovereign's will regarding the resolution of a particular case,
the descriptive argument presented here in support of subjective
intent excludes such passivity as a possibility.
However, there may be more to the normative argument than
this. The normative argument may be formulated as an objection to
the treatment of subjective legislative intent as a good reason for
an interpretation: law consists of the statute, not the intents underly-
ing the statute;219 if intent or purpose is a part of the interpretive
enterprise, the concept of law requires that intent or purpose be
attributed by the judge rather than discovered in the whims of
legislators." If this is the normative argument, it adopts a peculiarly
narrow definition of law 1 undeniably inconsistent with the purported
practice of the Burger Court.
The hypothesized Equal Pay Act case illustrates both the Burger
Court's practice and the broader definition of law implicit in its
normative view. The probable Burger Court interpretation2" of the
Equal Pay Act is that the plain meaning of the statute requires equal
work and that this plain meaning is supported by a congressional
intent to insist upon the equal work standard as a bulwark against
government attempts at regulating pay equity. The Court's probable
219. There is one sense in which this claim is unassailable: legislative intent
should not be employed as the basis for decision if it is inconsistent with the statute
as written because the legislature can only speak by constitutional means, and the
constitutional means of communication is enactment. See Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit
Products, Inc., 322 U.S. 607, 617 (1944).
220. See Moore, supra note 34, at 257-65; Statutory Interpretation, supra note
12, at 871.
221. See DICKERSON, supra note 7 at 75; HURST. supra note 48 at 38-40.
222. See County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 181-204 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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application of the statute in the hypothetical case is that pilots and
flight attendants clearly engage in work involving unequal effort, skill
and responsibility, that the inequality in fact of their work is sup-
ported by the job evaluation they introduced as evidence, and that
a job evaluation criterion for determining the equality question is sup-
ported by legislative history indicating a congressional intent to
incorporate the peculiar standards of job evaluation."3
Four important aspects of this hypothesized analysis should be
noticed. First, the analysis emphasizes the ordinary meaning of
language and supplements ordinary meaning with references to
legislative intent consistent with that meaning. Second, the analysis
ignores the "absurd result" that flight attendants are precluded from
attempting to prove intentional sex discrimination"' in favor of giving
effect to the equal work standard and the perceived congressional
intent underlying that standard. Third, the analysis has both a mean-
ing ascertainment component influenced by a characterization of sub-
jective congressional intent (the statute requires equality of work, not
merely the absence of a threat of government regulation) and an
implicit application component not resolved by reference to the
necessary meaning of the words of a statute (there is no guarantee
that the factual characteristics of pilot and flight attendant jobs are
within or without the meaning of the word "equal"). 5 Application is
nevertheless aided by reference to congressional intent; job evalua-
tion standards or practices supply a criterion for judging the ques-
tion of the equality of the factual characteristics of the two jobs.
Finally, even the congressional intent to incorporate job evalua-
tion standards merely aids judgment regarding the question of
application by narrowing the potential range of meanings to be
assigned the word "equal" in the statute. It does not guarantee that
pilot jobs and flight attendant jobs are unequal. The task of applica-
tion therefore remains a function of a judgment structured by the
meaning assigned the word "equal" by the process of ascertaining
meaning-perhaps by a judgment derived by means of a shared
perception that pilot jobs and flight attendant jobs are within some
core of the meaning of the word "unequal" as that core is understood
by a "community" of job evaluators.
223. See Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 201-10 (1974).
224. See County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 178-79 (1981).
225. With respect to the distinction between meaning and application, see supra
notes 56, 139. With respect to the claim that a statement of legislative intent is not
self executing in its application to the facts of a case see Moore, supra note 34, at 269-70.
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What distinguishes the hypothesized analysis of the Burger Court
from the analysis implicit in the extreme version of the normative
anti-subjectivism argument is that the latter would insist that the
court supply the intent or purpose which informs the meaning of the
statute. A court is to supply intent by discovering the intention in
a statute (as opposed to discovering the legislature's motivation)
through a hermeneutic process of determining the intention or inten-
tions which would rationally fit the words of the statute."' A court
is to supply purpose by attributing to the statute a function within
the system of law-an attribution requiring a set of normative assump-
tions about the objectives of that system.27
The use of supplied intent and supplied purpose in the anti-
subjectivism argument is the use of discovered subjective intent in
the Burger Court's argument: supplied intent and supplied purpose
provide good reasons for choosing one interpretation of the meaning
of a statute over another and provide a guide to application by stating
a goal or objective of the statute which application should further.
Supplied intent and purpose, like discovered intent and purpose, do
not guarantee that the facts of a case fall within or without the
statute. 8 For example, a supplied purpose of precluding government
regulation of questions of pay equity does not itself permit a conclu-
sion either that permitting flight attendants to claim sex discrimina-
tion in compensation will or that it will not entail government regula-
tion of pay equity because the term "regulation" itself has no necessary
meaning which guarantees that the flight attendant's lawsuit falls out-
side that meaning.
The hermeneutic process of determining the intention in a statute
by determining which intention rationally fits the statute is not
inconsistent with Burger Court methodology. Indeed, it appears essen-
tial to the Burger Court's claim that the language of the statute pro-
vides the best evidence of legislative intent. But the Burger Court
at least purports to discover the function of a statute within the
normative suppositions of the legislature by deriving a subjective
intent from legislative history; its normative view precludes an
226. See Moore, supra note 34, at 258-61. Moore identifies Learned Hand and
Justice Frankfurter as proponents of this view. Id. at 262 n.242, citing L. HAND, THE
BILL OF RIGHTS 19 (1958); Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47
COLUM. L. REV. 527, 538-39 (1947). It is however, possible to read Hand as more subjec-
tivist in his approach than Moore suggests. See L. Hand, How Far is a Judge Free
in Rendering a Decision? in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY, 103-110 (3d ed. enl. 1960).
227. See Moore, supra note 34, at 263-64.
228. Id. at 270 n.252.
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attribution of purpose founded upon of the function of a statute within
a court's version of the "good society."
In a sense, of course, this claim cannot stand; the Court must
choose between the plausible legislative intents it discovers in
legislative history, must argue from the intent it chooses to an inter-
pretation of the meaning of or range of concepts within the meaning
of the statute, and must argue from that meaning to an application
of the statute to the facts of the case. But the claim can stand as
a claim about evidence of the normative suppositions of the Congress,
and therefore can stand as a claim to fact finding as fact finding is
understood in the judicial process-as inference derived from a balance
of probabilities. And because it can make these descriptive claims,
it can make the further claim that, while the whim of the legislature
is not law, evidence of the normative suppositions of the legislature
should constitute the basis upon which the function of a statute is
determined.
The normative claim of extreme versions of the critique of sub-
jectivism is that the legislature's understanding of the good society
is to be excluded from the definition of law; the judge ought to assign
a function to the statute within his version of the good society. '29 The
difficulty with this claim is that judicial attribution of purpose mistakes
the value structure underlying the judiciary as an institution for law
properly defined. That mistake is fundamentally at war with the notion
of legislative supremacy precisely because the inherent difficulties of
determining the legislative will revealed by the descriptive critique
of subjectivism compel a series of judicial choices. Those choices are
highly susceptible to justification within the rhetoric of the judicial
method-the rhetoric of rationalty, consistency and principle."' One
difficulty with the rhetoric of the judicial method is that it is no more
valid as a description than the rhetoric of judicial passivity in the
application of the will of the legislature. That judges ought to seek
a rational order of internally consistent neutral principle is perhaps
a wholesome objective; that the actual process can be divorced from
the political persuasion of real judges is questionable. 3 '
There is a more fundamental difficulty with the rhetoric of
judicial method: it is a rhetoric, even understood as an unattainable
goal to be continuously sought, inconsistent with the mechanism of
229. See id. at 263-64.
230. See HART & SACKS. supra note 15, at 1410-17.
231. See, e.g., Nowak, supra note 34. But see infra text accompanying notes
316-413.
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legislative compromise. The normative suppositions of the legislature
can emphatically not be described in terms of internally consistent
neutral principle. 3 ' The rationality of the legislative process is the
rationality of the often internally inconsistent political bargain. To
define law in a fashion which ignores the rationality of the political
bargain is to defeat the notion of legislative supremacy because the
very difficulties identified by the descriptive critique of subjectivism
present opportunities for the truimph of the rhetoric of judicial method
in the guise of interpretation.2" Attribution of purpose understood
as the characterization of a statutory function by reference to the
judge's view of the good society"4 renders this defeat explicit:
statutory meaning is a matter of judge's meaning. The notion of
legislative supremacy thereby becomes estranged, if not divorced, from
the operative definition of law.
The definition of law is itself a normative matter; one cannot
"disprove" a definition under which the notion of legislative supremacy
is estranged. Nevertheless legislative supremacy is a generally shared
value rendering a definition of law, under which courts seek self con-
sciously to minimize estrangement through approximation of a
"legislative will," not out of order as a definition. Nor, of course, is
a definition which divorces legislative supremacy from law. But such
a definition cannot exclude its competition by definitional fiat; it is
merely a competitor.
3. Legislative Intent As Immediate Intent And Legislative
Purpose As Ultimate Purpose: Of Means, Ends, Attribution
and Discovery
In the hypothesized Equal Pay Act case discussed above, it was
argued that the Burger Court would choose an interpretation that would
preclude the flight attendant's cause of action for failure to satisfy the
equal work criterion of the statute. This interpretation would be sup-
ported in part by choosing the subjective legislative intent that emphas-
ized the equal work requirement as a bulwark against governmental reg-
ulation of questions of pay equity. The Burger Court would therefore
reject an interpretation of the statute which would treat the equal work
criterion as a nonmandatory device for achieving the purpose of
precluding such government regulation. The rejected alternative would
232. See supra text accompanying notes 99-100.
233. See Posner, supra note 4, at 819-20.
234. See Moore, supra note 34, at 263-64.
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give effect to the congressional intents both to prohibit discrimination
and to preclude regulation of questions of pay equity by permitting the
flight attendant's action to proceed and by precluding use of external
standards for the valuation of unequal work."'
The Burger Court's choice may be described as "literalism" in
the sense that the plain meaning of the equal work requirement is
enforced under it. The alternative choice may be described as pur-
posive in the sense that the objectives, goals or purposes of the Equal
Pay Act are the touchstones for decision under it. The Burger Court's
choice enforces the immediate intent of the Congress or the means
selected by Congress to achieve the ultimate objectives sought by
Congress. The alternative choice enforces directly the ultimate objec-
tives of the statute.
238
It is possible to question this distinction between statutory means
and statutory ends by exploiting ambiguities in the notions of pur-
pose and subjective intent. Purposive interpretation," a methodology
traceable to Heydon's Case,' assigns meaning to a statute by reference
to the evil thought to have been targeted by the legislature or to
the objective sought by Congress and determines application of a
statute to the facts of particular cases by reference to whether the
targeted evil is present in the case or whether the congressional
objective would be furthered by application. 9 Interpretation and
application by reference to purpose may be characterized as inter-
pretation and application by reference to the subjective intent of the
Congress in the sense that the evil targeted or objective sought, as
these are established by legislative history, are evidence of the sense
235. See County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
236. See Cox, supra note 200, at 106-114.
237. See, e.g., HART & SACKS, supra note 15, at 1413-17; Fuller, supra note 44,
at 669; Middle Road, supra note 5, at 796-800.
238. 30 Co. 7a, 76 Eng. Rep. 637 (Exchequer 1584):
[Flor the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general . . . four
things are to be discerned and considered:
1st. What was the common law before the making of the Act.
2nd. What was the mischief and defect for which the common law
did not provide.
3rd. What remedy the Parliament both resolved and appointed to
cure the disease of the commonwealth.
And 4th. The true reason of the remedy; and then the office of
all the judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the
mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and
evasions for continuance of the mischief, and pro privato commado, and
to add force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent
of the makers of the Act, pro bono publico.
239. Some theorists have argued that language conveys no meaning except
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in which Congress expected statutory language to be understood. 4 °
Indeed, one argument favoring purposive interpretation is premised
on the notion that legislators are more likely to be aware of and con-
cerned with the general aims of a statute than the details of a statute
in voting for or against it. 41 The Burger Court's interpretive strategy
is in this sense arguably purposive: it seeks to enforce the purpose
the equal work language of the Equal Pay Act "will bear" by inferr-
ing a purpose to prophylactically preclude regulation of pay equity
by means of an equal work requirement.
However, purposive interpretation and application may also be
characterized as resting on the purpose or purposes attributed to the
legislature by a court.42 Attribution of purpose is itself an ambiguous
notion. It may be taken to mean the court's "guess" about the pur-
pose entertained by the legislature,24 in which case it resembles an
inquiry into subjective intent in the sense suggested above,24 ' or it
may be taken to mean the function assigned the statute within a
court's perception of the good society,2 5 in which case purpose has
little to do with what the Congress did and much to do with what
a court wants the statute to do. Finally, attribution may be taken
to mean merely what must be conceded: a court is, necessarily deeply
engaged in the selection and characterization of statutory purpose even
where it seeks honestly to discover or infer purpose from the evidence
when considered in light of the purpose with which it is employed. See Fuller, supra
note 44, at 669; Llewellyn, supra note 12, at 400; Middle Road, supra note 5, at 763.
Cf. THE AIMS OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 3, at 67-68; (meaning is ultimately a matter
of speaker's intention rather than convention). Grice, supra note 210 (meaning of a sentence
is an utterance, utterance meaning is speaker's meaning and speaker's meaning is speaker's
intention).
The counterargument is that words have conventional meanings, or, at least,
ranges of conventional meanings, independent of speaker's meaning. See Black, Mean-
ing and Intention: An Examination of Grice's Views, 4 NEw LITERARY HIST. 257 (1973); Mac-
Callum, supra note 156, at 757-58; Moore, supra note 34, at 252-53.
240. This version of purpose is synonymous with the version of subjective intent
advocated here earlier. See supra text accompanying notes 186-218.
241. See HART & SACKS, supra note 15, at 1285-86.
242. See id. at 1413-17.
243. See HAND. THE BILL OF RIGHTS. supra note 226, at 19; Frankfurter, supra
note 226, at 544.
244. See supra text accompanying notes 186-218.
245. See Moore, supra note 34, at 263-65. Cf. R. KEETON, VENTURING To Do
JUSTICE 82 (1969); "I do not understand Hart and Sacks to imply that the purpose to be
attributed to the statute need be one that was or even could have been consciously
formulated at the time the statute was enacted." The ambiguity of attribution in the
Hart and Sacks scheme is suggested by the varying views of commentators on this
point. Compare KEETON with Middle Road, supra note 5, at 785.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 19, No. 2 [1985], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol19/iss2/1
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
of legislative history; given such an honest search, a court cannot
behave as a passive conduit for legislative intent."'
These ambiguities are complicated by the fact that there are
multiple congressional purposes and intents falling both within ver-
tical hierarchies of generality and abstraction and within horizontal
spectrums at any given level of generality and abstraction."7 This is
no less true of discovered or inferred subjective intent than of
attributed purpose. In the hypothesized Equal Pay Act case, it may
be inferred that Congress intended, in descending vertical order, to
(1) achieve justice in compensation for women, (2) prohibit disparate
treatment of women in compensation, or (3) equalize male and female
compensation within equivalent jobs. Congress simultaneously intended
a parallel vertical hierarchy of intents: (1) to preclude governmental
regulation of compensation, (2) to preclude governmental regulation
of compensation standards, or (3) to preclude governmental regula-
tion of compensation standards outside equal work factual contexts.
A court relying on subjective intent, like a court relying on
attributed purpose, must choose between hierarchies and must choose
which level within a given hierarchy it will employ in argument. When
these choices are viewed in the light of the ambiguities of the distinc-
tion between discovered or inferred intent and attributed purpose,
it is at least difficult to conclude that the distinction between the
means selected by Congress and the goals sought by Congress is more
than a matter of rhetorical characterization.
It is nevertheless the contention here that the characterization
has content and reflects normative distinctions between versions of
an interpretive strategy that relies on subjective intent and an inter-
pretive strategy that relies on attributed purpose. This contention rests
initially on the distinction between interpretation as ascertaining mean-
ing and interpretation as application of a statute to the facts of particular
cases.
248
As was argued here earlier, the Burger Court tends to rely on
subjective congressional intent to inform and very often to confirm
246. A court's perception of intent or purpose is highly influenced by its con-
scious or unconscious perceptions of the good society even when it conceives of its
function as ascertaining the intent or purpose entertained in fact by the Congress.
To the extent that judges are capable of suspending their value systems in favor of
the attempt to discover intent or purpose outside themselves, the task is in at least
degree a matter of inferring purpose or intent from more or less probative evidence.
See HART & SACKS, supra note 15, at 1413.
247. See, e.g., HART & SACKS, supra note 15, at 1414; Statutory Interpretation, supra
note 12, at 876; Landis, supra note 8, at 785-822; Moore, supra note 34, at 250-51.
248. See supra text accompanying notes 56, 139.
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or support its perception of the "plain meaning" of statutory language;
it does not treat such an intent as the intended resolution of the case
before it in the mind of the legislature at the time of enactment."9
Although the Burger Court occasionally employs subjective legislative
intent in the sense suggested by Heydon's CaseY -to determine
whether application or nonapplication of the statute to the case before
it would further that intent or preclude the evil or mischief targeted
by the statute151 - it more often treats the facts of the case before
it as within or without the "plain meaning" of the statute as that
meaning has, in part by reference to legislative intent, been
determined." Such a tendency is the basis for the charge of literalism.
Even in those instances in which the Burger Court applies a statute
by means of a Heydon's Case methodology, it tends to define the
intended objective or mischief targeted in terms of the meaning it
has assigned to statutory language as the plain meaning of that
language rather than in terms of the ultimate objectives or aims of
the statute."
These tendencies are in stark contrast to purposive interpreta-
tion understood as attributed purpose. United Steelworkers v. Weber
illustrates this point. Weber involved a challenge to a racial preference
in an affirmative action plan negotiated by an employer and a union.
Under that plan, fifty percent of available positions in a craft train-
ing program maintained by the employer were set aside for black
workers. The remaining positions were filled on the basis of worker
seniority. The plan was challenged by a white worker excluded from
the training program who had greater seniority than black workers
admitted to the program but insufficient seniority to successfully bid
for non-black positions in the program. The plaintiffs challenge was
primarily predicated on Section 703(d) of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice . . . to
discriminate against any individual because of his race...
249. See supra note 218, and accompanying text.
250. 30 Co. 7a, 76 Eng. Rep. 637 (Exchequer 1584). See supra note 238.
251. See, e.g., First Nat'l. Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981); United
Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975); NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412
U.S. 67 (1973); Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582 (1973).
252. See, e.g., Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807 (1980); Aaron v. S.E.C., 446 U.S.
680 (1980); Potomac Electric Power Co. v. Director, OWCP, 449 U.S. 268 (1980); Mobil Oil
Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618 (1978).
253. See Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 815-24 (1980); Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1977). But see First Nat'l. Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB,
452 U.S. 666 (1981), discussed supra at text accompanying notes 134-35.
254. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
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in admission to, or employment in, any program established
to provide apprenticeship or other training."'5
A Supreme Court majority, in an opinion written by Justice
Brennan, rejected the challenge in a two step analysis. First, although
a literal reading of Section 703(d) would prohibit the program, "a thing
may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute,
because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers."' -
Second, the primary congressional concern in enacting the statute,
as evidenced by legislative history, was to improve the relative
economic position of blacks by opening employment opportunities in
occupations traditionally closed to them. 57 As the challenged program
was designed to achieve this end by opening opportunities in tradi-
tionally segregated craft work positions, it was not within the spirit
or intent of the prohibition."
Justice Rehnquist's dissent addressed each of the majority's
points. First, the plain language of Section 703(d) prohibited the
challenged program: the plaintiff was denied admission to the pro-
gram "because of' his race.259 Second, the legislative history indicated
that Congress meant what Section 703(d)'s plain language says;'
sponsors and supporters of the legislation repeatedly responded to
the contentions of opponents of the legislation that it would require
255. 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-2(d) (1976).
256. 443 U.S. at 201 (quoting from Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143
U.S. 457, 459 (1982)).
257. Id. at 202-03.
258. See, id. at 204. The majority further argued that Congress addressed the
question of racial preferences in Section 703(j) of Title VII by providing that nothing
in Title VII "shall be interpreted to require any employer ... to grant preferential
treatment . . . because of a racial imbalance in [a] workforce." 443 U.S. at 205-06. See
42 U.S.C. S 2000e-2(j) (1976). Because Section 703(j) did not provide that Title VII was
not to be interpreted to "permit" racial preferences to correct racial imbalance in a
workforce, "[tlhe natural inference is that Congress chose not to forbid all voluntary
race-conscious affirmative action." 443 U.S. at 206. This "natural inference" was thought
by the majority to be confirmed by legislative history indicating that Section 703(j)
wa enacted to satisfy the demands of those congressmen who feared excessive regula-
tion of management prerogatives. Id. As the challenged program had been voluntarily
adopted rather than governmentally imposed, it fell within the congressional "choice"
not to prohibit voluntary affirmative action. Id.
On the question of the accuracy of the majority's characterization of the volun-
tary nature of the challenged plan, see Cox, The Question of "Voluntary" Racial Employ-
ment Quotas And Some Thought On Judicial Role, 23 ARIz. L. REV. 87 (1981). For the
dissenting opinion's response to the majority's argument, see note 261 infra.
259. 443 U.S. at 220 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
260. Id. at 226-52.
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racial preferences by stating that the statute prohibited preferences
favoring any race. 61
The Burger Court's approach to the questions of meaning and
application is represented by Justice Rehnquist's dissent; the alter-
native, purposive, approach is represented by Justice Brennan's
majority opinion. The differences between the approaches are real
and important."2
Both opinions purport to rely on subjective legislative intent
inferred from legislative history, and the characterizations of intent
in both opinions are largely accurate. It is quite likely that supporters
of the legislation intended to improve the relative economic position
of blacks by opening employment opportunities to them. It is however
equally likely that supporters of the legislation intended to prohibit
261. Id. at 248.
Justice Rehnquist further argued that Section 703(j) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. S
2000e-2(j) (1976), was inserted into the legislation to confirm the view of Title VII's
sponsors that racial preferences were not required by Title VII and that the possibility
of voluntary preferences was precluded both by the prohibitory provisions of the Act,
including Section 703(d), and by the claims of those same sponsors that preferences
were precluded by the Act. It was therefore unnecessary to include the term "per-
mit" in Section 703(j). 443 U.S. at 252-53.
262. It is possible to view the difference between the substantive conclusions
reached in the two opinions as a matter of the meaning each assigns the term
"discrimination" in the statute. That term may either be understood as referring to
intentional discrimination (disparate treatment) or as referring to any employer's failure
to achieve a distribution of employment opportunities to racial groups proportionate
to the representation of such groups in the population. See, generally Fiss, A Theory
of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. Cm. L. REV. 235, 237-40 (1971). On this view, the ma-
jority opinion in Weber treats discrimination as referring to disproportionate results
and the dissenting opinion in Weber treats discrimination as referring to disparate
treatment. Cf. Civil Rights Act, supra note 4 (arguing that Weber involved an issue
of a choice between "political theories" of this character, either of which arguably
"fits" Title VII).
There is support in Supreme Court case law both for a disproportionate results
understanding of discrimination, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), and
for a disparate treatment understanding of discrimination. McDonald v. Sante Fe Trail
Transportation Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976). The question posed by Weber, however, was
whether an employer and union could comply with a prohibition of disproportionate results
by means of disparate treatment. Section 703(j) of Title VII would preclude, even under
the majority opinion in Weber, mandatory disparate treatment to achieve proportion.
See supra note 258. And the Court has in other contexts concluded that "voluntary"
disparate treatment to achieve proportion is unlawful. See Arizona Governing Com-
mittee v. Norris, 103 S. Ct. 3492 (1983); Los Angeles Dep't. of Water & Power v.
Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978). Moreover, neither Justice Brennan, who wrote the majority
opinion in Weber, nor Justice Rehnquist, who wrote the dissent in Weber, has been
consistent in their choice of meanings for the term "discrimination." See, e.g., Connec-
ticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982) (Brennan, J., majority opinion) (declining to recognize
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consideration of race in employment decisions and that the prohibi-
tion was perceived as applicable to all races.2" Although there is
evidence in the legislative history that major supporters of the legisla-
tion represented to their fellow congressmen that racial preferences
designed to maintain racial balance would be prohibited by Title VII,'
it is perhaps a fair characterization of that history that a voluntary,
remedial program designed to open employment opportunity in tradi-
tionally segregated employment positions was not specifically
addressed."5
The crucial distinction between the Brennan and Rehnquist
opinions in Weber is the use made of these various intents. Brennan's
majority opinion rests on the most generalized and abstract of the
alternative intents legitimately inferrable from the legislative
history-the intent to improve the relative economic position of blacks
by opening employment opportunities. That opinion then employs this
intent in the classic mode of purposive interpretation: because the
challenged program furthered the objective of the statute, its pro-
hibition was not intended. In the terminology of Heydon's Case, the
mischief targeted by the statute was barriers to black employment
opportunity, and the challenged program was not within this mischief
because it did not entail such a barrier. What is interesting in this
tactic is that it ignores the question of meaning in favor of the ques-
tion of application. Brennan's opinion dismisses the language of Section
703(d) as the mere "letter" of the statute and proceeds to the ques-
tion whether legislative objectives would or would not be furthered
by application of the statute's prohibition to the program in question.'
proportionate distribution of promotion opportunities as a defense to disparate impact
liability); General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (majority opinion by
Rehnquist, J.) (rejecting a disparate treatment claim where employer's benefit plan
proportionately distributed benefits to men and women as groups).
In view of these inconsistencies, the claim that Weber involved an issue of a
fundamental choice between plausible conceptions of the concept of discrimination, Civil
Rights Act, supra note 4, is of doubtful viability. Because the justices who composed
the majority in Weber would a least generally treat the term "discrimination" in the
statute as including the disparate treatment conception, that opinion is best understood
as an instance in which the Court chose to enforce its understanding of ultimate
statutory aims in preference to its understanding of the means chosen by Congress
to achieve those aims.
263. See 443 U.S. at 239-52 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
264. See 443 U.S. at 238 (Rehnquist J., dissenting).
265. See Schatzki, United Steelworkers v. Weber: An Exercise in Understandable
Indecision, 56 WASH. L. REv. 56, 66-67 (1980).
266. See 443 U.S. at 201-04.
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By contrast, Rehnquist's dissent begins with the "letter" of the
statutory language, assigns that language a meaning and resorts to
legislative history in an effort to support that meaning. It is true that
Rehnquist treats the program in issue as within the mischief targeted
by the statute and therefore relies on the congressional intent to pro-
hibit racial discrimination understood as disparate treatment as an
argument favoring application of the prohibition to the facts of the
case, but this argument was not made in Rehnquist's opinion in the
form of the efficacy of application in furthering congressional objec-
tives. It was made, rather, in the form of a virtual restatement of
the statutory language: the program in question is a racial preference
within the congressional intent to prohibit discrimination. In the ter-
minology of Heydon's Case, the "mischief' targeted by the statute was
racial discrimination, and the program in issue entailed racial
discrimination simplicitor.1
17
Contrasts between Brennan's approach and Rehnquist's approach
in Weber are evident as well in the distinction between attributed
purpose and discovered or inferred intent. Although both approaches
relied on legislative history and made legitimate claims to support
from subjective congressional intent, there are significant differences
in the levels of generality and abstraction selected by the justices
and therefore significant differences in the degree to which it may
be said that the intents relied upon in the opinions were either
attributed or discovered.
The source of both the abstract intent employed by Brennan and
the more concrete intent employed by Rehnquist was the legislative
history; both justices legitimately claimed that the intent they favored
was entertained by Congress and discovered in the record left by Con-
gress. Moreover, both justices had a choice of intents; neither intent
can be said to have constituted the true intent or sole relevant intent
except by reference to some normative scheme by which truth and
relevance might be judged. If judicial discretion can be confined, it
is confined by a consistently applied normative scheme by which an
appropriate level of abstraction is defined-a normative scheme itself
but one of several alternatives from which a choice must be made.
But a consistent choice of abstract and general intent-the ultimate
aims or objectives of the statute in Brennan's opinion in Weber-leaves
far more room for an application of a statute consistent with a court's
view of how a statute is to fit within its vision of the good society
than a consistent choice of the ordinary meaning of statutory language
as the best evidence of congressional intent.
267. See 443 U.S. at 220 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 19, No. 2 [1985], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol19/iss2/1
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
This claim should not be understood as suggesting that judicial
discretion is confined by a choice of concrete intent and unconfined
by a choice of abstract intent. The fact that there is choice compels
a conclusion that there is an inevitable judicial discretion. The argu-
ment that courts attribute purposes to statutes, if understood as an
argument that courts have a choice in every case between concrete
congressional intent and abstract congressional intent is therefore
unassailable. Under that understanding, the Burger Court no doubt
always attributes purposes by selecting among alternative intents
discovered in legislative history.
There is however a sense in which attribution of purpose does
not mean merely recognition of judicial choice; it may also be
understood as a reference to the degree to which a court is free from
the constraints of the statute in applying that statute to achieve its
objectives. A court attributes purpose in this sense when it conceives
of its task as resolving the case before it in the manner best calculated
to accomplish the aims it discovers and quite legitimately characterizes
as the intent of Congress. Such a court employs a presumption that
Congress acted "reasonably" in passing legislation;268 the general and
abstract objectives of legislation are likely to be thought reasonable
from both legislative and judicial perspectives. And such a court is
thereby freed of the problems posed by the "letter" of the statute
where the letter seems incompatible with the efficacious pursuit of
statutory aims.269 Purpose is attributed rather than discovered by such
a court because, although the source of the court's characterization
of the aim of the statute may well be legislative history, the statute
is applied as if it were an internally consistent, rational instrument
for achieving that aim.
The difficulty with this approach from the point of view of the
Burger Court is that statutes are not internally consistent, rational
instruments for achieving their aims; they are the irrational products
of political bargains achieved through compromising incompatible
aims. ' On such a premise, the best evidence of congressional intent
268. Cf. HART & SACKS, supra note 15, at 1157 (rebuttable presumption to this
effect).
269. But cf. id. at 1412 (a court should never give a statute a meaning its words
will not bear).
270. See generally, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 4; Posner, supra note 4; Posner,
supra note 108. Judge Posner distinguishes between categories of legislation- e.g., public
interest legislation and narrow interest group legislation-but treats these categories
as matters of degree in a legislative spectrum; even pure public interest legislation is
the product of political compromise.
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is statutory language because statutory language represents the
political compromise that achieved passage; it is the single item of
evidence that enactment guarantees was collectively intended. 7 ' Ap-
plication of the statute is therefore to be achieved by reference to the
plain meaning of the statute or to the most concrete aim supported by
that plain meaning, because it is the Court's function to approximate
the compromise reached rather than the ultimate objectives supposed
to underlie that compromise.272 It is in this sense that Rehnquist's dis-
sent in Weber advocates enforcement of the means chosen by Congress
rather than the aims sought by Congress. Given that Justice Brennan's
understanding of congressional aims was accurate, the statutory means
to those ends was a prohibition of racial discrimination supportable by
a more concrete and no less accurate understanding of congressional
intent-that racial discrimination is, as such, an evil to be prohibited.
Enforcing political compromise cannot, of course, mean determin-
ing what political compromise would be reached in the case before
the court; subjective congressional intent understood as congressional
expectations about how statutory language will be understood is not
271. Cf. Moore supra note 34, at 268 n.144 (one can be certain only that statutory
language itself was intentionally agreed upon).
272. It is often possible to view particular legislation as stating merely a set
of objectives which courts are to pursue by making up the means by which the objec-
tives are to be achieved. The usual example given of such instances of delegation to
the judiciary is the Sherman Act. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 4, at 544; If there
are such statutes, Congress cannot be said to have enacted a compromise regarding
means; it has at most enacted a compromise regarding ends.
One difficulty with this theory is that the ambiguity, vagueness and open tex-
tured character of language is always available as source for an argument that a statute
is a delegation of common law making authority. See Miller, Statutory Language and
the Purposive Use of Ambiguity, 42 VA. L. REV. 23 (1976). A second difficulty is that the
theory relies on and seeks to encourage the common law method on the assumption
that the common law method, although it rests upon values of process, is substantively
neutral. The substantive neutrality of common law method is at least questionable,
and the history of interpretations of antitrust statutes suggests such doubts. Compare
United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) with Continental T.V., Inc.
v. G.T.E. Sylvania, Inc., 97 S. Ct. 2549 (1977).
It is nevertheless no doubt the case that every statute entails a degree of delega-
tion of law making authority; some degree of judicial choice in interpretation is
inevitable. On that premise, the Sherman Act, understood as a statute which delegates
law making authority, illustrates the difficulties of purposive interpretation. It is surely
possible to disagree about whether the aim of the Sherman Act is the elimination
of combinations and restraints which are economically inefficient or the aim is instead
the elimination of centers of excessive economic power whether or not such power
is economically inefficient.
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the congressionally intended resolution of a case not before Congress
at the time of enactment.27 Enforcing political compromise must
therefore mean enforcing the concept or concepts enacted, the sense
in which statutory language was used by Congress, by reasoning from
that concept or by seeking to ensure that the concept is made
operative in the context of the facts of a case before the court. What
distinguishes purposive application from enforcement of political com-
promise is therefore not a matter of concrete legislative intention
understood as a collective belief about appropriate application. The
distinction, rather, is between seeking that resolution of a case that seems
best calculated to further congressional objectives and that resolution
that seems to best fit the relatively concrete sense in which Congress
used statutory language.
The ultimate distinction between the Burger Court's approach
to the matters of legislative intent and purpose and its critics'
approach to those matters therefore remains normative, for it is the
necessary supposition underlying the view that legislation is to be
applied to achieve its ends as they are understood under a
reasonableness criterion that the political compromise underlying the
statute is not to be enforced unless consistent, within the context of
the facts of a particular case or class of cases, with those ends. That
supposition requires a normative understanding of the function of a
legislature and the function of a court radically different than the
understanding that compels enforcement of political compromise.
This is not to suggest that such a radically different under-
standing is illicit. Indeed, that understanding is the fundamental
premise of the third regime across the spectrum of viewpoints within
the third regime. Courts are to behave in a "statesman-like" manner
by giving effect to purpose,27 ' by utilizing purpose as the source of
judge-made law15 and by ensuring the reasonable, rational and just
development of law in a dynamic society.7 ' Courts adopting such an
understanding are thought to thereby ensure the success of legislative
programs by declining to adopt stingy interpretations which defeat
the purposes underlying statutes.277 If there is a difficulty in such an
undertaking, it is in its failure to identify successful limits on
273. See supra text accompanying notes 209-12.
274. See, e.g., HART & SACKS, supra note 15, at 1410-17.
275. See, e.g., Common Law and Legislation, supra note 8; Statutes and the Sources
of Law, supra note 8.
276. See generally Calabresi, supra note 26.
277. See, e.g., Cohen, "Judicial Legisputation" and the Dimensions of Legislative
Meaning, 36 IND. L.J. 414,418 (1961); Posner, supra note 4, at 821, CommonLaw andLegisla-
tion, supra note 12; Middle Road, supra note 5, at 789-822.
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technique. That difficulty is important because enforcement of pur-
poses understood as the abstract aims entertained by Congress in
enacting a statute may as easily occur from the perspective of an
ideologically conservative or ideologically libertarian court as an
ideologically liberal or ideologically radical court; purposive interpreta-
tion risks the breakdown of the no doubt fragile distinction between
law and politics. This is the reason that the third regime constantly
debates alternative proposals for such limitations on judicial license
as "the purposes the words of the statute will bear," '278 "interpretive
community"' and "best fitting" political theory.' It is also the reason
for the Burger Court's distrust of purposive interpretation: the Burger
Court both distrusts the legal process school's claim that purposive
interpretation and reasoned elaboration can be politically neutral 81
and disagrees with the normative vision of active judicial role implicit
in that claim.282
The question posed by this discussion of the distinction between
the Burger Court's approach to purpose and intent and the legal
process or new legal process school's approach to purpose and intent
is whether the Burger Court's claim that its approach serves political
neutrality can be sustained. The discussion has argued that the Burger
Court's approach is not precluded by descriptive claims of
impossibility, but the argument has simultaneously recognized that
judicial choice is an inherent aspect of the enterprise. That recogni-
tion leaves the Burger Court open to the charge that its approach
is as vulnerable to the intrusion of political perspective as the approach
it rejects. Indeed, a rejection of purposive interpretation and focus
upon relatively concrete congressional intent will generally have the
consequence of limiting the scope of operation of a statute-the
statute's "domain"2 will be confined in comparison to its potential
domain under a purposive regime. Such a consequence is arguably
attributable to hostility to the substantive merits of federal regulatory
schemes.
278. See HART & SACKS supra note 15, at 1412.
279. See Fiss, supra note 3.
280. See Forum of Principle, supra note 71.
281. See, e.g., United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980);
Potomas Electric Power Co. v. Director, Office Workmens Compensation Programs,
449 U.S. 268 (1980); Consumer Product Safety Comm'n. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S.
102 (1980).
282. See, e.g., University Research Ass'n. Inc. v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754 (1981);
Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980); Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
283. See Easterbrook, supra note 4.
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III. THE OBJECTION FROM THE
NORMATIVE CHARACTER OF FORMALISM
A. Legal Formalism And Its Critics
The objection from the normative character of formalism is best
introduced by a summary of the argument thus far made here. It
should by now be obvious that the Burger Court's underlying
normative view is a version of legal formalism. Legal formalism may
be defined as any legal theory that maintains a distinction, at least with-
in the context of statutory law, between rule making and rule applica-
tion: rules are made by legislatures through a political bargaining pro-
cess that compromises inconsistent purposes, policies and values; rules
are applied by judges through a politically neutral process distinct from
compromise and characterized by reasoning from premises supplied by
the preexisting compromise embodied in statutory rules.28 ' "Political"
for present purposes means a normative judgment or decision about the
wisdom, efficacy or morality of the substantive content of a statutory
rule or proposed rule, as distinguished from a normative judgment or
decision about the wisdom, efficacy or morality of alternative concep-
tions of the judicial function in implementing statutes generally.
There are distinct versions of formalism which differ descriptively
in the degree to which they adhere to the rigidity of the distinction
between rule making and rule application. That descriptive difference
is illustrated by distinctions between the first and third regimes. For
the first regime, conclusions in particular cases are to be deduced
from statutory rules without regard to the consequences of such
application either to the parties to the litigation or to society.285 For
the third regime, conclusions in particular cases are to be creatively
derived from the projection of the underlying purposes of legislation
within the factual context of the case at hand; the consequences of
application for the parties to the litigation and for society are therefore
to be expressly considered in terms both of the purposes underlying
legislation and of competing and independent purposes and values.286
The first regime's objection to the third is that purposive inter-
pretation is indistinguishable from the essentially legislative process
284. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 27, at 354-77; Moore, supra note 34, at 154-61;
Tushnet, supra note 27, at 782-86; Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV.
L. REV. 563, 564-67 (1983).
285. See, e.g., Kelsen supra note 9; Thomas, Statutory Construction When Legisla-
tion Is Viewed As A Legal Institution, 3 HARV. J. LEGIS. 191 (1965).
286. See, e.g., HART & SACKS, supra note 15, at 1410-17; FULLER, supra note 44.
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of choice between or compromise of competing purposes, policies and
values because it necessarily requires a judicial choice between and
within the hierarchies of purposes underlying a statute.287 The
normative premise underlying this complaint is essentially skeptical:
courts ought not to make such choices because values-the purposes,
aims or interests potentially served by legislation-are arbitrary and
subjective. As choices between values cannot be resolved by reason,
such choices are for the democratic legislature.288 This, indeed, is the
Burger Court's critique of the third regime implicit in its literalism,
occasionally explicit in its views of itself and of Congress and described
in the immediately preceding section of this paper.89
The third regime's objection to the first is that the deduction
from statutory rules central to the first regime's understanding of
statutory language is implausible because, even if statutory language
has an ordinary meaning, the political compromise embodied in
statutory language cannot be adequately duplicated in the context of
application by reference to that language.' It cannot be duplicated
for the reasons earlier surveyed here: the legislature cannot in any
discoverable sense be said to have contemplated resolution of the case
before the court and the frailties of language are such that there is
no guarantee that the facts of that case are within or without the
necessary meaning of statutory language. The normative premise
underlying the third regime's reliance on purpose is that courts are
legitimately creative law makers responsible for symmetry within an
internally consistent, principled understanding of law.,'
287. See supra text accompanying notes 270-82. Cf. Kennedy, supra note 27,
at 295-98 (registering this complaint from the distinct perspective of what is termed
in the present article the second regime).
288. See Kennedy, supra note 27, at 362-63 (so describing the first regime). This
aspect of the first regime is perhaps best represented by Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., despite
his rejection of deduction in favor of "experience" as the mechanism of judicial deci-
sion. See generally G.E. WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION, 156-60 (1976); White,
The Integrity of Holmes Jurisprudence, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV., 633 (1982); White, The Rise
and Fall of Justice Holmes, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 51 (1971).
289. See supra text accompanying notes 270-82. In a sense, then, the Burger
Court seeks to adhere to the legal positivist's separation of "is" from "ought": statutes
are facts to be found and applied by courts; the substantive content of statutes is
a matter of morality or values of no concern to the judge.
290. Cf Kennedy, supra note 27, at 377-91 (arguing that social and political
change, in combination with the unpredictability of change, renders duplication of
political compromise impossible and mechanistic application likely to alter political power
within the legislature). This argument has some features in common with the argu-
ment that legal rules ought to be left open-ended to account for change. See, e.g.,
Traynor, The Limits of Judicial Creativity, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 1025 (1978); Traynor,
Statutes Revolving In Common Law Orbits, 17 CATH. U.L. REV. 401 (1968).
291. See e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 87-88 (demanding consistency of principled
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 19, No. 2 [1985], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol19/iss2/1
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
That premise is perhaps best illustrated by the third regime's
response to the complaint that choices must be made within and
between hierarchies of statutory purposes. Such choices may be made
in a manner distinct from legislative process and are therefore
distinguishable from ad hoc political decision because constrained by
a shared understanding of the political theory that best fits either
the text of a statute or the background principles of political morality
underlying the system of law. 92 Alternatively, if there is no agreed
upon background morality from which an internally consistent system
of law may be derived,"3 courts may permissibly employ a common
law methodology, 94 with its emphasis on common sense, practical
philosophy, balancing and distrust of axiomatic systems of thought,2
95
and they are constrained in this enterprise by standards of
craftsmanship29 or by the suppositions of interpretive communities 9.
in a degree that distinguishes judicial interpretation from open-ended
political compromise.
This description of competing positions within formalism suggests
that the Burger Court's normative view may be placed on a spec-
trum on which it occupies a position rather closer to the first than
the third regime. If the Burger Court does not believe in a pristine
positivism,2 8 it nevertheless believes that it exercises law making
discretion only within "gaps" in the fabric of statutory law,29 9 and is
judicial decision making); Wechsler, supra note 17 (same). But see Wellington, supra note
4 (treating judicial task as discovery and application of community's presumably incon-
sistent moral principles).
292. See, e.g., Law as Interpretation, supra note 3; Dworkin, supra note 71,
Civil Rights Act, supra note 4.
293. What links Professor Dworkin's thought to the tradition of the third regime
is his emphasis upon rejection of ad hoc judgment. He insists that judicial decision
in any given case be related to an internally consistent system of principle. See
DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 87-88.
294. See generally Wellington, supra note 4. Cf. LEVY, supra note 113, at 27-33
(identifying similarities and dissimilarities between common law reasoning and statutory
interpretation.)
295. See, e.g., Lehman, How To Interpret A Difficult Statute, 1979 Wis. L. REV.
489, 493-95; Moore, supra note 34 at 292-94 (judges apply statutes through a process
of balancing moral and linguistic intuitions); Shiffrin, Liberalism, Radicalism, And Legal
Scholarship, 30 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1103, 1192-1217 (1983). This view generally relies on
Aristotle's notion of practical philosophy as the ability to determine what is right in
particular cases as distinguished from knowing a way of knowing what is right. ARISTOTLE
NCHOMACHAEAN ETHICS Bk. VI, chs. 5-11.
296. See, e.g., Hart, Foreward: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV.
84 (1959); Wechsler, supra note 17.
297. See Objectivity and Interpretation, supra note 3.
298. See supra text accompanying notes 158-76.
299. See, B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, 129 (1921): "[Courts]
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chiefly distinguishable in its approach from its predecessor by its reluc-
tance to fill such "gaps."3 '0 The argument made here in defense of
that position has thus far been that the position is plausibly held within
that spectrum as an approximation, despite its defects, of the first
regime's positivism and that the defects of the third regime render
it merely a more or less persuasive competitor rather than a decisive
victor within that spectrum. The choice between the first and third
regimes is a matter of inclination having more to do with the values
of the critic than with the necessary superiority of purpose over
language. Indeed, one suspects that most lawyers, including the
justices of the Burger Court, tend to move more or less at will
between degrees of the first and third regimes in an eclectic effort
to accommodate their internalization of the values of both. °1
There is, however, so far absent from this scheme an accommoda-
tion of the second regime. Legal realism and neo-realism attack both
the first and third regimes by claiming that neither language, nor
intent, nor purpose or principle constrains judicial decision.' Statutory
meaning is a function of individual perspective;311 the intent, purpose
or principle underlying both statutes and judicial precedent is indeter-
minate because there is always a choice of purposes or principles which
equally "fit" or support them;" there is no intelligible moral order
have the right to legislate within gaps, but often there are no gaps." See also So.
Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1961) (Holmes, J., dissenting): "I recognize
without hesitation that judges do and must legislate, but they can do so only inter-
stitially; they are confined from molar to molecular motions."
300. On this characterization, the Burger Court is no less "realistic" than a
Cardozo or a Holmes in recognizing that it "must legislate." See supra note 299. It
simply exercises this authority by declining to exercise it in a fashion which would
alter the status quo, particularly where the status quo appears to entail less judicial
intrusion into private orderings than its alternative. See infra notes 385-401 and ac-
companying text.
301. Cf. Lehman, supra note 295 at 501 (judges, in guise of positivism, utilize
such notions as legislative intent as metaphors with which to exercise practical wisdom);
Kennedy, supra note 5 (lawyers are constantly torn between "altruism" and
"individualism" because they are committed to the contradictory premises of both).
Tushnet, supra note 27, at 785-86 (we may live in a world of tension between the
notions of mutual dependence and individualism in which only a continuous dialogue
is possible).
302. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 5, at 1766-67; Tushnet, supra note 27; Unger,
supra note 284, at 564-73; Statutory Interpretation, supra note 12.
303. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 46, at 240-41; Llewellyn, supra note 12, at
396-97 (distinguishing judicial personality types and their resulting attitudes toward
creativity in judicial decision).
304. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 92, at 215-19; Tushnet, supra note 27, at 810-18.
See also supra text accompanying notes 117-283.
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underlying the legal system because no such theory is compatible with
the actual content of legal doctrine at any point in time. 5 Law,
including statutory interpretation understood as application of
statutory rules, is therefore indistinguishable from radically indeter-
minate and ad hoc political judgment.26 At most, judges are con-
strained by the sociological fact that they are selected from relatively
narrow socio-economic strata within the population and are therefore
likely to share a relatively predictable world view."0 7 Even if judges
do not decide on the basis of their breakfast menu, and decide instead
on the basis of constraints defining what arguments will be heard,
these constraints are supplied by predominant culture rather than legal
theory-a predominant culture itself so internally inconsistent as to
render statutory application indeterminate.
The standard third regime response to this argument is to con-
cede its validity in degree, but to claim that purposive interpretation
places sufficient constraints independent of political perspective on
the judge to permit a distinction between law and politics."' Alter-
natively, the third regime argues that the "contraditions" which
generate indeterminacy of application 9 discovered in the "liberal
state" by neo-realists are better described as "tensions" generating
a healthy dynamism in American law.1 The Burger Court's response,
in keeping with the standard response of neo-positivists to the second
regime's argument, is to concede that judges must legislate within
"gaps" " or "penumbras,""3 2 but to deny that statutory application
within vast areas of non-gaps or core meanings is other than com-
pliance with the sovereign legislature's "command.""3 '
305. Unger, supra note 284, at 567-73. See Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10
HARV. L. REV. 457, 465, 470-73 (1897).
306. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 3. Unger, supra note 284, at 572-73.
307. See, e.g., Nowak, supra note 34; Tushnet, supra note 27 at 822-24. Cf.
Wellington, supra note 4 (treating judicial task as discovery and application of the
community's moral values).
308. See, HART & SACKS supra note 15, at 1225, 1414-17. Cf. Law as Interpretation,
supra note 3, at 543-46 ("fit" as a constraint on judge's political theory).
309. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 5 (contradiction between individualism and
altruism); Tushnet, supra note 27, at 785 (contradiction between individualism and "com-
munitarian assumptions of conservative social thought"). Cf. Levinson, supra note 3,
at 395 n.87 (describing "tension" between creativity and objectivity in Objectivity and
Interpretation, supra note 3).
310. See Shiffrin, supra note 295, at 1203-06, 1211-15; White, Law as Language:
Reading Law and Reading Literature, 60 TEx. L. REV. 415, 441-45 (1982).
311. See supra note 299.
312. See Hart, supra note 44, at 607.
313. See, e.g., Potomac Electric Power Co. v. Director, Office Workmens Com-
pensation Programs, 449 U.S. 268 (1980); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S.
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An interesting feature of this summary of competing arguments
is that the postulated positions both partially share and partially
dispute controverted ground. The Burger Court's approximated
positivism may facially appear grounded in a faith in the certainties
of language, but its insistence upon enforcing legislative decision and
disinclination to make law within the "gaps" it occasionally perceives
in these decisions has as its source a profound skepticism not unlike
the second regime's skepticism about an intelligible moral order
underlying the legal system. It is a mistake to assume that approx-
imated positivism is either naive or the product of docility;"4 it is
rather quite possibly cynical. 5 The distinction between the Burger
Court and the second regime is that the former purports to allocate
decision making authority to the legislature and the latter insists upon
the judge's moral responsibility for his "applications" of statutes. The
second and third regimes share a common skepticism about the
viability of the Burger Court's claim that it merely complies with con-
gressional decision, but vigorously dispute the third regime's claim
of access to a politically neutral methodology.
B. Reader Perspective, Normative View and Politics
What is of crucial importance to the present discussion in this
summary is the claim made by realism against both the Burger Court's
approximated positivism and the third regime's neutral process: both
are inescapably normative because a judge's political perspective con-
trols statutory interpretation and application.16 There is one sense
in which this claim is nearly trivial. The Burger Court's attempt to
618 (1978).
314. For examples of this charge, See, e.g., FRANK, supra note 12, at 19-23;
Llewellyn, supra note 12, at 396-97. Cf. G. GRAFF, LITERATURE AGAINST ITSELF: LITERARY
IDEAS IN MODERN SOCIETY 23 (1979) (describing the rhetoric of the battle between pro-
ponents of stable textual meaning and proponents of readers meaning from the point
of view of the latter as a contrast in part between "docility" and "risk".)
315. The obvious example is Justice Holmes, See authorities cited supra note
288. For a claim that the Burger Court exhibits such skepticism, see Note, supra note
34, at 901.
316. Realism here refers both to the legal realist's attacks on legal positivism
in the 1930's and to contemporary neo-realist attacks, from a variety of distinct perspec-
tives, on the Burger Court's approximated positivism, on the traditional legal process
school and on what Professor Weisberg terms the "new legal process" school. Weisberg,
supra note 21. Examples of claims of "reader perspective" made by original legal realists
are Llewellyn, supra note 12 and Statutory Interpretation, supra note 12. For more
contemporary examples, see Moore, supra note 34; Nowak, supra note 34. Examples
of neo-realist claims of reader perspective include Kennedy, supra note 5; Levinson,
supra note 3; Tushnet, supra note 27.
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approximate positivism is inescapably a normative choice of a con-
troversial definition of judicial role; that is the whole point of
emphasizing here its underlying normative view as the real content
of its "literalism." '317 The claim is in this sense trivial because any choice
made at this level is normative: a decision to approximate positivism
and therefore to minimize judicial law making or to approximate
reasoned elaboration of statutory purpose and therefore to expand
judicial law making is political in the sense that methodology reflects
distinct political conceptions of the judicial function.
To the extent, then, that advocates of reader perspective as the
source of statutory meaning intend only to argue that positivists will
apply statutes positivistically,318 there is both no reason to disagree
nor a reason to think such an argument threatening. It is only the
fact that there are large numbers of anti-positivists in the legal culture
that renders such an argument interesting. It renders the argument
interesting because the meanings discovered in statutes by the Burger
Court will, as discoveries derived from a controversial perspective,
be themselves controversial even within the legal culture. The Court's
legitimacy as an interpreter of statutes-its justification independent
318. See Statutory Interpretation and Literary Theory, supra note 1, at 682-90.
Abraham, relying on Stanley Fish, and Fish, argue both that readers create the texts
they read by encountering a text in a "situation" and that readers are not free to
make up whatever meaning they idiosyncratically desire because they are "embedded"
in "interpretive communities" -communities whose practices are internalized by the
reader and govern his perceptions of meaning. FISH, supra note 3, at 303-71. See KUHN,
supra note 58, at 35-51. Neither is therefore a legal realist if realism is taken as a
position which claims that judicial decision is idiosyncratic.
The claim that interpretation3 are enabled by interpretive communities may
mean only that a literalist will read literally, an intentionalist intentionally, etc. See
Chain Gang, supra note 3, at 556-59. It might also mean, however, that an interpretive
community's shared beliefs within its interpretive posture (e.g., a belief in the virtues
of individualism and evils of government regulation within a positivist posture) encounter
text and construct it within situations. The first of these possibilities has been in this
article treated as the "choice" of an underlying normative viewpoint, and it is in this
sense that the article concedes that such a normative viewpoint governs interpreta-
tion that the possibility is treated as "trivial." Cf. My Reply to Stanley Fish, supra
note 3, at 295 (respecting the practices of an interpretive community provides a very
weak constraint on subjective interpretation). The second possibility is not trivial,
because it implies that there cannot be a politically neutral statutory application even
on the assumption of an underlying normative viewpoint. The latter claim appears
to be the claim of advocates of "critical legal studies" because they treat formalism
as crucially linked to individualism and individualism as generating particular substantive
recommendations.
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of raw power for imposing with the force of the state its interpreta-
tions on litigants and potential litigants-will therefore be controver-
sial insofar as that legitimacy is dependent upon agreement about
methodology and the underlying normative position that generates
methodology.
If, however, this is all that is meant by the claim that law is
indistinguishable from politics, it exaggerates its case. There is no
doubt that controversial methodology threatens legitimacy; that has
repeatedly occurred as a phenomonon, albeit primarily with respect
to constitutional methodology, throughout the Court's history.3 19 But
the Supreme Court's perceived legitimacy remains generally intact
despite the attacks of those critics whose disagreement with
methodology are often couched as a prediction of the Court's impend-
ing loss of the American public's esteem.2 It may be that no one
is capable of relativism at the level of argument about methodology
or normative perspective,3 1 but relativism has been the governing
stance at the level of perceived legitimacy.' The fact of the matter
is that agreement about methodology is not crucial to legitimacy so
long'as methodology is not perceived by the legal culture, as "off the
wall." And the Burger Court's methodology is merely controversial;
it is not "off the wall."
However, there is a sense in which the reader perspective claim
does constitute a non-trivial threat to the Burger Court's underlying
normative view. The claim may be stated as an argument that the
Burger Court's normative perspective is not substantively neutral; ap-
proximated positivism is necessarily political because perception of
"plain meaning" is a function of political perspective.32 4 An example
of this claim is a potential characterization of Justice Rehnquist's
understanding of the term "discrimination" in the statute in issue in
Weber.325
319. Examples include both the original legal process school's attacks on the
Warren Court, e.g., Wechsler, supra note 17, and recent efforts to restrict the Supreme
Court's jurisdiction with respect to, for example, the abortion issue.
320. See Kurland, Forward: Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the Legislative
and Executive Branches of the Government, 78 HARV. L. REV. 143, 175 (1964).
321. See FISH, supra note 3, at 740-41 (a belief that belief controls meaning is itself
a belief entailing commitment).
322. There are exceptions to this generalization; critical legal studies adherents
and other deconstructionist scholars are engaged in an attack upon legitimacy through
an attack on methodology. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 27; Unger, supra note 284.
See also Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1983).
323. See Chain Gang, supra note 3, at 556-67.
324. See Levinson, supra note 3, at 392-402.
325. See supra text accompanying notes 226-31.
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Although "discrimination" might be understood either as referr-
ing to disparate racial treatment or to disparate allocation of benefits
between racial groups, Rehnquist's dissent in Weber assumes only the
former meaning. 26 It is possible to characterize that understanding
as the product of a particular political theory internalized by
Rehnquist: a libertarian philosophy would regard race an illicit con-
sideration in employer decision making and would regard redistribu-
tion of opportunities on the basis of a principle of proportion among
racial groups as anathema. Alternatively, Rehnquist's understanding
of "discrimination" may be characterized as dependent upon his general
distaste for governmental intrusion into private orderings and desire
to minimize the impact of regulation on such orderings; he will
therefore assign the term that meaning he perceives as generating
the least regulatory impact.327
Similar characterizations may be made of the Burger Court's
resolution of the bargaining issue in First National Maintenance
Corporation."8 Partial closure of a business is less likely to be treated
as a mandatory subject of bargainig by a court that places a high
value on managerial prerogatives than by a court that places a high
value on union participation in decision affecting employee interests
in job security. Moreover, the contrast between the literalism of
Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Weber and the purposive approach that
marked the Burger Court's analysis in First National Maintenance
may be viewed as evidence that approximated positivism is merely
a device more often than not compatible with a particular substan-
tive political perspective; positivism will be abandoned in favor of a
search for purpose where positivism threatens that perspective.
If these claims are viable, neither the Burger Court's underly-
ing normative view nor its approximated positivism may be said to
explain its interpretations; both constructs are merely devices by
which it enforces its substantive political values. Moreover, deter-
minacy of statutory application is implausible if these claims are viable;
326. See supra text accompanying note 226.
327. This, indeed, is the explanation enjoying the most empirical support in
the cases, for Rehnquist does employ distinct understandings of the term "discrimina-
tion" in ways consistent with an anti-regulatory objective..See, e.g., Los Angeles Dept.
of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 725-28 (1978) (Burger, C.J., joined by
Rehnquist, J., dissenting); General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). The
anti-regulatory bias in Rehnquist's dissent in Weber is apparent when it is recognized
that Rehnquist believed (quite reasonably) that the employer adopted the plan challenged
in that case under pressure from the Labor Department. See United Steelworkers v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 223, 225-26 n.6 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
328. See supra text accompanying notes 134-35.
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"plain" statutory meaning in different cases will both be a function
of shifting majorities on a court composed of justices with distinct
substantive perspectives3" and be independent, in the thought of a
single justice, of the politically neutral concept or principle invoked
in prior cases as justification for his earlier decisions.'
The threat posed by this version of the attack on Burger Court
literalism as necessarily normative is that it undermines the Burger
Court's claim to the normative ideals of legal formalism; literalism,
even as approximated positivism, cannot claim that it defers to a
legislative sovereign if its interpretations are in fact reflections of
its substantive political values.
A potential line of response to the realist claim is to distinguish
power and propriety. To the extent that empirical observation con-
firms the claim,3' observation merely suggests that the Supreme Court
has the power to impose its substantive political opinions as inter-
pretations, not that the Burger Court's rhetoric or effort to realize
that rhetoric is "wrong.""2 But the realist claim from reader perspec-
tive is stronger than generalization from observation; it is that reader
perspective understood as substantive political position necessarily
governs interpretation. 3
It is therefore necessary to confront the realist's strong claim
directly by denying it in sufficient degree to render the Burger Court's
position plausible and therefore to affirm, ironically in view of the
Burger Court distrust of the legal process school, the significance of
329. This possibility may be inherent in a collective decision making body com-
posed of persons whose distinct perspectives cause them to prefer distinct principles
as grounds for decision. See Easterbrook, supra note 100; Farago, supra note 100.
330. See Tushnet, supra note 27, at 813-18 (judicial decisions are so open-ended
that there are many principles to choose from as the explanation of such decisions;
therefore, we do not know what proposition case 1 stands for until case 2 tells us).
But see My Reply to Stanley Fish, supra note 3, at 306 (there is a distinction between
interpretation as an act of seeking that justification of past legal decisions which best
fits those decisions and the invention of the best present decision for prospectively
ordering some aspect of human activity).
331. See supra note 327. This same point may be made, however, about those
justices who do not share the Burger Court's normative view. Indeed, Justice Rehnquist
and Justices Brennan and Marshall may at this level be viewed as the most similar
in approach of the justices of the current Supreme Court.
332. See Hart, supra note 44, at 607-08.
333. See, e.g., Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Con-
tradictions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE, L.J. 1063 (1981); Brest,
supra note 3, at 770-73; Levinson, supra note 3, at 386-88; Nowak, supra note 34; Tushnet,
supra note 27, at 822-24.
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the form of judicial decision over the results reached by such deci-
sion. The denial will again rely on the distinction between interpreta-
tion and application.3"
C. Interpretation and Application Revisited
Recall that interpretation as it has been defined in this paper
is the ascertainment of the meaning of statutory language in the con-
text of enactment; it entails a narrowing of the concepts or range
of concepts potentially conveyed by that language. 5 Under the
methodology attributed here to the Burger Court, that narrowing
process occurs by reference both to the ordinary meaning of words
in the linguistic context of the statute read as a whole and by
reference to the context of enactment as the latter is evidenced by
the most concrete expressions of congressional intent in legislative
history."' To illustrate by use of a popular example in recent com-
mentary, the statement "keep off the grass" has a wide range of
possible meaning in the abstract."' Its potential range of meaning is
narrowed once the context of enactment is admitted in evidence: the
statement has one range of meaning if it appears on a sign in a public
park and another meaning if it appears in a (questionably drafted)
drug abuse control statute. A similar process occurred in the examples
thus far employed in this paper. The Court declined to narrow the
term "actions" in the Endangered Species Act in T.V.A. v. Hill because
legislative history convinced the Court that Congress intended a broad
range of meaning.' The term "equal" in the Equal Pay Act is judicially
understood to mean "equal" as equality is understood by job
evaluators.339 The term "discrimination" in Title VII was understood
by Justice Rehnquist in Weber as meaning disparate racial treatment." °
334. See supra text accompanying notes 56, 139 and supra notes 138-139.
335. See supra text accompanying notes 56, 139.
336. See supra text accompanying notes 139-42, 249-82.
337. See Graff, supra note 139, relying on Searle, supra note 44, at 117-36; Grice,
supra note 210. One potential use of the "keep off the grass" example is to claim
that the statement means nothing until used by someone in a context and, therefore,
to claim that speaker's intention is conceptually necessary to meaning. The counter-
argument is that language conventions grant the statement at least a range of mean-
ing; the statement does not in fact mean nothing absent evidence of an intention. See
supra note 44.
338. See supra text accompanying notes 169-77.
339. See supra text accompanying notes 223-26.
340. See supra text accompanying note 259.
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Application of a statute entails specifying the significance of the
statute' in the context of the facts of a particular case and may be
understood as asking what a court's use of ascertained meaning should
be. The methodology by which that question is answered may alter-
natively be conceived as determining whether the facts of the case
are within or without the core of ascertained meaning, as determin-
ing whether application would further congressional purpose, or as
determining by means of complex moral and linguistic judgments
whether ascertained meaning and the facts of the case ought to be
linked by a premise supplied by the judge in completing a syllogism. 3 2
It was for example necessary to determine whether completion of the
Tellico dam was an "action" within the ascertained meaning of the
Endangered Species Act in Hill; whether flight attendant and pilot
jobs were within the ascertained meaning of "equal" in the
hypothesized Equal Pay Act case and whether the affirmative action
plan at issue in Weber entailed prohibited discrimination.
It is crucial for present purposes to further recall that, although
the distinction between interpretation and application often becomes
indistinct in practice, the reasons judicially given for the use of
evidence are distinct in the context of interpretation and the context
of application. For example, the function of reliance on purpose or
intent in ascertaining meaning is distinct from the function of reliance
on purpose or intent in application. Intent or purpose may be used
as a reason to infer a particular range of concepts conveyed by con-
gresssional use of statutory language or may be used as a reason for
a particular judicial use of that language in the context of a case.
To illustrate: The term "discrimination" in Title VII means disparate
treatment if the congressional intent inferrable from legislative history
was to use "discrimination" to invoke such a conception; discrimina-
tion does not mean disparate treatment in the context of an affirmative
action plan because the Supreme Court concluded in Weber that the
congressional purpose to improve black employment would not be fur-
thered by such an application. Notice that the Supreme Court's con-
clusion has the effect, by virtue of the doctrine of precedent, of con-
straining future applications of Title VII, but this constraint has no
341. Cf. Burns, Law as Hermeneutics: A Response to Ronald Dworkin in THE
POLITICS OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 3, at 317-19 (there can be no interpretation of
law which is not simultaneously an application to a concrete situation); Graff, supra
note 139, at 411-12 (distinguishing epistemological problem of how to determine what
a text means from ethical problem of application); AIMS OF INTERPRETATION, supra note
3, at 85-92 (distinguishing meaning from significance).
342. See generally Moore supra note 34.
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effect on ascertained meaning; the term "discrimination" in Title VII
continues to mean, at least in part, disparate treatment.
It is finally necessary to recall that, although meaning may be
use in the sense that one cannot know the meaning of statutory
language without knowing the use of statutory language, this does
not defeat the distinction between interpretation and application
postulated here. Even if knowing meaning is knowing use, there are
two uses of statutory language: the prospective and directive use of
that language by a legislature and the concrete use of that language
by a court within the situation of a case. A court, no doubt as an
exercise of judgment or of "practical wisdom" gained from experience
within a community of rule interpreters and rule appliers, must both
know how to use statutory language in constructing an understand-
ing of prospective and directive congressional use and know how to
use statutory language by specifying its significance within the cir-
cumstances of a case.U
3
D. Substantive Political Perspective and Interpretation
If it is true that the mechanism that enables a court to assign
a range of meaning to statutory language by excluding some poten-
tial meanings as inappropriate to the context of enactment or to the
use made of that language by the legislature is a sense of propriety
supplied by shared membership in a community, the proposition does
not require rejection of Burger Court literalism. The Burger Court's
literalist claim's are not claims that words have a single, necessary
range of meaning either independent of context or independent of
343. See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text. The use understanding of
meaning is Wittgenstein's, and is often stated as the proposition that one cannot know
the meaning of a rule without knowing how to apply it. The difficulty with this for-
mulation for present purposes is that it immediately suggests (in the fashion
Wittgenstein was criticizing) application within the fact situation of a case. "Applica-
tion" does not however mean only the real world concrete example of application in
a case; the term does not correspond to that example. It may also be "used" to mean
what the text here refers to as interpretation. There are at least two uses of a rule.
See Luban, supra note 139, at 640.
A court exercises "practical wisdom" gained from its experience in interpreta-
tion and application because neither of these functions is itself completely rule governed.
See ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHAEON ETHICS Bks. 5-6. Even metarules about these functions
merely inform and perhaps constrain the process, they cannot ultimately direct it.
Llewellyn, supra note 12. See Luban, supra note 139, at 639 (relying on Kant) (know-
ing the relevance of a rule to a situation cannot be governed by a meta-rule concern-
ing the relevance of the rule, because one then requires a further meta-rule about
when the rule concerning relevance is relevant, and one then encounters an infinite
regress).
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shared understandings of practices within a community of "normal
speakers of the English language." The question posed by the strong
realist argument, however, is whether the Burger Court's assignment
of a range of meaning to statutory language-its understanding of
that language-is dependent as well upon a substantive ideology that
may or may not have been shared by Congress.
A substantially damaging piece of evidence suggesting that the
Burger Court's understanding of statutory language is dependent upon
substantive political ideology is that there can be disagreement about
the meaning to be assigned congressional use of language. It is, for
example, possible to believe that Congress meant, by its use of the
term "discrimination" in Title VII, that racial groups were not to be
deprived of proportionate shares of the employment pie or that
employers were not to consider race in dividing that pie or that both
of these conceptions were within the congressional use of the term. 44
It is also possible that ideology understood as the alternatives of
"individualism" and "altruism" 5 or of welfare statism and laissez
faire"s are responsible for these beliefs. Indeed, interpretation's
dependence upon inference from available evidence suggests that it
is inevitably uncertain. The less evidence available and the more uncer-
tain the inference, the more likely it is that disagreement about
perceived meaning will follow from distinct political perspectives. That
appears to be the case, for example, in constitutional interpretation."
344. Compare, e.g., Blumrosen, The Group Interest Concept, Employment
Discrimination and Legislative Intent: The Fallacy of Connecticut v. Teal, 20 HARV. J.
LEGIS. 99 (1983) with, Wilson, A Second Look at Griggs v. Duke Power Co.: Ruminations
on Job Testing, Discrimination, and the Role of the Federal Courts, 58 VA. L. REV. 844
(1972).
345. See generally, Kennedy, supra note 5.
346. See Note, supra note 34.
347. The age of the Constitution and the consequent differences between the
culture in which it was originally drafted and the culture within which its interpreters
are embedded may be viewed as generating insurmountable difficulties for an effort
at identifying the meaning of that document in the context of its enactment. See, e.g.,
Brest, supra note 186; Forum of Principle, supra note 71, at 471-99; Tushnet, supra
note 27, at 793-97. Old statutes may be viewed as presenting the same difficulty. Cf.
Kennedy, supra note 27. To the extent that a court may imaginatively enter the world
of an old legislature for the purpose of identifying "original intent", the present
significance of such an intent may be both indeterminate and therefore subject to
distinct assessments by different judges. Tushnet, supra note 27 at 798-804. Cf. AIMS
OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 3, at 38-42, 46-49 (arguing that past meaning in a distinct
culture may be ascertained, but that the significance of this past meaning is subject
to dispute).
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These considerations do not, however, compel the realist's strong
claim that an assigned range of meaning is necessarily a matter of
substantive political perspective for the simple reason that the claim
requires a counter-factual conclusion that it is not possible to perceive
a meaning with which one disagrees. The Burger Court's normative
ideal of approximated positivism is plausible as an explanation of its
behavior despite arguable lapses because it is in fact possible for the
Court to understand a meaning with which it disagrees. 8 It is possible,
even given that the mechanism by which comprehension of meaning
occurs is shared values and practices, because the values and prac-
tices shared by a language community are of a general and fluid
character. If agreement about the concrete specifics of values and prac-
tices were crucial to communication, there could only be incomprehen-
sion, not disagreement.-" It is therefore possible to distinguish the
judicial power to invent a meaning from the correct practice under
the ideal of approximated positivism-the practice of inferring from
available evidence the meaning of the congressional use of statutory
language.
The proof of the possibility lies in the mode of argument
employed in statutory application. Such argument often assumes a
It is nevertheless the case that it is possible to ascertain with no doubt
problematic exactitude the meaning of an old constitution or old statute in the con-
text of enactment; it would otherwise be unnecessary to construct elaborate normative
arguments about why such meanings should be ignored (such as Dworkin's argument
that the constitutional framers enacted concepts and contemporary interpreters must
supply conceptions. DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 134-36). Such arguments presuppose an
understood meaning thought currently inconvenient or currently immoral. The real
question posed by the problem of the old constitutional or statutory text is the pro-
blem of current significance. Cf. AIMS OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 3, at 46-49 (mak-
ing this claim with respect to old literary texts).
348. See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 216 (1979) (Burger, C.J.
dissenting). But cf. Weisberg, How Judges Speak: Some Lessons On Adjudication In Bil-
ly Budd, Sailor With An Application To Justice Rehnquist, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 64-69
(1982) (formalism as concealing impulses of judge).
Professor Dworkin finds the possibility that a judge could disagree with the
interpretation that judge adopts "perplexing": it is not possible to distinguish a judge's
choice of the principle of political morality which best fits a statute from the judge's
morality. Civil Rights Act, supra note 4, at 42. This observation was however made
on the assumption that the statute and available evidence of the context of its enact-
ment did not supply an answer to the case before the judge. Id. For examples of in-
stances in which Burger Court justices have perceived and voted to enforce meanings
with which they apparently disagreed, see, e.g., Jacksonville Bulk Terminals v. Inter-
national Longshoremen's Assoc. 102 S. Ct. 2673, 2687 (1982) (O'Connor, J. concurring);
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 451 U.S. 401, 417-24 (1981) (Powell, J. concurring);
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 441-49 (1975) (Rehnquist, J. concurring).
349. Cf. AIMS OF INTERPRETATION supra note 3, at 151-52 (distinguishing a general
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meaning ascertained from the context of enactment and directs its
attention to the question whether that meaning ought to be enforced.
Moreover, this ought question is answered by reference to reasons
independent of the meaning assumed to have been ascertained from
statutory language and the context of its use:"s application of that
meaning would or would not further the "spirit" or purpose of the
statute, would or would not generate absurd, unreasonable or unjust
results, would or would not impinge upon fundamental independent
values and therefore should or should not be subject to a clear state-
ment requirement.
These arguments and counter-arguments do not express disagree-
ment about the range of meaning of statutory language understood
in the context of its congressional use; rather, they express disagree-
ment about the wisdom, efficacy or morality of enforcing that mean-
ing in the context of the court's use of that language to resolve a
case. There was in the example of the Weber decision no disagree-
ment that "discrimination" was used by Congress to include disparate
treatment or even that the affirmative action plan there in issue
entailed disparate treatment. Rather, there was disagreement about
whether that use ought to be the Court's use of the term "discrimina-
tion" in the context of affirmative action plans."' Moreover, there is
often no disagreement about the meaning of congressional use of
language where that language and evidence of the context of its enact-
ment fails to significantly narrow the range of concepts identified as
statutory meaning. First National Maintenance Corporation is an
example.- 2 There was no disagreement in that case that congressional
structure of practice from the relatively concrete "paradigms" of "perspectivism").
350. See Graff, supra note 139, at 411-12. Cf. DICKERSON, supra note 7, at 238-61.
Although Dickerson advocates the distinction between interpretation and application
borrowed here, he conceives of the problem of application as arising where the mean-
ing ascertained by the process of interpretation "fails to dispose of the case at hand".
Id. at 238. His view therefore resembles Dworkin's notion that the moral perspective
of the judge controls where statutory language and evidence of the context within
which it was enacted do not supply an answer. Application as it is understood here
includes the notion that the case before a court does not appear resolved by ascer-
tained meaning, but includes as well the possibility that ascertained meaning produces
an inconvenient or immoral result.
351. It would not be accurate to say that disagreement about the lawful
character of an affirmative action quota is disagreement about congressional intent
about that issue unless evidence regarding the context of enactment addressed the
issue. Nor, however, is it accurate to say that disagreement about the lawful character
of an affirmative action quota is disagreement about the meaning of congressional
use of the term discrimination: such a quota entails disparate treatment as that con-
cept is understood by the community of normal speakers of English. Disagreement,
rather, is about whether the meaning of discrimination inferred from congressional
use ought to be suspended in favor, e.g., of attributed congressional purpose.
352. 452 U.S. 666 (1981), discussed supra at text and notes 134-35.
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use of "terms and conditions of employment" in identifying mandatory
subjects of bargaining was so open-ended as to potentially include any
subject affecting the employment relationship. Indeed, that use is
judicially treated by justices of diverse political persuasions as an act
of delegation of law making authority."' Disagreement about man-
datory subjects of bargaining therefore typically ignores congressional
use and focuses entirely on the question of what use a court ought
to make of statutory language in the context of application.
Argument made in the context of application is, in short, typically
argument either about disagreement with ascertained meaning or argu-
ment that ignores ascertained meaning on the ground that it is not
usable or that its implications are so broad that independent values
(as they are perceived by the Court) are threatened by it. Both modes
of argument assume an ascertained meaning and therefore assume
a capacity to interpret objectively -that is, independently of substan-
tive political perspective. Indeed, the fact that such arguments are
used necessitates the plausibility of such a capacity; absent the
capacity, there is no need to ask ought questions about judicial use
of statutory language.
E. Substantive Political Perspective And Application
If statutory meaning can be identified independently of substan-
tive political perspective, the argument just made nevertheless
strongly suggests that statutory application cannot be independent
353. See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n., 447 U.S. 490
(1980); NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607 (1980). It is
however controversial whether the delegation has in operation been to the National
Labor Relation Board or to the courts; the Supreme Court has not been consistent
in its deference to Board "expertise." Compare N.L.R.B. v. City Disposal Systems, 104
S. Ct. 1505 (1984); N.L.R.B. v. Transportation Management Corp., 103 S. Ct. 2469 (1983)
with American Ship Building Co. v. N.L.R.B., 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
It is possible to view the history of Supreme Court interpretation of the Labor
Act as a sustained refusal to apply the Act in a fashion consistent with the radical
premises of the Congress that first enacted the Wagner Act, Klare, Judicial De-
radicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-41,
62 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1978), or, at least, as application from a political perspective that
gives the Labor Act a content fundamentally different than the content implicit in
radical versions of congressional use of the language Act. See, e.g., J. ATKINSON,
VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW (1983), Klare, Labor Law As Ideology:
Toward a New Historiography of Collective Bargaining Law, 4 INDUS. REL. L.J. 450
(1981); Stone, The Post-War Paradigm in American Labor Law, 90 YALE L.J. 1509 (1981).
On this view, the Labor Act (at least in its original Wagner Act version) ought to
be given a literal interpretation. The Court's failure to do so might be attributed to
its incapacity even over time to perceive a meaning inconsistent with a non-radical
political perspective, but its repeated statements over time that the Labor Act cannot
be construed literally (even where post-Wagner Act anti-union provisions were in issue)
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of substantive political perspective."' The strong realist claim may
therefore be understood as insisting that judicial use as distinguished
from congressional use of statutory language is necessarily political.
The Burger Court's literalism, in service of its underlying
normative view, is supposed to obviate this charge through the claim
that application is a matter of approximating the identified meaning
of statutory language in the context of the facts of a case. For example,
the Burger Court's choice of the most concrete congressional intent
consistent with identified meaning (as distinguished from the more
abstract aims of a statute) as a device by which to judge application
is supposed to limit the possibility that the substantive political
perspective of judges will distort the substantive political perspec-
tive of the Congress which enacted a statute. The efficacy with which
that intent would be furthered by application, rather than the efficacy
with which ultimate aims would be furthered, is the measure of the
extent to which the political compromise underlying the statute is
approximated in the case."' If this practice was consistently followed,
it would express a particular normative perspective regarding judicial
function, but would be politically neutral regarding statutory
application.3 -
There are, however, three reasons to believe that the Burger
Court's applications of statutes have not been politically neutral. If
they have not been politically neutral, that is at least evidence that
the court's literalism cannot be politically neutral. The first reason
is that the Burger Court is in fact not consistent in its practice; it
does not invariably follow the strategy attributed to it here."7 The
second is that there are instances in which there is not a single iden-
tified meaning to be applied, but a number of inconsistent identified
meanings to be applied in a case.'- 8 A conclusion that the Court is
capable of grasping a meaning with which it disagrees does not exclude
the possibility that it may grasp a number of meanings only some
suggests instead that it was perfectly capable of perceiving a meaning with which
it disagreed. See, Local 761, International Union of Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 366
U.S. 667 (1961).
354. Cf. AIMS OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 3, at 86-87 (distinguishing meaning
from significance within a situation).
355. See supra text accompanying notes 249-67.
356. See supra text accompanying notes 270-83.
357. See supra text accompanying notes 36-38.
358. Cf., e.g., Cohen, supra note 92, at 30-32 (choice of different rules as ex-
planations of past decisions); Tushnet, supra note 27, at 811 (choice of alternative prin-
ciples underlying prior case equally supporting that case).
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of which invoke its disagreement. An arguable example of this dif-
ficulty is Weber. There is apparently general agreement among the
justices of the Supreme Court that Congress used the term
"discrimination" in Title VII to mean both disparate treatment and
the unjustified disparate impact on protected racial groups of race-
neutral employment criteria."9 These meanings of "discrimination"
include concepts with which it is possible to disagree, and the problem
in Weber may be viewed as a conflict between meanings requiring
a judicial choice between them in applying Title VII to an affirmative
action plan.3"'
The third reason to believe that application has not been
politically neutral is that the Burger Court's approximated positivism
is incomplete; the Court retains the option and occasionally exercises
the option to refuse to apply a statute where application would pro-
duce absurd, unreasonable or unjust results and to impose a clear
statement requirement where fundamental values are threatened by
application. 6 Indeed, these options may be crucial to the possibility
of communication. If language has meaning only by virtue of shared
reactions to text-a set of assumptions shared by both speakers and
listeners or a set of rules understood by players in a language
game' 3- then both the relevance and degree of relevance of that mean-
ing within the context of the factual situation of a case is a judgment
made as well on the basis of shared assumptions. A court's interpreta-
tion of the facts of a case is also enabled by its assumptions,363 and
application of identified meaning within the context of a set of inter-
preted facts is enabled by shared assumptions about what it is
reasonable and not absurd to understand the significance of identified
meaning to be in that context.
The common judicial perception that a legislature could not have
intended that a court apply identified meaning in a factual context
in which application would produce an absurd result 64 illustrates this
359. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
360. See supra note 262.
361. See supra text accompanying notes 86-95.
362. See supra text and note 138.
363. The dependence of one's understanding of facts upon one's assumptions
and therefore one's values is as probable as the dependence of one's understanding
of text upon such assumptions. See, e.g., J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL, 316-21 (1949); Frank,
Words and Music, supra note 2, at 1272-78. The positivist's assumption that fact and
value are separable is no doubt threatened by this realization, but it is not wholly
defeated. If assumptions can be shared, and the "fact" of human communication sug-
gests that they are, separation remains in degree plausible.
364. See, e.g., Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892);
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point. What enables a court to plausibly make such a claim is that
both it and its audience share assumptions about what an absurd result
looks like. 5 The difficulty is that only some assumptions are shared.
Other assumptions are controversial. It may therefore be difficult to
distinguish politically neutral considerations of proper judicial func-
tion from the substantive political preferences furthered by applica-
tion in explaining at least some judicial opinions. It is, for example,
difficult to determine whether Burger Court decisions enforcing separa-
tion of powers values are best explained by a politically neutral desire
to "reinforce the institutional responsibility" of Congress or by "a
hostility to the substance of congressional programs." '6 A similar dif-
ficulty arises in contexts in which distinct regulatory regimes seem
relevant to a dispute but provide different answers about resolution
of the dispute."u In such circumstances a court is compelled to choose
between alternative substantive values, and may be viewed as
necessarily making that choice on the basis of its preferences.
The fundamental values the Burger Court employs in invoking
clear statement requirements or in postulating unreasonable results
are both shared by significant communities and controversial.68 To
the extent therefor that the Court demands clear statements or
invokes unreasonable result as a reason for suspending its positivism,
it has arguably imposed its substantive political perspective in the
context of application, whether or not that perspective is shared.
How, then, can the Burger Court's normative view of its role
be defended as plausible? If the criterion for a successful defense is
satisfaction of the aspirations of that normative view, it cannot be
defended. Political perspective colors a court's judgment about the
significance of a statute in the context of the facts of a case and
application of statutory language within such a context requires a judg-
ment about significance. The defense must proceed again, then, from
an argument about approximation. 9
United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. (7 Wall) 482 (1868); Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506 (1889).
365. See LIEBER. LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMANEUTICS, supra note 156, at 17-22.
366. Luneburg, supra note 34, at 269.
367. See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Bildisco & Bildisco 104 S. Ct. 1188 (1984); Connell
Constr. Co., Inc. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
368. An example is federalism and the weight properly assigned that value.
See generally, Bator, The State Court and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 605 (1981).
369. Cf. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 138, at 41e-42c (inexact explanation is not an
unusable explanation). Wittgenstein is often cited for the propositions that subjectivity
and indeterminacy are inherent in language-a rule cannot fully explain how it is to
be used. Tushnet, Legal Scholarship: Its Causes and Cure, 90 YALE L.J. 1205, 1217 (1981).
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F. Approximated Political Neutrality in Interpretation
and Application
Both a court's interpretation of a statute and a court's applica-
tion of a statute are subject to characterization as the products of
that court's normative perspective about its role as a court or to
characterization as the product of that court's substantive political
perspective about the desirability of particular legislation. It has been
the thesis of this article that the Burger Court's tendencies are
legitimate expressions of the first of these characterizations. The ques-
tion is whether these tendencies are necessarily expressions of the
second of these characterizations on the assumption that the second
characterization will at least often be plausible as an explanation of
any judicial decision.
This question will be approached here through a variation on
a well-worn parable popular in academic discussions of statutory
interpretation."' Assume that a city ordinance prohibits "dogs" in a
city park. A policeman arrests five persons for violating this ordinance:
a defendant in possession of a Greyhound bus in the park; a defen-
dant in possession of a cat in the park; a defendant in possession of
a stuffed toy St. Bernard in the park; a blind defendant in possession
of a seeing eye dog in the park; and a defendant in possession of a
Great Dane in the park. Moreover, the last of these defendants is
sued civilly by a plaintiff injured when he fell as a consequence of
the Great Dane's energetic effort to convince the plaintiff to play a
game of "catch."
The Burger Court is of course unlikely to confront cases arising
from alleged violations of the postulated ordinance, but the parable
serves as a vehicle for exploring the Burger Court's tendencies and
the relationship of those tendencies to substantive political perspec-
tive. It is used here to make the following general argument about
approximated political neutrality: the fundamental error made by the
strong realist claim that substantive political perspective controls
application is that it equates the probable mechanism by which mean-
ing is comprehended-a set of shared understandings, concepts or
values of a rather general and largely fluid character-with the
Wittgenstein also argued, however, that rules are useable; it is possible to make
judgments about the competent or incompetent use of rules within a language game.
See Easterbrook, supra note 4, at 533-34 n.2; Michelman, Politics as Medicine: On
Misdiagnosing Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1224, 1227 (1981).
370. Cf., e.g., Brest, supra note 186, at 207-10 (automobiles in the park); Forum
of Principle, supra note 71, at 478-82 (same); Hart, supra note 44, at 607 (same); Fuller,
supra note 44, at 663 (same).
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relatively concrete and specific character of ideological positions within
that set.71 It therefore mistakenly concludes that the dependence of
comprehension of meaning upon a shared but fluid structure of prac-
tices and values compels the dependence of application of that mean-
ing upon concrete ideological position. Although substantive political
perspective colors judicial judgment about the significance of statutory
language in the context of the facts of a case, the degree to which
it can be said to control application is a matter not of the inevitability
of its control, but of the evidence available to support or refute its
influence in particular cases. Because it is possible to perceive a mean-
ing with which one disagrees-and because the adversary system is
largely designed to realize that possibility-it remains possible for
the Burger Court to aspire to neutrality within the context of par-
ticular cases, albeit within the framework of its normative view of
its role. It therefore remains incumbent upon critics to resort to argu-
ment from evidence rather than argument from the determinism of
perspective.
371. Although it is possible to view some statutes as enacting a general con-
cept which contains within it the seeds of alternative conceptions, Forum of Principle,
supra note 71, it is also possible to turn this notion on its head: what enables com-
munication is that readers within a community share a set of general concepts but
recognize the alternative conceptions possible within that set. Readers are therefore
capable of recognizing a particular conception when specified in a statute. Concepts
are on this account "outside" text; conceptions are "inside" text.
Which of these accounts "best fits" a particular case is dependent upon the
specificity of the statute in question. The inverted account nevertheless at least often
describes the process postulated in this paper: A court first seeks to share the
legislature's understanding of the problem addressed by a statute by learning from
the context of enactment the set of relatively general concepts in the minds of
legislators. And a court is by virtue of the understanding it comes to share capable
of identifying which of a number of possible conceptions was in fact enacted even
if it disagrees with the conception enacted. Moreover, the court's view of the significance
of that conception within the factual situation of the facts before it is at least highly
influenced by the enacted conception: that conception becomes in application itself a
general concept which limits the possibilities of the more specific conception the court
writes in resolving the case.
Moreover, Wittgenstein can be read as taking a view consistent with this
explanation. His concern was in part that of avoiding the tyranny of language-the
tyranny of one's first reaction to language from the perspective of a reader caught
up in that reader's identification of a word with a particular real world "thing"
WITTGENSTEIN. supra note 138, at 47e. Avoidance of that tyranny requires a willingness
to be open to use-an openness to recognizing that a word has meaning only within
the context of the author's use of that word. That openness requires transcending
the tyranny of one's immediate assumptions and the sharing of a set of distinct assump-
tions. Within the context of that distinct set of assumptions-the approximate assump-
tions of the author-one can seek to specify a relatively specific conception invoked
by the word. But openness itself requires some set of even more general assumptions;
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1. Political Decision As Decision By Reference To The Substantive
Political Perspective of the Judge
The range of concepts conveyed by the language of the ordinance,
as narrowed by evidence of the context of enactment, would place
limits on the potential scope of application of the ordinance. Assume
that the term "dog" is narrowed at least to the notion of "living, non-
human animal." On that assumption, a judge's "linguistic intuitions"
about the term "dog" in the context of enactment would cause him
to dismiss the cases against the bus driver and the toy possessor and
therefore to create "gaps." Neither buses nor toys in the park are
regulated. If we further assume that the judge's political position is
that use of city parks ought to be wholly unregulated, may we con-
clude that his decisions were necessarily political?
It is important that this question be taken seriously.372 It is con-
ceivable that a Greyhound bus may be a "dog." Evidence of the con-
text of enactment discloses that local usage in the city in question
is that buses are "dogs" and that the city council was concerned with
bus fumes and disruptive tourists in the park when it enacted the
ordinance. A judge of the indicated political persuasion could credibly
be accused of a political decision (even if that decision was framed
in terms of "fair notice" and "plain meaning") if this was the state
of the evidence. The reason that the judge who dismisses the bus
and toy cases where this is not the evidence seems not to have made
a political decision despite the coincidence of his political views with
that decision is a series of shared assumptions about the meaning of
"dog" in the context of its enactment and the failure of a bus and
a toy to correspond with that meaning. The judge has a political
perspective and must determine the significance of a meaning within
a situation, but it is possible to make a judgment that substantive
political perspective is not responsible for determination. 73 It is
possible to make that same judgment about the case of the defendant
arrested for possession of the Great Dane in the park even if the
judge is known to detest dogs: the fact that his distaste for dogs coin-
cides with his decision to apply the ordinance does not necessarily
render his decision political if political decision is understood as deci-
sion by reference to the judge's particular political preference regard-
ing the issue before him.
otherwise the success of the effort is in substantial doubt. In short, one proceeds from
concepts to conceptions, but concepts as used here are outside text, not within it,
and although concepts are crucial to communication of meaning, conceptions are not.
372. On the importance of context to meaning, see supra text accompanying
notes 138-48.
373. See. My Reply to Stanley Fish, supra note 3, at 306.
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This, of course, is not the only possible understanding of a
characterization of a decision as political. If political decision is
understood instead as decision by reference to the judge's normative
view of his function, the judge's decision regarding buses, toys and
Great Danes is of course political and is necessarily so whichever
stance 'he takes regarding his role. Moreover, the judge's normative
view of his function is linked to and is no doubt an expression of a
complex collection of values forming a controversial understanding of
the good society. His decision regarding application of the ordinance
is therefore a product of this complex collection of values in the limited
sense that the set of possible decisional outcomes he will perceive
as plausible is constrained by a conception of role that expresses
that complex collection of values. 7 ' Application of an ordinance pro-
hibiting dogs in the park to a bus in the park is implausible because
the judge's conception of function renders it implausible and the
judge's conception of function is enabled by the complex collection
of values supporting it.
374. It is of course possible to view this complex collection of values as the
"political" evil to be attacked. For example, the critical legal studies argument that
law is ideology may be interpreted, not as a claim that judges decided directly by
reference to their political preferences, but, rather, that judges decide by reference
to an internalized value structure characterized by "alienation", "hierarchy," "hegemony",
"authoritarianism", "contradiction", "individualism", etc. This is the structuralist aspect
of the argument. It emphasizes the dependence of subjective perception on a socially
conferred fund of meanings, the function of preconception and myth in reconciling discon-
tinuities in those meanings, and structural similarities between political and economic
organization and legal doctrine. See, e.g., Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Com-
mentaries, 28 BUFFALO LAW REV. 205 (1979). These notions appear similar to those of
Merleau-Ponty and Sartre and are linked to the "structuralism" of Levi-Strauss and
Piaget. See Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory in THE POLITICS OF LAW 281
(D. Kairys ed. 1982). Cf. C. LEVI-STRAUSS, TOTEMISM (R. Needham trans. 1963); M.
MERLEAU-PONTY, PHENOMENOLOGY OF PERCEPTION (C. Smith trans. 1962); J. PIAGET, THE
CONSTRUCTION OF REALTY IN THE CHILD (M. Cook trans. 1955); J.P. SARTRE, CRITIQUE OF
DIALECTICAL REASON (A.S. Smith trans. 1976).
The neo-marxist aspect of the argument postulates the possibility of overcom-
ing the internalized fund of values and perceptions postulated by the structuralist
aspect of the argument and further offers in place of the positivist structure thought
currently extant a "non-alienated" and "humane" consciousness. Why this alternative
consciousness does not constitute merely an alternative belief structure from which
a judge possessing it sees the world and defines his role within the world is not obvious.
Nor is it obvious why alternative legal doctrines would not be generated by such a
consciousness and would not operate to legitimate the state of affairs generated by
such a consciousness, and would not operate to cause the population to submit to that
state of affairs through an internalization of such a consciousness. That a positivist
legal world is not an objective "given" compelled by history or culture seems obvious,
as does the proposition that the legal world is something we create from a fund of
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 19, No. 2 [1985], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol19/iss2/1
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
The decision the judge reaches remains nevertheless politically
neutral in the only sense in which a decision regarding application
of the ordinance can be politically neutral. The decision is not made
directly by reference to the compatibility of the ordinance with the
judge's complex collection of values. Rather, it is made by reference
to the understanding of judicial function yielded by that complex
collection of values. The judge must evaluate the significance of the
ordinance within the situation confronting him by reference to his
understanding of his function and of the society in which he performs
his function. The judge's practical wisdom-his capacity to evaluate
significance-is enabled by his values. But an exercise of practical
wisdom does not require an evaluation of the wisdom of the ordinance.
A judge convinced that buses ought to be banned from the park is
nevertheless capable of dismissing the case against the bus possessor.
The case of the cat in the park is more difficult. It is conceivable
that "dog" was used by the city council in the context of enactment
to mean animals or pets. Assume, however, that the judge knows only
that the city council enacted an ordinance prohibiting "dogs" in the
park. A judge inclined to attribute purposes might well conclude that
the cat possessor has violated the ordinance: the purpose of the
ordinance is to preclude the evils of non-human animals in the park
and application of the ordinance to the cat possessor would further
this purpose. A judge inclined to adopt a literalist stance might con-
clude instead that a cat is not within the ordinary meaning of "dog;" 7 '
if the city council wishes to regulate cats, it must fill the "gap" created
by a literal interpretation by saying so. If the literalist judge is known
to believe that use of parks should be unregulated, is his decision
political? Certainly it is possible that the decision is political, just as
it is possible that the decision of the purposive judge who dislikes
cats is political. But an interpretation of the judge's decision which
suggests that it rests on the judge's particular preference regarding
park use is implausible precisely because one of the shared values
of the community is that the judge ought not to decide on the basis
of his particular preferences regarding the issues before him. Absent
substantial evidence suggesting that the judge has in fact breached
that norm, there is a disinclination to believe such an interpretation.
In effect, a presumption favoring compliance with the norm structures
one's sense of plausible interpretations of the judge's behavior.
shared meanings. But acceptance of these propositions yields only a sense of the con-
tingent character of our understanding of the legal world, it does not compel or even
recommend a "humane" or "non-alienated" understanding.
375. See Easterbrook, supra note 4, at 535.
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A more plausible interpretation of the judge's decision is that
he decided by reference to his conception of his function and that
his conception is controversial. The literalist judge declined to apply
the ordinance to the cat possessor because he had a passive concep-
tion of his role and the purposive judge applied the ordinance to the
cat possessor because he had a more active conception of his role.
Both of these alternative conceptions are potentially linked to alter-
native substantive political positions regarding regulation of park use.
The purposive judge's purposive stance is compatible with a position
favoring regulation of park use and the literalist judge's literalist
stance is compatible with a position opposing regulation of park use.
But neither a purposive stance nor a literalist stance is so compelled
by substantive political position that purposive meaning is inaccessible
to the judge who is opposed to regulation or that literal meaning is
inaccessible to the judge who favors regulation. Nor is either stance
so compelled by substantive political position that it cannot be adopted
and followed by a judge independently of substantive political posi-
tion. Indeed, the independence of judicial conception of role from par-
ticularized political position is what enables entertaining the norm of
neutrality and entertaining a presumption of compliance with the
norm. Notice, however, that inherent in the postulate of independence
are the assumptions that the judge's decision occurs within alternative
and controversial conceptions of role and that the set of possible deci-
sions within one conception is distinct from the set of possible deci-
sions within the competing conception.
2. Political Decision As The Political Character Of The Decision.
The blind defendant's possession of a seeing eye dog presents
the most difficult of the postulated cases. Application of the ordinance
to that defendant would arguably produce an unjust, unreasonable
and absurd result. Such characterizations have a number of potential
sources: the shared values of the community, legislation compelling
accommodation of the handicapped (even if this legislation is "irrele-
vant"), the views of the judge on the question of accommodation of
the handicapped. A judge faced with the seeing eye dog case will be
tempted to conclude either that the city council would not have
intended application of the ordinance or that he ought to exercise his
independent responsibility as a judge to create a "gap" in the
ordinance by exempting seeing eye dogs.3 7
It is probable that the city council never contemplated the ques-
tion of seeing eye dogs when it passed the ordinance. It is possible
376. See supra text accompanying notes 148-57.
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that it would have exempted such dogs had it contemplated the ques-
tion. But the judge cannot know what the city council would have
done in the case absent evidence that it was considered, and a seeing
eye dog, unless "dog" was used in the ordinance to mean "bus," is
a "dog" as the range of concepts conveyed by that term has been
thus far specified. Even a judge inclined to purposive interpretation
will have difficulty excluding seeing eye dogs from the meaning of
the ordinance: seeing eye dogs, even if generally well behaved, exhibit
many of the characteristics of dogs generally, and it will be difficult
to conclude that only those characteristics not exhibited by seeing
eye dogs constitute the evil targeted by the ordinance.
A judge tempted to dismiss the case against the blind defen-
dant faces a further difficulty. His perception of absurdity,
unreasonableness and injustice may not be universally shared. The
anti-dog lobby that sought passage of the ordinance may include per-
sons who prize peace, quiet and sanitation in the park over the justice
of access by blind persons to the park. The political allies of that lobby
might even include persons prejudiced against blind persons, persons
afflicted with dog phobias and persons allergic to dog hair, and all
such persons may value their access to the park over a blind person's
access. Exemption of seeing eye dogs therefore requires a decision
that the value of access by blind persons to the park is a more impor-
tant or better value than the values held by the anti-dog lobby and
its allies.
A literalist judge whose normative view of his role rendered him
tolerant of injustice and absurdity might conclude that the blind defen-
dant violated the ordinance. A non-literalist judge whose normative
view of his role rendered him intolerant of injustice and absurdity
might conclude that the blind defendant did not violate the ordinance.
In what senses may these conclusions be said to be substantively
"political"?
There are senses in which departure from the "plain meaning"
of the ordinance is inherently political. (Notice that an exemption of
the seeing eye dog is a departure; the non-literalist judge cannot claim
that seeing eye dogs are not within the understood meaning of "dog"
and cannot claim that seeing eye dogs do not exhibit the evils targeted
by the ordinance). One sense in which departure is necessarily political
is that the judge must be sufficiently offended by the prospect of
application to the blind defendant to perceive injustice and absurdity,
but this condition would not be difficult to satisfy even for a judge
who prefers a park free of dogs to a park to which blind persons
have access. It is possible to perceive a meaning (here injustice) with
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which one disagrees. 77 And perception is not political decision; a judge
can perceive injustice and nevertheless refuse to depart from the
ordinance.
A second sense in which departure is necessarily political is that
it requires a decision that makes a choice between or compromises
competing interests and competing political perspectives and is
therefore political in character because the judge cannot claim that
he applies the ordinance; he must self-consciously make law. This is
so even if the judge has no substantive political stake in the outcome:
he is equally indifferent to dogs in the park and to the access of blind
people to the park. The instant the non-literalist judge decides to
depart from the ordinance, he has made a choice between competing
substantive political perspectives. That choice might be made on the
basis of his preference or might be made (if he is indifferent) on the
basis of his perception of what the city council or a majority of citizens
would think right in the circumstances, but that choice is in either
event political in the sense that it is an accommodation of political
perspectives rather than an application of an existing political
compromise."'
Does the literalist judge make a political decision in this sense
when he refuses to depart from the ordinance? It may be argued that
he does. Application of the ordinance to the blind defendant is a vic-
tory for the anti-dog lobby and a defeat for the blind people's lobby.
Moreover, this victory and defeat cannot be related to any specific
feature of the political compromise reflected in the ordinance because
it is stipulated that there is no evidence that the city council con-
sidered the issue of seeing eye dogs."'
It is, however, not accurate to say either that the meaning of
the ordinance in the context of its enactment is irrelevant to the blind
defendant's case or that the political victory of the anti-dog lobby over
the pro-dog lobby is not enforced by application of the ordinance to
the blind defendant. The literalist judge who is as personally indif-
ferent to dogs in the park and blind people's access to the park as
his non-literalist colleague does not decide on the basis of what he
thinks best in the circumstances or what he thinks the city council
would do in the circumstances or what he thinks a majority of citizens
would believe right in the circumstances. It is true that the effect
of his application is a political victory for the anti-dog lobby and is
377. See supra text accompanying notes 348-53.
378. See Kennedy, supra note 27, at 397 n.65.
379. See id. at 380.
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therefore an allocation of political bargaining chips; the blind persons'
lobby must now expend political capital in seeking a city council
amendment to the ordinance. But the literalist judge's decision was
based on the ascertainable political compromise reflected by the
statute as that compromise stands and despite the fact that that com-
promise did not contemplate the interest of blind people. The source
of the literalist judge's decision in the case was the ordinance, even
though the source of his decision to rely on the ordinance was his
belief structure or the belief structures of the community in which
he is "embedded."
A distinction has been made here between the cases of the bus,
toy, cat and Great Dane and the case of the seeing eye dog. The
political character of judicial decision in the former cases was said
to be a matter of judgment dependent upon whether there is evidence
supporting a conclusion that the judge decided on the basis of substan-
tive political considerations. The latter case was said to be inherently
political for the non-literalist judge because the decision to depart from
the ordinance necessarily requires a decision political in character even
when made by a judge politically indifferent to the issue. However,
it is quite possible to stipulate evidence from which to credibly infer
that a literalist judge has made a political decision in the seeing eye
dog case. All that is required is to postulate language in the ordinance
the meaning of which cannot be narrowed by evidence of the context
of enactment. Assume that an indifferent literalist judge is confronted
with some basis in the language of the ordinance or in its legislative
history for an exemption from the ordinance. The ordinance, for
example, states that dogs are prohibited in the park except where
"necessary," and there is no evidence from which the possibilities of
that term might be limited. The literalist judge is now faced with
a hard case in the sense that he is likely to perceive the case as both
morally and linguistically difficult.
The postulated exemption confronting the indifferent literalist
judge renders his decision inherently political for the same reason
that the indifferent non-literalist judge's departure from an ordinance
not containing such an express exemption is necessarily political: in
both instances thd judge is, by his decision or by express invitation,
left at large to formulate a political accommodation on the basis of
a choice between competing values." ° The situation in which the
380. This is the case with respect to many statutes the meaning of which in
the context of enactment is relatively open-ended. It is of course possible to claim
that all statutes are open-ended, but it is also possible to make judgments about degree
of open-endedness. See Frank, supra note 2; at 1265.
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literalist judge finds himself-in particular, the degree to which
evidence of meaning in the context of enactment fails to limit the
possibilities of statutory language-may necessitate decision of a
inherently political character even for a judge indifferent to the
substantive merits of his political alternatives. Indeed, the judge is
confronted in such a situation with a choice nearly as political in
character as the choices confronting judges in a common law lawmak-
ing context. But these facts are, again, mere evidence of political deci-
sion. Such evidence is not always present and cannot therefore
establish that judicial application of a statute is universally political
either in the sense of the character of such decision or in the sense
of a judge's substantive political perspective.
It is, in short, possible to meaningfully distinguish a literalist
judge from a non-literalist judge on the ground that the former seeks
to avoid substantive political decision. Even though it must be con-
ceded that there are instances in which statutory language makes
political decision unavoidable, it is possible to make judgments about
the constraining force of language and of legislative history on the
basis of available evidence. It may be true that there are no "easy
cases" in the rather technical sense that even the literalist judge must
in every case supply a minor premise for his deductive syllogism by
means of an act of characterization the source of which is the judge
(or of the community in which the judge is "embedded"). A seeing
eye dog is a dog only if the judge characterizes it as a dog. But it
is not true that the literalist judge is always as at large as the non-
literalist judge; the literalist judge's conception of his role confines
his sense of plausible characterization to a degree that makes mean-
ingful his claim to enforcement of a pre-existing (even if incomplete)
political bargain.
There remains, however, the argument that any departure from
literalism renders all decisions within a scheme of literalism political:
once the literalist judge concedes the possibility of an intolerably
absurd or unjust result, he must both ask himself the intolerable result
question in every case and must choose between application and
departure in every case. Moreover, that choice is rather expressly
stated in terms of the degree to which the judge is offended by
application: the judge's political perspective determines the absurdity
and injustice question.
381. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 27, at 391; Moore, supra note 34, at 280-81.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 19, No. 2 [1985], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol19/iss2/1
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
The argument fails, however, because the fact of choice-an
inevitable fact in an American judicial tradition that has always as-
sumed the possibility of departure from plain meaning in instances
of absurd and unjust results'-does not establish that the choice made
in a particular case was political; it is merely evidence of that
characterization. A judge who tends to be tolerant of absurd and
unjust results may no doubt be influenced by a substantive political
perspective that makes him insensitive to injustice and absurdity. In-
deed, a substantive political perspective defines that which is absurd
and unjust even if that substantive political perspective is universally
shared." But it remains possible for a judge's normative understand-
ing of role to trump his substantive political perspective-it is possible
for a judge to disagree with ascertained meaning and to perceive a
result as unjust and absurd and nevertheless to believe himself bound
by that meaning most of the time. To the extent that such a judge
concedes the possibility of an intolerably unjust result and therefore
the possibility that he is not bound by ascertained meaning some of
the time, he has only approximated his understanding of role, but
his inconsistency is merely inconsistency and inconsistency is merely
evidence of substantive political decision incompatible with that
understanding of role. It is therefore possible for a literalist judge
to exempt blind people possessing seeing eye dogs from the ordinance
on Tuesday, to dismiss the case against the cat possessor on the
ground a cat is not a dog on Wednesday, to dislike cats, like dogs
and be generally opposed to regulation of use of the park and
simultaneously to legitimately claim a literalist's normative view.
3. Political Decision As Making Or Refusing to Make Law
The last of the hypothesized cases raises a question whether a
judge should borrow the ordinance prohibiting dogs in the park to
establish the civil liability of the possessor of the Great Dane when
the latter is sued for injuries resulting from the Great Dane's
exuberance. A state court judge exercising general jurisdiction is com-
monly thought to have a creative role in developing the common law
in such circumstances, and the use of at least statutes as bases for
common law decision is commonly thought appropriate as an instance
of deference to legislative authority." Indeed, a judge who declines
382. See cases cited supra note 90.
383. It is possible to argue that subjectivity is confined by requiring that only
relatively narrowly defined "principles" may serve as the basis for a court's partial
nullification of a statute. See Wellington, supra note 4, at 262-64. But see Brest, supra
note 27, at 1068-73.
384. See Common Law and Legislation, supra note 8.
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to consider statutory law as a source of relevant policy in formulating
common law rules risks characterization as jealously preserving his
anti-democratic common law lawmaking authority. What however is
the relevance of that criticism to instances in which the Burger Court
has declined to make interstitial federal common law to further the
policies of federal legislation?
The difficulties with such criticism from the perspectives of
Burger Court literalism are two: federal court authority to make
federal common law ought to be highly limited,"5 and federal court
use of federal regulatory schemes to create private causes of action
designed to more effectively enforce such schemes cannot be traced
to congressional judgments.' Judicial creativity in service of effec-
tive enforcement ignores the obvious possibility that the political com-
promise giving rise to a regulatory scheme included a compromise
about the efficacy with which the scheme was to be enforced. 7
It is apparent that express judicial creation of a cause of action
and the borrowing of a technically irrelevant statute to inform the
content of a common law cause of action are judicial decisions political
in character as the term "political" has been understood here. Whether
or not such decisions may be properly dressed in the rhetoric of prin-
cipled, consistent and reasoned judicial methodology and therefore
distinguished from the mechanisms of political compromise in the
legislature, they are decisions which accommodate and compromise
contending interests through imposition of controversial perspectives.
The more interesting question is whether a refusal to create is
"political. '38
There is a sense in which a refusal to create is of course substan-
tively political. The values upon which the Burger Court declines to
385. See, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. Illinois and Michigan, 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
386. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
387. See, Easterbrook, supra note 4, at 541-42. This notion is rather expressly
recognized in federal labor law preemption doctrine, Teamsters Local 20 v. Morton,
377 U.S. 252 (1964), in Labor Act doctrine regarding the consequences of unprotected
employee activity, N.L.R.B. v. Insurance Agents Int'l. Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960), and
in Labor Act doctrine regarding remedies. H.K. Porter Co. v. N.L.R.B., 397 U.S. 99 (1970).
388. Cf., Corbin, Jural Relations and Their Classification, 30 YALE L.J. 226, 237
(1921) (a rule of law which permits is as much a rule of law as a rule which com-
mands); Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied in Judicial Reason-
ing, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 42 n.59 (1913) (same); Kennedy, supra note 5 (form is substance);
Glennon & Nowak, A Functional Analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment State Action
Requirement, 1976 SuP. CT. REV. 221 ("state action" as substance).
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extend federal regulatory schemes beyond their ascertained meaning
are federalism and the separation of powers. Both values are "objec-
tive" in the sense that it cannot be denied that both values are a
part of a constitutional tradition, but the essential question is how
much federalism and how much separation will the Supreme Court
demand. Its demand is a function of its political perspective; "giving
content to our fundamental values"' is a process dependent upon the
value Supreme Court justices place on often incompatible fundamen-
tal values. 9 ° Nor can the political perspective that places a high value
on federalism and separation be wholly excused as a mere incident
to a normative perspective regarding judicial role. It is possible to
derive the judicial passivity that often accompanies the values of fed-
eralism and separation from a normative literalism, but both such
values at least often require an activism inconsistent with Supreme
Court deference to congressional law making. 9'
There is however another sense in which the refusal to create
within the context of the substantive values of federalism and separa-
tion is not political: the refusal is not necessarily expressive of a
judicial hostility to the substantive merits of congressional regulatory
schemes. It is possible for a judge to decline to effectively enforce
a regulatory scheme with which he agrees or about which he is indif-
ferent within a doctrinal structure that values federalism and separa-
tion. It is possible because a statute's scope of permissable operation
may be established by reference to that doctrinal structure and
without reference to the substantive merits of the statute's objec-
tives or to the substantive merits of the means the statute invokes
to achieve those objectives.
There is, however, yet another sense in which it may be claim-
ed that a refusal to make law is necessarily political. The effect of
such a refusal is to preserve the status quo, and the status quo,
because often the product of private orderings within a structure of
judge-made law, is inherently the product of some normative perspec-
tive about the proper functioning of the good society.2
The invocation of a statute as a reason for judicial decision
imposes a choice on a court. The court must either require the party
389. Fiss, supra note 23, at 9-17.
390. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 3; Brest, supra note 3.
391. See, e.g., National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976); Stone
v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
392. See Kennedy, supra note 5, at 1752-66.
1985]
Cox: Ruminations on Statutory Interpretation in the Burger Court
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1985
392 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19
invoking the statute to show that the legislature has authorized judicial
action or require the party against whom the statute is invoked to
show that the legislature has not authorized judicial action. The former
allocation tends to restrict the statute's scope of operation and the
latter to expand that scope of operation. 93 In instances where the
legislature has failed to specify a decision-the case where it is claimed
that a private cause of action should be implied from a federal
regulatory scheme-the former allocation will always have the substan-
tive result that the status quo, often the status quo as it has been
privately formulated within a regime of state law, is preserved.9 Such
a substantive result is the product of a judicial choice between alter-
native allocations of the burden of persuasion, and that choice cannot
be grounded upon legislative decision-it is stipulated that the
legislature has made no decision. It is therefore tempting to conclude
that the criterion by which the choice is made is political: because
the Burger Court cannot claim that it defers to a non-existent con-
gressional decision, it defers in fact to private orderings or to state
law from a hostility to governmental intrusion or, at least, to federal
regulation. 9
In part, this claim merely repeats the claim that the value the
Burger Court places on federalism and separation of powers is a
substantive political decision. It is, however, also a claim that any
meta-rule regarding judicial treatment of a statute's scope of
operation-both a meta-rule that confines a statute to its ascertained
meaning and a meta-rule that draws on the statute as a source of
policy or principle for judicial decision in contexts outside that
meaning-is necessarily political because the choice between alter-
native meta-rules is made by reference to alternative and controver-
sial visions of the good society. However, the fact that it is a meta-
rule-a rule governing a generic judicial attitude toward statutes in-
dependent of the particular policy content of any given statute-
renders decisions within the structure of a choice of meta-rules
politically neutral for the same reason that decisions within a struc-
ture that places great value on federalism are politically neutral. 9
The structure is itself not politically neutral; it is an expression of
underlying beliefs about the wisdom, efficacy and morality of govern-
mental action. But decisions made within the structure are reached
393. See Easterbrook, supra note 4.
394. Lindgren, Social Theory and Judicial Choice: Damages and Federal Statutes,
28 BUFF. L. REV. 711, 727-35 (1979). See Sante Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462
(1977).
395. See Note, supra note 34, at 908-12.
396. See supra text accompanying notes 390-91.
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by reference to the structure rather than by reference to the judge's
view of the substantive merits of statutory schemes.
It is obvious that the political character of the choice between
meta-rules is the normative character of the choice between alternative
versions of the role of courts, legislatures and statutory text.3 97 The
latter choice is perhaps intrinsically linked to substantive political
perspective in the sense, at least, that any given version of judicial
role reflects a controversial version of the good society. 9 It has been
the argument here that it is possible despite that linkage to distinguish
between the inevitably normative character of a court's perspective
regarding its role and the potentially political character of a court's
perception of the meaning of a particular statute and the significance
of that meaning in the context of the facts of a case, but it cannot
be denied that substantive political vision generates the structure
within which judgments about the political neutrality of particular
statutory applications may be made. The "neutral principle" of judicial
restraint adopted by the Burger Court-like the "neutral principle"
of tolerance of absurd and unjust results-can be employed in a
politically neutral fashion; judgments about the neutrality of such a
principle's employment may be made on the basis of available evidence.
But neutral principles are not themselves politically neutral; they are
linked to and supported by controversial political arguments.
This admission brings us, however, to a point made earlier
regarding the triviality of the claim that the Burger Court's approx-
imated positivism is necessarily normative.' The fact that the Burger
Court applies statutes within a normative and controversial perspec-
tive does not defeat the Court's claim to the status of a mere agent
of a congressional sovereign unless that claim is understood in its
strongest and most absurd sense. The claim retains viability in the
weak sense that the Court can behave as a more or less faithful agent
on the controversial premise that it ought to behave as an agent. 4°0
397. See supra text accompanying notes 61-76.
398. See generally, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 5; Tushnet, supra note 27.
399. See text and notes 316-23 supra.
400. But cf. My Response To Stanley Fish, supra note 3, at 298-303 (it is not
possible to distinguish a skeptical argument outside a practice from a moral or political
argument within that practice); Knapp & Michaels, supra note 118, at 739-43 (it is
not possible to be in a position of seeing our beliefs without believing them). There
are senses in which the claim that one cannot stand outside of a practice supports
the point made in the text here and senses in which the claim undermines that point.
The notion underlying Dworkin's claim, a notion Dworkin shares with both Stanley
Fish and Knapp and Michaels, is that interpretations are plausible only because they
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The fact that its agency status cannot grant it the innocence of the
automaton-that it is ultimately responsible for its understanding of
the functions it performs within such a conception of its role-does
not necessitate a conclusion that it cannot behave in a fashion consis-
tent with that understanding. And there is no basis-other than the
equally controversial premise that the court ought not to behave as
an agent because to do so is inconsistent with alternative political
visions-for the argument that the Burger Court's vision is "wrong. 4 °1
CONCLUSION
It is quite possible that a normative view regarding judicial role
is the product of a substantive political perspective regarding the
nature of the good society. Legal formalism may, for example, be the
product of "individualism." It is therefore quite possible that the
Burger Court's response to any particular statute will reflect its
are connected to or embedded in some "practice" or political theory. This article assumes
that notion has force in the context of application within a situation, and argues here
that, if one assumes that the point of statutory application is to behave as an agent,
one can in degree succeed in behaving as an agent. The article is skeptical, however,
in the sense that it denies that there is an objective basis for concluding either that
one should or that one should not entertain the postulated assumption.
The claim that one cannot stand outside of a practice may mean that skepticism
is impossible because it requires a claim of knowledge its point is to deny: to say
that objectivity is impossible is to make a claim that objectivity is objectively im-
possible. Skepticism in this form is therefore internally inconsistent. But the internal
inconsistency of skepticism merely defeats skepticism's claim to a status above the
fray. Skepticism understood as a denial of the possibility of objectivity assumes that
the point of interpretation or application is objectivity because skepticism requires
a target. Such an assumption cannot itself be verified within a skeptical system of
thought; skepticism, like its competitors, requires a leap of faith it cannot validate.
The internal inconsistency of skepticism does not however defeat skepticism's
alternative claim to being a position that can be held simultaneously with a non-skep-
tical position. The fact that skepticism in the form "knowledge is mere belief' is itself
merely a belief does not preclude entertaining that belief. It is in fact quite possible
to have a position about how a court ought to interpret and apply statutes and
simultaneously to believe that neither one's own position nor its competitors can be
shown to be correct. It is moreover possible to simultaneously believe that "napalm-
ing babies" is evil and to recognize that assertion as merely a belief. See Leff, supra
note 117. Indeed, this capacity is a chief characteristic of twentieth century con-
sciousness; it requires an extraordinary medieval arrogance to be not simultaneously
amused and terrified by the frailties of one's beliefs and the dependence of one's percep-
tions upon these beliefs. The dilemma faced by a twentieth century consciousness is
the dilemma of the necessity of exercising power by acting on belief-a dilemma made
more acute in proportion to one's power over others and therefore made very acute
in the case of the judge.
401. See, e.g., Arnold, Professor Hart's Theology, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1298 (1960);
Leff, supra note 117.
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substantive political perspective: ideological hostility to federal
regulatory schemes may be expressed in terms of the values of judicial
neutrality in enforcing congressional political judgments.
There are, however, two reasons to think this possibility of
limited force as a ground for criticism. First, the Burger Court's ideals,
if consistently pursued, limit the capacity of substantive political
perspective to control adjudication. If it is possible to perceive a mean-
ing with which one disagrees, adjudication by reference to plain
statutory meaning limits the extent to which substantive political
perspective can be the real ground for decision. This does not mean
that substantive perspective is without force; it may control alloca-
tion of a burden of persuasion regarding the relevance and significance
of statutory meaning. But the Burger Court's stated ideals act to
preclude the "judicial creativity" necessary to gutting a regulatory
-scheme even if they permit limiting that scheme to its minimum
content.
Second, even if it is true that substantive political perspective
controls adjudication, that observation merely eliminates the judicial
claim to neutrality; it says absolutely nothing about what view of the
good society ought to prevail. Indeed, if the observation is correct
in its premise that formalism reflects a particular individualist
understanding of the good society, it constitutes merely a basis for
predicting the probable triumph of that perspective: persons enter-
taining the perspective possess the power to impose it.4 To the extent
that the observation makes an additional claim to a normative critique
of the Burger Court's substantive political perspective, it is reduced
to an assertion that the Court's values are simply "wrong;" a claim
to which the Court has a complete and irrefutable defense in the form
of a counterassertion: "no, they are not."
402. It is true that a part of this power is the claim to neutrality, but it is
at least doubtful either that exposure of the reality of judicial freedom in law reviews
will significantly undermine this source of power or that exposure would make any
difference to the prospects for alternative substantive political values. Indeed, suc-
cessful exposure such that the American public became aware of the substantive political
basis for judicial decision could only undermine the judicial power base from which
critics of the Burger Court's substantive political views have any hope of imposing
their own political perspective.
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ARTICLES
BRIBERY AS A "REAL" DEFENSE
AGAINST A HOLDER IN DUE COURSE
LOIS REGENT DRISCOLL*
I. INTRODUCTION
Bribery' is an ancient evil. Egypt's legal system, which goes back
"beyond 4000 B.C.,"' has left relics of specific pronouncements by King
Thutmose III dated about 1500 B.C.' condemning partiality on the part
of a judge.' Egyptian King Harmhab's Edict for Judges,5 written about
* Assistant Professor of Law, Baruch College, The City University of New
York; member, New York and Connecticut Bars.
1. Bribery is an unusually complex molecule and involves careful and exten-
sive separate study. See generally, E.A. Ross, SIN AND SOCIETY (1907); W.M. REISMAN,
FOLDED LIES: BRIBERY, CRUSADES AND REFORMS (1979) containing a bibliography of over
180 sources including United Nations and Congressional papers and law review articles;
N.H. JACOBY, P. NEHEMKIS, and R. EELLS, BRIBERY AND EXTORTION IN WORLD BUSINESS:
A STUDY OF CORPORATE POLITICAL PAYMENTS ABROAD (1977); R.L. SMITH, THE TARNISHED
BADGE (1965); THE KNAPP COMMISSION REPORT ON POLICE CORRUPTION (1972); D. BOULTON,
THE GREASE MACHINE: THE INSIDE STORY OF LOCKHEED'S DOLLAR DIPLOMACY (1978); R.W.
GREENE, THE STING MAN: INSIDE ABSCAM (1981); J. LEVY-CAEN, DE LA CORRUPTION DES
EMPLOYES: EN DROIT FRANCAIS ET EN DROIT ANGLAIS (1934); L.R. DRISCOLL, The Illegality
of Bribery: Its Roots, Essence, and Universality, CAPITAL U.L. REV. (to be published
February 1985).
2. J. WIGMORE, A PANORAMA OF THE WORLD'S LEGAL SYSTEM 11 (Library Ed.
(1936).
3. Id. at 16.
4. "It is an abomination of the god to show partiality. This is the teaching:
thou shalt act alike to all, shalt regard him who is known to thee like him who is
unknown to thee, and him who is near to thee like him who is far . . ." id. at 16-17,
quoting from instructions recorded on the tomb of chief judge Rekhmire purporting
to have been pronounced by King Thutmose III, citing the translation from J.H.
BREASTED, 2 ANCIENT RECORDS OF EGYPT S 666-670 (1907), at 52, n.c., 53.
5. King Harmhab's Edict, set forth by Wigmore, supra note 2, at 15-16, in
part inveighs: "I have sailed and traveled throughout the entire land. I have sought
out two judges perfect in speech, excellent in character, skilled in penetrating the
innermost thoughts of men, and acquainted with the procedure of the palace and the
laws of the court ... I have said to them, 'You shall not take money from one party
and decide without hearing the other; for how could you sit as judges upon other
men's deeds when one among you is himself committing an offense against justice?
The penalty for such an offense shall be death.' And I the king have decreed this,
that the laws of Egypt be bettered, and that suitors may not be oppressed. For I
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1300 B.C.,' on penalty of death, even more expressly and absolutely
prohibits a jurist from taking money from a party to a lawsuit.'
Almost as old as bribery itself is the law of commercial paper.
The first known negotiable instrument dates back to about 2100 B.C.,
around the time of the reign of King Hammurabi'
The laws pertaining to bribery and commercial paper are not
only ancient, but each is an integral part of our present everyday
lives. On a single average business day recently in the United States,
it is reported that over 100 million checks valued at over $50 billion
were written.' As for the prevalence of bribery today, the post-
Watergate scandals involving Lockheed Aircraft's countless millions
of dollars in payment abroad,"0 and the incredible videotaped
"Abscam"'' operations at home, depict bribery as quotidian today as
garden weeds, the common cold and TV soap operas.
1. Bribery Laws
Although they apparently have very little deterrent effect, we
have anti-bribery laws aplenty 2 on the books. The founding fathers
Id. (citing at 52, n.b., 53, the translation in BREASTED, supra note 4, Vol. 3 S 23.)
6. Id. at 18. Harmhab is said to have married the aunt-in-law of King
Tutankhamen. Id.
7. See supra note 5.
8. The bearer note reads, "5 shekels of silver, at the usual rate of interest,
loaned by the Temple of Shamash and by I. Company, to Idin and his wife, are payable
with interest on sight of the payors at the market-place to the bearer of this instru-
ment." WIGMORE, supra note 2 at 69 (citing the German translation in M. SCHORR,
URKUNDEN DES ALTABABYLONISCHE ZIVIL-UND PROZESSRECHTS, (No. 58) at 88 (1913). Id. at
95, n.e.
9. REILING, THOMPSON, BRADY and MACCHIAROLA, BUSINESS LAW TEXT AND
CASES 393 (1981).
10. BOULTON, supra note 1 at xiv. Senator Church, investigating Lockheed Air-
craft, is quoted as stating, "The bribes and the payoffs associated with doing business
abroad represent a pattern of crookedness that would make, in terms of its scope
and magnitude, crookedness in politics look like a Sunday school picnic by comparison."
Id. at 266.
11. "Abscam" was short for Abdul scam and involved a two-year investiga-
tion operated through a dummy corporation on Long Island called Abdul Enterprises,
Ltd. which resulted in bribery indictments of, among others, Philadelphia Congressman
Michael J. Myers; Representative Raymond F. Lederer (D-Pa.), a member of the House
Ways and Means Committee; Representative John W. Jenrette, Jr. (D-S.C.), a member
of the House Appropriations Committee; Representative Richard Kelly (R-Fla.);
Representative Frank Thompson, Jr. (D-N.J.), Chairman of the House Administration
Committee and the subcommittee on Labor-Management Relations; and Representative
John M. Murphy (D-N.Y.). GREENE, supra note 1, at 5-6.
12. "There is law aplenty on the books," but the real question is the extent
of "commitment to consistent and vigorous enforcement, which is, of course, the key
to the enforcement of antibribery laws and indeed to any meaningful response to white-
collar crime." REISMAN, supra note 1 at 160.
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so deplored bribery that, except for treason, it is the only crime
specified in the Constitution as an impeachable offense."3 Bribing
another's employee to influence him to perform his duties improperly
("commercial bribery"") is a common law offense,"6 is prohibited by
specific criminal statutes in at least half our states" and, in the
rest, may constitute wrongful conduct under the common law, or under
one or a combination of those states' various general criminal
13. U.S. CONST., art. II, S 4 provides for impeachment of the president, vice-
president, and all civil officers for "Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misde-
meanors." As to this provision, Prof. Reisman says, "It should be no surprise that
the first modern experiment in popular government fixed so sharply on bribery as
a fundamental violation of the trust the people were putting in an elected leader.
In this constellation of expectations, bribery is a form of treason." Id. at 3-4.
14. Commercial bribery has been defined as the "bribing of another's employees
for the purpose of inducing the employees to act in their employment in some way
favorable to the briber's interest." D.B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF REMEDIES
700 (1973). It has also been described as "an offense of bribing an employee, servant,
or agent, with the intent to influence him in his relation to his employer, master or
principal." 1 A.L.R. 3d 1350, 1352-53 (1965). 12 AM. JUR. 2d 759 (1964) defines it as "the
act of giving or receiving a gift for the purpose of influencing any agent to improperly
discharge a duty entrusted to him by a private individual or corporation." The history
of various statues prohibiting commercial bribery is described in Perrin v. United States
444 U.S. 37 (1979). "Commercial bribery was generally treated under the rubric of
the law of 'master and servant' since it involved deceit of the employer practiced jointly
by the external briber and the employee as well as contractual violations by the
employee. But the Federal Trade Commission viewed commercial bribery as an unfair
trade practice." REISMAN, supra note 1 at 176, n.3. See also United States v. Pomponio,
511 F.2d 953 (4th Cir. 1975).
15. "The common law offense of bribery has been defined as follows: 'whenever
a person is bound by law to act without any view to his own private emolument,
and another by a corrupt contract engages such person on condition of the payment
or promise of money or other lucrative consideration to act in a manner which he
shall prescribe, both parties are by such contract guilty of bribery' (14 Halsbury's
Laws (3rd Ed.) 213; 2 Douglas Election Cases 400)." I WORDS AND PHRASES, Bribery 185
(2d ed. 1969).
16. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. S 13-2605 (Supp. 1983-84); ARIZ. GEN. CORP.
LAW S 10-136 (1977); COLO. REV. STAT. S 18-5-401 (1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. SS 53a-160,
53a-161; HAWAII REV. STAT. S 708-880; ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 28 S 29A-1-20A-3; KAN. STAT.
ANN. S 21-4405; Ky. REV. STAT. SS 518.030; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 14:73; MASS. GEN. LAWS,
Ch. 271 S 39; MICH. STAT. ANN. S 750-150; Mo. REV. STAT., title 38 S 570.150; NEB. REV.
STAT. S 28-710; NEv. REV. STAT. S 613.110, 613.120; N. H. REV. STAT. S 638.7; N.J. STAT.
ANN. SS 2C:21-10 through 2C:21-15; 2C:41-1 through 2C:41-6.2 (1979); N.Y. PENAL LAW SS
180.00- 180.08; N.C. GES. STAT. S 14.353; PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. title 18 S 4108; R.I. GEN.
LAWS SS 11-7-3-11-7-5; S.C. CODE S 16-17-540; TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. S 32.43 (1974 and
Supp. 1984); UTAH CODE ANN. S 76-6-508 (1978); VA. CODE S 18.2-444 (1982); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. SS 49.44.060, 49.44.070 (1962); WIS. STAT. S 134.05. Commercial bribery may
also violate other criminal statutes in these states, and their common law; further-
more, in other states, it may violate the common law and various of their other criminal
statutes. See infra note 17.
Arizona, Colorado, Kansas, New Hampshire, New York and Texas provide for
felony violations under certain circumstances. In other states, commercial bribery viola-
tions constitute misdemeanors.
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statutes. 7 Federal statutes providing a second layer of enforcement
supplementing state authority to prosecute commercial bribery have
recently proliferated. 8
The earliest commercial bribery 9 statutes passed in the United
States were enacted just after the turn of the century.' They represented
a legislative response to the then alarming spread of commercial bribery
and its viciousness, dishonesty, and "demoralizing tendencies."" New
York's first commercial bribery statute, passed in 1905,22 was expanded
17. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE SS 484, 504, 506, 508, 639 and 639a; IDAHO CODE
ANN. S 18-2402; MONT. CRIM. CODE SS 94-2306-2309; N.M. CRIM. CODE S 30-16-6 (general
criminal fraud statute); OHIO REV. CODE SS 2913.02, 2921.13, 2913.43(A), 2921.21(A),
2923.03, 2921.22(A), 2905.12(C), 2905.11; OR. REV. STAT. S 165.080 (falsifying business
records); OKLA. REV. STAT. 21 S 421 (conspiracy), 21 S 1640; Wyo. REV. STAT. S 6-7-315.
18. See Perrin, supra note 14; the Federal Trade Commisison Act, as amend-
ed, 15 U.S.C. S 45(a)(1)(2) (1982); the Mail Fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. S 1314 (1982); the
Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. S 13 (1982); the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. S 1952 (1982);
the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. S 1951 (1982); the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organiza-
tion Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. S 1962 (1982); the Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. S 1059(2)
(1982); the Wire Fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. S 1343 (1982). There are also a large number
of federal statutes prohibiting not only such activities as bribing a Congressman (18
U.S.C. SS 204-205), a bank examiner (18 U.S.C. SS 212-213) or any other federal "public
official" (see 18 U.S.C. S 201(a)), but criminalizing "graft" and "conflict of interest" (18
U.S.C. SS 201-211) even as to former employees (id.) and partners of employees (id).
As to what commissions or fees are unlawful under the Robinson-Patman Act, see 42
A.L.R. FED. 276 (1979). See also 55 AM. JUR. 2d Monopolies SS 17, 162, 163, 800, 801 (1971);
as to cases dealing with federal kick-back statutes (41 U.S.C. SS 51-54 (1982)), see 17
L.Ed.2d 919 (1967). Any consignee or consignor of property delivered for interstate
transportation may not receive money or any valuable consideration as a rebate or
offset against regular charges for transportation. See S 1(3) of the Elkins Act, 49 U.S.C.
S 41(3). A briber may be prosecuted for his activities in aiding a bank officer who
violates 18 U.S.C. SS 371 and 215. U.S. v. Michael, 456 F. Supp. 335 (D.C.N.J. 1978).
See also Continental Management, Inc. v. U.S., 527 F.2d 613 (Ct. Cl. 1975) as to civil
sanctions, and cases collected at 12 AM. JUR. 2d 750, Bribery, Under Federal Statutes
S 4 (1964).
As to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (15 U.S.C. SS 78a, 78m) see ARKIN,
DUDLEY, EISENSTEIN, RAKOFF, RE And SIFFERT, 5 BUSINESS CRIME: CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF
THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY, ch. 18 and, generally, JACOBY, NEHEMKIS AND EELLS, supra
note 1; BOULTON, supra note 1.
19. See supra note 14.
20. See 1 A.L.R.3d 1353 (1978). As to the constitutionality of commercial bribery
statutes generally, see Annot., 1 A.L.R.3d 1350, 1357 (1978); State v. Brewer, 375 U.S.
9 (1963).
21. The words of Sirkin v. Fourteenth St. Store, 124 App. Div. 384, 387, 108
N.Y.S. 830, 832 (1st Dept. 1908).
22. New York's original commercial bribery statute was Sec. 384r of its then
Penal Code, which provided: "Corrupt influencing of agents, employees or servants.-
Whoever gives, offers or promises to an agent, employee or servant, any gift or gratuity
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in 190923 and became § 439 of the former New York Penal Law, which
thereafter was pared down" and cast into two separate statutes.25 A
further 1976 amendment bifurcated the crime into degrees, rendering
the first degree a class A misdemeanor." The most recent amendments
raised the penalties in all four commercial bribery statutes, so that com-
mercial bribing and bribe receiving in the first degree for the first time
in New York's history may constitute class E felonies."
whatever, without the knowledge and consent of the principal, employer or master
of such agent, employee or servant, with intent to influence his action in relation to
his principal's, employer's or master's business; or an agent, employee or servant who
without the knowledge and consent of his principal, employer or master, requests or
accepts a gift or gratuity or a promise to make a gift or to do an act beneficial to
himself, under an agreement or with an understanding that he shall act in any par-
ticular manner to his principal's, employee's or master's business; or an agent, employee
or servant, who, being authorized to procure materials, supplies or other articles either
by purchase or contract for his principal, employer or master, or to employ service
or labor for his principal, employer or master, receives directly or indirectly for himself
or for another, a commission, discount or bonus from the person who makes such sale
or contract, or furnishes such materials, supplies or other articles, or from a person
who renders such service or labor; and any person who gives or offers such an agent,
employee or servant such commission, discount or bonus shall be guilty of a misde-
meanor and shall be punished by a fine of not less than ten dollars nor more than
five hundred dollars, or by such fine and by imprisonment for not more than one year."
1905 N.Y. Laws 225.
23. N.Y. PENAL LAW S 439 (1909), amended 1930 N.Y. Laws 882, c. 409. 1953 N.Y.
Laws 2455 c. 891, S 7 was from Penal Code 1881, S 384r, added 1905 N.Y. Laws 225
c. 136, S 1.
24. N.Y. PENAL LAW SS 180.00, Commercial bribing, and 180.05, Commercial
bribe receiving were passed by 1965 N.Y. Laws 2343 c. 1030. Id. at 326, 330. The
new statutes deleted the former S 439 penalties which rendered a seller who gave
a present to a purchasing agent and the agent both guilty of a crime even in the
absence of any intent or agreement that the agent's conduct would thereby be
influenced.
25. See supra note 24.
26. Effective September 1, 1976, pursuant to 1976 N.Y. Laws, c. 458, SS 1
and 5. Prior to that time, both commercial bribing and commercial bribe receiving
were class B misdemeanors not split into different degrees. See 1965 N.Y. Laws 2420,
c. 1030.
27. The most recent amendments were effective September 1, 1983, and were
passed by 1983 N.Y. Laws 2048, c. 577 S 1. N.Y. PENAL LAW S 180.08 entitled "Com-
mercial bribe receiving in the first degree" provides:
An employee, agent or fiduciary is guilty of commercial bribe receiving
in the first degree when, without the consent of his employer or prin-
cipal, he solicits, accepts or agrees to accept any benefit from another
person upon an agreement or understanding that such benefit will influence
his conduct in relation to his employer's or principal's affairs, and when
the value of the benefit solicited, accepted or agreed to be accepted exceeds
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2. Definition of Bribery
Bribery has almost as many definitions as does the word "evil"
or "immorality." The subject requires separate and extensive study,
not here undertaken. For our purposes, we must keep in mind that
bribery is always associated with gross corruption.28
The verb "to bribe" is derived from and originally was defined
as "to steal."" Bouvier's 1914 Law Dictionary defines a briber simply
as "a thief."' One workable modern definition of bribery is "the act
or practice of giving, offering, or taking rewards for corrupt
practices."31 It is applied both to the one who gives and to the one
who receives.32
The difference between "commercial bribery"' and the bribery
of public officials has to do with the position held by the bribe-receiver.
In commercial bribery, he works for a private, rather than a public,
employer. The bribery of public officials is far graver, since it involves
the prostitution of a public trust.
The essence of the act of bribery is the giving of a gift or benefit
for the purpose of corruptly influencing an agent to discharge his duties
improperly. In that sense, it is the antithesis of honest pay received
for an honest day's work. It is dishonest pay received secretly to per-
form the dishonest bidding of the briber, in breach of the bribe-
receiver's duty toward his principal or employer, be such principal
or employer a public or private commercial entity.
When a briber gets "his man" (the bribe-receiver) within a system
of justice, politics, some branch of commerce, or within another's
one thousand dollars and causes economic harm to the employer or prin-
cipal in an amount exceeding two hundred fifty dollars. Commercial bribe
receiving in the first degree is a class E felony.
N.Y. PENAL LAW S 180.08 (McKinney 1975 and Supp. 1983-84). See also New York compa-
nion statutes: S 180.00 Commercial bribing in the second degree; S 180.03 Commercial
bribing in the first degree; S 180.05 Commercial bribe receiving in the second degree;
related statutes in Article 180, N.Y. PENAL LAW.
28. See McConnell v. Commonwealth Pictures Corp., 7 N.Y.2d 465, 199 N.Y.S.2d
483, 166 N.E.2d 494 (1960); DRISCOLL, supra note 1.
29. THE CENTURY DICTIONARY AND CYCLOPEDIA, AN ENCYCLOPEDIC LEXICON OF
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, Vol. 1 (1911).
30. The definition, in its entirety, reads: "BRIBOUR. One who pilfers other
men's goods; a thief. See 28 Edw. II. c.l." BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY 3d rev. 8th ed.
395 (1914).
31. THE WEBSTER'S NEW ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE,
UNABRIDGED 226 (1977); see also DRISCOLL, supra note 1.
32. Id.
33. See supra note 14 and 27.
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business, "his man" has been "bought" and is thus "owned" by the
briber, although he officially works for another. What follows is a
boring-from-within betrayal process. Through "his man" the briber gets
what he wants from the employer and, to that extent, secretly con-
trols and thereby also "owns" the employer. The briber thus "steals"
the services and loyalty of the agent or employee from the employer.
Viewed in this light, bribery has been characterized not only as dif-
ferent from, but possibly worse' than any other species of crime, and
has been described as a form of "treason." 5
II. SCOPE OF ARTICLE
One recent case required the superimposing of the complex legal
problems involved with bribery onto the clockwork of the law of com-
mercial paper. The case was Bankers Trust v. Litton Systems, Inc.,"
decided in 1979 by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, applying New York law. There, apparently for the first time,
a court was asked to decide whether bribery was a "real" 7 defense
against a holder in due course.' The court found it was not a "real"
but a "personal"39 defense, to be treated the same as fraud in the
inducement.0
This article analyzes the Bankers Trust decision and suggests,
in the interests of justice and in furtherance of the general public
34. "Bribery is thus different from other species of crime-worse, if you like-
but there is no reason to assume that bribery does not have its operational code."
REISMAN, supra note 1, at 2.
35. See supra note 13. Bribery is offensive and antithetical to our basic economic
philosophy insofar as it interferes with our need to maintain competitive conditions.
See, e.g., Continental Management, supra note 18. Since maintenance of competition
"is not viewed as a tampering with nature in favor of one class or another but as
a type of conservation, a fidelity to an essentially necessary state of nature," bribery
is the antithesis of our most fundamental policies and goals. REISMAN, supra note 1,
at 41. In contrast to American economic philosophy which is founded upon the
maintenance of free competition, consider Joe Bonanno's description of the economic
philosophy of organized crime. As a main objective, it seeks to establish and maintain
a strict system of monopolies. In his words, "If two Family members are bakers, they
are not allowed to own bakeries on the same block, for that would be bad for both
their businesses. They would be competing against each other." J. BONANNO with S.
LALLI, A MAN OF HONOR, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JOSEPH BONANNO 79 (1983).
36. 599 F.2d 488 (2d Cir. 1979).
37. See infra note 80 as to "real" defenses.
38. See infra Part III.
39. See infra note 80 as to "personal" defenses.
40. 599 F.2d at 493. Fraud in the inducement is fraud as to the nature of
the transaction as contrasted to fraud in the execution (or "essential" fraud) which
is fraud as to the nature of the instrument.
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policy interest which New York has always had in condemning criminal
bribery, the court could and should have gone the other way. In any
event, the analysis clarifies that even if Bankers Trust is applicable
to the particular facts of that case, it does not purport to, nor should
it be construed as standing for the general principle that bribery is
not a "real" defense good against the holder in due course of a
negotiable instrument.4 '
III. HOLDER IN DUE COURSE IN THE LAW OF COMMERCIAL
PAPER: PHILOSOPHY AND TECHNICAL PREREQUISITES
To cope with the issue of whether bribery is a good defense in
a civil action by a holder in due course, a basic understanding of the
underlying doctrines and the technical requirements of attaining holder
in due course status is necessary.
1. Philosophy
The holder in due course has been said to be the "emperor of
bona fide purchasers."' 2 The precursor of the concept of bona fide or
good faith purchaser appears primitively and as an ungerminated seed,
as early as 2250 B.C. in the Code of Hammurabi.' The first known
41. See infra note 83 as to the definition of "instrument."
42. WHITE AND SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE 456 (1972). The holder in due course is "one of the few purchasers in Anglo Saxon
jurisprudence who may derive a good title from a chain of title that includes a thief in
its links." Id. at 459.
43. Sections 9-12 of this earliest Code provide:
9. If any one lose an article, and find it in the possession of another:
if the person in whose possession the thing is found say "A merchant
sold it to me, I paid for it before witnesses," and if the owner of the
thing say "I will bring witnesses who know my property," then shall the
purchaser bring the merchant who sold it to him, and the witnesses before
whom he bought it, and the owner shall bring witnesses who can identify
his property. The judge shall examine their testimony-both of the
witnesses before whom the price was paid, and of the witnesses who iden-
tify the lost article on oath. The merchant is then proven to be a thief
and shall be put to death. The owner of the lost article receives his
property, and he who bought it receives the money he paid from the estate
of the merchant.
10. If the purchaser does not bring the merchant and the witnesses
before whom he bought the article, but its owner bring witnesses who
identify it, then the buyer is the thief and shall be put to death, and
the owner receives the lost article.
11. If the owner do not bring witnesses to identify the lost article,
he is an evil-doer, he has traduced, and shall be put to death.
12. If the witnesses be not at hand, then shall the judge set a
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negotiable instrument" is likewise of Hammurabian vintage, although
the fertile idea45 of transferability and negotiability did not appear
in European law until thousands of years later in the late middle ages.'
By the mid-1700's, however, our current basic principles of the
law of commercial paper were clearly laid down in the decisions of
English courts. 7 In 1758, Lord Mansfield in the seminal case of Miller
v. Race "8 set forth the essential elements of the holder in due course
doctrine.49
The theory enunciated in Miller v. Race was that if T steals
money from victim V, V has a good cause of action against T to
recover the money. But if T has used the money and it eventually
finds it way into the hands of, for example, merchant M, who took
it for goods sold, V cannot recover the money from M.
Substituting bearer paper" for cash, if T steals bearer paper from
V, V cannot recover the instrument if it passes through commerce
limit, at the expiration of six months. If his witnesses have not appeared
within the six months, he is an evil-doer and shall bear the fine of the
pending case. Code of Hammurabi, B.C. 2250, Pamphlets, V1421, 12182.
Association of the Bar of the City of New York Library.
44. See supra note 8.
45. WIGMORE, supra note 2, at 69.
46. Id.
47. W. BRITTEN, BILLS AND NOTES 9 (2d ed. 1961).
48. 1 Burr. 452, 97 Eng. Rep. 398 (K.B. 1758).
49. In Miller, supra, note 48 a demand promissory note in the amount of 21
pounds 10 shillings was made payable to William Finney or bearer. Finney mailed
the note to one Bernard Odenharty on December 11, 1756, but it was lost in a mail
robbery. Miller was an innkeeper who took the note for value on December 12th, in
the usual course of his business; but when he applied to the bank for payment, Race,
the bank clerk, refused either to pay the note or to redeliver it to Miller, because
the bank had been asked to stop its payment. Miller sued in trover for wrongful con-
version. Because he had taken the instrument for full and valuable consideration, and
in the usual course of his business and without any notice or knowledge that it had
been stolen, Miller prevailed. He was, although that term was not specifically coined,
a "holder in due course."
50. The law of commercial paper in the United States is embodied in the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). Louisiana has adopted only Articles 1, 3, 4, 5, 7
and 8 of the UCC. UCC 1978 Official Text with Comments, Table 1, XLIII, n.3. The
New York UCC statutes are referred to as "UCC" followed by a section number. All
quotes of the text of the UCC statutes have been taken from the UCC 1978 Official
Text, supra. The UCC has been applied in bankruptcy proceedings (In re United Thrift
Stores, 363 F.2d 11, 14 (3rd Cir. 1966)) and "is generally considered to be the federal
law of commerce." In re Quantum, 397 F. Supp. 329, 336, n.2 (D.C. Virgin Islands D.
St. Croix 1975), citing In re King-Porter Co., 446 F.2d 722, 732 (5th Cir. 1971).
As to "bearer paper," UCC S 3-111 provides, "An instrument is payable to
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and finds its way into the hands of one we now call a holder in due
course;5' also, the issuer52 should ordinarily be liable to pay the holder
in due course if sued for the amount of the instrument.
Put another way, we have a general rule of law that "no one
can transfer a better title than he himself possesses:" Nemo dat quod
non habet."5 But one of the exceptions to this rule arises out of the
law merchant as to negotiable instruments.5 If such an instrument
passes to that "highly refined species of bona fide purchaser" known
as a holder in due course, he will take the instrument "free of con-
flicting title claims to the instrument itself 57 and, more importantly
for our purposes, free of almost all defenses of prior parties with whom
he has not dealt.' The holder in due course is accorded this extraor-
dinary protection not because of his "praiseworthy character"5 but
to facilitate all commercial transactions and encourage and assure the
free flow of negotiable instruments in commerce. The law desires
unfettered negotiability of instruments and to that end assures that
a holder in due course acquires the right to collect on instruments
he buys on the market without the need for any "elaborate
investigations" ' of the process and background leading up to the
bearer when by its terms it is payable to (a) bearer or the order of bearer; or (b)
a specified person or bearer; or (c) 'cash' or the order of 'cash,' or any other indication
which does not purport to designate a specific payee." See also UCC S 3-805.
51. See UCC S 3-302.
52. "Issue" means the first delivery of an instrument to a holder or remitter.
UCC S 3-102(1)(a). "Issuer" is not used in the UCC. The issuer of a draft or check
(see UCC S 3-104(2(b)) is denominated a "drawer" (see, e.g., UCC SS 3-104(1b), 3-110(1)(a)),
and the issuer of a note is denominated a "maker." Id. "Issuer" is used throughout
to encompass either a "drawer" or "maker."
53. Whistler v. Foster, 14 Common Bench (N.S.) 248, 257-258, 43 Eng. Rep.
441, 444-45 (1863).
54. Id.
55. Id. Since negotiable instruments are "part of the currency," they "are
subject to the same rule as money: and if such instrument be transferred in good
faith, for value, before it is overdue, it becomes available in the hands of a holder,
notwithstanding fraud which would have rendered it unavailable in the hands of a
previous holder." Id. The law of "negotiable instruments" in the United States today
is known as the law of Commercial Paper and is embodied for the most part in UCC
Article 3. See also UCC S 1-103.
56. WHITE AND SUMMERS, supra note 42, at 456.
57. Id.
58. The holder in due course takes free of all defenses of a party with whom
he has not dealt except those potent defenses (commonly known as the "real" defenses)
described in the UCC. See UCC S 3-305(2).
59. Supra note 36, Bankers Trust at 599 F.2d at 494 citing Gilmore, The Com-
mercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057 (1954).
60. Id.
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issuance of those instruments. Any requirement to look beyond the
face of the instruments would be time-consuming and would thereby
impede their free flow.' Protection of the holder in due course tradi-
tionally has been likened to keeping "oil in the wheels of commerce.""2
Without the lubrication afforded by the holder in due course doctrine,
it is said that "those wheels would grind to a quick halt.""3
2. Some Basic Technical Prerequisites
To be a "holder in due course" of an instrument,' a person must
at least be a "holder" as defined in UCC S 1-201:5 he must not only
be in possession of the instrument, but it must have been properly
issued' or negotiated 7 to him. An instrument payable to order" and
delivered to a transferee cannot be further negotiated or enforced
by the transferee without indorsement. 9 Without such an indorsement,
there is an incomplete negotiation. One given unindorsed order paper
is a mere contract assignee. He stands in the shoes of his assignor
and is incapable, until he attains the status of a "holder"7 of acquir-
ing the rights accorded to holders under UCC § 3-301."' A fortiori,
such a transferee, because he is not a holder, cannot attain the rights
of a holder in due course. One to whom order paper has been delivered
without indorsement has the specifically enforceable right to have the
61. The holder in due course is entitled to rely "on the contract rights of
one who offers [the contract or instrument] for sale or to secure a loan." Id.
62. WHITE AND SUMMERS, supra note 42, at 457.
63. Id.
64. See infra note 83 as to the definition of "instrument."
65. "Holder" is "a person who is in possession of a document of title or an
instrument or a certificated investment security drawn, issued, or indorsed to him
or his order or to bearer or in blank." UCC S 1-201(20). See also UCC S 1-201(5) as
to definition of "bearer."
66. See supra note 52 as to the definition of "issue."
67. "Negotiation is the transfer of an instrument in such form that the
transferee becomes a holder. If the instrument is payable to order it is negotiated
by delivery with any necessary indorsement; if payable to bearer it is negotiated by
delivery." UCC S 3-202(1).
68. UCC S 3-110(1) in part provides: "An instrument is payable to order when
by its terms it is payable to the order or assigns of any person therein specified with
reasonable certainty, or to him or his order, or when it is conspicuously designated
on its face as 'exchange' or the like and names a payee .... See also UCC S 3-805.
69. The right of indorsement is covered in UCC 5 3-201. The types of
indorsements and their effect are important throughout Article 3 of the UCC, and
are treated in detail, especially in UCC S 3-202 through 3-206.
70. See supra note 64.
71. Whether or not he is the owner, a holder of an instrument may transfer
or negotiate it and, except as otherwise provided in UCC S 3-603, discharge it or enforce
payment in his own name. See UCC S 3-301(3).
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unqualified indorsement of his transferor:2 he may demand the
indorsement and, should it fail to be forthcoming, apply to a court
of equity for a decree directing the transferor unqualifiedly to indorse."
Negotiation is complete only when the indorsement is made, until which
time the law provides no presumption even that the transferee owns
the instrument."4 Upon receiving the indorsement, the transferee
becomes a holder and thereby may be able to achieve the status of
holder in due course.
Bearer paper,75 in contrast to order paper," may be properly and
completely negotiated by delivery alone,77 and is the closest thing to
cash in the world of commercial paper. As we saw in Miller v. Race,"8
it can move from hand to hand without so much as the tip of a pen
touching it.
UCC S 3-305 provides that a holder in due course will take the
instrument free from claims to it on the part of any person" and free
from what we commonly call "personal defenses"' of any party with
whom he has not dealt.
72. UCC S 3-201(3).
73. Id.
74. Id. A recent British case shows the broad general correlation of the UCC
provisions to long-standing English law. To attain the rights of a holder or holder
in due course, the court explains, "the holder of the bill must, if it be payable to
order, obtain an indorsement and ...he is affected by notice of a fraud received
before he does so. Until he does so, he is merely in the position of the assignee of
an ordinary chose in action, and has no better right than his assignor. When he does
so, he is affected by fraud which he knew of before the indorsement." Bank of Cyprus
v. Jones, Q.B., February 24, 1984 (12th para. of decision) quoting Whistler v. Foster,
supra note 53.
75. See supra note 50 as to "bearer paper."
76. See supra note 68.
77. See UCC S 3-202(1) at supra note 67.
78. Supra notes 48, and 49.
79. UCC S 3-305(1).
80. Some of the "personal defenses" are set forth in UCC j 3-306. By "per-
sonal" defenses we mean all those which are not "real" defenses. UCC S 3-305 sets
forth the real defenses, as follows:
To the extent that a holder is a holder in due course he takes the instru-
ment free from (1) all claims to it on the part of any person; and (2) all
defenses of any party to the instrument with whom the holder has not
dealt except (a) infancy, to the extent that it is a defense to a simple
contract; and (b) such other incapacity, or duress, or illegality of the trans-
action, as renders the obligation of the party a nullity; and (c) such
misrepresentation as has induced the party to sign the instrument with
neither knowledge nor reasonable opportunity to obtain knowledge of its
character or its essential terms; and (d) discharge in insolvency proceedings;
and (e) any other discharge of which the holder has notice when he takes
[Vol. 19
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There are five elements required for a "holder" to be a holder
in due course, all of which are set forth in UCC S 3-302."' One must be
1. A holder"2 of a
2. Negotiable instrument,83 who takes it for
3. Value" and in
4. Good faith" and
5. Without notice" that it was overdue or has been dishonored
or of any defense or claim to it on the part of any person."
One who is not himself a holder in due course because he cannot
fulfill all the substantive (and substantial88 ) requirements of UCC 5
3-302 may nevertheless attain the rights of a holder in due course
if he took the instrument from a holder in due course.89 In that way,
for example, an instrument transferred as a gift may give an eligible
donee' the same rights the donor had."1 If the donor was a holder
in due course, the donee normally attains his rights. There is yet one
the instrument.
81. UCC S 3-302 provides: "A holder in due course is a holder who takes the
instrument (a) for value; and (b) in good faith; and (c) without notice that it is overdue
or has been dishonored or of any defense against or claim to it on the part of any
person." UCC S 3-302(1). See also UCC S 9-206.
82. UCC S 3-302(1); see also UCC S 1-201(20), UCC SS 3-305, 3-306, 3-202(1). Cf.
UCC S 9-206 where this term is inapplicable.
83. For UCC Article 3 purposes "instrument" means negotiable instrument.
UCC S 3-102(1)(e). Cf. UCC S 9-206 at text corresponding to note 93 infra. See also
infra note 97.
84. 1,CC S 3-302(1)(a); see also UCC SS 3-303, 9-206, 1-201(44), 4-208, 4-209 and
WHITE AND SUMMERS, note 42 supra, at 465-71.
85. Id. at 471-72; UCC S 3-302(1)(b); UCC S 9-206.
86. UCC S 3-302(1)(c); UCC S 9-206; see UCC SS 1-201(25), 3-304; WHITE AND
SUMMERS, supra note 42, at 472-77.
87. UCC S 3-302(1)(c). See also UCC SS 3-305, 3-306. UCC S 9-206 requires only
that the assignee take his assignment "for value, in good faith, and without notice
of a claim or defense .... "
88. At first blush the requirements listed in UCC S 3-302(1) may seem
straightforward. Several of these elements, however, "are but doors which open onto
breath-taking vistas of complex statutory and decisional law." WHITE AND SUMMERS,
supra note 42 at 458.
89. See UCC S 3-201 as to the Code's "shelter" provisions.
90. Id. See infra note 91.
91. A transferee who has himself been a party to any fraud or illegality
affecting the instrument or who had notice of a defense or claim against it as a prior
holder cannot improve his position and benefit by the shelter provisions. See UCC
S 3-201(1). Otherwise, the transferee obtains holder in due course rights if the transfer
was by a holder in due course. Official Comment 2, UCC S 3-201.
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more way of acquiring the rights of a holder in due course, and that
is covered by UCC S 9-206 which pertains to assignees of certain
buyers or lessees of non-consumer goods.92 UCC § 9-206 in part
provides:
Subject to any statute or decision which establishes a dif-
ferent rule for buyers or lessees of consumer goods, an
agreement by a buyer or lessee that he will not assert
against an assignee any claim or defense which he may have
against the seller or lessor is enforceable by an assignee
who takes his assignment for value, in good faith and
without notice of a claim or defense, except as to defenses
of a type which may be asserted against a holder in due
course of a negotiable instrument under the Article on Com-
mercial Paper (Article 3). A buyer who as part of one trans-
action signs both a negotiable instrument and a security
agreement makes such an agreement.9"
In the Bankers Trust94 case, we therefore see the term "holder in due
course" applied to the assignee of a lease 5 (meaning one coming under
the provisions of UCC 9-206). "Holder in due course" under Article
3 of the Uniform Commercial Code speaks only to a holder of a
negotiable instrument. "Instrument" itself, under Article 3, means a
"negotiable instrument;"" and "holder in due course" in both UCC
S 3-302 and 3-305 speaks to holders of an "instrument," meaning a
negotiable instrument.' The holder in due course, under current law,"
is a bona fide purchaser of a negotiable instrument, or one having
those rights by virtue of the shelter provisions of UCC § 3-201; 9
92. Goods are "consumer goods" if they are bought or used primarily for
household, family or personal purposes. See UCC S 9-109(1); Laurel Bank & Trust Co.
v. Mark Ford, Inc., 182 Conn. 437, 438 A.2d 705, 707 (1980).
93. UCC S 9-206(1). Note that Louisiana has not adopted Article 9 of the UCC.
See supra note 50.
94. Supra note 36.
95. 599 F.2d 491.
96. Supra note 83.
97. Under Article 3 of the UCC the most acute of preliminary questions in
determining whether one should be accorded the exalted status of a holder in due
course is whether he holds a negotiable instrument. See definitions in UCC SS 3-104(1)
and 3-105, 3-112. The presumption is against negotiability, since all technical statutory
requirements must be met before an instrument will be deemed "negotiable." Under
Article 3, one can be a holder in due course only of a negotiable instrument; however,
an assignee may also attain the rights of holder in due course under UCC S 9-206.
98. Governed in all states in the United States by the UCC. Louisiana, however,
has not passed UCC Article 9. See supra note 50.
99. See supra note 91.
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but he may also acquire the rights of a holder in due course as an
assignee of a contract or lease of non-consumer goods, under the sup-
plementary provisions of UCC S 9-206.1°
The key import of the holder in due course doctrine, for our pur-
poses, is that one with holder in due course status takes free of all
defenses of any party with whom he has not dealt except "real"
defenses. These "real" defenses are only those few rare and potent
ones described in UCC § 3-305(2)(a) through (e)."1 The "personal"
defenses are all others.0 2
Most of the litigation involving holders in due course has nothing
to do with the claims or defenses to which they are subject. Rather,
the cases pivot on whether holder in due course status has been
established. Once it is shown that a defense exists, the person claim-
ing the rights of a holder in due course has the burden of establishing
all the elements set forth in UCC S 3-302.103 Only if he sustains this
often weighty burden does he attain the rights of a holder in due
course; and only then does the question of whether the defense is
"real" or "personal" become an issue.0 '
IV. ILLEGALITY AS A "REAL" DEFENSE
UCC § 3-305 provides that any holder in due course is subject
to the real defense of illegality, but only "such . .. illegality of the
transaction, as renders the obligation of the party a nullity."1 5 Whether
the "illegality" is or is not of such a degree of severity as to render
the obligation of the party a nullity and void is "primarily a matter
of local concern and local policy.""1 6 It is therefore left to "the local
100. See supra text corresponding to note 93.
101. See supra note 80.
102. Id. See also UCC S 3-306; Official Comment 5 to UCC S 3-306.
103. UCC S 3-307(3).
104. See supra note 80. The term "real" defense is pre-Code in origin, is not
used in the UCC, but connotes those defenses set forth in UCC S 3-305(2)(a) through (e).
105. UCC S 3-305(2)(b). See text of statute supra note 80.
106. Official Comment 6 to UCC S 3-305 states:
Duress is a matter of degree. An instrument signed at the point of a
gun is void, even in the hands of a holder in due course. One signed under
threat to prosecute the son of the maker for theft may be merely voidable,
so that the defense is cut off. Illegality is most frequently a matter of
gambling or usury, but may arise in many other forms under a great
variety of statutes. The statutes differ greatly in their provisions and the
interpretations given them. They are primarily a matter of local concern
and local policy. All such matters are therefore left to the local law. If
under that law the effect of the duress or the illegality is to make the
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law""' 7 to resolve. If under local law the effect of the illegality is "to
make the obligation entirely null and void, the defense may be asserted
against a holder in due course. Otherwise it is cut off."'08 The example
proffered by the Official Code Commentators is, "Illegality is most
frequently a matter of gambling or usury, but may arise in many other
forms under a great variety of statutes."'0 9
When we deal with such illegality as renders the obligation of
the party a nullity,"0 it is well to keep in mind that an instrument
normally is given for an "underlying obligation.'. That is, the issuer
most frequently uses it to pay for some obligation. Ordinarily,"' unless
otherwise agreed, the obligation to pay is suspended until the instru-
ment is due or presented.'13 If it is dishonored, an action may be main-
tained either on the instrument or the obligation."'
1. "Illegally Void": Definitions and Difficulties
The word "illegality" does not refer to the violation of criminal
statutes alone. A contract is "illegal," the Restatement tells us, "if
either its formation or its performance is criminal, tortious, or other-
wise opposed to public policy.""' 5 The word "illegality" in UCC §
obligation entirely null and void, the defense may be asserted against
a holder in due course. Otherwise it is cut off.
107. Id.
108. Id. See also the broad scope provisions of UCC S 1-103.
109. Id.
110. UCC S 3-305(2)(b).
111. See UCC S 3-802.
112. But not if a bank is a drawer or primarily liable on the instrument: see
UCC S 3-802(1) and (1)(a).
113. See UCC S 3-802(1)(b). The word "suspended" is intended to include suspen-
sion of the running of the statute of limitations (UCC S 3-122). Official Comment 3
to UCC S 3-802.
114. UCC S 3-802(1)(b). See UCC S 3-601 and Official Comment 3 to UCC 3-802
as to discharge of the obligor.
115. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS S 512 (1932). See also Hanley v. Savannah Bank
& Trust Co., 208 Ga. 585, 68 S.E.2d 581 (1952) (agreement by mother to surrender
possession of her infant to get a benefit under a will void); cf. Andrews, The Stork
Market: The Law of the New Reproduction Technologies, 70 A.B.A.J. 50 (1984); Coleman,
Surrogate Motherhood: Analysis of the Problems and Suggestions for Solutions, 50 TENN.
L. REV. 71 (1982); Randon v. Toby, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 493 (1850) (in state where slavery
tolerated, buying and selling of slaves not illegal.) "It is impossible to define with
accuracy what is meant by public policy for an interference and violation of which
a contract may be declared invalid. It may be understood in general that contracts
which are detrimental to the interests of the public as understood at the time fall
within the ban." Pope Manufacturing Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224, 233-234 (1892).
"We are not required to look exclusively to statutory enactments in determining ques-
tions of public policy. Constitutions and statutes are evidence of the general public
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3-305(2)(b), therefore, is broader than it may first appear, but at the
same time narrower: it is wide enough to encompass contracts which
are not only criminal but merely tortious1t0 or "contrary to the best
interests of citizens as a matter of public policy" '117 whether or not
there has been any proper expression about it;1"' but the illegality
under UCC § 3-305 must be such as renders the obligation of the party,
under local law, void.
There does exist a general rule that an illegal contract is "void."1 9
But, not surprisingly, the rule has a vast number of exceptions."M Fur-
thermore, many statutes which use the word "void" permit a court
to refuse enforcement of an entire contract, but also permit excision
of an offensive clause and enforcement of the remainder of the
contract. 2' Hence, although these statutes contain the word "void,"
policy of a state; but when confronted with questions of general public policy, as defined
in the books, the courts go beyond express legislation and look to the whole body
of law-statutory, common, and judicial decisions." Holland v. Sheehan, 108 Minn. 362,
367, 122 N.W. 1, 3 (1909).
116. For example, it has been held in New York that to bargain to commit
a tort is illegal. Reiner v. North American Newspaper Alliance, 259 N.Y. 250, 257 (1932).
117. Anaconda Federal Credit Union No. 4401 v. West, 157 Mont. 175, 178,
483 P.2d 909, 911 (1971).
118. Id. For example, it might be against public policy to enforce a contract
provision providing that a party will not interpose the defense of usury, the statute
of limitations, or failure of consideration. Pope Manufacturing, supra note 115 at 235.
See also Gellhorn, Contracts and Public Policy, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 679 (1935).
119. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS SS 598, 607 (1932).
120. See id., S 236(a); RESTATEMENT OF (SECOND) CONTRACTS S 229(a) (1973); 4
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS (3d ed. 1961) S 620; J. CALAMARI AND J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1977) 785-799; Symcox v. Zuk, 221 Cal. App. 2d 383, 34 Cal. Rptr. 462
(1963). Usury, "Blue Sky" or other remedial statutes passed to protect a certain class
of people sometimes give the plaintiff within the protected class a valid cause of
action against a defendant who, by statute, is deemed the wrongdoer. 15 WILLISTON
ON CONTRACTS (3d ed. 1972) SS 1754, 1755, 1756; 6A CORBIN ON CONTRACTS S 1540 (1963).
An agreement illegal because of its wrongful purpose may nevertheless give rise to
a valid cause of action by an innocent party if only one of them had an illegal purpose.
RESTATEMENT OF (SECOND) CONTRACTS S 602. See also infra note 121.
121. See, e.g., UCC S 2-302 as to unconscionable contracts or clauses. New York
also has a large number of statutes which declare a covenant, promise, agreement or
understanding in, or in connection with or collateral to a contract or agreement to
be void: See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW S 5-322.1 (McKinney 1978) entitled, "Agreements
exempting owners and contractors from liability for negligence void and unenforceable;
certain cases;" S 5-321 entitled, "Agreements exempting lessors from liability for
negligence void and unenforceable;" S 5-311 entitled, "Certain agreements between
husband and wife void;" S 5-301 entitled, "Certain employment contracts void;" S 5-322
entitled, "Agreements exempting caterers and catering establishments from liability
for negligence void and unenforceable;" S 5-323 entitled, "Agreements exempting building
service or maintenance contractors from liability for negligence void and unenforceable;"
S 5-325 entitled, "Garages and parking places;" S 5-326 entitled, "Agreements exempting
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whether the illegality would be such as to render the obligation of
the party a nullity would be left to judicial interpretation."
For example, one of New York's"I most encompassing statutes
of frauds.. starts, "Every agreement, promise or undertaking is void,
unless it or some note or memorandum thereof be in writing....
Yet the term "void" here means only unenforceable (rather than even
voidable). The lack of a writing if not timely pleaded as an affirmative
defense is waived. 26 It is equally clear everywhere else outside New
York 127 that an oral contract within the purview of a given statute
of frauds is not "illegal"'128: it is neither "criminal nor offensive to
general policy"" but at worst a contract "lacking a couple of legal
chromosomes.""' This, despite the fact that "void" or "no action shall
be brought".. habitually appear in these various statutes of fraud.
Corbin cautions that the common meaning of "void" is "total
absence of legal effect,"" but that even in the term "void contract"
pools, gymnasiums, places of public amusement or recreation and similar establishments
from liability for negligence void and unenforceable;" S 5-324 entitled, "Agreements
by owners, contractors, subcontractors or suppliers to indemnify architects, engineers
and surveyors from liability caused by or arising out of defects in maps, plans, designs
and specifications void and unenforceable;" S 5-511 entitled "Usurious contracts void;"
S 5-331 entitled, "Certain covenants and restrictions in conveyances and other
agreements affecting real property void as against public policy;" S 5-415 entitled, "Cer-
tain transfers of property in pursuance of lottery, void;" S 5-501 entitled, "Rate of
interest, usury forbidden;" S 5-413 entitled, "Securities for money lost at gaming, void;"
S 5-401 entitled, "Illegal wagers, bets and stakes;" S 5-417 entitled, "Contracts,
agreements and securities on account of raffling, void;" S 5-331 entitled, "Certain
covenants and restrictions in conveyances and other agreements affecting real property
void as against public policy.'
122. It has been said, for example, that "An act or contract neither wrong
in itself nor against public policy which has been declared void by statute for the
protection or benefit of a certain party, or class of parties, is voidable only. U.S. v.
New York & Porto Rico S.S. Co., 239 U.S. 88, 36 S. Ct. 41, 42, 60 L. Ed. 161; Weede
v. Iowa Southern Utilities Co. of Delaware, 231 Iowa 784, 2 N.W.2d 372, 397, 398."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 1745 (4th ed. 1968).
123. There is "no common law statute of frauds. Each state has its own statute."
J. DAWSON, W. HARVEY AND S. HENDERSON, CASES AND COMMENTS ON CONTRACTS, 951 (4th
ed. 1982).
124. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW S 5-701 (McKinney 1978).
125. Id. S 5-701(a).
126. Sanger v. French, 157 N.Y. 213, 51 N.E. 979 (1898).
127. DAWSON, HARVEY AND HENDERSON, supra note 123, at 967.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 968.
130. Id.
131. Section 4 of the original 1677 statute of frauds uses the words "no action
shall be brought." See id. at 952 setting forth the statute.
132. I CORBIN ON CONTRACTS (1963) S 7 p. 15. "One who says that an agreement
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there is an intrinsic self-contradiction." "Contract" by definition always
includes "some element of enforceability. '" u He thus prefers "void
agreement" to "void contract."'' 5
As to voidness, Corbin emphasizes the cruciality of judicial
interpretation stating, "Even if a statute expressly declares an agree-
ment to be illegal or void, justice requires and the courts have con-
tinually decided that the effect of such a statute upon a particular
case must depend upon the circumstances of that case. The words
of the statute will be interpreted in the light of the purpose of the
statute, with due regard to the result that will be reached by the
interpretation."'36
Thus, as the New Howard'37 case emphasizes: "An instrument
which a statute, expressly or through necessary implication declares
void, strictly speaking is a simulacrum only. It is without legal efficacy.
It cannot obligate a party or support a right."'' So that even though
the word "void" is not used, an agreement may be void by statutory
implication.
Most criminal statutes ordinarily stick to the knitting of describ-
ing what conduct they prohibit. Hence, most never get to "void" or
"voidable" at all, words which languish in the more civilized world
of contracts. Taking one example at random, "Robbery" in S 160.10
of the N.Y. Penal Law"9 sets forth the elements of the crime and
then affixes its statutory classification: "Robbery in the second degree
is a class C felony."'' There the statute ends. It does not speak to
or promise is 'void' usually supposes that it has no legal operation whatever, being
in many cases quite unaware that a number of important legal relations have been
created." Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 17.
137. New Howard Mfg. Co. v. Cohen, 207 A.D. 588, 202 N.Y.S. 449 (1st Dept.
1924).
138. Id. at 202 N.Y.S. 451, emphasis added. The New Howard court explains
why an instrument issued in defraud of creditors was not void, although a crime was
involved under the then Bankruptcy Law, because the statute did not specify the
instrument was to be treated as void. The holding is unremarkable because the crime
involved was criminal fraud in the inducement, rather than the real defense of fraud
in the execution; the statute had been amended to excise a previously included "void"
provision; and bankruptcy laws are not a matter of local state public policy. All New
Howard holds is that fraud in the inducement may be criminal, but still not a real
defense against a holder in due course.
139. McKinney's supra note 23, at Book 39, 201-202.
140. Id. at 202.
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whether a contract to commit robbery, or one induced by, tainted with,
connected to, or resulting from such robbery is "void" or "voidable."
The same applies to almost all other criminal statutes, including New
York's commercial bribery statutes.
2. Criminal Illegality as "Penalized" in a Civil Action
Ultimately, determining whether the obligation under UCC
3-305 is "illegally void" is a judgmental and labeling challenge. It is
a buck envisioned to be passed to the local court, where it stops. It
is the local court's function to perceive and implement local public
policy. Thus, in a civil action, the court has inherent power to control
the interpretation and application of criminal statutes, insofar as it
expounds upon and teaches both the litigants and the public as to
the meaning and impact of criminal statutes. And, by the very nature
of a civil proceeding, it does so in a swift and effective manner,
unimpeded by the constrictions inherent in criminal prosecutions. This
power is especially effective in the sphere of commercial bribery.
Bribery is all about money, and money is what the civil court has
the power to give or not to give.
Thus, what is crucial to the vortex of our topic is that the punish-
ment set forth in any penal statute is not the exclusive or even most
effective "price" or penalty for that crime. Irrespective of any fines
or sentences imposed upon a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt
in a criminal case, in a civil action the court can find the illegal con-
duct mandates a forfeiture of property.
This was the jurisprudential feat performed in Riggs v. Palmer,"'
now a legend in American legal folklore. In his dissent"" in Riggs,
141. The Riggs maxim set forth, "No one shall be permitted to profit by his
own fraud, or to take advantage of his wrong, or to found any claim upon his own
iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime. These maxims are dictated by public
policy, have their foundation in universal law administered in all civilized countries
and have nowhere been superseded by statutes." Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511-512
(1889). Although Riggs is frequently cited by American courts as the source of these
maxims, their, origin is much older. That one may not profit from his own wrong has
been found to be one of some 214 maxims of Edmund Wingate published in London
in 1658. Simpson, The Rise and Fall of the Legal Treatise: Legal Principles and the
Forms of Legal Literature, 48 U. OF CHic. L. REV. 632, 645 (1981). But their ultimate
source has been traced back to "Ulpian in Digest 50.17.134.1 where it appears as nemo
ex delicto meliorem suam conditionem facere potest." Id. This Digest was compiled by
Domitus Ulpianus, a Phoenician born about A.D. 170. J. MUIRHEAD, THE INSTITUTES OF
GAIUS AND RULES OF ULPIAN xiii (1880).
142. 115 N.Y. at 519.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 19, No. 2 [1985], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol19/iss2/1
BRIBERY
Judge Gray anguished, "What power or warrant have the courts to
add to the respondent's penalties by depriving him of property? The
law has punished him for his crime and we may not say that it was
an insufficient punishment."'4 In a superb exposition of advanced
justiciary, the majority exhibited just what power the civil court had.
The power to do justice, as Riggs demonstrates, is almost boundless.
That the Legislature understood civil courts would and should
exact penalties in addition to those imposed by criminal statutes is
evidenced by rarely cited language contained in the criminal statutes
themselves. Present N. Y. PENAL LAW S 5.10, derived from an 1881
statute'" predating Riggs specifically provides:
(3) This chapter does not bar, suspend, or otherwise affect
any right or liability to damages, penalty, forfeiture or other
remedy authorized by law to be recovered or enforced in
a civil action, regardless of whether the conduct involved
in such civil action constitutes an offense defined in this
chapter. 1' 5
Riggs never cited this statute's predecessor. A civil court does not
need statutory language as authority for its power to "penalize" per-
sons seeking to take advantage of illegal bargains.
From the 1889 Adam's rib holding in Riggs, over 70 years later
was wrought the Eve we see in McConnell v. Commonwealth Pictures
Corporation.4" Both cases are cited in Bankers Trust. '
When Elmer Palmer murdered his grandfather, Riggs held he
forfeited his legacy under his grandfather's will.' 8 When Fred
McConnell allegedly bribed a producer's agent to get the film distribu-
tion contract for Commonwealth, he forfeited his right to collect under
his commissions contract.
In McConnell's suit for an accounting, the defense was that he
should not be permitted access to the court because he had bribed
an agent of Universal Pictures to obtain the contract for Com-
monwealth. The court held the issue was not "whether the acts alleged
in the defenses would constitute the crime of commercial bribery." '
143. Id.
144. N.Y. PENAL LAWS S 5.10(3) (McKinney 1975) is derived from N.Y. PENAL LAW
1909 SS 23, 24, 37, all of which were derived from the Penal Code of 1881. See supra
Historical Note, McKinney's note 23, Book 39, p. 15.
145. Id. at 14-15.
146. See supra note 28.
147. 599 F.2d at 491, 492.
148. Riggs v. Palmer, supra note 141.
149. 7 N.Y.2d at 470.
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McConnell's motion to strike the defenses for insufficiency was treated
as his constructive admission'O of those facts. McConnell thereby was
deemed an unworthy plaintiff, seeking to take advantage of his own
wrong, and to acquire property by his own crime. He could not recover
commissions for having obtained a bribery-induced contract. The power
of Riggs was upon him. But the court said "all" they were doing was
"labeling the conduct described in these defenses as gross corruption
depriving plaintiff of access to the courts of New York State.. 5
McConnell may not have been indictable, no less "convictable" beyond
a reasonable doubt in a criminal case. It made no difference. He never-
theless was heavily penalized by the judgment in the civil case. Com-
monwealth was left with its bountiful windfall, enjoying the fruits of
the contract McConnell had brought to them. McConnell wound up
with nothing for all his efforts. 5 '
And it was the McConnell decision which barred one of the plain-
tiffs from summary judgment in the Bankers Trust case," which we
now examine.
V. FACTS AND RATIONALE OF BANKERS TRUST V. LITTONlM
Litton, the defendant, had decided to buy some photocopiers. 5
Angelo Buquicchio, a salesman who worked for Royal, a division of
one of Litton's subsidiaries, recommended Litton lease the photocopiers
from Regent Leasing, an outside entity." Regent was to buy the equip-
ment from Royal and then lease it to Litton. Neither Royal nor Litton
knew Buquicchio would be making money in this transaction.'57
Regent's president when later deposed admitted that he paid money
150. Words used in Flegenheimer v. Brogen, 284 N.Y. 268, 272 (1940).
151. 7 N.Y.2d 471.
152. McConnell originally got $10,000 from Commonwealth. Taking the defenses
as true, he gave the producer's agent $10,000. He was to get 20% of certain recouped
gross receipts realized on the distribution of 40 Western and four serial motion pic-
tures, simultaneously with further payments Commonwealth was obliged to make to
the producer. Lower court in McConnell at 1 Misc.2d 751, 752 (Sup. Ct. 1955). Com-
monwealth had originally counterclaimed for the return of this $10,000 but never ap-
pealed its being brushed aside in the lower court. McConnell never received anything
other than the first $10,000 which he allegedly used for the bribe.
153. Motion for summary judgment by plaintiff Regent denied, in reliance on
McConnell, 599 F.2d at 491.
154. See supra note 36.
155. 599 F.2d at 490.
156. Regent was entirely independent of either Litton or Royal. Id.
157. Id.
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to several Royal people, "particularly Buquicchio, so they would push
leases generally and Regent's leases specifically."''M To finance its pur-
chases, Regent had borrowed money from the plaintiff banks, assign-
ing the Litton leases as security.' 9 The leases contained a provision
allowing assignment and a clause providing the assignees' rights would
be independent of any claims or offsets of Litton as against Regent.'0
When Litton defaulted, a suit was started by the banks and Regent,
followed by motions for summary judgment. The heart of the defense
was that the bribery of Royal's employees rendered Litton's obliga-
tion null and void. The Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's
holding that the payments to Buquicchio "could constitute a defense
against Regent.''. However, it was not a good defense against the
banks as UCC § 9-206 holders in due course. Under New York law,
the court concluded, "a holder in due course may treat a contract
inducted by illegal bribery as merely voidable."'62 To analyze the
court's reasoning, the argument of the court has been broken down
into three tiers, to show its progression, then each tier is separately
treated, infra.
The substance of the court's reasoning was as follows:
TIER 1. In using the word "nullity" in UCC § 3-305, the "Legislature
iitended to provide a defense against a holder in due course only
in cases where the obligation sued upon is void on its face (e.g. a
wagering contract or a contract to perform an illegal act). .. .
TIER 2. "An examination of bribery-induced contracts suggests that
New York holds such contracts to be 'void.""" "Confusion in the use
of the words 'void' and 'voidable' is common."'6 5 Chiefly the difference
becomes important only where property is transferred to a holder
in due course." Since the New York cases on illegal contracts induced
by commercial bribery do not involve holders in due course, one may
assume "void" was used loosely, "without regard to its importance
158. Id.
159. Id. This was not the usual "leveraged" lease transaction. Had it been,
query as to whether plaintiffs would have been denied holder in due course status,
having "dealt" with Litton. UCC S 3-305(2).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 491 relying on McConnell, supra note 28.
162. Id. at 492.
163. Id. at 491. These were the observations of the court below which were
quoted with approval.
164. Id.
165. Id., quoting from RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS S 475, comment b (1932).
166. Id.
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when a holder in due course enters the picture."'' 1 A voidable con-
tract may be ratified, while a void transaction cannot.'68 "Sirkin v.
Fourteenth Street Store . . .suggests that the court meant the con-
tract to be truly 'void' because it "could not be ratified ... .
TIER 3. However, the policy supporting the New York cases is one
precluding recovery to a wrongdoer. 170 Where an innocent holder in
due course "is suing upon an illegal contract, the policy argument is
inapplicable because the plaintiff has done no wrong for which it should
be penalized. 1 1 "Bribery which induces the making of a contract is
much like fraud which has the same result ...""' Since fraud in the
inducement is a personal, not a real, defense under UCC § 3-305(2),
"the same treatment should be given to a contract induced by
bribery."'13 Denying recovery to holders in due course would probably
167. Id.
168. Id. at 492 quoting from RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS S 475, comment b
(1932).
169. Id., referring to Sirkin, supra note 21.
170. Id., citing inter alia, RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS S 598, comment a, (1932);
14 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS S 1630A (3d ed. 1972); Riggs v. Palmer, supra note 141,
McConnell, supra note 28; Riener, supra note 116.
171. Id. at 492-93.
172. Id. at 493.
173. Id. Here the court refers to RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS S 577, "Illustra-
tions 4 & 11 (1932)." Id. Referring to this authority, one sees S 577 is entitled, "Bargains
to Defraud or Harm Third Persons." The following rule is then set forth: "A bargain
performance of which would tend to harm third persons by deceiving them as to material
facts, or by defrauding them, or without justification by other means is illegal." The
RESTATEMENT continues:
Comment: a. Cases falling within the rule stated in the Section would
generally, but not always involve the commission of a tort and therefore
fall within the rule stated in S 571.
b. The tendency of the performance to deceive or otherwise
harm others sometimes necessarily follows from the character of the per-
formance promised, but in other cases the performance promised may be
used innocently or may be used in such a way as to harm or defraud
others. In such cases it is the purpose so to use the performance that
makes the bargain illegal. The purpose may be entertained by one or by
both parties to the contract. If entertained by one only, the other party
may recover for a breach of the contract (see S 602). If an improper pur-
pose is entertained by both parties to the contract, neither can recover.
Illustrations 4 and 11 cited by Bankers Trust set forth:
4. A desires to by land from B at a low price. C is aware
of facts which, if told B, will induce him to refuse to sell for such a price.
A promises C $500 if C will not tell B the facts in question. C does not
tell B. The agreement is illegal.
11. A agrees with B to pay B $500 if B causes a legislative
investigation of the affairs of a corporation. A's purpose is to depress
[Vol. 19
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not "have an appreciable effect on the frequency of commercial bribery.
Moreover, the holder in due course concept embodies important
policies which must be weighed against the policy of holding void,
contracts induced by bribery."'74
Taking these three points in order:
COMMENT AS TO TIER 1. This statement appears misleading. If
the obligation sued upon is void on its face (e.g., indicates it is a wager-
ing contract or a contract to perform an illegal act, the examples
proffered by the court), there could not be a holder in due course.
The holder would take with "notice" '175 that the obligation is illegal
and, having notice of a defense, he would be unable to establish his
status under UCC S 3-302(1)(c). He might also have trouble in sustain-
ing his burden of establishing his good faith.178
Even a "small" irregularity which should have been spotted on
the face of an instrument will bar establishment of holder in due course
status. Thus, in a typical "notice" case, a man had signed both his
name and his wife's name, placing his initials after the wife's signature
on a note. When the purchasing bank sued on it, failure of considera-
tion was raised as a defense. The bank could not establish it was a
holder in due course because of the "irregularity" of the initials next
to the one signature. On appeal, the finding was affirmed.'77
UCC § 3-304 itself specifies that the purchaser has notice of a
claim or defense if "(a) the instrument is ...so irregular as to call
into question its validity, terms or ownership or to create an ambiguity
as to the party to pay; or * * * (2) the purchaser has notice that the
obligation of any party is voidable in whole or in part, or that all par-
ties have been discharged."'7 8 It thus appears that any contract illegal
on its face could not, by definition, pass to a holder in due course.
the value of the shares and to obtain profit from selling short. B causes
the investigation and produces the desired result. The bargain is illegal.
Neither of these illustrations seems apposite to acts prohibited under the New
York Commercial Bribery statutes in that the parties to whom money is offered in
these examples is not an employee or agent of the victim of the fraud. The crime
of commercial bribery has at its heart the necessary element that the bribe-receiver
is an employee or agent. Thus, commercial bribery is a far graver act than fraud.
Its "treason" element (see n. 13 supra) is the essence of the crime, and that element
is missing in both these illustrations.
174. 599 F.2d at 493.
175. See UCC SS 3-302, 3-304, 9-206; see also UCC S 1-201(25) as to when a per-
son has "notice" of a fact.
176. "Notice" and "good faith," although hardly identical, "appear in the cases
and in the flesh as first cousins." WHITE AND SUMMERS, supra note 42, at 471.
177. Arcanum National Bank v. Hessler, 69 Ohio St.2d 549, 433 N.E.2d 204 (1982).
178. UCC S 3-304 (emphasis added).
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The concept makes good sense. The "would-be holder in due course""17
simply "does not deserve to take free of such defenses, for he could
have refused to take"'80 the instrument or proffered transaction.
More importantly, as to Article 3 instruments, a check or simple
promissory note might be issued by A, a debtor, payable to L, a loan-
shark, as follows:
July 27, 1984
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, I promise to pay to the order of
L the sum of ................................ $5,000.00
payable in 30 days.
(Signed) A
If this instrument were given in return for a $4,000 loan made by
L to A on July 27, 1984, in New York the note could be truly void
as criminally usurious8 ' and the usury defense would be a real defense
against a holder in due course. 12 Furthermore, the note could also
be usurious and truly void in New York were it given for a loan at
interest in excess of 16% per annum (although it would not be criminally
usurious'). Thus, it would be void in the hands of a holder in due
course, even though no criminal statute was violated.1 4 To boot, in
New York a usurious transaction is "not so utterly void"'8 5 that it
179. White and Summers explain the rationale of UCC S 3-304:
A party can acquire notice of a defense in a variety of ways. He can
observe that the instrument is crudely altered; he can see that its date
for payment has already passed; he can note that it has been stamped
'paid,' or he may even have actual knowledge of a contract defense of
the drawer or maker. In all such cases a would-be holder in due course does
not deserve to take free of such defenses, for he could have refused to
take the instrument.
Id., supra note 42, at 471.
180. Id.
181. N.Y. PENAL LAW SS 190.40, 190.42. This would not apply to certain exempt
transactions, such as any loan or forbearance in the amount of $2,500,000 or over as
provided in GOL 5-501(6)(b) and would not apply in several other exceptions outlined
in the GEN. OBLIG. See GEN. OBLIG. SS 5-501 through 5-531.
182. Sabine v. Paine, 223 N.Y. 401, 119 N.E. 849 (1918), cited by Bankers Trust,
599 F.2d at 493.
183. GEN. OBLIG. SS 5-501, 5-511.
184. Sabine v. Paine, supra note 182.
185. Smith v. Marvin, 27 N.Y. 137, 143 (1863); Graham v. Weiss, 3 Misc. 2d
28, 30, 149 N.Y.S.2d 676, 678 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
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cannot be ratified. To the extent that a debtor repays any portion
of the loan, he is deemed to have ratified' the transaction and can-
not recover, except to the extent of any amount in excess of the legal
rate of interest."7 If he had paid nothing and was sued, the defense
of usury would be good, even as against a holder in due course, who
could not collect on such a void instrument.
What is important is that, as the illustration of the note indicates,
there is nothing "on its face" to show its void nature. If the same
note in New, York were issued in payment of an illegal gambling
debt, 8 ' the illegality would be a good defense against a holder in due
course since the instrument, although it has no remarkable facial
defects, is void.
It is also clear that while UCC § 9-206'" validates the type of
waiver of defense clause involved in Bankers Trust, the statute works
only when the assignment is taken for value, in good faith, and without
notice of a claim or defense.'" The assignment remains subject to the
same defenses as may be asserted against a holder in due course of
an instrument under UCC Article 3."'
The statement that the word "nullity" in UCC S 3-305(2)(b) was
intended "to provide a defense against a holder in due course only
in cases where the obligation sued upon is void on its face," hence
seems unsupportable.
186. Id.
187. GEN. OBLIG. S 5-513.
188. See GEN. OBLIG. Title 4 and, e.g., GEN. OBLIG. S 5-413. As to the illegal
voidness of instruments issued for gambling purposes, see Hotel Riveria, Inc. v. First
National Bank and Trust Company of Oklahoma, 580 F. Supp. 122 (W.D. Okla. 1983);
Gulf Collateral, Inc. v. Morgan, 415 F. Supp. 318, 322 (S.D. Ga. 1976); National Recovery
Systems v. Mazzei, 123 Misc.2d 780, 475 N.Y.S.2d 208 (Sup. Ct. 1984) (a gambling debt
will not be enforced in New York unless it was valid where incurred). See also: Hen-
drix v. McKee, 281 Or. 123, 575 P.2d 134 (1977); Miller v. Radikopf, 394 Mich. 83, 228
N.W.2d 386 (1975) (agreement to split proceeds of winning Irish Sweepstakes ticket
enforced as non-offensive to public policy).
189. See supra text corresponding to note 93.
190. UCC S 9-206. United Counties Trust Co. v. Mac Lum, Inc., 643 F.2d 1140
(5th Cir. 1981) (assignee found to have had "notice" was subject to defense of failure
of consideration); First National Bank of New Jersey v. Reliance Elec. Co., 668 F.2d
725 (3d Cir. 1981) (assignee did not meet good faith and absence of notice requirements
and could not benefit from waiver of defense clause); Personal Finance Co. v. Meredith,
39 Ill. App. 3d 695, 350 N.E.2d 781 (1976) (if plaintiff had actual notice of complaints
it would not have been holder in due course); Laurel Bank & Trust Co. v. Mark Ford,
Inc., 438 A.2d at 105, supra note 92 (assignment is subject to all defenses of a type
assertable against a holder in due course under UCC Article 3).
191. Laurel Bank, 438 A.2d at 705, supra note 92.
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COMMENT AS TO TIER 2. As to whether a bribery-induced con-
tract is truly void in New York in that it may not be ratified, the
Sirkin92 wording adverted to by the court is as follows:
• . . this is not a case in which the rule of ratification,
applicable to ordinary contracts induced by fraud, should
be applied. The public policy of our state forbids the ratifica-
tion, as well as the making of such a contract. Usually
private contracts concern only the parties thereto, and it
is optional with a person who has discovered that he has
been defrauded whether to ratify the contract or to rescind
it. There is ordinarily, at least, no general public policy
involved in such cases.'93
Sirkin is New York's classic commercial bribery case. It was a simple
action to recover some $1,500 for hosiery and wrappers sold to the
defendant, a Manhattan department store. The defense was that Sirkin
had paid a bribe to the store's purchasing agent; hence, the store
should not have to pay for the goods delivered and accepted under
the bribery-induced contract. The court found the defense sufficient.1"
The store was able to keep the goods without having to pay for them.
The moral was simple: One who commits commercial bribery forfeits
his right to collect on the business he bribed to get. The civil judg-
ment had a remarkable penalty; and there was no problem about
establishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Sirkin held the bribery-
induced contract illegally void because it was induced by the commis-
sion of a crime. (The Penal Law's first stated general purpose in New
York is to "proscribe conduct which unjustifiably and inexcusably
causes or threatens substantial harm to individual or public
interests. ' " )
A litmus test of voidness has to do with whether a given con-
tract may be ratified." Sirkin finds the bribery-induced contract may
192. See supra note 21.
193. Id. 124 App. Div. at 391, 108 N.Y.S. at 835.
194. The Sirkin dissent insists New York's then commercial bribery statute
(S 384r, text supra note 22) failed to set forth the contract was void (Bankers Trust
also so states); that it was voidable only, since it was a legal contract merely bribery-
induced (Bankers Trust also so states); and that (echoing the Gray dissent in Riggs)
the criminal statute fixed a penalty and the court may not impose additional punish-
ment for its violation. See 124 App. Div. at 395, 108 N.Y.S. at 838. Cf. N.Y. PENAL
LAW S 5.10(3).
195. See McConnell, supra note 28. The same general notion is seen in the New
York statute allowing one who receives unsolicited goods to treat them as an "uncondi-
tional gift." N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW S 5-332(1).
196. See N.Y. PENAL LAW S .1.05(1).
197. See Bankers Trust at 599 F.2d 492.
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not be ratified because it involves criminal conduct. The general rule
is if the act done was a civil act, it may be ratified; "but no authority
is to be found that an act which is itself a criminal offense is capable
of ratification.""9 8 Ratification is a doctrine which applies when the
following four elements are present: (1) the principal is disclosed suf-
ficiently to be capable of later identification and (2) the agent acts
without or in excess of his authority and (3) the ratification is of the
entire act and not of a part and (4) the principal knows all the facts
of importance when he ratifies.1" Ratification is generally a contracts
and torts doctrine. 0
Although a forgery may be "ratified,"20' the Official Code Com-
mentators make clear that what is meant is "adopted" and, if that
is done, the word "ratified" is merely used to indicate the adoption
of retroactive. 02 They further caution that, "While the ratification may
be taken into account with other relevant facts in determining
punishments, it does not relieve the signer of criminal liability.120 3
Note that in forgery, by the forger's very act of passing off the
signature as the principal's, the forger purports to act as, and therefore
for, a principal; furthermore, ratification of the forgery is never forced,
but voluntary. One of the necessary elements of ratification is that
the agent purport to act for a principal. In the criminal bribery agree-
ment, the agent does not purport to act for the principal. As to this,
Corbin says "an agreement by two parties for the doing of acts that
both know to be a felony would have no legal operation and be 'void'
although the acts themselves, when performed, would have very
important legal effects indeed."' (If the resulting bribery-induced con-
tract is illegally void,s forcing a ratification down the throat of the
already victimized principal seems incongruous. If he cannot ratify
198. Brook v. Hook, L.R. 6 Ex. 89 (Exchequer 1871). Since one cannot commit
a crime by ratifying what is already done, the rule that subsequent ratification is
equivalent to prior authorization cannot be applied to criminal cases. Cook v. Com-
monwealth, 141 Ky. 439, 132 S.W. 1032 (1911).
199. A.L. SAINER, THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF NEW YORK 6 (1972).
200. Id. at 7; W. SEAVEY AND L. HALL, CASES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY 314 (1956).
201. UCC S 3-404. See also United States v. Davis, 125 F. Supp. 696 (W.D. Ark.
1954) (making payments on a note which the makers denied they signed not deemed
a "ratification").
202. Official Comment 3 to UCC S 3-404.
203. Id.
204. I CORBIN ON CONTRACTS S 7 p. 16.
205. Sirkin, supra note 21; ". . . an agreement to divide the profits of a
fraudulent scheme, or to carry out some object, in itself not unlawful, by means of
an apparent trespass, breach of contract or breach of trust, is unlawful and void.
(POLLOCK ON CONTRACTS, 342; SALMOND & WINFIELD, CONTRACTS p. 145); Harrington v.
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voluntarily, passing the transaction to a holder in due course cannot
coerce ratification.)
Under the general doctrine of respondiat superior, a principal
has been held criminally liable for a slander committed when a
manager of its store accused a customer of stealing."8 One thus easily
discerns that the rule which prevents "ratification" of criminal acts
is founded not only on public policy considerations, but on a concern
for protecting a principal from being ensnared into liability for an
unauthorized criminal act.
There is also to be considered where a person harmed by the
crime has power to control whether prosecution for the crime shall
or shall not be brought. As Sirkin 7 had implied "Insofar as an act
constitutes a private wrong the injured individual is free to make a
settlement with the wrongdoer, or to forgive him entirely without
any reparation. But the general rule is that a private individual has
no power to ratify, settle or condone a public wrong even if it was
a wrong which injured his person or harmed his property."" 8 Any
ability he has to ratify would come only if there is a specific excep-
tion to the general rule and only in the exact manner provided by
that exception. 9 For example, in New York, the owner of property
cannot, by accepting complete restitution, forgive the crime of larceny
or embezzlement.21 A larceny victim may contract with the thief for
repayment of his loss, but not if the contract includes an express or
implied promise that the victim will refrain from initiating a criminal
prosecution: A person commits the crime of compounding a crime if
Victoria Graving Dock Co., 3 Q.B.D. 549.)" Reiner, supra note 116 at 260-261; emphasis
added.
206. Gillis v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 223 N.C. 470, 27 S.E.2d 283 (1943).
207. Supra note 21.
208. R. PERKINS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 517-18
(1952).
209. Id., citing Commonwealth v. Heckman, 113 Pa. Super. 70, 172 Atl. 28 (1934).
Without the specific exception, a rape victim could not "ratify" the rape by forgiving
the act. Id., citing Commonwealth v. Slattery, 147 Mass. 423, 18 N.E. 399 (1888). It
was "even beyond the power of mother's love to wipe out the criminal guilt of a son
who maliciously burned her barn." Id., citing State v. Craig, 124 Kan. 340, 259 Pac.
802 (1927). Cf. People v. Gould, 70 Mich. 240, 38 N.W. 232 (1888) (prosecution for seduc-
tion by false promise of marriage discharged after parties' marriage).
210. N.Y. PENAL LAW S 215.45 (McKinney 1975). See also Breaker v. State, 103
Ohio St. 670, 134 N.E. 479 (1921); Fleener v. State, 58 Ark. 98, 23 S.W. 1 (1893). In
New York, it is an affirmative defense to the crime of compounding a crime that ac-
ceptance of restitution was in the reasonable belief that the amount was not in excess
of the amount due. Id. See, however, infra note 211.
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he agrees to accept any benefit upon an understanding that he will
refrain from initiating prosecution for a crime. 1 '
These, then, are some of the broad and complex concepts underly-
ing the statement in Sirkin that a bribery-induced contract may not
be ratified. If that statement is true, it would give the bribery-induced
contract what Bankers Trust calls "a characteristic of true voidness." '
One case not cited by Bankers Trust is Babcock v. Warner,"'
which squarely faced the question of whether a bribery-induced con-
tract may be ratified. The court held the contract was not capable
of such ratification as to enable one to recover under it. However,
this decision did not involve a holder in due course, and thus may
not have affected the last and most crucial step of the court's reason-
ing in Bankers Trust.
COMMENT AS TO TIER 3. The turning point of the Bankers Trust
holding occurs when the court stops examining the character of the
bribery-induced contract (after finding New York law holds such con-
tract to be void), and then turns away to examine the character of
the plaintiff. It is here the decision appears to run two different
reasons together, perhaps "even reasons of different types.2 1 4 A holder
in due course of an instrument issued for an illegal gambling debt,
or of a usurious instrument (even one not criminally usurious) in New
York is an innocent non-wrongdoer;215 yet he is precluded from
recovery precisely because these instruments are treated as illegally
void. A holder in due course for the same reason may not recover
if there was such fraud in the execution as to constitute a real defense
under UCC § 3-305."' In applying UCC S 3-305 to real defenses such
as illegal gambling, usury, or fraud in the execution, the policy of
New York has not at all been concerned with the preclusion of
wrongdoers from recovery. Holders in due course by definition are
not wrongdoers as to the instrument or obligation.
The Williston rules relied on by Bankers Trust"7 that "An inno-
cent plaintiff may recover on an illegal agreement which is not
211. N.Y. PENAL LAW S 215.45(1) (McKinney, 1975); Davis v. Mathews, 361 F.2d
899, 902 (1966).
212. 599 F.2d at 492.
213. Babcock v. Warner Bros. Theatres, Inc., 240 App. Div. 466, 270 N.Y.S. 765
(1934).
214. Summers, Two Types of Substantive Reasons: The Core of a Theory of
Common-Law Justification, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 707, 715 (1978).
215. See, e.g., requirements of UCC SS 3-302, 3-303, 3-304, 3-201, 3-307(3) and
9-206(1).
216. See UCC S 3-305(2)(c) and Official Comment 7 to UCC S 3-305.
217. See supra note 36, Bankers Trust, 599 F.2d at 493, n.2.
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declared void by statute" '218 and that "a holder in due course may
recover on a negotiable instrument originally given as part of an illegal
transaction" '219 hardly dispose of the illegality complications under UCC
S 3-305. The holder in due course indeed may recover-if the illegality
is not such as to render the obligation void. But if the obligation is
void, he may not. Williston does not mandate anything to the con-
trary, and that is the only possible interpretation to be given his rules;
otherwise, the letter and philosophy of UCC S 3-305(2)(b) codifying
illegality as a real defense would itself be a nullity.
In denying recovery to holders in due course of illegally void
instruments, the New York courts refuse to validate void transac-
tions, notwithstanding the innocence of the party seeking their
enforcement. Sirkin"' is clear that the court would not lend its aid
to the "enforcement of this contract,"" stating:
The Legislature has not expressly declared either that the
contract to pay the bribe or the contract induced by the
bribe is void or unenforceable. A contract, however, made
in violation of a penal statute, although not expressly pro-
hibited or declared to be void, is prohibited, void, and unen-
forceable, whether executory or executed (Griffith v. Wells,
3 Denio, 226; Barton v. Port Jackson and N.T.P.R. Co., 17
Barb. 397).'
In order to focus on the voidness issue in Bankers Trust, it is
necessary to examine the transactions involved in that case, since
there were three different contracts which need to be separated out.
V. BRIBERY AND ITS THREE BASIC CONTRACTS
The three basic contracts involved in Bankers Trust are typical
of all commercial bribery contracts. They are as follows:
A. The Employment Contract: The contract between the
employer or principal and the bribe-receiver who is an employee,
agent, or fiduciary.' [In Bankers Trust this was the contract between
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Supra note 21.
221. 124 App. Div. at 388, 108 N.Y.S. at 834; emphasis added.
222. Id. See also State ex rel Bradford v. Cross, 38 Kan. 696, 17 P. 190 (1888)
(if the state could prove bribery at the trial, a contract for the sale of school lands
would be declared void and the state would not be required to return the bribe money).
223. N.Y. PENAL LAW SS 180.00, 180.03, 180.05 and 180.08 (McKinney 1975). The
employment contract in connection with bribery involving public servants would be
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Royal and Buquicchio and the other employees who were bribed. '4]
B. The Bribery Contract: The bribery agreement between the
bribe-receiver and briber,' made in breach of the fiduciary duty owed
under the Employment Contract. Its purpose is to obtain the Resulting
Contract. [In Bankers Trust this was the agreement between Regent
and the Royal employees, particularly Buquicchio. 6 ]
C. The Resulting Contract: The bribery-induced contract between
the principal and the briber or a third party.' [In Bankers Trust,
this was the lease entered into between Litton and Regent.22 8]
ANALYSIS
A. Under the Employment Contract, the employee, agent or
fiduciary owes a duty of loyalty and good faith to the employer or
principal. 2 9
B. The Bribery Contract itself is illegal and surely absolutely
void in New York. Whether the employer or principal is a public
the government instrumentality. See N.Y. PENAL LAW S 10(15) (McKinney 1975) defini-
tion of "public servant." See also S 200.40 as to "party officer," and SS 200.45, 200.50
as to bribe giving and bribe receiving for public office.
224. See 599 F.2d at 490.
225. Extortion is not per se denominated as a defense to commercial bribery,
as it is in the bribery of either public or labor officials. No cases have been found
involving the use of extortion, duress or coercion as a defense to a civil action involv-
ing bribery or commercial bribery. If coercion is employed by one of the parties,
however, such conduct would itself be criminal in New York. See N.Y. PENAL LAW
SS 135.60, 135.65, 135.70, 135.75 (McKinney 1975).
226. 599 F.2d at 490.
227. New York has held such contracts to be void. "An examination of the
language in the New York decisions on the enforceability of bribery-induced contracts
suggests that New York holds such contracts to be 'void.' Sturm v. Truby, 245 App.
Div. 357, 361, 282 N.Y.S. 433, 437 (4th Dept. 1935); Sirkin v. Fourteenth Street Store,
124 App. Div. 384, 393, 108 N.Y.S. 830, 837 (1st Dept. 1908), cited with approval in
McConnell v. Commonwealth Pictures Corp., 7 N.Y.2d 465, 470, 166 N.E. 494, 497, 199
N.Y.S.2d 483, 486 (1960); and Shemin v. A. Black & Co., 32 Misc.2d 1046, 225 N.Y.S.2d
805 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1962), rev'd on procedural grounds, 39 Misc.2d 354, 240 N.Y.S.2d
622 (1st Dept. 1963)." Bankers Trust, 599 F.2d at 492.
228. 599 F.2d at 490.
229. Continental Management, supra note 18; Levy-Caen. supra note 1 at 107-09,
citing Rothschild v. Brookman, 2 Dow & Cl, 188 (1831); Pariente v. Lubbock, 20 Beav.
588 (1885); Andrew v. Ramsay, 2 K.B. 635 (1903). This is implicit in the agreement
between them, "since the undertaking is to advance the interests of the principal in
accordance with the principal's desires. It is not the agent's business that is carried
on, but that of the principal . . ." Seavey and Hall, supra note 200 at 3; see generally,
Muris, Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of Contracts, 65 MINN. L. REV. 521 (1981);
Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith-Its Recognition and Conceptualization, 67
CORNELL L. REV. 810 (1982).
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institution or a private entity, both parties are engaging in criminal
conduct and are in pari delicto.1 There is no "victim" in this two-
party agreement; hence, there is no possibility of "ratification." Since
both parties' conduct is criminal and they are equally at fault, we
do not have a "voidable" contract such as one resulting from fraud
in the inducement, where the victim is allowed time to decide whether
he wishes to elect to ratify or rescind. Instead, we have a situation
like The Highwayman's case:"' two criminals engaged in an illegal
agreement, neither having a cause of action against the other for
breach of their void agreement.
If the characterizing of this Bribery Contract is not excessive,
assume a $10,000 check were issued by B, a bribe-giver payable to
the order of A, a bribe-receiver. Were this check negotiated to a holder
in due course who sued B, and B claimed such illegality of the instru-
ment as to render his obligation a nullity (the "real" defense of
illegality), this defense should be good. 2
No cases have been found on this point either in the United
States or, going as far back as 1945, in Great Britain. The holding
in Bankers Trust might be improperly misconstrued as authority for
230. Clark v. United States, 102 U.S. 322 (1880); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS
S 598 (1932). Generally if a contract is illegal, neither party may recover on it and
the parties are left where they stand on the theory that the court will not grant aid
to either wrongdoer. Id.; Hedla v. McCool, 476 F.2d 1223 (9th Cir. 1973) (collecting
general illegality cases). One who bribes or attempts to bribe a judge or other public
official or agent is guilty of moral turpitude. See United States v. Manton, 107 F.2d
834 (2d Cir. 1938), cert. den. 309 U.S. 664 (1940); In re McNally, 252 App. Div. 550,
300 N.Y.S. 459 (1938) (attorney convicted of commercial bribery disbarred because acts
involved moral turpitude). Cf. Singleton v. Foreman, 435 F.2d 962 (5th Cir. 1970) (com-
plaint seeking return of jewelry deposited to secure illegal contingency fee agreement
in divorce case stated a valid claim); Liebman v. Rosenthal, 185 Misc. 837, 57 N.Y.S.2d
875, affid 269 App. Div. 1062, 59 N.Y.S.2d 148 (2d Dept. 1945) (jewelry given in France
to one purporting to be a friend of Portuguese Consul to be used as bribe for visas
to help plaintiff and his family escape Nazis during World War II: complaint for return
of jewelry withstood motion for summary judgment, since plaintiff was defrauded, not
in pari delicto, and not guilty of moral turpitude); Aikman v. City of Wheeling, 120
W. Va. 46, 195 S.E. 667 (1938) (recovery allowed although restitution check proffered
on condition that payee suppress criminal prosecution). See also, generally, Gellhorn,
Contracts and Public Policy, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 679 (1935).
231. See McMullen v. Hoffman, 174 U.S. 639 (1899) which refers to this as a
"real" case. Id. at 654.
232. Lord Mansfield cautions that this is true even though illegality "sounds
at all times very ill in the mouth of the defendant." Holman v. Johnson, 1 Cowp. 341,
343 (1775). Also a "person who is guilty of illegality or fraud, and knows that he can-
not sue himself, is likely to hand over the instrument to some other person to sue
for him." Bank of Cyprus, supra note 74.
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the proposition that bribery would be a personal and not a real defense
against the holder in due course of such an instrument. Bankers Trust
does not so hold and in any event should not be so construed.
The following examples are proffered to indicate why bribery
should be a "real" defense if an instrument is issued in payment of
the bribe, although it has passed to a holder in due course:
EXAMPLES
Dramatis Personae:
B: Briber
J: Dishonest Judge who agrees to accept bribe
A: Dishonest Agent who agrees to accept bribe
H: Holder, or possible Holder in Due Course
V: Victim of fraud in the inducement
1. B promises to pay Judge J $25,000 if J will decide a case to be
heard tomorrow in B's favor. J decides the case in B's favor, but never
receives the $25,000 and sues B for breach of contract. J cannot
recover if B pleads illegality. The parties are in pari delicto and the
agreement is illegally void.m
2. B pays J $25,000 cash in return for J's agreement to decide
a case to be heard tomorrow in B's favor. J accepts the money but
decides the case against B. B sues J for return of his money. B is
denied access to the courts and cannot recover.u
233. See supra notes 230-32.
234. Womack v. Maner, 227 Ark. 789, 301 S.W.2d 438 (1957) (no recovery of
bribe money paid to a county judge to prevent plaintiff from being punished for
gambling); Riggs v. Palmer, supra note 141; McConnell, supra note 28. Query as to
what effect a claim of extortion would have on the plaintiffs rights in such a case.
The Reviser's Notes to the Revision of the N.Y. PENAL LAW explain:
Even though the victim of an extortion, he [the briber] is still guilty of
bribery by virtue of conferring a benefit upon a public servant or a labor
official 'upon an agreement or understanding that' the latter's decision
or action will thereby be influenced' (N SS 180.15, 200.00). Out of obvious
equitable considerations, the new bill arbitrarily restores the coerced 'bribe
giver's' defense (N SS 180.20, 200.05).
Fourth Interim Report of the State of New York Temporary Commission on Revision
of the Penal Law and Criminal Code, Leg. Doc. (1965) No. 25 at 43. Extortion might
conceivably throw the case into a Liebman-type situation (see Liebman v. Rosenthal,
supra note 230) allowing recovery if plaintiff were not deemed guilty of moral tur-
pitude. See generally, N.Y. PENAL LAW SS 35.05 (McKinney 1975); William J. Davis, Inc.
v. Slade, 271 A.2d 412 (1970) (landlord under illegal lease deemed not guilty of moral
19851
Cox: Ruminations on Statutory Interpretation in the Burger Court
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1985
432 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19
3. B pays J $25,000 cash in return for J's agreement to decide
a case to be heard in B's favor. J accepts the money and decides the
case in B's favor. B sues J to get his money back. B is denied access
to the courts and cannot recover.235
4. B gives J his personal check for $25,000 made payable at
Js request to the order of "Cash," in exchange for J's promise to
decide a case to be heard tomorrow in B's favor. An hour later, J
takes the check and gives it to H, in payment for a good used car.
H gives J the car. The check is dishonored. (B may have stopped pay-
ment because he has decided to abandon his crime; or he does not
trust J; or he just does not have that much money in his checking
account.) H sues B on the instrument. B pleads illegality as a defense.
Assuming H can prove his holder in due course status, B's defense
should nevertheless be good. The transaction, bribing a judge, is a
felony and void.2'
(a) If the defense is not good against a holder in due course: H
could recover from B on the instrument, leaving J with the car. The
dishonest judge will profit from his crime. If B sues J, he cannot as
a wrongdoer have access to the courts to get his money back." 7 As
between B and J, we have more of an interest in having the bite
of the law felt by J, who is in a position of public trust and who
may again be encouraged to accept bribes; but the result instead is
that B, the briber is forced to carry out a crime and to pay; and J,
the corrupt judge, keeps the benefit of his illegal bargain.
(b) If the defense is good against a holder in due course: H could
not collect from B if B pleads illegality as a defense. This would not
turpitude entitled to recover in quasi-contract); see also Aikman, supra note 230;
Singleton v. Foreman, supra note 230.
235. See supra note 234.
236. Id.
237. The obligation to pay a bribe to a judge cannot but be a nullity. The
original agreement was by two parties for doing of acts that both knew to be a felony
and would have no legal operation and be void. See text corresponding to supra note
204 ". . . no man may be permitted to profit from his own wrongdoing in a court
of justice." Glus v. Brooklyn Eastern Terminal, 359 U.S. U.S. 231, 232 (1959); Stone v.
Freeman, 298 N.Y. 268, 82 N.E.2d 571 (1948); Womack v. Maner, supra note 234. Courts are
closed "to one who would prove his own wrongdoing as a basis for his supposed 'rights.'"
Carr v. Hoy, 2 N.Y. 2d 185 (1957h Sirkin, 108 N.Y.S. 830; McConnell, 7 N.Y. 2d 465; Reiner,
259 N.Y. 250; Riggs, 115 N.Y. 506; Holnan, 1 Cowp. 341; Certa v. Wittman, 35 Md. App.
364, 370 A.2d 573 (1977); Androws v. Coulter, 163 Wash. 429, 1 P.2d 320 (1931); Lanley
v. Devlin, 95 Wash. 171, 163 P. 395 (1917).
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leave H without remedy. He has two perfectly valid causes of action
against J:
[1] An action for goods sold and accepted in the amount of
$25,000;.38 and
[2] An action on the instrument for breach of warranty. 9 In this
case, J breached his warranty on transfer that there would be no
defense good against him. If B had a good defense of illegality, H
could collect the $25,000 from J for breach of this warranty. This result
leaves B not having to pay the bribe money and complete the crime,
and J, feeling the bite of the law, having to pay for his car with his
own money.
If, as is customary, H had asked for J's indorsement, albeit no
indorsement is necessary to transfer bearer paper.' J would have made
this warranty that there was no defense good against him to H and
any subsequent holder taking in good faith.2"' Even if J had given
a "without recourse" indorsement, H (and any subsequent holder
taking in good faith) 2 would still have a good breach of warranty
cause of action against J: the "without recourse" indorsement merely
narrows the no defense warranty. 3 to a warranty that J had "no
knowledge of' a defense good against him. In the example proffered,
J had actual knowledge of a defense good against him, having taken
the instrument in payment of a bribe, and would thereby be liable
for breach of this warranty.
5. Same facts as in 4, except that J has extorted14 the money
from B, who gave J the same $25,000 check made out to "Cash" at
J's behest. J uses it to pay for the car and, when the instrument
is dishonored for any of the reasons suggested in 4 above, H sues B.
(a) If the defense of bribery is not good against a holder in due
course: the victim of the extortion would have to pay H. J might keep
his car and profit from his crime. Although in New York extortion
is a defense to a criminal bribery charge involving a public servant
238. "Unless otherwise agreed where an instrument is taken for an underly-
ing obligation . . . the obligation is suspended .... If the instrument is dishonored
action may be maintained on either the instrument or the obligation . . ." UCC S 3-802.
239. "Any person who transfers an instrument and receives consideration war-
rants to his transferee" inter alia that "no defense of any party is good against him."
UCC S 3417(2)(d).
240. UCC S 3-202(1).
241. UCC S 3-417(2).
242. Id.
243. UCC S 3-417(3).
244. See supra note 234.
1985]
Cox: Ruminations on Statutory Interpretation in the Burger Court
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1985
434 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19
or labor official, B's case against J is not clear cut. Equitably, he should
recover. But no case has been found holding B, as a briber, would
not be denied access to the courts and precluded from recovering
against H.
(b) If the defense of bribery is good against the holder in due
course: H can collect against J on either of his two causes of action
set forth in 4(b)[1] and [2] above.
6. Same facts as in 4, except that the bribe-taker is not a judge
but A, an employee who has accepted the $25,000 check made out
to "Cash" in exchange for his promise to have his employer give a
contract to B. A now goes to H and buys the same car, giving H
the check. B has second thoughts and stops payment, maybe because
he does not trust A, has decided to abandon his crime, or maybe
because he just does not have that much money in his checking ac-
count. In any event, the check is returned to H dishonored. H sues
B on the instrument.
(a) In states where commercial bribery under these cir-
cumstances is a felony,24 B's defense without doubt should be a real
defense against H. The defense should also be good in all other states
because (1) The instrument is issued in direct contravention of those
states' commercial bribery statutes and thus is criminal in nature.
The underlying obligation (to pay a bribe) must be regarded as void.
Both parties are guilty of moral turpitude and are in pari delicto.
Neither is capable of ratifying his void agreement or criminality; or
(2) The instrument is issued in direct contravention of those states'
other criminal statutes, or is a common law offense or repugnant
to the public policy of these states. This would again leave H with
his two good causes of action set forth in 4(b)[1] and [2] above against
A, the bribe-taker.
(b) If the illegality is not a good defense against H: B would have
to pay H and again A, the bribe-taker, profits from his crime or takes
advantage of his own wrong and keeps the car. (Should B sue A, he
would be denied access to the courts as a wrongdoer, since courts
will ordinarily not assist a briber to recover bribe money paid. 46 )
Contrast the following fraud in the inducement example:
7. Victim V gives A his personal check for $25,000 made payable
at A's request to the order of "Cash" in exchange for an emerald
ring which A has represented to be "worth over $30,000." A transfers
245. See, e.g., supra note 16.
246. Womack v. Maner, supra note 234.
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the check to H in return for a good used car which H delivers to
A. V finds out from an appraiser that the ring is "a nice ring worth
about $500," and immediately stops payment on his check. H sues
V. V shows he has a defense of fraud in the inducement. H establishes
he is a holder in due course. V will have to pay H, since fraud in
the inducement is a personal defense. V's obligation to pay is voidable
only, not void. However, V has a good cause of action against A. He
is not denied access to the court because he is guilty of a crime, moral
turpitude, or is trying to profit from his own crime or take advan-
tage of his own wrong. As a victim of a fraud, in New York V is
entitled either to ratify or rescind the voidable contract and, to fraud
damages. 47 Thus, the wrongdoer is not left with the fruits of his
misdeed.248
In McConnell v. Commonwealth,249 had the alleged bribe to the
producer's agent been in the form of McConnell's $10,000 check even-
tually taken by a holder in due course, it is inconceivable to the writer
that New York courts would not have held bribery to be a real
defense, if McConnell had pleaded illegality in an action by the holder
in due course.2'5
Because the Uniform Commercial Code has built in warranties
on transfer and presentment,25 ' the instrument issued to pay a bribe
should be treated as truly void, coming from an illegally void,
unratifiable two-party agreement, with no redeeming features between
parties to a crime who are in pari delicto. Otherwise, for the first
time, bribe-takers could accept instruments and, by merely negotiating
to a holder in due course, the instrument would metamorphose into
a legal obligation to commit a crime and pay a bribe.
If bribery is treated as a real defense, the illegal Bribery Con-
tract is left to unwind, so that no money is paid out on it.
C. The Resulting Contract, of the type involved in Bankers Trust,
is more complex. It is, however, the raison d'ere of the Bribery Con-
tract. In that sense, it is also the corpus delicti of the criminal bribe.
The Resulting Contract is the bag of loot The Highwayman2 52 sought
247. See N.Y. CiV. PRAC. LAW S 3002(e).
248. The opposite result occurs if bribery is not a real defense. See supra
examples 4(a), 5(a), 6(b).
249. Supra note 28.
250. It is black letter law that one who has timely withdrawn from his wrongful
act stands clear. McConnell would have been allowed to say he turned back from his
wrongful intentions. If he so pleaded, the reason would not be important; the turning
back is paramount. See Aikman v. City of Wheeling, supra note 230.
251. UCC S 3-417.
252. See supra note 231.
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to have apportioned, or the body of the poisoned grandfather in Riggs
v. Palmer -the entity which will give the criminal the fruits of his
crime.
Like a check given in payment of a bribe, the Resulting Con-
tract is legal on its face. But under its gloss is a dough composed
of breach of fiduciary duty, corruption, crime, some larceny, conspiracy,
theft, betrayal, embezzlement, mendacity and "treason,"' held
together by the grease of the briber's lubrication payments and
droplets of fraud. Its flavor is different from a transaction resulting
from fraud in the inducement because of the existence of the Employ-
ment Contract. At the moment of making the criminal Bribery Con-
tract, there simultaneously occurs a breach of fiduciary duty under
the Employment Contract. Those two misdeeds then merge with the
briber's crime. The Resulting Contract is thus born with two bad genes
coming from the bribe-receiver, linked with the bad gene of the
briber's crime. Is it void or voidable? Sirkin said it was void; Bankers
Trust, voidable only, in the hands of a holder in due course.
Since a holder in due course, by definition, is a non-wrongdoer
as to the obligation or transaction, that cannot be a reason for treating
as voidable a bribery-induced contract which for over 75 years in New
York has been condemned as illegally void.
As Sirkin observed, quoting Chief Justice Marshall: "Where the
contract grows immediately out of, and is connected with, an illegal
253. Supra note 141.
254. See supra note 13.
255. See supra text corresponding to note 222. If it is void, how many void
contracts are there floating around which parties abide by? The validity of the con-
tract which McConnell allegedly bribed to get for Commonwealth was never questioned.
Query as to what would have happened if Universal, whose agent was bribed, breached
and pleaded the illegality.
In 1981, the McConnell case was invoked in a landlord's summary proceeding
for some $27,000 in unpaid rent under the lease of a Brooklyn warehouse. The tenant,
Prudential Lines, Inc., pleaded the landlord had bribed its vice-president and board
member to obtain the lease. It took the position, therefore, that although the lease
had four more years to run, it should not have to pay anything and should be per-
mitted to collect rents from its subtenant for the balance of the lease. The court
disagreed, stating (1) neither Sirkin nor McConnell required the wrongdoer without
compensation to provide goods or services in futuro; and (2) since the bribe-taker was
their own agent, the parties were in pari delicto. As to where this would leave the
parties, the court sidestepped. Prudential had adverted to pending actions it had com-
menced against the landlord in State and Federal courts. In view of the nature of
summary proceedings, the court found Prudential should pay its rent and be relegated
to having its commercial bribery problems resolved in the pending plenary actions.
McKeon v. Prudential Lines, Inc., 108 Misc.2d 873, 438 N.Y.S.2d 960 (N.Y. City Civ.
Ct., Kings Co. 1981).
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or immoral act, a court of justice will not lend its aid to enforce it.
And if the contract be, in fact, one connected with the illegal transac-
tion, and growing immediately out of it, though it be, in fact, a new
contract, it is equally tainted by it."2 '
Under New York law, the bribery-induced contract has been held
and appears to be truly, not loosely, illegally void. If it cannot be
perceived as truly void, however, one might consider treating it like
an instrument which is fraudulently taken prior to issuance. The
"voidness" issue is thereby avoided. The defense in that case would
be that because the instrument or assignment was bribery-induced,
it was never voluntarily delivered or issued into commerce. Hence,
there cannot be a holder in due course. The same occurs where the
payee's signature on order paper is forged. There can be no holder,
and hence no holder in due course."7 This principle has not impeded
commerce; nor has the law that fraud in the execution or other illegally
void transactions2" may be asserted as real defenses against a holder
in due course.
Infancy, or such duress or incapacity as renders the obligation
a nullity, and discharge in insolvency proceedings are all real defenses
under UCC § 3-305.
Had Bankers Trust held bribery to be a real defense, the plain-
tiff banks would have had a good cause of action against their assignor
for breach of the implied warranty that the assignment was valid and
that there would be no defense which would impede their obtaining
a judgment on it.259
Much of the mystique surrounding the sacred rights of a holder
in due course has recently been dispelled. In consumer sales, even
prior to the Federal Trade Commission Act mandates26 the holder
in due course doctrine had ceded to the reality that consumer notes
256. 124 App. Div. 394, 108 N.Y.S. at 837.
257. "No party can ever be a holder of an order instrument stolen prior to
indorsement by the owner of the instrument." WHITE AND SUMMERS, supra note 42 at
459.
258. For example, in Alabama a contract to issue stock in exchange for a
promissory note was held truly void and it was found that "the illegality voids the
instrument, even in the hands of a holder in due course." General Beverages v. Rogers
216 F.2d 413, 417 (10th Cir. 1954).
259. See Friedman v. Schneider, 238 Mo. App. 778, 186 S.W.2d 204 (1945);
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS 2d S 333(2); Lonsdale v. Chesterfield, 99 Wash.2d 353, 662
P.2d 385 (1983).
260. Thereunder, contracts must carry a ten-point bold face notice that the
holder takes subject to the consumer's claims and defenses. See 16 C.F.R. S 433.2 (1976).
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ordinarily did not course through the long and fast streams of com-
merce. They rarely went beyond their first transferee. Institutions
like the plaintiffs in Bankers Trust which finance the purchase of non-
consumer goods likewise tend to be first and last transferees. Hence,
the overriding necessity for enveloping the holder in due course in
his traditional protective mantel does not exist to the same degree
under UCC § 9-206 as it does for negotiable instruments.
As one with the rights of an Article 3 holder in due course,
however, it seems clear that the UCC § 9-206 assignee remains sub-
ject to any real illegality defense under UCC S 3-305, whether or not
the assigned transaction is "void on its face."'"
CONCLUSION
Although a holder in due course may take a good title from a
chain which has a thief in its links, 2 the bearer instrument which
passed via a thief to the holder in due course in Miller v. Race" was
legally issued.' It is only such legally issued instruments which the
law need seek to protect. Instruments or agreements growing out
of such criminality as would render them void require condemnation
as a transaction-regardless of whether the plaintiff is a holder in
due course. That is the raison d'etre of the real illegality defense under
UCC § 3-305.
In Bankers Trust the court was invited not to aid illegality but
to condemn it.' 5 The court, however, sent its regrets. It may thus
have left the impression that in New York bribery is not as bad -
since it is not as illegally void-as usury or gambling, which are real
defenses. Yet usury is a real defense even in instances where the
amount charged does not attain the level of criminality; and gambling
run by the state is not illegal. Hence, they do not appear to be more
serious in nature than illegal commercial bribery.
From time to time, the legalization of capital punishment, and
of various crimes such as the sale of addicting drugs, prostitution,
pornography and adultery is discussed and considered. Usury and
gambling are included in those discussions. Bribery is not. It cannot
261. See Bankers Trust, 599 F.2d at 491; and supra text corresponding to notes
175-91.
262. See supra note 42.
263. See supra note 49.
264. See supra note 52. Contra UCC S 3-207(1)(c) as to illegal negotiation.
265. Selango United Rubber Estates, Ltd. v. Cradock, 2 All. E.R. 1073 (1968),
at text of decision corresponding to court's n.185.
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be legalized precisely because its essence is antithetical to structure.
It does to legal, commercial, or societal fiber what termites do to wood,
consuming and destroying from within.2 6 If bribery is to be deterred,
it is the decisions of civil courts which have great influence as a deter-
rent. Principals who are victimized by commercial bribery require,
especially in a UCC § 9-206 case, as much, if not more protection from
courts, as the holder in due course.
It may be true, as Bankers Trust opined, that its holding will
not have "an appreciable effect on the frequency of commercial
bribery." '67 One could also speculate that had the court seen fit to
hold the other way, such a decision might have had an appreciable
effect on reducing commercial bribery-how much of an effect is
impossible to guess, since all bribery arrangements are always made
and kept completely shrouded in secrecy.
266. A handbook written by an 18th Century Ottoman statesman observed:
"Bribery is the beginning and root of all illegality and tyranny, the source and foun-
tain of every sort of disturbance and sedition, the most vast of evils, and the greatest
of calamities. It is the mine of corruption than which there is nothing whatever more
calamitous... " JACOBY, NEHEMKIS AND EELLS, supra note 1, at 254 n.4; DRISCOLL, supra
note 1.
267. 599 F.2d at 493.
The author acknowledges with thanks a Faculty Research Grant awarded her
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These enactments have raised free speech, due process, and privacy
questions. This article will examine how these issues have been
judicially resolved. In general, it will argue that the crucial factor
in judicial resolution is the weight 'courts have given to free speech
interests. In this regard, it will argue that courts have more easily
resolved child pornography production issues by defining them as con-
duct unprotected by the first amendment. At the same time, this
article will argue that courts have had greater problems in resolving
obscenity and child pornography distribution issues, because of the
greater importance they have attached to the free speech interests
of children, parents, and other adults.
Part I will provide a framework for the analysis of these issues.
Part II will examine the legal regulation of children as recipients of
pornography: the evolution of a children's obscenity standard in
Ginsberg v. New York' and Erznoznick v. City of Jacksonville and the
creation of a child-based indecency standard for broadcasting in
Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation.' Part III
will examine the legal regulation of children as actors in the produc-
tion of pornography, via the Supreme Court's decision in New York
v. Ferber,4 and its impact on appellate and trial courts. Part IV will
draw some conclusions about these judicial decisions, their impact on
the public and private interests involved, and the issues that remain
to be decided.
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK:
THE PORNOGRAPHY SYSTEM AND PARTICIPANT INTERESTS
Systems theory is a useful framework for understanding the
involvement of children in the pornographic marketplace. A system
is a set of structured interactions that converts resources (inputs) into
products (outputs) for distribution to consumers.' The pornography
industry,6 represented in Figure 1 below, is a- system which takes
human and financial resources and creates sexually appealing products
in the form of pictures, magazines, books, and movies which are
1. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
2. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
3. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
4. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
5. Easton, An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems, 9 WORLD
POLITICs 383-400 (1957).
6. The President's Commission on Obscenity and Pornography reported-that
a monolithic smut industry does not exist; rather there are several distinct markets
(films, books, magazines) and submarkets which distribute a variety of erotic materials."
Lockhart, Report of the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography 7 (1970).
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distributed through bookstores, the mail, theatres, and television to
adult and children consumers.
The pornography business is composed primarily of two groups:
producers and distributors. Producers create the product using both
child and adult subjects. In the case of child pornography, the pro-
ducers are those people who coerce or entice children into participa-
tion, and also those who participate with them in and record their
sexual behavior. Distributors market the product. Obscene and inde-
cent materials are sold to both children and adults, but adults are
the principal consumers of child pornography. Therefore, children are
involved in the pornography industry's input and output functions as
its subjects and objects; they are actors, resources for the production
of pornography, and consumers, recipients for the distribution of in-
decent and obscene materials.
FIGURE 1
CHILDREN, THE PORNOGRAPHY SYSTEM, AND
(INPUTS) Child Pornography
Statutes
THE LAW
(OUTPUTS)
Production Distribut
Adults
Solicitation " Promotion &
Children Production ornography Distribution
I Children
Child
Obscenity
Statutes
ion
This youthful participation has become a matter of public con-
cern. As a consequence, state and federal governments have passed
two types of legislation to protect children: obscenity and child por-
nography statutes Child pornography statutes are input-oriented: they
permit the prosecution of the producers of child pornography.
Obscenity statutes (output-oriented) are of two types. One type, child
obscenity statutes, outlaw distribution to juveniles. The other, child
7. Most states control the distribution of obscene material by statute. In
Kentucky the advertising, promotion and distribution of obscene material is prohibited
by Ky.Rev.Stat. SS 531.050, .060, .020; using minors to distribute obscene material by
S 531.040; and the distribution of obscene materials to minors by S 531.030. Most states
also control child pornography. For a recent comprehensive list, see Ferber, 458 U.S.
at 749. In Kentucky, the production and distribution of child pornography controlled
by Ky. Rev. Stat. S 531.300.
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pornography statutes, permit the prosecution of persons involved in
the promotion and sale of child pornography in order to eliminate the
sexual abuse of children in its creation.
Obscenity prosecutions under federal and state statutes have
raised fundamental questions about private and public interests. The
participant interests in these cases are expressed in terms of the four
models which are represented in Figure 2 below.
FIGURE 2
PARTICIPANTS' LEGAL INTEREST MODEL
Government Interests
Model
#1
Parent # 3 W #2 Adult Rights
Rights Model: Model
#4
Children's Rights
Model
The Government Interests Model (#1) recognizes four interests.
First, the state has an interest in the health, safety, morals, and
general welfare of all its citizens, but it uses this police power
primarily on behalf of its adult citizens Second, "[t]he State also has
an independent interest in the well-being of its youth."9 Under its
parens patriae and police powers it has the authority to protect the
welfare of children from abuses from anyone. It may also use these
powers to override parental decisions in order to protect individual
children from neglect or abuse and to promote the general public's
health and safety." Third, there is the state's interest in supporting
"the parent's claim to authority in their own household to direct the
rearing of their children."'" Fourth, there is the state's interest in
safeguarding and strengthening the family and the relationships among
parents and children."2
8. The police power is the basis for state obscenity and child pornography
statutes. Id. The fedeal government also has a "police power" under its postal and
commerce powers to regulate obscenity and child pornography. See infra note 28.
9. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 640.
10. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (state child labor law upheld
as applied to a child distributing religious materials) and Jacobsen v. Massachusetts,
197 U.S. 11 (1905) (state compulsory vaccination of children upheld in spite of religious
objections of parents).
11. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 639.
12. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981) (states requirement that physician
provide notice to parents of a minor's abortion decision).
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The Adult Rights Model (#2) recognizes that the vast array of
constitutional rights that people have against the exercise of govern-
mental power are conferred principally upon adults.13 As a result, this
model distinguishes between adult rights and those selected constitu-
tional rights recently extended to minor children under Model #4. The
Adult Rights Model also acknowledges that when adults become
parents, they gain additional rights under Model #3.
The Parent Rights Model (#3) recognizes the personal interest
of parents in the care of their children free from state interference.
The Court has acknowledged the primary responsibility of parents
to direct the upbringing of their children1 4 as an aspect of liberty pro-
tected by the due process 5 and free exercise clauses.16 Moreover, the
Parent Rights Model recognizes that parents share an interest with
their children in an autonomous family relationship.
The Children's Rights Model (#4) recognizes that minor children
have rights against the state. The Court has recently extended to
minors an interest in equal protection against racial discrimination
in education,18 in procedural due process in juvenile court adjudication 9
school disciplinary proceedings,"0 in freedom of speech,2 and, even as
13. Constitutional rights in full force are generally conferred only upon people
who have achieved their majority, though the Supreme Court has made recent minor
alterations in this view. See infra notes 18-23.
14. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (state statute re-
quiring children to attend public school violated parent's right to educational choice
for children).
15. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (state statute restricting private
school teaching to English violated parent's due process right to have children taught
German).
16. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (state compulsory school atten-
dance law infringed upon the religious convictions of Amish parents).
17. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform (OFFER),
431 U.S. 816 (1977) (state procedures for removing children from foster homes intruded
upon privacy rights of the foster family) and Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494 (1977) (city zoning ordinance violated the privacy of the extended family).
18. Brown v. Board, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (state statutes requiring or permitting
racial segregation in educational facilities violated equal protection rights of children).
19. Minors' rights in &iminal proceedings include protection against coerced
confessions, Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962); the right to notice, counsel, con-
frontation, cross-examination, and not to incriminate oneself, In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1
(1967); the prohibiiion against double jeopardy, Breed V. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975),
and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358
(1970).
20. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (public school suspension of students
without notice and hearing, violates their due process rights).
21. Tinker v. DesMoines School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (school regula-
tion forbidding the wearing of armband violated student's free speech right).
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against their parents, in personal privacy to make decisions about
contraception2 and abortion.' At the same time, the Children's Rights
Model also recognizes the minor's due process interest in the family
relationship, because of an interest in receiving parental guidance.24
The Supreme Court's decisions in cases involving children and
pornography have turned upon its evaluation of Model #1 governmen-
tal interests and the Model #2, #3, and #4 first amendment, due
process, and privacy rights of adults, parents, and children. Parts II
and III of this analysis will examine how the Court's decisions in cases
involving children as participants in the creation and consumption of
pornography have affected these participant interests.
II
CHILDREN AS CONSUMERS
Government regulation of the involvement of children with por-
nography began, not with the creation of the product, but with its
distribution. The following analysis will examine the child obscenity
standard developed in Ginsberg v. New York25 and Erznoznick v.
Jacksonville' and the child-based broadcast indecency standard created
in Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation.7
Child Obscenity Standard
Federal and state governments regulate the distribution of
obscene material. Federal statutes restrict the importation, mailing
or communication of obscene materials.' States have general obscenity
statutes which impose criminal penalties on those who distribute
22. Carey v. Population Services Internat'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (state law
restricting sale of contraceptives to minors violate their right to privacy).
23. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (state statute requir-
ing written consent by parents or spouse to a woman's abortion decision violates her
right to privacy).
24. See supra note 17.
25. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
26. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
27. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
28. The Tariff Act is 19 U.S.C. S 1305 (1976). The basic postal statute, 18
U.S.C. S 1461, prohibits the knowing use of the mails for the mailing or delivery of
obscene materials. Another postal statute, the Anti-Pandering Act, 39 U.S.C. S 4009
(1976), leaves the matter of erotic arousal at the sole discretion of the individual postal
patron. The FBI Statute, 18 U.S.C. S 1462 (1976), prohibits the use of common carriers
for the importation or interstate transportation of obscene materials and 18 U.S.C.
S 1465 (1976) prohibits the interstate transportation of obscene material for sale or
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obscene material.' The Supreme Court has generally upheld these
Atatutes, because it has found that obscenity as a class of speech is
hot entitled to any constitutional protection because it is without
redeeming social value."
Whether the material is obscene is determined by an internal
test first announced in Roth v. United States"1 and later elaborated
in Miller v. California.2 It is a test based solely on the anticipated
effect of the material on the average adult. It requires the trier of
fact to apply contemporary community standards to an examination
of the material alleged to be obscene and to determine whether the
work taken as a whole describes sex in a patently offensive way;
appeals to the prurient interest in sex; and lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value. If the material passes the test,
it is obscene.'
Obscenity under the Roth-Miller test is also a constant concept,
because the intentions of the distributor, the manner of distribution,
and the identity of the recipients are unimportant. Commercial
distribution of obscene material to adults is unprotected by the first
amendment. As the Court said in Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton: "com-
mercial exploitation of depictions, descriptions, or exhibitions of
obscene conduct. . . falls within a State's broad power to regulate
commerce and protect the public environment."34
Whether pornographic materials, non-obscene for adults, would
be obscene for children was not considered by the Court until the
appearance of an external test for obscenity. In Ginsburg v. United
States" and Mishkin v. New York," the Court announced the concept
of variable obscenity: the circumstances of distribution could make
obscene material which was otherwise protected expression. Redrup
v. New York3 7 extended the concept by holding that the obscenity of
material would also depend upon whether it was pandered or sold
distribution. The FCC Statute, 18 U.S.C. S 1464 (1976), prohibits the use of radio or
television to utter "obscene, indecent, or profane language."
29. Supra note 7.
30. Roth v. U.S., 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (later elaborated in Miller v. Cal., 413
U.S. 15 (1973)).
31. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
32. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
33. Id. at 24.
34. 413 U.S. 49, 68-69 (1972).
35. 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
36. 383 U.S. 502 (1966).
37. 386 U.S. 767 (1967).
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to juveniles." Whether material was obscene for children, however,
involved more than just a conflict between a child's right to free
expression and the public interest in morality. The sale of pornography
to children raised other questions. Could the government's interest
in the protection of children qualify the right of parents to educate
their children and the right of adults to protected materials? The Court
addressed this question initially in Ginsberg v. New York 9 and
Erznoznick v. City of Jacksonville0 which will be examined below.
Ginsberg v. New York
Could a state prohibit the sale of printed material to minors
defined as obscene on the basis of its appeal to them, though it would
not necessarily be obscene to adults? Justice Brennan, speaking for
the majority in Ginsberg, found that it was reasonable for a state to
conclude that a minor's exposure to such material might be harmful
and to enact a statute such as New York's which "simply adjusts the
definition of obscenity to social realities by permitting the appeal of
this type of material to be assessed in terms of the sexual interest
. . . of minors."41
Two state interests justified a limitation on the availability of
obscene material to minors. One was the state's "independent interest
in the well-being of its youth."4 The other interest supported "the
parents' claim to authority ... to direct the rearing of their children."'
It is clear that the statute was more than merely supportive, because
it denied parents, if they wished, the right to allow their children
to have uninhibited access to books and magazines."' Nonetheless,
Justice Brennan claimed that the statute did not "bar parents who
so desire[d] from purchasing the magazines for their children.""5
Therefore, Ginsberg did not explicitly discuss the rights of adults, but
one could assume that if the statute did not bar parental purchases,
it would not impair an adult's right of access to a bookstore or theatre.
Erznoznick v. City of Jacksonville
Could a city in the exercise of its police power prohibit the
exhibition of non-obscene nudity in drive-in movies visible from "any
38. Id. at 769.
39. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 629.
40. Erznoznick, 422 U.S. at 205.
41. Ginsberg, 390. U.S. at 638.
42. Id. at 640.
43. Id. at 639.
44. Id. at 674 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 639.
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public street or public place" in order to protect children?" Justice
Powell, speaking for the Court in Erznoznick agreed that the city could
"adopt more stringent controls on communicative materials available
to youths."4 At the same time, the city had to acknowledge that even
though the first amendment rights of minors were not co-extensive
with those of adults, "minors [were] entitled to a significant measure
of First Amendment protection"4" which included the right to view
non-obscene nudity.
The Jacksonville ordinance, judged by this standard, was fatally
overbroad as applied to children, because it was not directed against
sexually-explicit nudity, but forbade all nudity in outdoor films. "All
nudity," Justice Powell said, "cannot be deemed obscene even as to
minors. . . ." under the Ginsberg obscenity standard.49 Non-obscene
speech could not be suppressed "solely to protect the young from ideas
or images that a legislative body thinks unsuitable for them."' Thus
Erznoznick acknowledged the post-Miller validity of the Ginsberg child
obscenity standard, but it did not discuss whether public exhibitions
not obscene to adults could be restricted, because they were obscene
to children.
The Child-Based Indecency Standard
The federal government also regulates the distribution of non-
obscene material. Federal statutes restrict the mailing and broadcast
of indecent material. The Supreme Court first upheld this governmen-
tal action in Rowan v. United States Post Office Department5 ' where
it approved of the Anti-Pandering Act, 19 U.S.C. S 4009," which leaves
the matter of erotic arousal at the sole discretion of the individual
postal patron who has the right to obtain from a post office a pro-
hibitory order against the advertiser even though the material was
not obscene by any objective standard.
The Court's decision in Rowan is, however, rather limited in its
application. It upheld only the right of an adult to make a personal
46. Erznoznick, 422 U.S. at 205.
47. Id. at 212.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 213.
50. Id. at 213-14.
51. 397 U.S. 728 (1971).
52. Section 4009 permits a person who has received "a pandering advertise-
ment which offers for sale matter which the addressee in his sole discretion believes
to be erotically arousing or sexually provocative" to request the post office to issue
an order directing the advertiser to refrain from further mailings. 19 U.S.C. S 4009 (1976).
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judgment about a mailed advertisement. Moreover, it did not consider
whether the child had a right to refuse offensive material, whether
the parents had discretion under section 4009(g) to determine what
material a child may receive,' nor whether the state's parens patriae
power could prevail over parental discretion., These issues, along with
the free speech-rights of adults, were addressed in the much wider
context of radio broadcasting.
Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation
Could the FCC regulate radio broadcasts non-obscene for
children? The issue was raised one afternoon when WBAI, a Pacifica
Foundation radio station, broadcast George Carlin's "dirty words"
monologue. The FCC, acting on a complaint from a listener, concluded
that the monologue "depicted sexual and excretory activities and
organs in a manner patently offensive by contemporary standards for
the broadcast medium""5 and was prohibited as indecent under 18
U.S.C. S 1464.' The Court of Appeals reversed. 7 On appeal, the
Supreme Court upheld the Commission, 5 to 4.58
Justice Stevens in his opinion for the Court read the statutory
language's prohibition on the use of "any obscene, indecent, or pro-
fane language by means of radio communication" in the disjunctive;59
determined that indecent meant "nonconformance with accepted stan-
dards of morality";' and then agreed with the Commission's conclu-
sion that indecent language was used in the Pacifica broadcast. 1
53. Section 4009(g) allows the post office to include in any prohibitive order
"the names of any minor children who have not attained their nineteenth birthday
and who reside with the addressee." 19 U.S.C. S 4009(g) (1976).
54. The Supreme Court has never ruled on whether there is any limit to a
parent's discretion in determining what reading material a child may bring into the
home, though Ginsberg suggests that the state has an interest to see children are
safeguarded from abuse.
55. In re A Citizen's Complaint Against Pacifica Foundation Station WBAI(FM),
56 F.C.C.2d 94 (1975).
56. 18 U.S.C. S 1464 (1976).
57. 556 F.2d 9 (D.C.Cir. 1977).
58. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726. A majority opinion written by Justice Stevens was
joined by four members of the Court: Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun,
Powell and Rehnquist. Justice Powell joined by Blackmun concurred in part in the
opinion and the judgment. Justice Brennan, joined by Marshall, dissented on constitu-
tional grounds. Justice Stewart, joined by Brennan, White, and Marshall, dissented
on statutory grounds.
59. Id. at 739-40.
60. Id. at 740.
61. Id. at 741.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 19, No. 2 [1985], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol19/iss2/1
CHILDREN AND PORNOGRAPHY
Justice Stevens found no constitutional barrier to the FCC's authority
to impose a time regulation on the indecent radio broadcast.2 Two
characteristics of the broadcast media justified this regulation of
indecent speech: the impact of the broadcast media on an adult's
privacy in the home and the media's easy accessibility to children. 3
The Pacifica decision is noteworthy, because it is the first
instance in which the Court has upheld the federal government's power
to restrict non-obscene speech. One commentator observed: "the
Pacifica Court tacitly embraced a general or national standard of
decency" for broadcasting. 4 The Court offered two justifications, but
the privacy rational is flawed. "[C]hanneling indecent broadcasts ..
. cannot possibly protect that interest. . . [, because] it will do nothing
to aid the unwilling adult listeners who randomly tune in at night."65
As a consequence, the protection of young children is the only interest
advanced by the Court which can justify the regulation of broadcast
indecency. This interest, however, makes major alterations in the
rights of children, their parents, and other adults in their access to
non-obscene broadcasting.
The Court had recognized the government's interest in the well-
being of youth by adopting a children's obscenity standard in Ginsberg.
In broadcasting, however, the Court assumed that Ginsberg was
insufficient, because the Pacifica decision "allows the government to
prevent minors from gaining access to materials that are not
obscene."6 In doing so, Pacifica also disregards the admonition in
Erznoznick that "speech that is [not] .. .obscene as to youths . ..
cannot be suppressed solely to protect the young from ideas or images
that a legislative body thinks [are] unsuitable for them. 17
The Court recognized in Ginsberg the governmental interest in
supporting parental authority. Justice Stevens, citing Ginsberg, claimed
that the Court's interest in preventing children from hearing offen-
-sive broadcasts supported "the parents' claim to authority in their
own household."68 Like Ginsberg, Pacifica restricts the rights of those
parents who may find it desirable to expose their children to the Carlin
monologue. 9 However, Pacifica goes one step further. The offensive
62. Id. at 750-51.
63. Id. at 748-50. See also id. at 755-61 (Powell, J., concurring).
64. The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92 HARV. L. REv. 57, 157 (1978).
65. Id. at 160.
66. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 767 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 768. (Quoting Erznoznick, supra note 46).
68. Id. at 749. (Quoting Ginsberg, supra notes 11 & 41).
69. Id. at 770 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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material will be available to parents only at times when children are
not likely to be in the listening audience."
The Court's decision in Ginsberg did not impair the access of
adults to books, magazines, records, and movies. This physical separa-
tion of the audience is not possible in the broadcast media. As a con-
sequence, Pacifica raised the question as to whether the FCC's action
violated the principle of Butler v. Michigan; government may not
regulate the distribution of pornography to children in a manner that
prevents adults from gaining access to protected materials and,
thereby, "reduces the adult population . . . to reading only what is
fit for children."71 The Pacifica majority claimed that the regulation
of indecent broadcasting did not violate the principle of Butler. The
Commission's decision had not closed all broadcasting to indecent
speech. 2 Adults, Justice Powell said, may hear the monologue "dur-
ing late evening hours when fewer children are likely to be in the
audience."73 Moreover, the FCC ruling did not restrict adult use of
alternative forums. "Adults who feel the need may purchase tapes
and records or go to the theatres and nightclubs to hear these
words."74 Justice Powell in his concurring opinion was more cautious.
"Butler... is not without force," he said, "but it is not sufficiently
strong to leave the Commission powerless to act... in this case."75
Implications of Pacifica
What Pacifica means is unclear. Justice Stevens claimed that
the Court's review was limited to the Commission's decision "that the
Carlin monologue was indecent as broadcast."7 Justice Brennan was
profoundly disturbed by the implications of the majority's action: it
was the product of "acute ethnocentric myopia."77 His dissent raised
three questions about the meaning of Pacifica.
What will a broadcast indecency standard mean and what will
be its effect? Justice Brennan argued that there will be greater
problems than those encountered in defining obscenity. Indecency is
a less precise term. Moreover, he claimed that its implementation
would destroy cultural diversity, because a decency standard would
70. Id. at 768 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
71. 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957).
72. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750.
73. Id. at 760 (Powell, J., concurring).
74. Id. at 750 n. 28. See also id. at 760 (Powell, J., concurring).
75. Id. at 760 (Powell, J., concurring).
76. Id. at 735. See also id. at 755-56 (Powell, J., concurring).
77. Id. at 775.
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be likely to be a reflection of the will "of the dominant culture's
• . . thinking, acting, and speaking.""
What does "as broadcast" mean? Justice Brennan argued for a
narrow view of the Court's holding. Since,
"the FCC insists [in its brief] that it desires only the
authority to reprimand a broadcaster on facts analogous to
those presented in this case . . . [the opinions of Stevens
and Powell] do no more than permit the Commission to cen-
sor the afternoon broadcast of the 'sort of verbal shock
treatment'. . . involved here."79
Pacifica may, however, have a wider meaning. As one commentator
argued, the Stevens and Powell opinions "authorized time zoning
: * , when the broadcast: (1) uses language offensive to most people
in depicting sexual or excretory activities; (2) uses that language not
incidentally, but repetitively; (3) is aired at a time of day when children
are likely to be in the audience; and (4) is likely to influence children."'
That Pacifica may have this wider meaning was not foreclosed by
Stevens when he said that whether the playing of the monologue in
the late evening would be permissible "is an issue neither the com-
mission nor this Court has decided."" s
What guidance did Pacifica provide the FCC? Justice Brennan
complained that the privacy and children rationales were "plagued
by a common failing: the lack of principled limits on their use .... ,,
Neither the Stevens nor the Powell opinions, he says, "serve to clarify
the extent to which the FCC may assert the rationales as justifica-
tion for expunging from the airways protected communication the Com-
mission finds offensive."" Indeed, Stevens' opinion in which Powell
concurred suggested no limitation on future FCC decisions. As Stevens
said:
[t]he Commission's decision rested entirely on a nuisance
rationale under which context is all important. The Con-
cept requires consideration of a host of variables. The time
of day [,] . . . [t]he content of the program in which the
language is used will affect the composition of the audience,
78. Id. at 777.
79. Id. at 771.
80. Supra note 64, at 162.
81. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750 n. 28.
82. Id. at 770.
83. Id.
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and the differences between radio and television, and
perhaps closed circuit transmission, may also be relevant."
These questions Justice Brennan raised six years ago have not
been answered. No broadcaster has challenged the non-renewal of his
license by the Commission because of indecent material in its pro-
gramming. As a consequence, neither the courts of appeal, nor the
Supreme Court have had the opportunity to say what Pacifica means
besides the Commission's finding "that the Carlin [radio] monologue
was indecent as broadcast.""5 What has captured judicial attention in
the years since Pacifica has been child pornography.
III. CHILDREN AS ACTORS
Child pornography, the visual or printed depiction of a minor
child engaged in explicit sexual conduct, became the subject of govern-
ment attention after disclosures of a widespread market in 1977
revealed the inadequacy of existing legislation." Federal and state
obscenity laws did not reach the producers of child pornography, only
its distributors. 7 Moreover, "punishment [of distributors] under
obscenity statutes was not severe enough to reflect the aggravating
circumstances of child abuse involved in child pornography."' Fur-
thermore, state sexual offense and child abuse statutes did not reach
the producers of child pornography, because they failed to apply to
the abusive acts involved and the penalties they provided were too
weak." As a consequence, federal and state legislation was enacted
"to protect children directly from physical abuse in pornography and
indirectly by suppressing obscene material that might encourage fur-
ther abuse ... ."' by imposing criminal liability on all the participants
in the child pornography system. The following analysis will examine
these federal and state child pornography statutes and then turn its
attention to the Supreme Court's child pornography decision, New York
84. Id. at 750.
85. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 735, 755, 756.
86. Note, Child Pornography: A New Role for the Obscenity Doctrine, 1978 U.
ILL. L.F. 711, 713-15 (1978).
87. Virtually all child pornography is obscene under current standards. S. Rep.
No. 438, 95th Cong. 1st Sess., 12 (1978).
88. Note, Child Pornography: A New Role for the Obscenity Doctrine, supra
note 86, at 715.
89. Id. See also Comment, Protection of Children from Use in Pornography:
Toward Constitutional and Enforceable Legislation, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 295, 302 (1979).
90. Moore, Child Pornography, the First Amendment, and the Media: The Con-
stitutionality of Super-Obscenity Laws, 4 COMMIENT 125 (1978-79).
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v. Ferber,9 the cases that preceded it and the impact it has had on
trial and appellate courts.
Child Pornography Legislation
The federal Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation
Act of 197792 regulates the interstate aspects of child pornography
in two ways. First, the statute regulates conduct involved in the
solicitation-production of child pornography without regard to its
obscenity. Section 2251 forbids parents and other persons from employ-
ing children as models for the production of sexually explicit material
for interstate shipment. 3 Section 2254, more broadly applicable, makes
punishable the "causing of a minor to engage in sexual conduct for
commercial exploitation." '94 Second, section 2252 regulates distributors
by prohibiting obscene child pornography from being shipped in
interstate commerce and received for distribution and sale. 5
State statutes, like the federal act, usually contain 'production
offenses' that directly regulate the conduct of those who solicit or
procure children, and 'dissemination offenses' which "attempt to curb
sexual abuse [indirectly] by dampening economic supply and demand
for sexual depictions of children."" This state legislation is not based
on any uniform act. 7 Consequently, there are considerable variations
in the use of an obscenity standard in state child pornography statutes.
Figure 3 presents four types of state statutes with examples of each.
States like Illinois (#1) apply an obscenity definition to both
solicitation-production and distribution activities. States like Florida
(#2) follow the federal statute and dispense with an obscenity stan-
dard for solicitation-production offenses, but impose one on distribu-
tion offenses." However, no state reverses this approach (#3). States
like New York and Kentucky (#4) dispense with an obscenity require-
ment for all child pornography offenses.w These statutes prohibit all
91. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
92. P. L. No. 95-225, 92 Stat. 7 (1978).
93. 18 U.S.C. S 2251 (1978).
94. 18 U.S.C. S 2423 (1978). Section 2243 also amended the Mann Act to cover
males.
95. 18 U.S.C. S 2252 (1978).
96. Note, Child Pornography: A New Role for the Obscentity Doctrine, supra,
note 86, at 725-26.
97. Note, Child Pornography Legislation, 17 J. FAM. L. 505, 531 (1978-79).
98. Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, S 11-20a (Supp. 1978). Now repealed and replaced
by S 11-20.1.
99. Fla. Stat. Ann. S 847.014 (Supp. 1978). Now repealed and replaced by
S 847.071.
100. Ky. Rev. Stat. SS 531.300-.370 (Supp. 1978) and N.Y. Penal Law SS 263.00-.25
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speech that contains explicit sexual depictions of children. However,
the statutes which incorporate an obscenity requirement (#1 & 2) often
define it in terms of variable obscenity. 1 ' As one commentator
explained: "[U]se of the variable obscenity provision seems the only
possible way to arrive at a finding of obscenity for material that
depicts children . . ., because [it is the sexually deviant pedophile not]
the average adult presumably [who] would . . find sexual depictions
of children appealing to his prurient interest."' '
FIGURE 3
USE OF OBSCENITY DEFINITIONS IN CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
STATUTES
Application to
Solicitation & Production
Offenses
Yes No
Application Yes
to
Distribution No
Offenses
Child Pornography Decisions
Were these child pornography statutes constitutional? In four
early cases, state statutes were challenged primarily on first amend-
ment and due process grounds. In two of these cases the defendants
claimed that the statutes were vague and that they were also over-
broad, because they contained no obscenity requirement for produc-
tion offenses.
In a Florida case, Griffin v. State,"° the defendant pled no con-
test to charges of procuring and using a minor in the production of
obscene photographs. On appeal he contended that the Florida Statute
(McKinney Supp. 1978).
101. Variable obscenity evaluates the sexual depictions of children or other
susceptible groups including sexually deviant pedophiles when it appears from the
character of the material or the circumstances of its distribution to be directed at
such audiences.
102. Note, Child Pornography: A New Role for the Obscenity Doctrine, supra
note 86.
103. 396 So.2d 152 (Fla. 1981).
1 2
Illinois Florida
3 4
NY & KY
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847.014, which made it unlawful "to procure a minor to perform
or participate in any photograph, motion picture, exhibition, show,
representation or other production, in whole or in part, which depicts
sexual conduct, sexual excitement, or sadomasochistic abuse [and to
produce same] involving a minor," was void for vagueness. °4 The
Florida Supreme Court held "the statute is impervious to attack on
grounds of vagueness, as a person of common intelligence has adequate
notice of the conduct proscribed."'' 5 The court also dismissed the argu-
ment that the material could not be found obscene, because the statute
failed to incorporate the Miller test: "the statute . . .does not pro-
scribe constitutionally protected speech or activities, but
specific conduct relating to minors.""' 6 Since the statute had been con-
stitutionally applied, the court found the defendant did not have stand-
ing to challenge the statute for overbreadth. 7
In a Kentucky case, Payne v. Commonwealth,"' the defendant had
been convicted of sodomy, sexual abuse, and using a minor in a sexual
performance."' On appeal, he contended that the prohibition in
Kentucky Revised Statutes 531.310 on "the use of minors in actual
or simulated 'acts of ... homosexuality or lesbianism' [was] unconstitu-
tionally vague,""' because it was unclear whether the activity pro-
hibited included "such seemingly innocuous activity as 'two females
embracing or two males standing with their arms around each
other.' ""' The Supreme Court of Kentucky replied: "[tihe definitional
section [of the statute] read as a whole, coupled with a reference to
any standard dictionary should provide the ordinary person of com-
mon sense a clear enough indication of the type of acts prohibited.""'
The Court then went on to consider the appellant's argument that
the statute was overbroad because it prohibited constitutionally pro-
tected conduct. The Court distinguished between statutes in terms
of the degree of constitutional scrutiny protecting a minor from actual
104. Fla. Stat. S 847.014 (1977).
105. Griffin, 396 So. 2d at 154.
106. Id. at 155.
107. Id. at 155-56.
108. 523 S.W.2d 867 (Ky. 1981).
109. In Payne the defendant had been convicted in Fayette Circuit Court of
sodomy, sexual abuse, and using a minor in a sexual performance. "Seven of the twenty
counts of using a minor in a sexual performance [were] predicated upon appellant's
act of videotaping a sexual performance by boys under the age of sixteen years. The
remaining thirteen counts . . . [were] predicated upon appellant's act of taking
photographs of a juvenile less than sixteen years of age engaged in sexual conduct."
Id. at 869.
110. Id. at 871. (Quoting Ky. Rev. Stat. S 531.310 (1978)).
111. Id.
112. Id.
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use in a sexual performance and those dealing with the distribution
of materials portraying those sexual performances. Statutes such as
K.R.S. 531.310 which "protect children from the conduct of being used
in a sexual performance""' 3 do not give rise to free speech considera-
tions involved in the sale of child pornography."' As a consequence,
"[a]ny overbreadth problems must be considered then in light of the
less favored position of conduct in the constitutional framework."'' 5
Erznoznick required that the statute's "deterrent effect on legitimate
expression [must be] both real and substantial.""' Applying the Erz-
noznick test, the court concluded that "[any deterrent effect on
legitimate expression" of the photographed and videotaped conduct
of minors engaged in sexual performances could "not be said to be
real and substantial." 7
These two decisions by the Florida and Kentucky Supreme
Courts suggested that the procurement and production offenses of
state statutes were not susceptible to vagueness and overbreadth
challenges, because the statutes gave adequate notice to a person of
common intelligence and the proscribed conduct was not protected
speech. At the same time, two other state statutes which made
distribution an offense were challenged in federal court on first amend-
ment and due process ground with different results.
In a Texas case, Graham v. Hill,"8 a movie theatre and bookstore
manager was prosecuted for violating the Texas Penal Code, section
43.25 which made it unlawful for a person to sell, distribute, or possess
for sale or distribution "any motion picture or photograph showing
a person younger than 17 years of age observing or engaging in sex-
ual conduct.""' 9 The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment
on the grounds of the statute's unconstitutional overbreadth. The
federal district court granted the motion. Section 43.25 was overbroad,
because it failed to include "the most basic requirement-that... the
photograph or motion picture be obscene. (citations omitted) As a
result. . .its deterrent effect on protected conduct is both real and
substantial, especially considering the severe sanctions for violation
of the statute.' 20
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 872.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. 444 F. Supp. 584 (W. D. Tex. 1978).
119. Tex. Penal Code Ann. S 43.25(a) (Vernon 1977) (statute amended in 1979).
120. Graham, 444 F. Supp. at 592, 593.
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In a New York case, St. Martin's Press v. Carey,2' the state
legislature had passed a child pornography statute which contained
both production and dissemination offenses. Section 263.15 made it
unlawful "to promote a sexual performance by a child when... he
produces, directs, or promotes any performance which includes sex-
ual conduct by a child less than sixteen years of age.""' Shortly before
its effective date, St. Martin's requested an injunction against its
enforcement. The publisher claimed that section 263.15 would prohibit
their publication, distribution, advertisement, and sale of the book
Show Me!, because it was unconstitutionally broad. St. Martin's claimed
that Show Me! was not obscene, but that section 263.15 would pro-
hibit its publication. The publisher argued that the statute ap-
plied to motion pictures or photographs of children involved in sex-
ual conduct whether or not they were obscene. 3 St. Martin's also
claimed that section 263.15 was unconstitutional, because it was a
denial of due process. New York, the publisher claimed, may prevent,
its children from being exploited, but that purpose had no rational
application to Show Me!, because the book was produced in Germany
between 1969 and 1973.124
The district court granted the preliminary injunction, because
of the statute's apparent overbreadth12' and because the book which
clearly fell within the statute might be protected first amendment
speech,"26 and as a consequence, its removal from the marketplace
would cause irreparable harm to the publisher's constitutional rights."
The court was, however, more persuaded by the publisher's due
process argument. It agreed that New York could not make criminal
"the dissemination of photographs of children taken outside the United
States some years before the effective date of the statute.""' On
appeal, the decision was reversed, because the Second Circuit found
that the suit did not involve a case or controversy where there was
a lack of state prosecutorial activity 129 and the book did not come
within the statutory language for due process reasons. 'We fail to
see," the Court of Appeals concluded, "how the New York legislature
has any legitimate concern with German children in the years before
1973 .. .
121. 605 F.2d 41 (2nd Cir. 1979), 440 F. Supp. 1196 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
122. N.Y. Penal Law S 263.15 (Consol. 1977).
123. 440 F. Supp. at 1199 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1206.
126. Id. at 1205.
127. Id. at 1203.
128. Id. at 1205.
129. 605 F.2d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 1979).
130. Id. at 44.
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New York v. Ferber
When the United States Supreme Court considered the child por-
nography issue for the first time, the major constitutional issue was
whether a state "consistent with the First Amendment [could] pro-
hibit the dissemination of material which shows children engaged in
sexual conduct regardless of whether the material is obscene.""' The
case, New York v. Ferber, involved a bookstore owner who had been
convicted of promoting the sexual performance of a child under the
same statute that had been at issue in St. Martin's Press: section
263.15.132 Ferber had argued that the statute was unconstitutionally
overbroad, because it did not contain a requirement that the child's
performance be obscene.'33 This time, however, the overbreadth
challenge came before the state supreme court with a different result.
The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction because the
statute would "in many, if not all, cases prohibit the promotion of
materials which are traditionally entitled to constitutional protection
from government interference under the First Amendment."" On ap-
peal, the United States Supreme Court reversed the judgment
unanimously.' 5
Justice White, writing for the Court, first identified the state's
interest in regulating child pornography. "The state's interest in
'safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor' is
'compelling.""' Prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse of children,
he said, "constitutes a governmental objective of surpassing
importance.""' 7 The New York statute's regulation of distribution was
an appropriate means to promote the state's interest. "The advertis-
ing and selling of child pornography provides an economic motive for
... [its] production. . . .,,,3 Moreover, its distribution "is intrinsically
related to the sexual abuse of children [, because]. . .the materials
produced are a permanent record of the children's participation and
the harm to the child is exacerbated by their circulation."1 9 At the
131. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 754.
132. People v. Ferber, 96 Misc.2d 669, 409 N.Y.S.2d 632, 634 (N.Y. Sup.Ct. 1978).
133. 52 N.Y.2d 674, 677, 422 N.E.2d 523, 524, 525 (N.Y. 1981).
134. 422 N.E.2d at 525.
135. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). A majority opinion written by Justice White
was joined by four members of the Court: Chief Justice Berger and Justices O'Connor,
Powell, and Rehnquist. Separate concurrences were written by Justice Brennan join-
ed by Marshall, Justice Stevens, and Justice O'Connor. Justice Blackmun concurred
in the result.
136. Id. at 756, 757.
137. Id. at 757.
138. Id. at 761.
139. Id at 759.
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same time, the value of permitting children to appear in pornographic
films and photographs was "exceedingly modest, if not deminimus."''
In these circumstances, where the evil to be restricted "so overwhelm-
ingly outweighs the expressive interests, if any at stake," a content-
based classification was permissible."' Justice White concluded:
When a definable class of material, such as that covered
by § 263.15, bears so heavily and pervasively on the welfare
of children engaged in its production, we think the balance
of competing interests is clearly struck and that it is per-
missible to consider these materials as without the protec-
tion of the First Amendment."2
How could child pornography be regulated? Justice White found
that the Miller obscenity standard could not be used, because it was
an output-oriented standard which focused on the harm the material
posed to society and not an input-oriented standard which applied to
the psychological harm inflicted on the child. As he stated concisely:
[Tihe question under the Miller test of whether a work,
taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest [or is
patently offensive to] the average person bears no connec-
tion to the issue of whether the child has been physically
or psychologically harmed in the production of the work
.... It is [also] irrelevant to the [abused] child ... whether
or not the material... has a literary, artistic, political, or
social value.'4
Miller's community standard test was also inapplicable to the evalua-
tion of child pornography. "It would be equally unrealistic to equate
a community's toleration for sexually oriented material with the per-
missible scope of legislation aimed at protecting children from sexual
exploitation."'"
Child pornography would be judged by a separate four-part test:
(1) adequate definition of the offensive sexual conduct, (2) visual depic-
tion, (3) the minority of the subject, and (4) the knowledge of the defen-
dant. According to Justice White, "the conduct to be prohibited must
be adequately defined by the state law [,J . . .limited to works that
visually depict sexual conduct by children below a specified age [, and
with] ...some element of scienter on the part of the defendant."'145
140. Id. at 762.
141. Id. at 763, 764.
142. Id. at 764.
143. Id at 761.
144. Id. at 761 n.12.
145. Id. at 764, 765.
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The New York child pornography statute met this test. The con-
duct and context were sufficiently limited. Section 263.15 forbade the
performance by a minor of "actual or simulated sexual intercourse,
deviate sexual intercourse, sexual bestiality, masturbation,
sadomasochistic abuse, or lewd exhibition of the genitals .... [in] any
play, motion picture, photograph or dance, or any other visual per-
formance exhibited before an audience."'"" The statute also forbade
the knowing promotion of "sexual performances by a child under the
age of sixteen by distributing material which depicts such
performances.'
47
What remained to be addressed was the claim that the statute
was unconstitutionally overbroad, because it prohibited the distribu-
tion of medical and educational materials that portrayed adolescent
sex in a non-obscene manner. In response, Justice White said that
where conduct and not merely speech is involved, Broadrick v.
Oklahoma'" had held that "the overbreadth of a statute must not on-
ly be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's
plainly legitimate sweep."'' Applying Broadrick, he said that Ferber
was "the paradigmatic case of a state statute whose legitimate reach
dwarfs its arguably impermissible applications."" Section 263.15 might
forbid the distribution of material with serious literary, scientific, or
educational value, but "these arguably impermissible applications
[would] amount to [no] more than a tiny fraction of the material within
the statute's reach.""' As a consequence, section 263.15 was not
substantially overbroad."'
In sum, Ferber upheld a New York and Kentucky-type child por-
nography statute" which dispenses with the obscenity requirement
for the promotion and distribution of visual child pornography. What
then of the Miller standard of obscenity? Miller v. California remains
applicable to all obscene sexual representations of children in books,
magazines, pamphlets, and oral recordings, but not visual materials.54
However, the concurring opinions in Ferber suggest that the Court
146. Id. at 751.
147. Id. at 749.
148. 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
149. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 770 (Quoting Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613).
150. Id. at 773.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. See Figure 3 in text, at 456.
154. Note, Child Pornography: A New Exception to the First Amendment-New
York v. Ferber, 10 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 684, 696-97 (1983).
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did not necessarily dispose of the Miller LAPS test when it decided
that overbreadth challenges to child pornography statutes must meet
Broadrick's demanding real and substantial test. Justice O'Connor
stated: "the Court does not hold that New York must accept material
with serious literary, scientific, or educational value."'55 Justice
Brennan, joined by Marshall, went even further when he said: "depic-
tions of children that in themselves do have serious literary, artistic,
scientific, or medical value, would not violate the First Amendment. ''
Justice Stevens, however, saw no reason for the Court to discuss the
matter, because there had been no claim that the material at issue
in Ferber had any socially redeeming value. 7 In spite of these reserva-
tions, the Ferber child pornography test would be likely to dispose
of almost all first amendment overbreadth and vagueness challenges.
The decision did not, however, directly address two issues raised in
pre-Ferber cases: the privacy rights of parents and adults and the
due process right implicated by the exercise of the state's police power
on behalf of children in foreign jurisdictions. 8
155. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 774 (O'Connor concurring).
156. Id. at 776 (Brennan with Marshall concurring).
157. Id. at 777 (Stevens concurring).
158. Two prosecutions under the federal Protection of Children Against Sexual
Abuse Act of 1978, 18 U.S.C. 2423, 2251-53, will not be examined in the text but briefly
mentioned here.
U.S. v. Langford, 688 F.2d 1088 (7th Cir. 1982) involved the issue of whether
a prosecution under section 2252 was properly venued in the sending state and the
jury was properly instructed to apply that state's community standard. The Seventh
Circuit rejected the appellant's argument that the community standards of the receiv-
ing jurisdiction should apply, because it interpreted the appellants argument as an
attack on the validity of the venue statute for federal obscenity cases, 18 U.S.C. S
3237(a) which "authorizes federal obscenity cases to be venued in either the sending
jurisdiction, the receiving jurisdiction, or in any jurisdiction through which the mailed
obscenity moves." Id. at 1094. The court found that this expansive view of section
3237(a) reflected a congressional interest "in protecting minors in ... each and every
aspect of the illicit pornographic scheme" to which the Supreme Court had given its
support in Ferber (458 U.S. at 1095).
U.S. v. Nemuras, 567 F. Supp. 87 (D.Md. 1983) involved the issue of whether
sexually explicit photographs, here defined as lewd exhibition of the genitals in sec-
tion 2253, were taken with the knowledge that they would be distributed in interstate
commerce in violation of section 2251. The court found that the evidence was clear
that the photographs were distributed in interstate commerce. Therefore, the "sole
issue" was whether the photographs were lewd. "In the court's view . . . lewd
photographs of children [were] those in which the child is depicted as half or partially
clothed, posed in such a way as to depict or suggest a willingness to engage in sexual
activity or a sexually coy attitude." Id. at 89. The court then found that the photographs
fit within its definition and upheld the defendant's conviction. Id. at 90.
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Impact of Ferber
State child pornography prosecutions have continued since Ferber.
Defendants in these cases have continued to raise overbreadth,
vagueness, substantive due process, and right to privacy arguments.
What impact Ferber has had will be examined at two levels: first at
the trial court level in Kentucky in the distribution case of Com-
monwealth v. Mikesell"9 and at the state appellate court level in one
distribution case, People v. Enea,6' and two production cases: State
v. Shuck61 and State v. Jordan."'
a. In Trial Court
What is the impact of Ferber at the trial court level in a jurisdic-
tion with a child pornography statute analogous to New York's? A
Kentucky prosecution for the distribution of child pornography,
Commonwealth v. Mikesell," will serve as an illustration. In Mikesell,
the Lexington-Fayette Urban County police had established a fictitious
organization, the Kentucky Adolescent Center (KyAC) to identify per-
sons involved in child pornography." In its letters to suspects, KyAC
was presented as a non-profit clearing house for putting members in
touch with each other for the purpose of producing, trading, and sell-
ing child pornography.' The defendant, Donald Mikesell, responded
to the solicitation and in a meeting in a local hotel room agreed to
loan an undercover police detective his collection of magazines,
photographs, and films.' A month later, Mikesell wrote the detec-
tive complaining that he had received no material from him in
exchange for the loan, asking for the return of his material, and an
end to their relationship.' 7 Instead, a prosecution was initiated under
the Kentucky child pornography statute which prohibits the "distribu-
tion of matter portraying a sexual performance of a minor.""' Mikesell
159. Comm. v. Mikesell, No. 83-CR-208 Fayette Cir. Ct., Ky. June 8, 1983
(Angellucci, J.) (order overruling defendant motion to dismiss the indictment on con-
stitutional grounds).
160. 665 P.2d 1026 (Colo. 1983).
161. 661 P.2d 1020 (Wash. App. 1983).
162. 665 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1983).
163. Mikesell (court's order), No. 83-CR-208.
164. Id. at 2.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 3.
167. Id.
168. Ky. Rev. Stat. S 531.340(1) (1978). The Kentucky child pornography statute
which prohibits "distribution of matter portraying a sexual performance of a minor"
provides in relevant part:
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did not dispute that the material portrayed "a sexual performance
by a minor" as the phrase was used in the statute, 9 but in his attempt
to dismiss the charges challenged the statute on constitutional grounds:
its overbreadth and its intrusion on his right to privacy.
The Fayette Circuit Court first turned its attention to the defen-
dant's two overbreadth arguments. Mikesell argued that under K.R.S.
531.300(1), distribution required the "transfer of possession" of the
materials. " However, the statute was inapplicable here, because his
"loan" of material was not commercial distribution, but merely a
transfer of custody, "a non-commercial delivery for temporary
examination.''. Mikesell also argued that K.R.S. 531.300(1) could only
protect Kentucky minors from involvement in the production of por-
nography. Here, however, the statute was overbroad, because "the
pictures were taken of persons outside Kentucky and at a time prior
to the enactment (in 1978) of K.R.S. 531.300."'' His "loan" of a pic-
ture "long since produced, duplicated, sold, and circulated about the
country ... " he concluded, "did not make it a more or less perma-
nent record.'' 3
The Court dismissed the defendant's overbreadth arguments. The
loan of the material was a transfer of possession as defined by K.R.S.
500.080(14), because it involved a transfer of "actual physical posses-
sion . . .or control over a tangible object." 174 No transfer of interest
in property was required. Therefore, when the defendant transferred
possession, it was an act in violation of the statute."' The Court also
found unpersuasive, in light of Ferber, the defendant's argument that
he loaned material produced outside Kentucky. In Ferber, the Supreme
Court had concluded: 'it is often impossible to determine where such
A person is guilty of distribution of matter portraying a sexual performance of a minor
when, having knowledge of its content and character, he:
(a) sends or causes to be sent into this state for sale or distribution; or
(b) brings or causes to be brought into this state for sale or distribution; or
(c) in this state, he: (1) exhibits for profit or gain; or (2) distributes; or (3) offers to
distribute; or (4) has in his possession with the intent to distribute, exhibit for profit
or gain or offer to distribute, any matter portraying a sexual performance by a minor.
169. Ky. Rev. Stat. S 531.300(4), (6) (1978).
170. Mikesell, No. 83-CR-208 at 5 (Memorandum for Defendant on Consitutional
Issues).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 8.
173. Id. at 23.
174. Mikesell (court order), 83-CR-208 at 4.
175. Id.
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material is produced' ....,"' Ferber also held that since child por-
nography is not protected by the first amendment, "a state is not
barred from prohibiting the distribution of unprotected material pro-
duced outside the state."'177 Moreover, the circuit court dismissed as
irrelevant the defendant's contention that the films and photographs
were several years old. A principal concern of the Court in Ferber
had been to uphold a state statute similar to Kentucky's in order to
prohibit the continued circulation of the "permanent record" of the
child's act in the mass distribution system of child pornography for
years after the photographs were taken.17
The Fayette Circuit Court then turned its attention to Mikesell's
two privacy claims. The defendant argued that his loan of materials
was protected by his federal right to privacy. Stanley v. Georgia's
right to possess obscene materials applied to him, because 'a hotel
is for these purposes the same as a house." '179 Moreover, his loan of
the material was not affected by the limitation of the right to receive
after Stanley.
In every case limiting the application of Stanley, there was
a public element present .... None of these elements are
present here. None of the post-Stanley cases have so limited
its holding to permit states to constitutionally outlaw a
private not-for-consideration loan of any form of com-
municative materials from one individual to another, con-
ducted at a location in which the lender had a reasonable
expectation of privacy. 8 °
Mikesell also argued that he was protected by the state's right to
privacy announced in Commonweath v. Campbell' which went beyond
the First Amendment rights under the Federal Constitution.'82 This
right, he argued, extended to his circumstances, because
Commonwealth v. Smith" made it clear that friends sharing their vices
together are entitled to the same protection as an individual acting
privately in his home."'"
176. Id. at 5 (Quoting Ferber, 458 U.S. at 766 n. 19 (1982)).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 5, 8.
179. Mikesell (defendant's memorandum), 83-CR-208 at 16 (citing Stanley, 394
U.S. 557, 565 (1969)).
180. Id. at 26.
181. 133 KY. 50, 117 S.W. 383 (Ky.App. 1909).
182. Mikesell (defendant's memorandum), 83-CR-208 at 17.
183. 163 KY. 227, 173 S.W. 340, (Ky.App. 1915).
184. Mikesell (defendant's memorandum), 83-CR-208 at 17.
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The Court dismissed Mikesell's federal right to privacy claim on
two grounds. First, Stanley held that mere possession of obscene
materials in one's own home could not be made a crime. The defen-
dant's behavior involved more than mere possession. "[T]he defendant
expected to be able to 'borrow' another's collection of child por-
nography in return for the loan. This could arguably constitute 'con-
sideration' for the loan which would further remove it from the
category of 'mere possession'."'" The Court then concluded that Ferber
had approved state regulation of the defendant's activity, because
"[l]oans made to individuals for the purpose of copying child por-
nography give the 'permanent record' of the child's act wider circula-
tion for years after the original photograph was taken."'" Second, the
Court found that Stanley had not dealt with child pornography. Ferber
had, however, "ruled that child pornography is not protected by the
First Amendment if it involves scienter and the category is suitably
limited and described to include only visual depictions of sexual con-
duct by children."18 ' Thus the court concluded that Ferber would not
allow a defendant's right to privacy to frustrate the government's com-
pelling interest in preventing the sexual exploitation of children.'88
Then the court turned to the defendant's state privacy claim. It was
"not unmindful" that Kentucky had a broader right to privacy than
under the federal constitution, but it found that the defendant's argu-
ment was "grounded primarily on cases which the Court finds inap-
plicable . . . [because] the Kentucky legislature has recently shown
its concern about the protection of children by the passage of the
statute in question."
1 89
b. .In Appellate Courts
The Mikesell case never went to trial; the defendant accepted
a plea bargain. In the aftermath of Ferber, many other child por-
nography cases have probably been disposed of in a similar manner.
Appeals in cases where the defendant was tried and convicted have
raised overbreadth and privacy issues similar to those examined in
Mikesell. They have been rejected in all three reported state cases
which will be discussed below.
185. Mikesell (court's order), 83-CR-208 at 8.
186. Id.
187. Id. (Quoting Ferber, 458 U.S. at 758 (1982)).
188. Id. at 7-8.
189. Id. at 9.
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In the only distribution case, People v. Enea,9' the defendant
claimed on appeal that Colorado statute, section 18-6-403' 9' denied him
due process, because it was vague. The Colorado Supreme Court
dismissed the challenge, because Enea's "bald assertion of vagueness"
was insufficient "to overcome the presumption of constitutionality to
which the statute is entitled."'92 The Court then turned to the defen-
dant's principal argument: the statute was overbroad, because it pro-
hibited his participation in the sale of non-obscene photographic
materials. Ferber, the Court said, was dispositive: these materials were
unprotected by the first amendment.'9 3 Since the defendant had made
no claim that the materials had artistic, educational, medical, or scien-
tific value, the Court also found it unnecessary to reach the over-
breadth issue.'
In State v. Shuck," the first of two production cases decided since
Ferber, the defendant argued on appeal that the Washington child
pornography statute, chapter 9.68A 1' was unconstitutionally overbroad
on its face, because "the preparation of educational materials depict-
ing non-obscene adolescent sex falls within the ambit of the statute."'"
The Washington Court of Appeals answered: Ferber made it clear that
"given the overriding governmental concern for the physiological,
emotional, and mental health of the children involved,"'99 the child por-
nography statute did not violate the first amendment under the
substantial overbreadth rule of Broaderick,'99 because it proscribed
works of serious educational value.2 0
The other production case, State v. Jordan,2' 1 involved a challenge
to the constitutionality of Utah statute, section 76-10-1206.5. 202 The
Supreme Court of Utah dismissed the defendant's three constitutional
challenges. First, the Court rejected the argument that the state had
no right to prohibit acts which were not obscene under the Miller
test.2 3 Ferber had rejected the Miller standard and then created its
own four-part test for child pornography. Judged by the Ferber stan-
190. 665 P.2d 1026.
191. Colo. Rev. Stat. S 18-6-403 (Supp. 1980).
192. Enea, 665 P.2d at 1027.
193. Id. at 1028.
194. Id.
195. Shuck, 661 P.2d at 1020 (Wash.App. 1983).
196. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. S 9.68A (1981).
197. Shuck, 661 P.2d at 1022.
198. Id.
199. 413 U.S. 601'(1973).
200. Shuck, 661 P.2d at 1022.
201. Jordan, 665 P.2d 1280.
202. Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-12065 (Supp. 1981).
203. Jordan, 665 P.2d at 1283.
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dard, the Utah statute was not substantially overbroad. 20 4 Second, the
Court rejected the claim that the statute invaded the right of privacy
of consenting people in their homes. This broad reading of Stanley
v. Georgia,0 5 the Court said, was a "sophistic argument [that] ignores
the fact that we are not dealing with two consenting adults in the
privacy of their own home."206 Here the right to privacy could not
frustrate the state's compelling interest in protecting minors against
sexual exploitation. Third, the Court rejected the claim that the
statutory phrase "simulated sexual conduct" was so vague as to deny
the defendants due process, because the phrase was sufficiently
defined by the statute to warn of the proscribed conduct.
21
c. Conclusions
This brief survey of post-Ferber cases suggests the following ten-
tative conclusions about state child pornography statutes. Courts are
unlikely to be receptive to vagueness challenges to either production
or distribution offenses. Overbreadth challenges will meet with a
similar reception. Courts are unlikely to accept a narrow construc-
tion of the distribution offense which would exclude a "loan" of child
pornography. Loans are part of the network of commercial distribu-
tion. State power to control child pornography produced in other
jurisdictions, challenged before Ferber on due process grounds, will
now be rejected on overbreadth grounds. States are not prohibited
from suppressing the distribution of unprotected material. Overbreadth
challenges to both production and distribution offenses based on the
claim that the child pornography at issue is non-obscene under Miller
will be rejected, unless the defendant makes a claim that the material
has educational, medical, or scientific value. Privacy claims by pro-
ducers and distributors will not shelter the sexual exploitation of
minors. Stanley continues to be narrowly construed. Post-Ferber courts
have said that Stanley protects the use of obscene material by con-
senting adults, not the production of child pornography. Stanley also
protects merely possession in one's home, it does not extend to the
right to receive borrowed or loaned materials, because they are part
of the scheme of commercial distribution.
CONCLUSIONS
What is the current status of laws regulating the sexual exploita-
tion of children in the pornographic marketplace? Participation of
204. Jordan, 665 P.2d at 1284.
205. 393 U.S. 557 (1969).
206. Jordan, 665 P.2d at 1285.
207. Jordan, 665 P.2d at 1285-86.
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children in the creation of visual child pornography will be judged
by the Ferber four-part test. Distribution will be judged differently
depending upon the subject and form of the material. If it is visual
child pornography, irrespective of the identity of its intended audience,
it will also be judged by the Ferber test. If it is distributed to children
in the form of books, magazines, or movies then Ginsberg and
Erznoznick hold that it must be obscene for children. If, however,
the material is broadcast by radio and children are likely to be in
the audience, then Pacifica holds it need be merely indecent to be
prohibited, but not necessarily indecent to children.
How has the Supreme Court's response to the sexual exploita-
tion of children affected the legal interests of the participants? There
is no adult, parental, or child right (as defined by Models 2, 3, and
4) to produce or distribute child pornography. Adults have no right
to exploit those persons incapable of consent, nor do parents have
any authority to abuse minor children entrusted to their care. Only
the Model 1 governmental interest based on the parens patriae and
police powers to insure the well-being of children has been recognized
by the Court. With obscenity legislation, the Court has recognized
that an adult's right to distribute and receive protected materials
under Model 2 differs from a child's right under Model 4. A parent
has the discretion under Model 3 to purchase obscene material for
their children, but none in the receipt of indecent broadcast material.
Model 1 governmental interests in the protection of the child and
parental assistance have justified a different standard for the sale
of obscene material to minors under Model 4 and a restriction on
parental discretion under Model 3 in the receipt of indecent broad-
cast material. However, as Erznoznick and Pacifica make clear, the
Court has yet to confront the implications of that choice for Model
4 adult rights on the public streets and in the broadcast media.
In conclusion, the Burger Court has created two-child based
exceptions to the obscenity doctrine since Miller, but with entirely
different results. Two years after Ferber, there are few unanswered
questions about the constitutional status of child pornography statutes.
Only the issue of whether child pornography may have scientific,
medical, or educational value remains to be examined. Six years after
the Pacifica decision, the opposite circumstance prevails. Justice
Brennan's questions remain to be answered by the Commission and
the Court. Consequently, no one knows the meaning of a broadcast
indecency standard, nor what action the FCC may take to protect
the interests of children in the audience.
[Vol. 19
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BROADCAST ADVERTISING UNDER INDIANA'S
NEW ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY RULES
WILLIAM R. BUCKLEY*
Since the days of caveat emptor the American consumer has con-
templated advertisements with considerable suspicion.1 At the turn
of the century advertising practices were so thoroughly perverted by
dishonestly and misrepresentations2 that the ABA elected in 1908 to
prohibit attorneys from commercializing the profession.' During subse-
quent decades significant protective legislation has purified advertis-
ing endeavors so that "let the buyer beware" has been slowly
superseded by a spirit of "let the seller be fair." As moral turpitude
gradually has been expunged from commercials, lawyers have
cautiously waded into the shallower advertising waters. Since Bates
v. State Bar of Arizona' many states have amended their ethical man-
dates to accommodate broadcast advertising. In January 1984, Indiana
joined this continuing trend by authorizing attorneys to utilize televi-
sion commercials.5
Despite the promising prospects of these new modifications, many
lawyers appraise broadcast commercials with consternation comparable
to the Celtic horror of Grendel in the Beowulf legend. Past abuses
in the advertising industry have etched cavernous skepticism in the
* A.B., Indiana University, 1980; J.D., Indiana University, 1983. Partner,
Buckley, Buckley, & Buckley, Lafayette, Indiana.
1. R. ANDERSON & T. BARRY, ADVERTISING MANAGEMENT 478 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as ANDERSON & BARRY]; Greyser, Advertising: Attacks and Counters, 50 HARV. Bus.
REV. 22-28 (March/April 1972); Warne, Advertising: A Critic's View, 26 J. MARKETING 10-14
(Oct. 1962).
2. L. GORDON. ECONOMICS FOR CONSUMERS 184-85 (2d ed. 1944). "Untruthful and
misleading advertising probably reached its height in the early part of this century.
In 1906 it was estimated that 72 percent of newspaper advertising was doubtful and
that 32 percent was definitely objectionable." Id. at 184.
3. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 27 (1908). See also Annot., 39
A.L.R. 2d 1055, 1056-57 (1955).
4. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
5. The Indiana Supreme Court adopted the modified ethical rules on January
17, 1984. See WEST'S INDIANA CASES, 459 N.E.2d No. 1, at XXVI-XLIX (March 7, 1984);
27 RES GESTAE 588-602 (June 1984).
The amended Code is currently undergoing constitutional challenge in Wilcox
and Ogden v. Supreme Court of Indiana, No. 84-82 (S.D. Ind. filed Jan. 19, 1984). To
date the court has ruled solely on the Plaintiffs' standing to litigate. Wilcox & Ogden
v. Supreme Court of Indiana, No. 84-82 (S.D. Ind. July 12, 1984).
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psyche of the bar. However, if one entertains the beast's perspective'
advertising via the electronic media is much maligned and
misunderstood by attorneys. Commercial communication need not
become a leviathan if its users are scrupulous.
This article will examine the alterations of the Indiana Code of
Professional Responsibility within the broadcast advertising context.
Various probable consequences of the new regulations shall be posed,
and the processes through which the attorney advertiser must ven-
ture will be outlined. Finally, the author will recommend a style of
advertising that should survive ethical inspection while helping to
excavate the practice of law from the public mire of misconception
and mistrust.'
HIGHLIGHTS OF THE NEW ADVERTISING RULES
Among the Indiana Supreme Court's revisions in Canon Two
were the explicit inclusion of television as a permissible attorney
advertising medium and the deletion of geographic limitations to print
and radio commercials." No longer must lawyers limit their advertis-
ing to the regions in which they live or operate offices, or from which
the bulk of their clientele reside.' Also, attorneys must preserve a
6. See J. GARDNER, GRENDEL (1971).
7. An examination of the constitutional bases for broadcast advertising is
beyond the scope of this article. For outstanding synopses of these issues, see, e.g.,
L. ANDREWS, BIRTH OF A SALESMAN: LAWYER ADVERTISING AND SOLICITATION (rev. ed. 1981);
Whitman & Stoltenberg, The Present Constitutional Status of Lauyer Advertising-
Theoretical and Practical Implications of In Re R.M.J., 57 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 445 (1983);
Note, Attorney Advertising Over the Broadcast Media, 32 VAND. L. REV. 755 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Broadcast Media]; Annot., 30 A.L.R. 4th 742 (1984). For cases
clarifying the constitutional protections afforded attorney advertisers, see In re R.M.J.,
455 U.S. 191 (1982); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n,
436 U.S. 447 (1978); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Durham v.
Brock, 498 F. Supp. 213 (M.D. Tenn. 1980), affid without op. mem., 698 F.2d 1218 (6th
Cir. 1982). For a general analysis of the effects of broadcast advertising on the public,
see Griffin, Broadcast Advertising: What Has It Done to the Audience?, 23 WASHBURN
L.J. 237 (1984).
An excellent evaluation of current disciplinary developments has been collated
by Fisher & Watts, Professional Responsibility, in 1983 Survey of Recent Developments
in Indiana Law, 17 IND. L. REV. 283-300 (1984).
8. INDIANA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(A) (as amended
through April 18, 1984), reprinted in the INDIANA RULES OF COURT (1984) [hereinafter
cited as THE CODE].
9. Jackson, An Overview of Ethics and Professional Responsibility, in INDIANA
CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION FORUM, LAWYER ADVERTISING RULE CHANGES I-5 (1984)
[hereinafter cited as Jackson, An Overview]. The elimination of this restriction could
pose ethical dilemmas for multistate broadcasting of attorney advertisements. See infra
notes 44-56 and accompanying text.
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copy or recording of commercials for six years after dissemination
as well as a listing of dates and carriers of the advertisements."0 The
tension between the solicitation ban and advertising has been relieved
by a specific allowance for solicitation through permissible
commercials." As with prior versions the Code retains restrictions
to advertisement content and format. Commercials cannot contain
information that is "false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, self-
laudatory or unfair""2 and must be "done in a dignified manner." 3 The
scope of facts that may be included in advertisements remains con-
strained to traditional biographical data, although the new provision's
list of permissible examples of subjects for advertising offers guidelines
rather than mandates." Attorneys may now indicate that their prac-
tice involves specific areas of law. 5 However, lawyers cannot claim
specialist status except in the historically acceptable categories of
patent, trademark and admiralty law.'" The trade name prohibition
survives,' 7 presumably because the "inherently misleading" qualities
of such "catchy" or unusual firm names might be amplified through
television or radio.'8
10. THE CODE DR 2-101(E).
11. Id. DR 2-103(E).
12. Id. DR 2-101(B). These terms are defined at id. 2-101(C).
13. Id. DR 2-101(B). According to one commentator, this requirement "is so
broad and vague as to be possibly unconstitutional or otherwise incapable of enforce-
ment." Elberger, New Disciplinary Rules: As They Affect Radio & Television Advertis-
ing, in INDIANA CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION FORUM, LAWYER ADVERTISING RULE
CHANGES IV-3 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Elberger, New Disciplinary Rules].
14. THE CODE DR 2 -101(B). The list of "permissible areas" includes lawyers' or
firms' names, general fields of law practiced, birth date and place, academic
achievements, admission to state or federal bars, public offices held, military service,
bar or professional association memberships, technical or professional licenses, foreign
language ability, bank references, participation in prepaid or group legal programs,
and fee and credit arrangements. Id. DR 2-101(B)(1)-(19). One observer suggests that
the new rule "seems to leave open the possibility of [advertising] other permissible
areas. . . ." Jackson, An Overview, supra note 9, at 1-21 n.11.
15. THE CODE DR 2-104(A)(2). This provision is subject to the "fraudulent,
misleading and self-laudatory" language of DR 2-101. Id..
16. Id. DR 2-104(A)(1); Jackson, An Overview, supra note 9, at 1-3, 1-15 to -16;
McCray, Stating of Areas of Practice, in INDIANA CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION FORUM,
LAWYER ADVERTISING RULE CHANGES 111- to -4 (1984).
17. THE CODE DR 2-102(B).
18. Typically unusual firm names have been used merely to attract persons'
attention, particulary with media advertising. McGill, Traditional Methods of Communica-
tion, in INDIANA CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION FORUM, LAWYER ADVERTISING RULE
CHANGES 11-1 (1984). For a concise discussion of trade and firm names, see id. at II-1 to
-7. Trade names prohibitions have passed constitutional muster. See e.g., Friedman
v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979).
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The new Code could provide the broadcast advertiser with
greater flexibility in styling commercials. The previous prohibitions
against using photographs, pictorials, background music, or sound
effects-what this author terms pizzazz-have been deleted from
the new provisions.19 However, this does not license attorneys to
inundate the media with typical Madison Avenue hype. Such sight
and sound supplements still must be "dignified" and cannot violate
the "fraudulent, misleading and self-laudatory" language of DR 2-101.
Also, only the attorney herself or a fellow firm member may be pic-
tured within the commercial.2" The Ethical Considerations are swift
to squelch the urge to over-commercialize:
A lawyer should strive to communicate [advertised] informa-
tion without undue emphasis upon style and advertising
strategems which serve to hinder rather than facilitate
intelligent selection of counsel.
The public benefit derived from advertising depends
upon the usefulness of the information provided the com-
munity or to the segment of the community to which it is
directed. Advertising marked by excesses of content,
volume, scope, or frequency which unduly emphasized
unrepresented biographical information does not provide
that public benefit.
The non-lawyer is best served if advertisement's con-
tain no misleading information or emotional appeal.... ."
Given these precepts, attorneys are unlikely to romp about the media
like a Disney cartoon. Still, there continues to be considerable
apprehension over the prospect of "style-over-substance" attorney
advertising. The new rules forebode several probable difficulties which
the following sections shall discuss.
POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW RULES
A. The Ogre of "Pizzazz"
Most critics of lawyer advertising are quick to conjure the
unethical prospects of gimmick commercials often associated with ques-
tionable late night mail-order television lures. There have been
19. Compare THE CODE DR 2-101(B) (1983) (old rule) with THE CODE DR 2-101(B)
(1984) (current rule). See also Jackson, An Overview, supra note 9, at 1-2. See infra
notes 22-43 and accompanying text for additional discussion of pizzazz.
20. THE CODE DR 2-101(D)(4).
21. Id. EC 2-8(A), 2-10, 2-10(A).
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interesting instances in which attorneys have experimented with
unusual advertising approaches. In one television commercial a
Wisconsin lawyer donned scuba gear, emerged from a lake, and
addressed potential bankruptcy clients with a clever attention-getter:
"In over your head?"22 Other tactics have included an attorney who
drove a hearse to "dig up" probate customers and another who flew
airplane banners at football games.23 The courts have generally
disallowed gimmickry of this variety. 4
While there is little debate that blatant huckstering is inap-
propriate for lawyer advertising," the same cannot be said for the
employment of pizzazz now permitted under the amended Code.26
Objections to the use of such advertising techniques rely upon the
supposition that the potential for misrepresentation is greater with
broadcast advertising because of television's subliminal capacities and
historical overemphasis of style, as well as the transitory quality of
televised messages.27 However, there is no compelling evidence that
the introduction of pizzazz into attorney commercials is inherently
22. Middleton, The Right Way to Advertise on TV, 69 A.B.A.J. 893, 893 (1983).
23. Arthur, New Disciplinary Rules as They Affect In-Person & Third Person
Solicitation, in INDIANA CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION FORUM, LAWYER ADVERTISING RULE
CHANGES VII-5 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Arthur, Solicitation].
24. Bishop v. Committee on Professional Ethics and Conduct of Iowa State
Bar Ass'n, 521 F. Supp. 1219 (S.D. Iowa 1981), vacated & remanded on other grounds,
686 F.2d 1278 (8th Cir. 1982) (use of contrived drama and background sounds promo-
tional and thus prohibited); Eaton v. Supreme Court of Arkansas, 270 Ark. 573, 607
S.W.2d 55 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 966 (1981) (advertising in discount coupon booklets
impermissible); In re Duffy, 19 A.D.2d 177, 242 N.Y.S.2d 665 (1963) (use of neon signs
at law offices disciplinary violation); In re Petition for Rule of Court Governing Lawyer
Advertising, 564 S.W.2d 638 (Tenn. 1978) (advertising by handbills, circulars, or billboards
prohibited); In re Utah State Bar Petition for Approval of Changes in Disciplinary
Rules on Advertising, 647 P.2d 991 (Utah 1982) (state restrictions against advertising
by billboards or promotional items such as inscribed matchbooks, pens, and pencils,
held constitutional); THE CODE EC 2-8, 2-8(A); Arthur, Solicitation, supra note 23, at VII-3
VII-5, VII-12 to -13.
25. The authorities generally concur. See, e.g., Bishop, 521 F. Supp. at 1219
(adjectives such as "cut-rate, lowest, give-away, below-cost," and "special" not within
First Amendment protection); Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582,
586 (D.D.C. 1971), aff'd, Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Acting Attorney Gen., 405 U.S.
1000 (1972); In re Petition, 564 S.W.2d at 638; Note, Broadcast Media, supra note 7,
at 770.
26. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
27. See Capital Broadcasting Co., 333 F. Supp. at 586; Attorney Grievance
Comm'n v. Hyatt, Nos. 83-1479, 83-1845 (Prince George's County, Md. Cir. Ct., April
11, 1984), as summarized in 1 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND BUREAU OF NATIONAL
AFFAIRS, ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Current Reports, at
182-83 (May 2, 1984) [hereinafter cited as ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL]; ABA Code of
Professional Responsibility Amendments, Report to the Board of Governors of the Task
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misleading." Nor has psychological research demonstrated that
subliminal stimuli can alter people's attitudes or behavior.' The poten-
tial for deception exists in all advertising.0 If the integrity of televi-
sion advertisements is suspect, it is because commercial enterprises
over the years have manipulated the medium in an overzealous
attempt to persuade rather than to inform potential customers. ' Past
abuses in product advertising do not necessitate comparable results
for lawyers' commercials. Even if attorneys flooded the airwaves with
gimmickry, the prospect for mass delusion is remote. Emotional appeal
in advertisements best affects viewers for products or services that
they frequently purchase or with which the public is most familiar.32
Since most persons rarely consult an attorney on a regular basis,
emotional ploys will have been long forgotten by the time the average
person needs legal advice.
Since the Supreme Court warned in Bates v. State Bar of
Arizona33 of the "special problems of advertising on the electronic
broadcast media,"34 many members of the judiciary, legislature and
bar seem to have concluded that lawyer commericals on radio and
televison must receive stricter ethical regulation than print adver-
tisements. But "advertising is advertising irrespective of the device or
instrumentality employed."35 Even the Bates Court recognized that
most attorneys electing to advertise "will be candid and honest and
Force on Lawyer Advertising, 46 U.S.L.W. 1, 2 (Aug. 23, 1977); Reed, The Psychological
Impact of TV Advertising and the Need for FTC Regulation, 13 AM. Bus. L.J. 171 (1975);
Note, Broadcast Media, supra note 7, at 764, 767-70; Note, Lawyer Advertising in Kansas:
Expanding Marketing of Legal Services, 21 WASHBURN L.J. 626, 639 (1982) [hereinafter
cited as Note, Kansas Advertising]. For discussions of subliminal advertising, see
ANDERSON & BARRY, supra note 1, at 398; Subliminal Seduction, 70 A.B.A.J. 25-27 (July
1984).
28. Andrews, The Model Rules and Advertising, 68 A.B.A.J. 808, 810 (1982).
Contra, Bishop, 521 F. Supp. at 1228-29. The Federal Trade Commission has defended
the permissability of pizzazz approaches in cases in Iowa and Alabama. See ABA/BNA
LAWYERS' MANUAL, supra note 27, News and Background, at 47 (Feb. 8, 1984); Id., News
Notes, at 288 (June 27, 1984).
29. S. DUNN & A. BARBAN, ADVERTISING: ITS ROLE IN MODERN MARKETING 227
(5th ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as DUNN & BARBAN].
30. Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Stuart, 568 S.W.2d 933, 934 (Ky. 1978).
31. Note, Broadcast Media, supra note 7, at 772.
32. H. BALDWIN. CREATING EFFECTIVE TV COMMERCIALS 9 (1982) [hereinafter cited
as BALDWIN].
33. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). For an illustration of the advertisement utilized by
the Appellants, see DUNN & BARBAN, supra note 29, at 141.
34. Bates, 433 U.S. at 384 (1977).
35. In re Petition, 564 S.W.2d at 643. This court specifically rejected the Bates
"special problems" language. Id.
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straightforward," 6 if only to avoid disciplinary sanction. State
requirements such as Indiana's six-year-retention-of-commercial rule
can easily preserve the fleeting broadcast signal for closer disciplinary
scrutiny.37
The fear that dramatization, background sound, music, color,
animation, and graphics will inevitably distort and mislead suggests
a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of communication.
Pizzazz opponents apparently assume that viewers will absorb broad-
cast bilge and become swept away by the commercial Pied Piper's
song and dance. In reality very few people are so easily mesmerized
by advertisements. Audiences actively assimilate communications by
interpreting the data using numerous cognitive processes. 8 Viewers
first must receive the message, and often perception is impaired by
transient attention spans and myriad distractions.39 Even with atten-
tive audiences, the recipient of the information tends to retain those
facts which most readily conform to existing motives, attitudes, and
predispositions." These conceptions are heavily influenced by an
individual's education, economic status, geographical orientation, and
identification with a certain social class or subculture, religion, race,
nationality or ethnic origin."' Sociological and psychological studies
have indicated how consumers analyze communications prior to adopt-
ing or rejecting a new idea. This diffusion process involves several
stages: awareness, interest, evaluation, trial, and adoption.42 Numerous
other factors influence the effectiveness of the commercial, such as
the perceived expertise and credibility of the communicator and
whether the audience is positively or negatively aroused by the
36. Bates, 433 U.S. at 379.
37. See generally Note, Broadcast Media, supra note 7, at 770-71; Elberger,
New Disciplinary Rules, supra note 13, at IV-2.
38. ANDERSON & BARRY. supra note 1, at 44-45; Schramm, Nature of Communica-
tion Between Humans, in THE PROCESS AND EFFECTS OF MASS COMMUNICATION 3-53
(Schramm & Roberts 1971); Greyser, supra note 1, at 24.
39. DUNN & BARBAN, supra note 29, at 305-07; S. WORCHEL & J. COOPER,
UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 90 (rev. ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as WORCHEL &
COOPER!.
40. BALDWIN, supra note 32, at 10-11, 13-14; DUNN & BARBAN, supra note 29, at
219, 226-27.
41. DUNN & BARBAN, supra note 29, at 235-37; J. KLAPPER, EFFECTS OF MASS
COMMUNICATIONS 3 (1961) [hereinafter cited as KLAPPER]. See generally E. HEIGHTON & D.
CUNNINGHAM, ADVERTISING IN THE BROADCAST AND CABLE MEDIA 113 (1984) [hereinafter
cited as HEIGHTON & CUNNINGHAM].
42. DUNN & BARBAN, supra note 29, at 234-35, 305-12.
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message.' Thus, it seems improbable that commercials with pizzazz
should dupe individuals into impulsively selecting counsel.
B. The Threat of Interstate Transmission
With the introduction of cable networks and satellite communica-
tion, television and radio" signals frequently transcend state
boundaries."5 Even prior to such regional broadcasting viewers in
neighboring states could receive Indiana stations via a standard roof
antenna." Many border-city broadcasters openly cater some of their
programming to their out-of-state markets."' This "spill-over" presents
no problems for typical commercial advertising and in fact can boost
state-line cross-over consumer purchasing. With attorney advertising,
however, interstate broadcast transmissions pose several dilemmas.
Consider the prospect of a Chicago law firm advertising to Gary
residents. From the commercial's context, it might not be clear to
the layperson that the Chicago counsel could not represent a Hoosier
client absent admission to practice in Indiana. Assuming that none
of the practitioners of this hypothetical firm was licensed in Indiana,
the multistate advertisement could falsely represent that these
attorneys could dispense legal advice in our state, posing an
unauthorized practice of law scenario. A similar case has arisen in
which a New York lawyer not certified in Florida advertised in the
state on behalf of his Miami-based offices. The court held that the
attorney's commercials tended "to mislead the public into believing
he was a member of The Florida Bar" and consequently was an
unauthorized practice of law. 8
Suppose that these hypothetical Chicago lawyers operated
affiliate offices in Indiana under the same firm name. Conceivably an
interstate commercial could satisfy Illinois' ethical precepts and still
43. KLAPPER, supra note 41, at 3; WORCHEL & COOPER, supra note 39, at 73-79,
81-86.
44. Utilizing a television cable system, one can boost FM-radio reception
multifold. In this way the author has easily received out-of-state stations based in
Illinois, Ohio and Michigan.
45. For example, Indiana viewers at least as far south as Bloomington can
receive WGN-Channel Nine (Chicago) with cable television services.
46. Neighboring Kentucky, Illinois, Ohio and Michigan citizens can readily tune
in television programming originating from Evansville, Terre Haute, Fort Wayne, or
South Bend.
47. See, e.g., WTWO-Channel Two, Terre Haute, Indiana (television newscasts
for "Illiana").
48. The Florida Bar v. Kaiser, 397 So. 2d 1132, 1133-34 (Fla. 1981).
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violate Indiana Code standards.49 Other than the possible unauthorized
practice complication, it is unclear whether such an out-of-state broad-
cast could constitute an ethical faux pas under our Code, if the Indiana
members of the Chicago-based operation did not participate in the
improper advertising. Even if no disciplinary breach occurred, arguably
such a multistate transmission might provide the Indiana branch with
an unfair advantage over competing firms whose advertisements more
strictly conformed to the Code's mandates. There is sparse caselaw
on this issue' but in one instance the New Jersey Supreme Court
ruled that such interstate beaming of commercials "could give [a New
York firm with New Jersey offices) a substantial competitive advan-
tage" and subsequently disallowed the advertisements."
Another wrinkle is the possibly. deceptive aspect of "spill-over"
broadcast advertising. Courts have concluded that television and print
commercials which appear in several metropolitan areas can mislead
the public into believing that an attorney appearing in the commer-
cial personally practices at numerous office locations while he actually
is present in name alone.52 Persons viewing such advertisements could
select a firm in one city expecting to be represented by a counselor
whose practice is fully restricted to another region out-of-state or
across the state.
As a practical matter advertisements which comply with the
49. For example, Illinois does not prohibit the use of trade names, while Indiana
does. Compare ILLINOIS CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-102 (1984) [hereinafter
cited as ILLINOIS CODE] and Id. DR 2-102 Comments to Rule 2-102 with THE CODE DR
2-102(B.
50. See generally Elberger, New Disciplinary Rules, supra note 13, at IV-6 to
-7 (citing only the New Jersey case below).
51. On Petition for Review of Opinion 475 of the Advisory Comm. on Profes-
sional Ethics and DR 2-102(C), 89 N.J. 74, 78-79, 88-89, 444 A.2d 1092, 1094, 1099-1100
(1982), Appeal dismissed sub nom Jacoby & Meyers v. Supreme Court of New Jersey,
459 U.S. 962 (1982). This case concerned a New York law firm which was broadcasting into
New Jersey at a time when New Jersey prohibited any television advertising. Id.
at 88-89, 444 A.2d at 1099. The Court recommended reconsideration of that ban. Id.
at 78, 444 A.2d at 1094.
52. See, e.g., In re Sekerez, __ Ind. __ , 458 N.E.2d 229, 241, 243 (1984)
cert. den. 83 L.Ed.2d 116, 53 U.S.L.W. 3239 (1984). (lawyer used trade name and own
name in print advertising in numerous cities) ("The entire manner of operation of
Respondent's legal clinics [with offices in several cities] . . .suggests that there was
in fact a great deal of misunderstanding as to the identity, responsibility and status
of those practicing and working in the legal clinics."); Attorney Grievance Comm'n
v. Hyatt, Nos. 83-1479, 83-1845 (Prince George's County, Md. Cir. Ct., April 11, 1984),
as summarized in ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL, supra note 27, Current Reports, at
182-83 (May 2, 1984).
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disciplinary provisions of Illinois,5" Kentucky," Ohio,55 and Michigan"
53. Illinois permits radio and television advertising so long as the communica-
tion is "in a direct, dignified and readily comprehensible manner" and does not "con-
tain any false or misleading statements or otherwise operate to deceive." ILLINOIS CODE
DR 2-101, 2-101(a)-(c). Illinois lists eight information categories that the commercial
may discuss, as contrasted with Indiana's 19 "suggested" areas. Compare Id. 2-101(a)
with THE CODE DR 2-101(B)(1)-(19). Illinois' and Indiana's classifications encompass vir-
tually the same range of data, however. There is some confusion as to whether the
Illinois Rules restrict advertisement elements to the eight classes given in DR 2-101(a)
The Code states, "Such [advertising] communication shall be limited to one or more
of the [eight categories indicated]." ILLINOIS CODE DR 2-101(a) (emphasis added). But the
accompanying Committee Comments sharply contradict this language and suggest the
list is merely a guide and does not limit advertising to specific disclosures. Id. DR
2-101 Comments to Rule 2-101. Even if the eight elements were exhaustive, which
the Committee clearly discounts, the listing has a "catch-all" provision allowing "other
information... which a reasonable person might regard as relevant in determining
whether to seek the lawyer's services." Id. DR 2-101(a)(8).
The primary discrepancy between the Illinois and Indiana Rules concerns adver-
tising under trade names. See supra note 49.
54. Kentucky allows broadcast advertising that is "designed to inform the
public" but is not "misleading," "deceptive," "unfair," or "self-laudatory." KENTUCKY
SUPREME COURT RULES, Rule 3.135(2)(a), (4) (1984) [hereinafter cited as KENTUCKY RULES].
Advertisements cannot contain "a misrepresentation of fact or law" and cannot omit
"a fact necessary to make the [commercial's] statement considered as a whole not
misleading." Id. Rule 3.135(5XaXi). Kentucky's Rules outline 26 items that may be included
in an advertisement, and these essentially mirror the Indiana scroll. Compare id. Rule
3.135(6)(a)(i) with THE CODE DR 2-101(B)(1)-(19). If an attorney advertises specific areas
of practice, the commercial must state the following: "Kentucky law does not certify
specialties of legal practice." KENTUCKY RULES Rule 3.135(5)(b)(ii).
On May 9, 1984, the Board of Governors of the Kentucky Bar Association, which
administers the State's disciplinary rules, approved a regulation that would forbid
lawyers' use of the term "reasonable" in advertisements to describe fees. 48 KY.
BENCH & B. 4 (1984). The Board felt that the adjective was too vague and misleading to
the public. Id.
For an excellent evaluation of the perplexing quirks in the Kentucky Rules
regarding solicitation, see Gaetke, Solicitation and the Uncertain Status of the Code
of Professional Responsibility in Kentucky, 70 Ky. L.J. 707 (1981-82). See also Gaetke
& Casey, Professional Responsibility, 70 Ky. L.J. 325 (1981-82), for a critique of the Ken-
tucky Supreme Court's inconsistent application of disciplinary mandates.
55. In Ohio lawyers advertising on television or radio must avoid "any form
of public communication containing a false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, self-
laudatory or unfair statement or claim." OHIO CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
DR 2-101(A) (1984). This section's language is identical to paragraph one of Indiana's
DR 2-101(B). Broadcast commercials must "be presented in a dignified manner without
the use of drawings, illustrations, animations, portrayals, dramatizations, slogans, music,
lyrics or the use of pictures, except the use of pictures of the advertising lawyer,
or the use of a portrayal of the scales of justice." Id. DR 2-101(B) (emphasis added).
Attorneys must derive their advertisements' contents from an exclusive slate of 20
acceptable subjects duplicative of the Indiana examples. Compare id. DR 2-101(B)(1-20)
with THE CODE DR 2-101(B)(1)-(19). Given Ohio's stricter standards, the danger of ethical
infringements due to multistate transmissions is greater from Hoosier commercials
beamed into Ohio rather than vice versa.
56. Michigan advertising cannot be "false," "fraudulent," "misleading,"
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should also meet Indiana's requirements. Therefore, the possibility of
an undue competitive advantage such as that found by the New Jersey
Court is greatly minimized, since such a commercial edge would more
easily be acquired for an out-of-state broadcaster if Indiana attorneys
were still prohibited from competing on television. If other Hoosier
law offices can utilize that medium to advertise with comparable style,
the multistate commercial would stand on equal ground with its
domestic counterpart. The potential unauthorized practice tickler can
easily be avoided if attorneys insert a geographic reference into their
commercials to identify which state they serve.
C. Positive Developments Under the New Rules
The Code's new provision permitting attorneys to advertise the
general fields of law in which they practice should assist persons in
selecting appropriate counsel. A national survey conducted by the
American Bar Foundation and the American Bar Association has
demonstrated that as much as 83 percent of the public felt that "people
do not go to lawyers because they have no way of knowing which
lawyers are competent to handle their particular problems.""7 Com-
mercials listing areas of practice should alleviate this stigma. Also,
enabling attorneys under the new rules to clarify the scope of their
pursuits bolsters their attempts to reach those most in need of their
specific services. Many lawyers consider themselves to be limited prac-
tioners and prefer to attract clientele within certain specialized areas.
Another national study indicated that 65 percent of young attorneys
responding to the survey "considered themselves specialists,"58 and
73 percent devoted over 40 percent of their efforts to a single legal
subject. 9 The complexities of the modern legal arena necessitate
acknowledgement of practice specialization. There is a substantial
social value to be achieved through guiding the public in its selection
of qualified counselors, and advertising fields of practice serves to
accomplish this goal.
"deceptive," or "self-laudatory." MICHIGAN CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR
2-101 (1984). Pursuant to a Michigan Supreme Court Administrative Order, attorneys
may advertise using "any form of public communication" which satisfies the above
restrictions and the general requirements of the State's ethical precepts. 3 MICHIGAN
LAW PRACTICE ENCYCLOPEDIA Attorneys & Counselors S 65, at 382 (West 1970).
57. Andrews, supra note 28, at 809. See also B. CURRAN & F. SPALDING, THE
LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC, PRELIMINARY REPORT 94 (1974) (over 70 percent surveyed
agreed with this statement); Note, Broadcast Media, supra note 7, at 780; Note, Kan-
sas Advertising, supra note 27, at 626.
58. Andrews, supra note 28, at 810.
59. Id.
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Other benefits will accrue from the introduction of televised com-
mercials. Broadcast advertising of fee schedules will augment the print
media's efforts to reduce public anxiety and misunderstanding of legal
expenses.' Price competition through advertising will continue with
the application of the electronic media, resulting in more affordable
legal assistance to larger segments of the public. 1 The volume of
clientele for all lawyers also should expand as more people become
aware of the availability of economical legal aid. Fear of high costs
prevents many citizens from ever consulting attorneys.2 A major
benefit of televised commercials is the reduction of that fear.
Another plus is that use of television will provide information
regarding legal services for those persons who are typically isolated
from published communications-namely, the illiterate, the
undereducated, and the vision-impaired.' Actually overall public
cognizance will improve from television commercials. As one commen-
tator concisely stated, "Broadcast attorney advertising is the most
effective means of disseminating" details concerning fees and the
existence and essence of legal guidance. 4 More importantly, televised
commercials will stimulate viewers about the law before they may
realize that they need counsel. It is easy for an individual to consult
the telephone directory when he already appreciates his legal quan-
daries. However, many laypersons rarely ponder their legal rights or
duties and might not recognize the need to make a timely visit to
an attorney. After seeing or hearing a television or radio advertise-
ment, the subject of "the law" would at least briefly flicker through
the audience's thoughts.
Whether or not broadcast advertising will engender any of these
benefits or burdens will depend primarily upon the directions in which
the commercial is developed. The subsequent sections will attempt
to tunnel through the complex morass of delivering the message to
the potential client.
60. Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Hyatt, Nos. 83-1479, 83-1845 (Prince George's
County, Md. Cir. Ct., April 11, 1984), as summarized in ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL,
supra note 27, Current Reports, at 183 (May 2, 1984). See generally Bates, 433 U.S.
at 376, 377 n.35; Note, Broadcast Media, supra note 7, at 761-62, 766.
61. See generally Bates, 433 U.S. at 377; Note, Broadcast Media, supra note
7, at 780.
62. Note, Broadcast Media, supra note 7, at 766, 780.
63. Grievance Comm. for Hartford-New Britain Judicial Dist. v. Trantolo, No.
10775 (Conn. Jan. 3, 1984), reprinted in ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL., supra note 27,
Current Reports, at 30 (Feb. 8, 1984); In re Petition, 564 S.W.2d at 643-44; ABA/BNA
LAWYERS' MANUAL, supra note 27, Practice Guide, at 81:502 (1984); Note, Broadcast Media,
supra note 7, at 766.
64. Note, Broadcast Media, supra note 7, at 766.
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A BROADCAST ADVERTISING PRIMER
A. To Advertise or . . . That is the Question
In Bates the Supreme Court did not instantly exorcise the pro-
fession's lengthy repugnance toward lawyer advertising. Since 1977
attorneys have been extremely hesitant to advertise far beyond the
Yellow Pages.' Much of this reluctance stems from the dread of
impropriety, discipline, or disapproval of one's colleagues." After
seventy years of prohibition, prejudicial perceptions of advertising
perpetuate among the bar. Lawyers today might summarily dismiss
the prospect of broadcast commercials simply because of this amor-
phous stigma. If a firm wishes to incorporate electronic advertising
into its arsenal of client communication, this demon must first be
dispelled.
Why should attorneys advertise? Despite the lofty inspiration
of the Code and caselaw, there remains one honest answer: to
encourage the customer to purchase one lawyer's services over
another's. This admission does not betray the public interest. Rather,
it dispatches the hypocrisy that a lawyer's primary purpose in prac-
ticing is to resolve society's interpersonal conflicts. That might be,
or perhaps should be, the quixotism toward which attorneys strive;
however, few firms actually view their daily activities so philan-
thropically. If they did, then the majority of their clientele would be
represented pro bono. Since the business of practicing law is an
accepted attitude among the bar, then advertising one's law business
must be viewed with a comparable perspective. There is ample
opportunity to incorporate the idealism of the profession into the com-
mercial message. In deciding whether or not to advertise, attorneys
must always distinguish the purely economic analysis from the ethical
implications of the communication's contents. Fear of the latter's abuse
should not fog the former.
B. Marketing Decisions
Once a lawyer has decided to consider advertising she must
initially decide whether to employ a professional advertising agency
to create a commercial campaign. Depending upon the proposed
breadth of one's advertising and the depth of one's pocketbook, hiring
65. "Since June 1977, approximately ten percent of attorneys have advertised."
Note, Kansas Advertising, supra note 27, at 626 (citing Lawpoll, 67 A.B.A.J. 1618 (1981).
However, this was a substantial increase from three percent in 1979. Slavin, Lauryers
and Madison Avenue, 6 BARRISTER 46,47 (Summer 1979).
66. Laev, The Right Way to Advertise, in INDIANA CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCA-
TION FORUM, LAWYER ADVERTISING RULE CHANGES X-2 to -3 (1984) [hereinafter cited as
Laev, The Right Way].
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consultants may prove beneficial to the development of effective
commercials. 7 The greater the saturation of the media, the more
valuable the agency's guidance. Whether a law firm opts for profes-
sional or "in-house" production of advertisements, several considera-
tions must be assessed in selecting the appropriate advertising media."
A frequently overlooked criterion in choosing a commercial
medium is the lawyer's goals to be achieved through advertising. Until
his objectives are clearly formulated the direction of his advertising
cannot be properly initiated. While the primary directives must be
determined by the individual, some generalizations can be suggested.
For example, the central purpose of all commercials is persuasion,
and advertisements typically are generated "to create awareness, to
promote understanding, to shape attitudes, to enhance recall, and to
motivate action."" With these functions in mind, an attorney can begin
to evaluate which types of commercials within a constrained budget
would most efficiently communicate to potential clients the nature of
her practice.
Perhaps the single most crucial matter the potential advertiser must
confront is how to channel commercials toward prospective customers.
There are various classification schemes used to segment target
audiences." Populations may be categorized in terms of the legal crises
they encounter, the media to which they are exposed, the types of media
material that they prefer (such as the varieties of television programs
they watch or sections of the newspaper they read), or the time of day
or frequency with which they use the media. 1 Advertising agencies often
conduct extensive research to isolate target markets. Data regarding
consumer demographics,72 sociopsychological qualities7 3 and service usage
67. See id. at X-10 to -20 (factors to evaluate in selecting advertising agency).
68. For an analysis of considerations in choosing advertising media, see id.
at X-1 to -38.
69. HEIGHTON & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 41, at 62 (emphasis in original deleted).
See also ANDERSON & BARRY, supra note 1, at 244-45.
70. Targeting is sometimes referred to as market segmentation. See
ANDERSON & BARRY, supra note 1 at 225-27.
71. See DUNN & BARBAN, supra note 29, at 49, 59.
72. Demographic data include age, sex, income, education, occupation, family
size and orientation, geographic location, race, and religion of the average consumer
for a given good or service. See ANDERSON & BARRY, supra note 1, at 84, 227; BALDWIN,
supra note 32, at 47-48; DUNN & BARBAN, supra note 29, at 206, 243-51; HEIGHTON & CUN-
NINGHAM, supra note 41, at 67-68, 82.
73. Such qualities as one's motivations, perceived affiliation with a certain social
class or subculture, personality traits ("such as leadership, independence, compulsiveness,
conformity, and gregariousness"), and life-style indicators can assist the advertiser in
devising a commercial aimed at a certain section of the populace. See DUNN & BAR-
BAN, supra note 29, at 219-23, 251. See also ANDERSON & BARRY, supra note 1, at 84,
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trends" enable the advertiser to tailor the commercial to address those
particular groups most likely to engage or require a select legal service.
Unfortunately, most attorneys will lack sufficient financial fortitude to
underwrite such elaborate research ventures. However, many broadcast
facilities and advertising agencies have already accumulated much of this
information and might permit advertisers to access their stockpiles, par-
ticularly for a small consideration.
Once the attorney knows who and where his possible clients are,
he must elect a media mix which can most cogently contact the target
audience. The broadcast media clearly are more pervasive than
publications. As of 1980, 98 percent of American households owned
a television, and 99 percent had a radio. Moreover, the average
American family watches over six hours of television each day, and
the typical adult listens to over three hours of radio daily.7 Broad-
casting obviously has the reach, but will the desired target groups
be exposed to its commercials? Persons at work or in transit are more
likely to tune in radio than television," though radio listeners fre-
quent only a few specific stations that offer a limited programming
fare, such as news, rock-and-roll, or country music. Television viewers
"channel-hop" in search of favorite shows,8 particularly with the
increasing popularity of cable systems. Newspapers and magazines
are often only diversions to be skimmed as readers await other
engagements or enjoy a meal. Consequently, various media must be
employed at different times utilizing diverse styles if contact is to
be made with particular portions of the populace. 1
The frequency with which an advertisement is broadcast or
printed will heavily influence its effectiveness even if several media
277; BALDWIN, supra note 32, at 48-49; HEIGHTON & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 41, at 69-70,
82.
74. See ANDERSON & BARRY, supra note 1, at 84, 227; BALDWIN, supra note 32,
at 49; DUNN & BARBAN, supra note 29, at 251-54; HEIGHTON & CUNNINGHAM, supra note
41, at 67.
75. DUNN & BARBAN, supra note 29, at 497.
76. Id. at 547, 565.
77. Id. at 561, 569; HEIGHTON & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 41, at 86, 89.
78. DUNN & BARBAN, supra note 29, at 569. Automobile drivers play the radio
"60 percent of the time the car is in use." HEIGHTON & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 41,
at 89.
79. See DUNN & BARBAN, supra note 29, at 486; HEIGHTON & CUNNINGHAM, supra
note 41, at 89-91; Kahn, The Practical Experience of Radio Advertising, in INDIANA CON-
TINUING LEGAL EDUCATION FORUM. LAWYER ADVERTISING RULE CHANGES VIII-3 (1984)
[hereinafter cited as Kahn, Practical Experience].
80. HEIGHTON & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 41, at 88-89.
81. "Communicators, even at their best, reach only a fraction of the total poten-
tial audience." DUNN & BARBAN, supra note 29, at 59.
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are engaged. Often commercials must be transmitted numerous times
before the bulk of the target audience has been exposed, and further
repetition is essential before the communication "sinks into" the public
memory.82 Generally, the greater the reach of the media, the less often
an advertisement must be run." Thus, with broadcasting, fewer com-
mercials would have to be developed and purchased.
Matching market segments with media carriers necessitates a
keen evaluation of the communicator's capabilities. Some stations or
periodicals can be eliminated quickly because of their restricted sub-
ject matter that appeals to very few people. Conversely, a narrow
reader- or viewership might be the attorney advertiser's primary pool
from which possible clients may emerge. Given the increasing number
of cable systems that specialize programming, some lawyers might
prefer such media to reach targeted viewers." Obviously broadcasting
provides sight-and/or-sound stimulus that the written word cannot,
and therefore more individuals may encounter a T.V. or radio com-
mercial even while pursuing other endeavors than would a person who
has only a few minutes each day to devote to reading. Unfortunately,
this "viewer/listener flexibility" can also doom fleeting broadcast com-
mercials that must compete with attentions focused elsewhere.' Thus,
complex over-the-air explanations of legal services could confuse an
audience" while a similar published commercial would provide the
reader time for reflection.
For "bottom-liners" advertising costs will dictate the choice of
most lawyers. Media prices vary depending upon frequency, time slot,
duration, and geographic coverage. 7 Most television commercials run
30-seconds, though 10- and 60-second versions are also utilized.8 As
one would anticipate, 60-second advertisements are twice as expen-
sive as half-minute commercials and four times the cost of the ten-
second variety." Thirty second radio advertisement rates are only 25
to 30 percent lower than the minute figure." Very few lawyers could
bankroll network commercials, as these regularly require tens of
82. ANDERSON & BARRY, supra note 1, at 483.
83. HEIGHTON & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 41, at 92.
84. See generally id. at 87.
85. See DUNN & BARBAN, supra note 29, at 432; HEIGHTON & CUNNINGHAM, supra
note 41, at 88-89, 91.
86. DUNN & BARBAN, supra note 29, at 432. See generally BALDWIN, supra note
32, at 10; HEIGHTON & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 41, at 85.
87. See Kahn, Practical Experience, supra note 79, at VIII-3 to -4.
88. BALDWIN, supra note 32, at 187; DUNN & BARBAN, supra note 29, at 490;
HEIGHTON & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 41, at 96.
89. HEIGHTON & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 41, at 97.
90. Id.
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thousands of dollars to produce.91 Volume discounts are available for
both local television and radio, although they tend to be more substan-
tial with the latter medium.92 Undoubtedly television advertisements
carry the steepest price tag, even at the local level. Most product
manufacturers take solace by dissecting large television expenditures
into cost-per-units-sold analysis," and this interpretation can make
mammoth outlays palatable. For attorneys, however, unit pricing has
little practical application, as post-advertising sales increases cannot
be easily tabulated for legal services as for many consumer goods.
Since there may be a considerable time lag between initial media pur-
chases and an influx of new clients, a lawyer must carefully consider
how much revenue she can afford to sink into her commercial ven-
tures. Local radio and cable television programming might be the most
economical investment for the novice advertiser, as their prices rival
newspaper classifieds in terms of relative affordability.' Much money
can be saved if studio facilities or the firm's law offices are used to
film or record the commercial.95 Videotaped advertisements are also
less expensive than those filmed, and they also can be instantly review-
ed and reshot if necessary."
Despite these bleak prospects attorneys should avoid exag-
gerating the spectre of expense. The objective is extensive communica-
tion, and the exposure delivered by the electronic media often justifies
a heftier payment.
Having struggled through this labyrinth in adopting a suitable
advertising campaign, the lawyer must proceed to formulate the com-
mercial itself. Styles obviously will vary per an individual's tastes or
lack thereof. There are several proper advertising methods available.
Yet, as this article will suggest in the following section, there is one
91. See, e.g., BALDWIN, supra note 32, at 187-89; Middleton, supra note 22, at
894-95.
92. HEIGHTON & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 41, at 235.
93. ANDERSON & BARRY, supra note 1, at 275; DUNN & BARBAN, supra note 29,
at 551; HEIGHTON & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 41, at 95. This analysis has been applied
to radio commercials as well. DUNN & BARBAN, supra note 29, at 567.
94. See generally id.; HEIGHTON & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 41, at 20, 41, 90.
95. See HEIGHTON & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 41, at 148-49. One of radio's cen-
tral advantages is this ease with which commercials can be produced. Id. at 137-38, 142.
96. BALDWIN, supra note 32, at 94; DUNN "&BKRBAN, supra note 29, at 475;
HEIGHTON & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 41, at 155. Videotape is becoming increasingly
popular among large advertisers. BALDWIN, supra note 32, at 93; DUNN & BARBAN, supra
note 29, at 474. Attorneys are also utilizing videotape to tackle numerous legal chores.
See Buckley & Buckley, Videotaped Wills, 89 CASE & CoM. 3 (Nov.-Dec. 1984); Buckley
& Buckley, Videotaping Wills: A New Frontier in Estate Planning, 11 OHIO N.U.L. REV.
271 (1984).
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technique which best accommodates the intentions of the Disciplinary
Rules and the purposes of advertising.
C. Educational Broadcast Advertising
Regardless of the format of an attorney's commercials, several
principles apply to all advertising. Simplicity of content is paramount,
especially with broadcasting. Subtlety is artistic but will lose the vast
majority of any audience. An effective commercial arouses the per-
son's attention with simple, familiar messages that are sufficiently
intriguing to retain that attention.98 The introduction of pizzazz into
an advertisement may capture the viewers' interest, though the ver-
bal and visual communications should be closely correlated if televi-
sion is employed.99 What is seen should supplement the narrative, as
it is vital that the audience comprehends the message expressed rather
than fixate on an irrelevant visual component such as a dancing hippo
or synchronized swimmers. Perhaps most significant for attorney
advertising is spokesperson attractiveness and credibility.100 The
counselor appearing in the television commercial should exude con-
fidence, composure, and trustworthiness.11 Obviously, if on radio the
lawyer's voice should express these qualities and should also be clearly
articulate.
The commerical's eventual time slot may influence the prepara-
tion of the substance of the message. Many attorneys advertise during
television's "graveyard shift" as several potential clients who are kept
awake at night because of nagging economic or marital difficulties
view the early morning offerings."2 Other lawyers elect slots during
popular local programming, such as the late night news," presumably
because audiences tune in to such shows primarily to acquire informa-
tion. Viewers frequenting each time slot will probably desire different
legal information, and commercials must be devised accordingly.
97. BALDWIN, supra note 32, at 15-16; DUNN & BARBAN, supra note 29, at 431.
98. BALDWIN, supra note 32, at 14-16.
99. Id. at 16.
100. "There is extensive literature that shows that people tend to agree with
those whom they like more than those they dislike." ANDERSON & BARRY, supra note
1, at 255. See also McQuire, Source Variables in Persuasion, in HANDBOOK OF
COMMUNICATION 225-32 (1973). Even though identical information is conveyed by two
sources, one may be accepted as superior authority merely because of the impression
made upon the recipient of the communication. For example, law review editors and
judges frequently frown upon legal encyclopedia references while praising string cita-
tions of cases which, coincidentally, happen to appear in the encyclopedia.
101. See ANDERSON & BARRY, supra note 1, at 50.
102. Slavin, supra note 65, at 50.
103. See, e.g., Middleton, supra note 22, at 895.
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Television and radio advertisements typically can be categorized
by their essential ingredients: singing, demonstration, testimonial,
dramatization, dialogue, humor, animation, or narrative."' While each
style has its merits or flaws, the narrative has been the lawyer's
favorite over the years. Predictably, this "preference" largely has been
a function of the past and present Disciplinary Rules which have vir-
tually eliminated the other varieties from an attorney's repertoire.
While any of these techniques possibly may be combined to produce
an ethical commercial under the Code, there is one species that has
,proven historically acceptable and dignified. This is the educational
or "public service" advertisement. This approach has been pursued
successfully be several practitioners."5
For decades Ethical Opinions have permitted and encouraged the
profession's use of broadcast media to conduct educational programs
in which a myriad of legal issues has been explained to the public. °6
A critical distinction must be made between commercials that tutor
and educational pursuits such as Terry English's legal newspaper
columns in the Bloomington Herald-Telephone/Sunday Herald-Times
and Alfred Buckley's On the Law segments on WRTV-Channel Six
(Indianapolis) and WASK-AM radio (Lafayette)."7 These are purely
104. ANDERSON & BARRY, supra note 1, at 250-51; DUNN & BARBAN, supra note
29, at 433-35, 440-49.
105. See, e.g., Middleton, supra note 22, at 893-97; Note, Kansas Advertising,
supra note 27, at 650-51.
106. See, e.g., Belli v. State Bar of California, 10 Cal. 3d 824, 112 Cal. Rptr
527, 519 P.2d 575 (1974), application for stay denied, 416 U.S. 965 (1974) (radio and
television); ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 298 (1961) (radio); ABA
Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 179 (1938) (radio); ABA Comm.
on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 148 (1935) (radio); ABA Comm. on
Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 1179 (1971) (television); ABA Comm. on Professional
Ethics, Informal Op. C-764 (1964) (radio); ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal
Op. 528 (1962) (radio); Dallas Ethics Op. 1980-5, as summarized in ABA/BNA LAWYERS'
MANUAL, supra note 27, at 801:8402 (1984) (radio); Mississippi Ethics Op. 74, as summarized
in id. at 801:5103 (1984) (television); New York City Ethics Op. 80-8, as summarized
in id. at 801:6303-04 (1984) (radio); Oregon Ethics Op. 465, as summarized in id. at
801:7108 (1984) (television); Giving Human Interest to the Lawyers' Message: Two Suc-
cessful Experiments, 23 A.B.A.J. 939, 940-41 (1937) (radio dramatizations).
107. Terry L. English practices law in Bloomington and has written a legal-
consumer affairs newspaper column since 1977. Letter from Terry L. English to the
author (Sept. 11, 1984). Alfred W. Buckely is a partner of the law firm of Buckley,
Buckley & Buckley in Lafayette and has broadcast his On the Law series since 1982,
initially with WFTE-AM radio (Lafayette). He has also published an On the Law column
in Farmweek, a central Indiana newspaper.
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public affairs presentations intended to enlighten and heighten
individual cognizance of important legal matters. Advertisements,
whether informational or otherwise, are still designed to solicit
customers. °8 Yet applying the educational motif embosses legal com-
mercials with a scholarly ornament that transcends the supposedly
"lesser" or vulgar commercial ilk presented by other businesses. A
public need and an advertising pursuit can be simultaneously
accomplished. As one commentator aptly expressed, "Lawyer adver-
tising at its best can inform people about their legal rights and help
them make an informed choice of attorneys to exercise those rights."' 9
Public service advertising usually strives to generate goodwill
for both institutional and individual services and often corrects popular
misconceptions about organizational projects or policies.110 Commer-
cials of this mold typically are least infested with the advertising
abuses most dreaded among the bar. Educational advertisements most
closely correspond with the spirit of the Code's Ethical
Considerations"' while possibly shielding the lawyer from potential
disciplinary sanction.
The informational format affords a plethora of topics to discuss.
Regrettably, one cannot engage in lengthy elaborations within a half-
minute commercial. Still, a tersely phrased advertisement can supply
the audience with a comprehensible if minute summary of a certain
point of law. More importantly, a pedagogical commercial entices the
viewers and listeners at least momentarily to consider general legal
problems and perhaps ponder their own personal legal concerns. So
the message need not exhaustively explain legal concepts to produce
the desired positive results.
Of course, advertising that does not embody such scholastic goals
is no less satisfactory, ethical, or beneficial to the layperson. People
also will prosper from commercials which increase awareness of the
diversity of practice among competing law firms or which clarify that
one need not mortgage the homestead for generations to consult an
attorney. But educational overtones best dissociate legal commercials
from the gimmickry of other advertisements while appearing to con-
tribute a valuable service to the public well-being. As the ABA Com-
mittee on Professional Ethics and Grievances stated forty-six years
ago:
108. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 179 (1938).
109. Andrews, supra note 28, at 809.
110. DUNN & BARBAN, supra note 29, at 647, 649, 651-52, 659; R. SIMON, PUBLIC
RELATIONS: CONCEPTS AND PRACTICES 9, 11-12 (2d ed. 1980).
111. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 19, No. 2 [1985], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol19/iss2/1
ATTORNEY ADVERTISING
Advertising which is calculated to teach the layman
the benefits and advantages of preventive legal services will
benefit the lay public and enable the lawyer to render a
more desirable and beneficial professional service ...
[Blecause of the trouble, disappointments, controversy, and
litigation it will prevent, it will enhance the public esteem
of the legal profession and create a better relation between
the profession and the general public .... It will lessen the
instances in which the lay public may feel that a person's
honest intentions and desires have been frustrated by what
the layman chooses to call the "technicalities" of the law.
It will result in the public acquiring a higher regard for
the legal profession, the judicial process, and the judicial
establishments .
112
Despite the fact that advertising remained forbidden fruit for
attorneys for 39 more years, the Committee's lesson is applicable today
with equal vigor. Considering the continuing popular impression of
lawyers is often bloated with suspicion and distrust, any advertising
that dispels public misinterpretations seems welcome and long
overdue.
CONCLUSION
Television commercials could become an indispensable tether
between attorneys and the public unless rigid interpretations of the
revised Code squelch pioneering efforts. While some degree of regula-
tion will be necessary to tackle perplexities such as the interstate
transmission problem, the Supreme Court must guard against
excessive enforcement. Otherwise the Code's new freedoms would
become hollow options. Broadcast advertising initially promises to be
an expensive and arduous undertaking that will never flower into an
effective mode of client communication should early users be throttled
into submission. With the electronic media large portions of the popula-
tion that have rarely consulted a lawyer will increasingly discover
that appropriate legal assistance can be affordable. Broadcast law com-
mercials will prominently contribute to advertising's continuing
elimination of prejudice and misunderstanding which an uninformed
public has assembled since 1908. Whether the modified Rules become
a panacea or a Pandora's Box depends entirely upon the path the pro-
fession elects. "Advertising does not corrupt-it communicates.""' 3
Practitioners throughout the state should harvest the vast oppor-
tunities now available through broadcast advertising.
112. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 179 (1938).
113. Laev, The Right Way, supra note 66, at X-32 (emphasis in original deleted).
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NOTES
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE INDIANA MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE ACT: RE-EVALUATED
In the early 1970's insurance companies declared a nationwide
"medical malpractice crisis."' Insurance carriers feared that excess jury
verdicts would result in extensive losses due to the insurance
industry's inability to anticipate future awards.! As a result, insurance
carriers refused to guarantee future insurance coverage to all health
care providers.3 The Indiana Legislature responded to this "crisis"
by enacting the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act.4
Indiana's Medical Malpractice Act was designed to guarantee that
health care providers would continue to receive malpractice insurance
coverage.5 In order to accomplish this guarantee, the Legislature
enacted several limiting provisions. A monetary limitation on the
amount of damages of $500,000 per incident' and a reduction in the
1. The "medical malpractice crisis" was not brought about by medical prac-
tice but by malpractice insurance carriers. See generally L. LANDER, DEFECTIVE
MEDICINE: RISK, ANGER, AND THE MALPRACTICE CRISIS (1978).
2. Questions have been raised as to the validity of the "fears" of the insurance
industry. In 1974, the average pay out per doctor was $750, while the average premium
paid per doctor was $3,500. Aitken, Medical Malpractice: The Alleged "Crisis" in Perspec-
tive, 637 INS. L. J. 90, 97 (February, 1976). See also Note, Alternatives To Litigation:
Pretrial Screening and Arbitration of Medical Malpractice Claims: Has Missouri Taken
a Giant Step Backward? 50 UMKC L. REv. 182 (1982).
3. Insurance companies argued that the increased cost of providing health
care services, the increase in the number of claims and suits against health care pro-
viders, and the unusual size of such claims were forcing them to withdraw from the
insuring the high risk health care providers. Hoodenpyl, Medical Malpractice Litiga-
tion in Indiana, 20 RES. GESTAE 126, 127 (March 1976).
4. Medical Malpractice Act of 1975, IND. CODE S 16-9.5 et seq (1976).
5. Indiana's Legislature failed to state a purpose for the Medical Malprac-
tice Act, however, the Indiana courts have explained the purpose of the legislation.
See, e.g., Rohrabaugh v. Wagoner, Ind. - - 413 N.E.2d 891, 894 (1980) (the
legislature enacted this legislation to prevent the loss of insurance to health care pro-
viders); Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., Ind. -. .. 404 N.E.2d 585, 590 (1980)
(the limitations of the Act were written to allow health care insurance carriers to
better anticipate their expenses and to guarantee insurance to all health care providers).
6. IND. CODE S 16-9.5-2-2 (1982).
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age of disability for minors to age six7 are the harshest of the limita-
tions placed on the health care tort victim. Moreover, the legislature
defined a statute of limitations for the filing of claims to begin two
years from the date of "occurrence" instead of the date of "discovery."8
In addition to these limitations, the Legislature created a review panel
to screen malpractice claims.' The purpose of the review panel process
is to expedite the review of malpractice claims which ordinarily pro-
ceed to trial, as well as screen out non-meritorious claims." As a result
of these provisions, the Legislature hoped to increase the delivery
of health care services and decrease the costs of medical care."
This note discusses the constitutional implications of the Indiana
Medical Malpractice Act. Limitations on the amount of damages
available to an injured patient, the age of disability for minors, and
the two years from "occurrence" statute of limitations have resulted
in classifications which violate the patient's equal protection rights
as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.'2 Admissibility of the
review panel's decision in a future court action denies the patient his
right to trial by jury. 3 Actual application of the review panel process
has resulted in oppressive delays contrary to the intent of the
Legislature.'4 These delays are a violation of both the patient's right
to trial by jury and the patient's right of access to the courts." Con-
stitutional implications of the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act make
it an invalid method of dealing with the "medical malpractice crisis."
7. IND. CODE S 16-9.5-3-1 (1982). Prior to the Medical Malpractice Act the age
of disability for minors was eighteen.
8. Id.
9. IND. CODE S 16-9.5-9-3 (1982).
10. The rational behind legislative provisions establishing review panels or
arbitration panels was to screen out unmeritorious claims and to encourage parties
to settle valid claims, thereby, expediting the review of malpractice claims. See supra
note 2 at 185.
11. Sakayan, Arbitration and Screeing Panels: Recent Experiences and Trends,
17 FORUM 682, 683 (1982).
12. See infra notes 123-39 and accompanying text. The two-year statute of
limitations is beyond the scope of this Note. Indiana courts have questioned the con-
stitutionality of this limitation. "We have not though, ruled out the possibility of deciding
in a future case that this occurrence rule must be applied as though it was a discovery
rule due to the questionable constitutionality of the occurrence rule." Alwood v. Davis,
__ Ind. App. , - 411 N.E.2d 759, 761 (1980). See also Chaffin v. Nicosia, 261
Ind. 698, 310 N.E.2d 867 (1974).
13. See infra notes 162-67 and accompanying text.
14. See supra note 5.
15. See infra notes 198-201 and accompanying text.
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THE INDIANA MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACT
Patients' claims against health care providers" were originally
governed by the same statutes governing other tortfeasors.'7 The
statute of limitations for filing a malpractice complaint was two years
from the date the "cause of action accrued." 8 This statute of limita-
tion was construed to run from the date the injury resulted and
damages were ascertainable." A malpractice plaintiff would file his
complaint in a court of law and had the right to demand a jury trial.'
An injured patient could recover, without limitation, any amount of
damages which the jury awarded and the court found to be
reasonable.2 However, in 1975 the Indiana legislature enacted the
Indiana Medical Malpractice Act which separated "medical malprac-
tice" tort feasors from all other tortfeasors. In order to understand
the implications of separately classifying the "medical malpractice"
tortfeasor, one has to be familiar with the procedures involved.
A. Procedure under the Malpractice Act
A health care provider qualifies for protection under the Indiana
Medical Malpractice Act by meeting the minimal prerequisites of the
Act.' First, the health care provider is required to file proof of finan-
cial responsibility" with the Indiana Commissioner of Insurance."
Secondly, the health care provider must pay an annual surcharge"
within thirty days after the premium for malpractice insurance
16. The term "health care provider" includes a person, partner, corporation,
registered or licensed nurse, officer or employee, college, university, blood bank and
mental health center. IND. CODE S 16-9.5-1-1 (a)(1)(2)(3) (1982).
17. IND. CODE S 34-4-19-1 (1982).
18. IND. CODE S 34-1-2-2 (1982).
19. Montgomery v. Crum, 199 Ind. 660, 679, 161 N.E. 251, 259 (1928).
20. Id.; see also IND. CODE S 34-1-54-8 (1971).
21. IND. CODE S 34-1-22-1 (1982).
22. IND. CODE S 16-9.5-2-1 (1982).
23. Proof of financial responsibility requires that the health care provider's
insurance carrier file proof of the health care provider's policy of malpractice liability
insurance. Each health care provider is required to have liability insurance of at least
$100,000 per occurrence and $300,000 in annual aggregate insurance. A hospital with
100 or fewer beds is required to keep an annual aggregate policy of $2,000,000, while
a hospital with over 100 beds is required to have a minimum of $3,000,000 in annual
aggregate liability insurance. See IND. CODE S 16-9.5-2-6 (a)(1) (1982).
24. A health care provider may also qualify his officers, agents and/or
employees for malpractice insurance. In order to qualify they must be named individually
or by class in the statement of proof of financial responsibility. Such insurance covers
only malpractice within the scope of employment See IND. CODE S 16-9.5-2-1(b) (1982).
25. IND. CODE S 16-9.5-4-1(bX1982). The annual surcharge is determined by the
Commissioner of Insurance based upon actuarial principles.
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coverage is received by the health care provider's insurer.'8 Failure
to pay the surcharge within the time limit results in the suspension
of the Act's protection until payment is made." If a health care pro-
vider fails to meet the prerequisites of the Malpractice Act, a malprac-
tice victim will not be restricted by the terms of the Act. 8
The patient of a health care provider that has qualified under
the Malpractice Act is similarly required to follow the requirements
of the Act to initiate a claim. The injured patient must file a com-
plaint with the Commissioner of Insurance" within two years of the
alleged act, omission, or neglect of the health care provider.3 If the
patient is under, six years of age at the time of the alleged malprac-
tice, he has until his eighth birthday to file a claim.3 ' After filing the
complaint, the patient and the health care provider must wait at least
twenty days, at which time either party may file a request for the
formation of a medical review panel.2 After the complaint is heard
by the medical review panel,' the patient has ninety days to refile
the complaint with a state court. 4
The medical review panel consists of one attorney and three
health care providers.2 5 Time constraints are set for the selection of
the panel members to expedite the selection process. The attorney
member sits in an advisory capacity, as chairman, and has no vote
26. IND. CODE S 16-9.5-4-1(d)(1982).
27. IND. CODE S 16-9.5-4-1(g)(1982).
28. If a health care provider does not qualify under the Act, the patient's
right of action would be governed by the same statutes as other tort claimants' actions.
Thus there is no cap on recovery. IND. CODE S 16-9.5-1-5 (1982).
29. IND. CODE §16-9.5-9-1 (1982). In addition, the statute provides, "no dollar
amount or figure shall be included in the demand in any malpractice complaint, but
the prayer shall be for such damages as are reasonable in the premises." IND. CODE
5 16-9.5-1-6 (1982).
30. IND. CODE S 16-9.5-3-1 (1982). Indiana courts interpret this statute of limita-
tions to be based on an "occurrence" rule rather than a "discovery" rule. Therefore,
if the patient fails to discover the malpractice within two years of the day of the
physicians conduct, the patients cause of action is lost. See Colbert v. Waitt, - Ind.
App. - - 445 N.E. 2d 1000, 1002 (1982). The only exception to the statute of
limitations is the doctrine of fraudulent concealment. To invoke this doctrine the health
care provider must have defrauded the patient in such a manner as to mislead the
patient or elude the investigation of the patient who claims the cause of action. Id.
at 1003.
31. IND. CODE S 16-9.5-3-1 (1982).
32. IND. CODE S 16-9.5-9-1 (1982).
33. Before any action can be commenced in state court, the plaintiffs com-
plaint must be heard by a review panel. IND. CODE S 16-9.5-9-2 (1982).
34. As the statute is written, a defendant cannot file a complaint in a state
court. The statute only provides for a filing by the plaintiff. Id. See also IND. CODE
5 16-9.5-5-6 ((1976).
35. IND. CODE S 16-9.5-9-3 (1982).
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in the panel's decision.' The parties must agree upon a chairman
within fifteen days after the request for formation of the panel. 7 If
the parties fail to agree on a chairman the Clerk of the Supreme Court
will draw at random a list of five qualified attorneys.' After a chair-
man is selected, the Clerk of the Supreme Court has five days to
inform the chairman of the selection. 9 Within fifteen days after
notification, the chairman must inform the Clerk of his acceptance
or make a showing of good cause as to his inability to serve."' Once
the chairman is confirmed, each party has fifteen days to choose a
health care provider to sit on the panel.4 '1 The third health care pro-
vider is selected by the first two health care providers" within fif-
teen days of their selection. 3 After all the members are selected, the
chairman must notify the Commissioner of Insurance within five days."
Therefore, the selection process encompasses seventy to ninety days
from the request for a formation.
4 5
36. It is the chairman's duty to expedite the selection of the panel members,
convene the panel, and the panel's decision. The chairman may also schedule reasonable
dates for submission of evidence. Id.
37. IND. CODE S 16-9.5-9-3(a)(1976).
38. Once the clerk of the Supreme Court has compiled a list of five attorneys,
both parties alternatively strike names until only one name remains. If a party fails
to strike a name within five days, the opposing party must request the Clerk of the
Indiana Supreme Court to strike for them. Id.
39. Id.
40. IND. CODE S 16-9.5-9-3(a)(2)(1982). The requirements for showing "good cause"
are found in subsection (c).
41. If a party is unable to select a health care provider in the prescribed
time limit the chairman will choose someone and notify both parties. IND. CODE
16-9.5-9-3(b)(1)(1982).
42. Id.
43. IND. CODE S 16-9.5-9-3(b)(2)(1982). If the two panel members fail to choose the
third health care provider within 15 days, he will be chosen by the chairman. Id. Either
party can challenge the selection of any panel member within ten days of his selection
without cause. The party whose member was challenged shall select a replacement.
If the challenge involved the third health care provider, the first two health care pro-
viders make another selection. If two such challenges are made the chairman shall
choose three members and each side shall strike one, the remaining one will take
that position. IND. CODE S 16-9.5-9-3(b)(3)(1982).
44. IND. CODE S 16-9.5-9-3(b)(4)(1982).
45. Addition of the minimum number of days under each subsection of sec-
tion 3 results in 70 days:
Number of days Subsection
15 (a)
5 (a)
15 (a)
15 (b)(2)
15 (b)(2)
5 (b)(4)
Total 70 days
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The medical review panel's sole duty is to determine the validity
of the patient's complaint against the defendant health care provider."
Each party may submit evidence to the review panel, including:
medical charts, depositions of witnesses, x-rays, lab reports, and
excerpts from treatises.47 All evidence must be submitted by the
parties in written form.48 Panel members will review the submitted
evidence and may also request additional information, consult with
medical authorities, and examine reports prepared by other health
care providers.49 After submission of the evidence, either party may
convene the panel and ask questions concerning any relevant issues
before the panel.' The panel has thirty days in which to render an
opinion after receiving all of the information and meeting with the
parties." The panel has a maximum of 180 days from the date of the
selection of the last member to render its expert opinion.' Therefore,
the entire panel process should take a maximum of nine months from
the date the complaint is filed to the date the decision is rendered."
A determination by the panel that the defendant's care fell below
the community standard of care is followed by the patient's claim for
An additional 20 days can be added to the selection process if lack of agreement bet-
ween parties causes the clerk of the supreme court to strike names or the chairman
to choose names of qualified members. IND. CODE S 16-9.5-9-3 (1982).
46. IND. CODE S 16-9.5-9-7 (1982).
47. IND. CODE 5 16-9.5-9-4 (1982).
48. Id.
49. IND. CODE S 16-9.5-9-6 (1982).
50. The chairman is the presiding member of the informal meetings of the
review board. IND. CODE S 16-9.5-9-5 (1982).
51. One or more of the following expert opinions must be rendered by the
panel:
(a) The evidence supports the conclusion that defendant or defen-
dants failed to comply with the appropriate standard of care as charged
in the complaint.
(b) The evidence does not support the conclusion that the defen-
dant or defendants failed to meet the applicable standard of care as charged
in the complaint.
(c) That there is a material issues of fact, not requiring expert
opinion, bearing on liability for consideration by the court or jury.
(d) The conduct complained of was or was not a factor of the
resultant damages. If so, whether the plaintiff suffered: (1) any disability
and the extent and duration of the disability, and (2) any permanent im-
pairment and the percentage of the impairment.
IND. CODE S 16-9.5-9-7 (1982).
52. IND. CODE S 16-9.5-9-3.5 (1982).
53. The total of 270 days or nine months for the panel process includes a
maximum of 90 days for the panel selection and 180 days for the panel to render
its decision.
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damages. If the claim is in excess of one hundred thousand dollars
($100,000.00), the plaintiff must file a petition in the court named
in the proposed complaint.' The petition will either seek approval
of an agreed settlement, 56 or demand payment of damages from the
patient's compensation fund." After the petition is filed, the Commis-
sioner and either the health care provider or his insurer may agree
to settle with the claimant from the compensation fund or file written
objections to the payment of the amount demanded. 8 The judge of
the court then sets a court date for the approval of the petition59 or
a hearing if objections were filed by the health care provider. ®
A hearing will result in a decision by the court of the amount
of the plaintiffs damages. Relevant evidence may be submitted by
the Commissioner of Insurance, the claimant, the health care provider,
and the health care provider's insurer." After hearing the relevant
evidence, the court decides what damages, if any, will be paid by the
health care provider and the patient's compensation fund.8
The maximum award the patient can recover from the health
care provider and the patient's compensation fund is $500,000.00. The
first $100,000.00 of the court's judgment or approved settlement is
paid by the health care provider's insurance.' Judgments or set-
tlements in excess of $100,000.00 are paid from the patient's compen-
sation fund up to the Act's $500,000.00 limitation. 4 To receive pay-
ment, the patient's attorney must report the judgment or approved
settlement to the Commissioner of Insurance within sixty days of the
54. A maximum amount of up to $100,000 in damages is paid by the health
care provider or his insurer. Therefore, damage settlements below $100,000 do not
require review by the Commissioner of Insurance. IND. CODE S 16-9.5-4-3 (1982).
55. IND. CODE S 16-9.5-4-3(1) (1982). A Petition can be filed, in any case, in the
circuit or superior courts of Marion County. Id.
56. Settlement of the claim at any time during the proceedings is encouraged,
the only requirement is that the settlement be approved by the court. Id. S 16-9.5-4-2.
57. Id.
58. IND. CODE S 16-9.5-4-2 (1982).
59. Any settlement approved by the court cannot be appealed. IND. CODE S
16-9.5-4-3(6) (1982).
60. IND. CODE S 16-9.54-3(4) (1982).
61. IND. CODE S 16-9.5-4-3(5) (1982).
62. Any amount awarded in excess of the insurer's liability of $100,000 is as-
sessed against the patient' scompensation fund. Id.
63. IND. CODE S 16-9.5-2-2(d) (1982).
64. A balance of $400,000 is the total portion assessable against the patient's
compensation fund. This figure equals the $500,000 cap on recoveries less the amount
of $100,000 assessable to the health care provider or his insurer. IND. CODE
S 16-9.5-2-2(c) (1982).
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final disposition. 5 All claims received by the Commissioner will be
computed as of the last day of the year of the decision." If the full
payment of all claims would exhaust the patient's compensation fund,
the fund will be prorated over the number of unpaid judgments and
the balance paid in the following year. 7
A patient has ninety days after the panel's decision to file a com-
plaint in a court of law demanding trial by jury.68 The complaint can-
not include a demand for specific damages, but can include a prayer
for "reasonable damages." 9 At trial the panel's decision is admissible
as evidence" and, in addition, either party may call any member of
the panel as a witness.7' The jury may award an appropriate amount
of damages up to the $500,000.00 limitation." The jury's decision is
appealable by either party.73
Indiana Medical Malpractice legislation was drafted to expedite
the reviewing of malpractice claims. 4 All of the steps of the review
process are to be completed within prescribed time limits. If one party
fails to meet a time limit in the panel selection process, the other
party may have the Clerk of the Supreme Court expedite the selec-
tion. However, the legislature has failed to provide a remedy if the
panel members or non-party participants do not follow the prescribed
time limits. Lack of a remedy for failure to meet prescribed time
limitations has resulted in delays in the panel process and, therefore,
65. The statute provides that the report to the commissioner must state: "(a)
nature of the claim; (b) damages asserted and alleged injury; (c) attorney's fees and
expenses incurred in connection with the claim or defense; and (d) the amount of any
settlement or judgment." IND. CODE S 16-9.5-6-1 (1982).
66. IND. CODE S 16-9.5-4-1(j) (1982).
67. Id.
68. A decision by a medical review panel is a prerequisite to filing a com-
plaint in state courts. IND. CODE S 16-9.5-1-6 (1982).
69. Id. After a panel decision, the complaint must be filed in a court of law
having requisite jurisdiction.
70. IND. CODE 5 16-9.5-9-4 (1982).
71. Id.
72. IND. CODE 5 16-9.5-2-2 (1982).
73. IND. CODE 5 16-9.5-4-3 (1982). Appeal of a state court decision can be made
by either and is governed by the Indiana Rules of Civil Procedure. IND. CODE S 34-1-47-1
(1982).
74. See supra notes 5, 10 and accompanying text.
75. The statute provides that "a party, attorney or panelist who fails to act
as required by this chapter without good cause shown is subject to mandate or
appropriate sanctions upon application to the court designated in the proposed com-
plaint as having jurisdiction." IND. CODE S 16-9.5-9-3.5 (1982). However, this has not been
proven to be an adequate remedy for keeping the panel process within the prescribed
time limitations. See infra notes 76-90 and accompanying text.
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few claims receive a review panel decision within the nine month
prescribed limitation.
B. Statistical Analysis of the Operation of the Act
Following the legislative procedures, a review panel decision
should be rendered within nine months of a request for a panel
formation.76 However, this nine-month legislative scheme is rarely met
due to various delays occasioned during the process." These delays
have been exacerbated by the growing strain on the system caused
by the yearly increase in the number of complaints filed.
Complaints against health care providers have steadily increased
since the Medical Malpractice Act's inception. In 1975, only one com-
plaint was filed."8 The following year the number of complaints
increased to eighteen and in 1983 a total of 629 complaints were filed. 9
76. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
77. See infra note 176 and accompanying text.
78. 1983 Ind. Dept. of Ins., Patients Compensation Division year end report
[hereinafter cited as INSURANCE REPORT].
79. STATUS OF COMPLAINTS FILED PER YEAR
AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1983
YEAR
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
CUMM.
TOT.
COMPLAINTS
FILED
PER YEAR
1
18
142
272
319
401
431
556
629
2,769
COMPLAINTS
PENDING
(A)
0(.00)
0(.00)
3(.02)
11(.04)
13(.04)
34(.08)
63(.15)
131(.24)
377(.60)
632(.23)
COMPLAINTS
PROGRESS-
ING (B)
o(.oo)
2(.11)
5(.04)
13(.05)
22(.07)
56(.14)
112(.26)
230(.41)
191(.30)
PROBLEM
STATUS
(C)
0(.00)
0(.00)
4(.03)
2(.01)
9(.03)
19(.05)
16(.04)
14(.03)
18(.03)
CLOSED
(D)
1(1.0)
8(.44)
75(.53)
151(.55)
159(.50)
179(.45)
143(.33)
130(.23)
39(.06)
PANEL
OPINIONS
(E)
0(.00)
8(.44)
55(.30)
95(.35)
116(.36)
113(.28)
97(.22)
51(.09)
4(.01)
631(.23) 82(.03) 885(.32) 539(.19)
(A) (B) (C)
(A) PENDING
(B) PROGRESSING
(C) PROBLEMS
Current active cases filed
Division.
with the Patients Compensation
- Complaint has been filed, and a request for a medical review
panel has been received.
- Complaint has been filed, and a request for a review panel
has been received. The file will remain in this stage until all
the members of a panel have been selected.
Complaint has been filed, but either a dollar amount has been
referred to in the prayer, or the health care provider did not
comply with the Malpractice Act, or a possible statute of limita-
tions problem.
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Accordingly, the number of complaints awaiting panel decisions has
also increased."0
A total of 2,769 complaints have been filed with the Commissioner
of Insurance since July 1, 1975.81 Of the total number of complaints
filed, 1,345 (49 percent) are still awaiting completion. 2 Only 1,424 (51
percent) of the complaints filed have been completed, and 539 (38 per-
cent) of these completed have received panel decisions. The remain-
ing 885 (62 percent) complaints have been settled prior to the render-
ing of a panel decision.' Almost twenty-five percent of the cases filed
prior to 1981 are still awaiting a panel decision.' Thirty-six percent
of the complaints filed have been pending for a year or longer. 5 This
backlog of complaints can be attributed, in part, to the system's
inability to cope with the ever increasing need for decisions.
(D) CLOSED Complaint was filed, but it was closed prior to the rendering
of a panel opinion.
(E) PANEL OPINION- Complaint was filed and a medical review panel rendered an
opinion..
1983 Ind. Dept. of Ins., Patient Compensation Division year end report.
80. See supra note 79. Each year the number of complaints pending decision
has increased significantly.
81. Information available on the status of complaints filed prior to January
1, 1984, is as follows:
% of Total
number of
Number of complaints
complaints filed
Opinions rendered 539 19
Settled prior to opinion 885 32
"Problem status" unsettled 82 3
Review panel requested 631 23
Review panel not yet requested 632 23
TOTAL 2,769 100%
See INSURANCE REPORT, supra note 78.
82. The figure of 1345 complaints awaiting completion is computed by adding
complaints where a review panel has been requested to the number of complaints
where a review panel has yet to be requested and those considered to be in a "problem"
status. Of those complaints where a review panel has .been requested, 175 have com-
pleted the selection process and 456 are still in the selection process.
83. See INSURANCE REPORT, supra note 78; see also supra note 79.
84. By 1981, a total of 1584 cases had been filed . As of 1983, only 1200 had
been completed through settlement or panel decision. The remaining 384 (24%) had
yet to be completed. See INSURANCE REPORT, supra note 78.
85. In 1982, a total of 2,140 cases had been filed. Of these cases, 759 had
yet to be completed as of December 31, 1983. See INSURANCE REPORT, supra note 78.
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The total number of decisions rendered in any one year has failed
to equal the number of complaints pending decisions in that year."
The percentage of panel decisions was at its highest in 1983 when
it equalled twenty-seven-and-one-half percent of the complaints filed
that year.87 As of December 31, 1983, the percentage of complaints
requiring panel decisions equalled thirty-eight percent of the total
number of causes filed." If the percentage of panel decisions per com-
plaint continues to increase at the rate of three-and-one-half percent
per year,89 the backlog of complaints will continue to increase until
the year 1986. ® Efficient operation of the panel process, as envisioned
by the legislature, cannot be achieved until the number of decisions
rendered equals the caseload presented and the massive backlog is
alleviated.
Medical review panels were established to expedite the pro-
cedures involving medical malpractice complaints. Each segment of
86. See infra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
87. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE PANEL OPINIONS
MATERIAL OPINIONS
COMPLAINTS NO ISSUE RENDERED
YEAR FILED MALPRACTICE MALPRACTICE OF FACT VARIATIONS (%)
1975 1 0 0 0 0 0(.00)
1976 18 1 0 0 0 1(.05)
1977 142 1 2 0 0 3(.02)
1978 272 1 13 0 1 17(.06)
1979 319 6 33 1 0 40(.12)
1980 401 7 55 1 6 69(.17)
1981 431 16 94 4 4 118(.27)
1982 556 25 85 6 7 123(.22)
1983 629 21 133 6 13 173(.275)
1983 Ind. Dept. of Ins., Patients Compensation Division year end report.
88. The total number of cases completed as of December 31, 1983 was 1424.
Of these 1424 cases, 539 (38.5%) required the rendering of a panel decision. See supra
note 87.
89. On average, the number of panel decisions per complaint has increased
at the rate of 3.5% per year. This figure is computed by taking the percentage of
panel opinions in 1983 (27.5%) dividing by the total number of years the Act has been
in operation (8.5). See supra note 87.
90. Complaints have increased at the rate of 74 per year:
629 (complaints filed in 1983)
(divided by) 8.5 (number of years Act has been in operation)
74 (average amount of additional complaints each year)
Using this figure, as well as the increase percentage of 3.5% as constants, it is possi-
ble to estimate when the number of panel decisions will equal the number needed.
However, several assumptions must be made. First, the number of complaints needing
panel decisions will remain at 38.5 percent. Second, the number of complaints will
continue to increase at 74 per year. See supra note 90. Third, the number of decisions
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the procedure has a prescribed time limitation. However, due to the
absence of a penalty for failure of a party to meet a deadline, the
number of complaints continue to backlog. Presently, an average of
two years is needed for a complaint to pass through the panel process
which is far in excess of the statutory nine-month guideline. Therefore,
medical review panels in Indiana have failed to expedite the review
of claims against health care providers.
THE STATUTORY LIMITATIONS OF THE INDIANA MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE ACT AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
The Indiana Medical Malpractice Act imposes three limitations
upon patients injured by health care providers. The first is a two-
year statute of limitations for filing claims.91 A second limitation is
a lowered age of disability for minors, from age eighteen to age six,
where a health care provider is the tortfeasor. 2 The third is a
$500,000.00 limitation on the amount of damages a malpractice victim
can recover.93 All three of these limitations are constraints on a
malpractice victim's equal protection rights as guaranteed by the Four-
teenth Amendment.
The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws.' Courts have interpreted this
clause to mean that all those who are similarly situated must be
will continue to increase at the rate of 3.5 percent of complaints filed. The following
is a mathematical analysis of these assumptions:
% of opinions/ % short of the
Year complaint filed needed 38.5%
1984 31% 7.5
1985 34.5/o 4.0
1986 38% .5
Following the given assumptions the number of opinions rendered equal the number
of cases needing decision in 1986. Continuing this analysis one step further, the backlog
created prior to 1987 would not be completed until 1994.
91. IND. CODE S 16-9.5-3-1 (1982). The statute of limitations reads: "No claim,
whether in contract or tort, may be brought against a health care provider based
upon professional services of health care rendered or which should have been rendered
unless filed within two (2) years from the date of the alleged act, omission, or neglect
.. " Id. The doctrine of fraudulent concealment is the only means by which to get an ex-
tended period to file. See supra note 30.
92. IND. CODE S 16-9.5-3-1 (1982).
93. A plaintiff cannot receive in excess of $500,000 per injury or death. IND.
CODE S 16-9.5-3-1 (1976).
94. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, S 1.
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similarly treated. 5 Under this interpretation, all victims of tortfeasors
are similarly situated since all tort victims have been harmed by the
action or inaction of another. 6 Victims of health care tortfeasors are
a lesser-included classification of the larger classification of tort vic-
tims. Medical malpractice claimants are dissimilarly treated since they
are the only classification regulated by the Indiana Medical Malprac-
tice Act.97
The initial question in an equal protection analysis is what stan-
dard of review is to be used. Courts traditionally use two standards
of review to determine whether a legislative classification violates the
equal protection clause. These standards of review are the "strict
scrutiny" and the "rational basis" test.9 The Supreme Court over the
last fifteen years has been searching for an intermediate standard
of review for legislation which does not easily fit under either of the
traditional standards."' 0 This search has produced a third level of
scrutiny which falls somewhere between "strict scrutiny" and "rational
basis" tests. This third approach has been referred to as a "means
scrutiny" test.101
The "strict scrutiny" standard has the most exacting
requirements. A "strict scrutiny" approach is invoked only when a
suspect classification or a fundamental right is involved.10 ' When a
court invokes the "strict scrutiny" standard, the legislature is forced
to show a great justification for the classification involved. 103 For a
95. Frost v. Corporation Comm'n, 278 U.S. 515, 522 (1929).
96. All tort victims are harmed due to the negligent action or inaction of
another. Under the Medical Malpractice Act those victims who suffer injury due to
the negligence of a "health care provider" are treated separately from other tort victims.
97. IND. CODE S 16-9.5-1-1 (1982).
98. See Comment, Constitutional Challenges to Medical Malpractice Review Board,
46 TENN. L. REV. 203, 208 (1978-79); Taylor and Shields, The Limitation on Recovery in
Medical Negligence Cases in Virginia 16 U. RICH. L. REV. 799, 835 (1982).
99. See supra note 98.
100. See Redish, Legislative Response to the Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis:
Constitutional Implications, 55 TEx. L. REV. 759, 771-72 (1977).
101. A similar test is the "means focused" test. Both tests are an intermediate
approach to Equal Protection analysis. For a more detailed discussion on this evolving
doctrine, see Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrime on a Changing Court: A Model
for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972). The reason given for the title
"Means Scrutiny" is "[a] 'substantial relationship' must be established between the
means and ends of the challenged legislation." Id. at 20.
102. In the past, suspect classifications have been based on race and national
origin. Rights that have been considered fundamental are voting, procreation, interstate
travel, and the ability to present a defense in criminal actions. Johnson v. St. Vincent
Hosp. Assn., - Ind.... - 404 N.E.2d 585, 596-97 (1980).
103. Horton v. Califano, 472 F.Supp. 339, 343 (W.D.Va. 1979).
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statute to remain valid under a "strict scrutiny" approach the
legislature is forced to prove that the statute's classification is required
by a "compelling state interest" and that no "less drastic means" are
available to accomplish the "compelling state interest."'' 4
Legislation that involves neither a suspect class nor a fundamen-
tal right"15 is reviewed under the "rational basis" test. Under the
"rational basis" approach a statute is valid as long as the legislation
is not arbitrary and is reasonably suited to achieve the legislature's
objective.'" In applying the rational basis test, the court need only
find a rational nexus between the legislative classification and a per-
missible government goal."7 The governmental goal identified by the
court need not be the goal intended by the legislature.'' Due to the
minimal level of scrutiny and the court's ability to find a permissible
governmental goal, classifications which are analyzed under the
"rational basis" test are almost always upheld.' °1
Review under a "means scrutiny" approach falls between that
of the "strict scrutiny" and "rational basis" approaches. "Means
scrutiny" analysis was first used by the United States Supreme Court
in Reed v. Reed,' when it declared an Idaho statute unconstitutional
because it gave preference to men over women as estate
administrators."' Under the "means scrutiny" test a legislative
"classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon
104. See Britton v. Rogers, 631 F.2d 572, 576 (8th Cir. 1980) (governmental action
against blacks as a racially defined class is subject to "strict scrutiny"); Fullilove v.
Kreps, 584 F.2d 600, 603 (2d Cir. 1978) (public works employment does not require
"strict scrutiny" evaluation).
105. See note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality and Equal Protection, 82 YALE
L.J. 123 (1972).
106. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). The Supreme Court explained,
"A statutory discrimination will note be set aside if any statement of facts reasonably
may be conceived to justify it." Id. at 425-26.
107. See supra note 104, at 144; see also, e.g., Ohio Bureau of Employment Serv.
V. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471 (1977).
108. The rational basis test allows the court to find a justifiable purpose for
a particular statute. Thus an imaginative reviewing court could validate any
discriminatory legislation depending on its adherence to the theory of judicial restraint.
Jones v. State Board of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 871, 555 P.2d 399, 411 (1976).
109. "A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts
reasonably may be conceived to justify it." McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426
(1961).
110. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
111. 404 U.S. at 77. "Regardless of their sex, persons within any one of the
enumerated classes of [administrators of estate] are similarly situated with respect
to that objective. By providing dissimilar treatment for men and women who are thus
similarly situated, the challenged section violates the Equal Protection Clause." Id.
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some ground of deference having a fair and substantial relationship
to the object of the legislation." ' The legislature must show the means
utilized are reasonable.' If the legislature fails to state a rational
objective for the means used, the court will not search for a legitimate
state purpose, and will hold that the legislative classification is
violative of the equal protection clause and, therefore,
unconstitutional.1 14
Indiana's Supreme Court has not found the classifications of the
Indiana Malpractice Act to be a violation of the equal protection
clause.1 1 5 Indiana's Supreme Court has always applied the "rational
basis" test when analyzing equal protection questions involving medical
malpractice legislation."6 "Strict scrutiny" analysis has not been applied
because the courts have never found a fundamental right to exist in
collecting damages for medical malpractice injuries, '1 1 7 nor have the
courts found a suspect class in health care tort victims."8 Due to the
court's ability to find a permissible legislative goal under the "rational
basis" approach, the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act has not been
found to be a violation of the equal protection clause.' However,
Indiana courts should reach a different conclusion if the "means
scrutiny" analysis were applied to the classifications resulting from
the limitations of the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act."10
112. Id. at 76. The Idaho Supreme Court opined that Medical Malpractice legisla-
tion needs to be analyzed under a stricter standard than the traditional "rational basis"
analysis and applied the "means scrutiny" analysis in evaluating its Medical Malprac-
tice legislation. The "means scrutiny" analysis was also used by the North Dakota
Supreme Court in Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N. D. 1978) to evaluate a medical
malpractice act.
113. See supra note 101, at 21.
114. Taylor and Shields, supra note 98, at 843. The Act violates the equal pro-
tection clause if the court fails to find that the "means reasonably, fairly, and realistically
achieve the objectives of the legislation." Id.
115. See Rohrbaugh v. Wagoner, -- Ind.-, 413 N.E.2d 891 (1980); Johnson
v. St. Vincent Hosp., Ind., 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980).
116. Id.
117. Rohrabaugh, _nd. at - , 413 N.E.2d at 893.
118. See supra note 102. The challenged classifications under the medical
malpractice act do not fall among those listed as "suspect" by the United States Supreme
Court.
119. See supra note 114.
120. [T]hose courts striking down medical malpractice legislation on equal
protection grounds have all utilized a more exacting standard of review
than mere rationality. Although these courts have explicitly concentrated
on the factual nexus between purpose and means, an implicit evaluation
of conflicting interests also appears to play a prominent role in the judicial
decisionmaking process. The courts have balanced state goals, assuring
adequate health care and lowering malpractice insurance costs, with the
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The great significance of the right to recover for bodily injury
justifies application of the intermediate, "means scrutiny" standard.
Full compensation for tort injuries is a state-created right. 2 ' Since,
as a state-created right, the right to collect for bodily injury is not
considered a "fundamental" right the "strict scrutiny" standard can-
not be applied." However, as a state-created right, the right to collect
for bodily injury warrants application of a stricter standard than
"rational basis."'23 Therefore, the Medical Malpractice Act should be
examined under a "means scrutiny" approach.'24
Following a "means scrutiny" examination, the disability age for
minors classification of the Act is a violation of equal protection. The
Act grants children a "disability" classification until the age of six."5
If the malpractice occurred any time prior to the child's sixth birth-
day, he can file a claim until he reaches his eighth birthday. 6 The
victims of other types of tortfeasors receive a disability until they
reach age eighteen allowing them the ability to file a claim until age
twenty.' Under "means scrutiny" analysis the legislature must show
that the different treatment of minor tort victims is legitimately
related to an objective of the malpractice statute.
The aim of the Indiana Medical Malpractice statute is to keep
interests of victims of medical malpractice. In each instance, the constitu-
tional balance has favored those victims.
Note, California's Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act: An Equal Protection
Challenge, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 829, 880 (1979).
121. A plaintiff is entitled to damages for injuries proximately caused by the
breach of a duty owed to him. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., Inc., v. O'Bryan, __ Ind. App.
-... 408 N.E.2d 178, 184 (1980).
122. See supra note 102, for a list of rights the Supreme Court has considered
"fundamental."
123. Carson v. Maurer, 12 N.H. 925, 930, 424 A.2d 825, 830 (1980). See also
Redish, Legislative Response to the Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis: Constitutional
Implications, 55 TEX. L. REV. 759 (1977)
124. See Redish, supra note 6, at 774. For a discussion of the two year statute
of limitations, see generally Carmichael v. Silbert, __ Ind. App . . 422 N.E.2d
1330, 1332 (1981).
125. See supra note 92.
126. Id.
127. The New Hampshire Supreme Court found a reduced minority classifica-
tion under the Medical Malpractice Act to be unconstitutional. "It extinguishes rights
conferred by RSA 508:8, which provides: 'An infant or mentally incompetent person
may bring a personal action within two years after such disability is removed."' (In
New Hampshire minority under the Medical Malpractice Act was eight years of age).
Carson at 933, 424 A.2d at 833.
128. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
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down medical malpractice insurance costs.'" Restricting the amount
of time in which a minor can file suit is intended to enable insurance
carriers to better determine the amount of losses and thus provide
more reasonable insurance prices to health care providers.' 18 However,
studies show that the number of recoveries by minors is only a few
percent of the total number of recoveries.13 The incidental number
of additional claims that may arise under the Indiana minor's disability
statute for tort victims does not justify the harsh penalty inflicted
upon those minors, who because of their age, limited experience, and
lack of knowledge, do not learn of their injury until after the statute
of limitations has expired.'32 Therefore, the separate classification of
minors is not a "reasonable" means of keeping down medical malprac-
tice costs. Under "means scrutiny" analysis the classification does not
have a fair and substantial relationship to the object of the legisla-
tion and is a violation of the victim's right of equal protection
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Similarly, the limitation on recoveries under the Indiana Medical
Malpractice Act also results in a classification which should be
analyzed under a "means scrutiny" approach of equal protection
analysis." The $500,000.00 cap on recoveries separates out a small
129. The Legislative purpose of the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act is to limit
the awards to injured patients in order to appease the insurance industry and guarantee
future insurance to health care providers. See supra note 5.
130. Carson at 934, 424 A.2d at 834.
131. See C. Hoodenpyl, Medical Malpractice Litigation in Indiana - a Ten Year
Survey, 20 RES GESTAE 126, 128 (1976).
132. Carson v. Maurer, __ N.H. __, 424 A.2d 825, 834 (1980). The Indiana
Supreme Court, discussed the old minority disability, one year before the Malpractice
Act was enacted, and stated,
It makes practical sense particularly with respect to infants who, because
of their youth, cannot be expected to articulate their physical and mental
condition or to realize and act timely to preserve their legal rights. It
is not difficult to conceive of situations where the results of medical
malpractice upon an infant could remain undiscovered for a number of
years.
Chaffin V. Nicosia, - Ind., ____ 310 N.E.2d 867, 871 (1974).
133. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. The concept of due process
is not discussed as an individual topic of this Note. Arguments of due process viola-
tions can be found in the equal protection, right to jury trial, and access to court
sections, as well as in the following discussion.
The Indiana Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of Indiana's Medical
Malpractice Act in Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., __ Ind. . 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980)
including a comparison to the Price-Anderson Act. 42 U.S.C. S 2200 et. seq. (1957).
The Price-Anderson Act sets a 560 million dollar ceiling on the aggregate liability
of licensed private nuclear power companies and the government per nuclear incident.
The limit on liability is a legislative assurance given to the nuclear power industry
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group of medical malpractice victims and denies them the same
opportunities for monetary recovery possessed by all other tort
that it will not be exposed to unlimited liability in case a nuclear incident occurs.
This ceiling provision was motivated by the legislature's desire to encourage continued
research and development by the nuclear power industry.
The Price-Anderson Act's ceiling on liability includes several statutory provi-
sions. Each licensee is required to keep up to $60 million of private financial protec-
tion per incident. The United States Government is responsible for keeping an addi-
tional $500 million available for damages in excess of $60 million. Thus, the aggregate
liability, under the Act, is limited to $560 million per single nuclear incident. In addi-
tion, the Price-Anderson Act also provides that in the event that the damages from
a single nuclear incident exceeds the aggregate limitation the Congress will review
the situation and take any action necessary to protect the public from the consequences.
The reasonableness of the legislature's $560 million ceiling was later examined
under both the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fifth Amendment.
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978). In
Duke the Supreme Court predicated its decision on two major presumptions. The first
was the correctness of expert appraisals that the risk of a nuclear incident with damage
claims in excess of $560 million was slight. The second was that in the event of a
large scale nuclear incident Congress would likely enact extraordinary relief. Id. A
House report supported the Court's second presumption. This report asserted, "The
limitation of liability serves primarily as a device for facilitating further congressional
review of such a situation rather than a bar to further relief of the public." H.R. Rep.
No. 833, 89th Cong. 1st Sess. 6-7 (1965). The Court recognized that the individuals
that resided around nuclear power plants had a property right in receiving damages
but balanced the right against the need for nuclear power and the protection provided
by the two presumptions and found the Act was not a violation of the due process
clauses of the Fifth Amendment.
The Indiana Medical Malpractice Act's ceiling does not include the presump-
tions found by the Supreme Court in the Price-Anderson Act. The malpractice fund
operates in a similar fashion as the Price-Anderson Fund. Each health care provider
is responsible for the first $100,000 in damages per incident after which the fund pays
the balance of damages up to the $500,000 ceiling. However, this is the only similarity.
The fund, itself, is not supported by any government money; instead, each health care
provider pays an annual surcharge to finance the fund. In addition, there is not a
government agency that will step in and review a patient's damages if it exceeds
$500,000. Thus, no matter what amount a patient's damages exceed the limitation,
the patient is forced to pay this excess expense on his own.
The failure of the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act to provide a review for
patients whose damages exceed $500,000 prevents it from being justified by a com-
parison to the Price-Anderson Act. The Price-Anderson Act did not violate property
owners' due process rights because of the legislative commitment to take whatever
action was necessary and appropriate to protect the public from the consequences
of a nuclear disaster. A malpractice victim has a property interest in his right to
recover for bodily injury. However, a malpractice victim does not have the same
legislative commitment to take whatever action is necessary to protect him from the
consequences of a malpractice disaster. Therefore, the Indiana Malpractice Act's ceil-
ing on liability cannot override due process and equal protection challenges in light
of the Duke Power decision.
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victims." Only this group is denied the opportunity for full recovery
for expenses and pain and suffering possessed by all other victims
of tortfeasors. 13 5 The legislative purpose behind this cap was to keep
down the costs of malpractice insurance and to provide adequate com-
pensation for those with meritorious claims.'38
The cap on recoveries is not a reasonable means of meeting the
objectives of the malpractice Act. The legislature has argued that this
cap benefits all injured patients since it reduces medical costs and
guarantees the continued availability of medical care in Indiana.'37
While few claims exceed the $500,000.00 limitation, in extreme cases
the victims medical costs alone may greatly exceed $500,000.00'1 These
unfortunate malpractice victims are denied full recovery so that all
other injured patients may enjoy slightly lower medical costs. Under
"means scrutiny" analysis the $500,000.00 limitation is arbitrary and
is an unreasonable means3 9 by which to meet the objectives of the
legislation. There is no statistical information proving that the cap
134. For the purpose of this Note, malpractice victims with claims under
$500,000 are included in the group of all other tort victims.
135. A health care tort victim with expenses over $500,000 is injured twice.
He must not only suffer at the hands of the negligent doctor, but also must pay for
the cost of medical expenses in excess of $500,000. See Note, Malicious Prosecutions
and Medical Malpractice Legislation in Indiana: A Quest For Balance, 17 VAL U.L. REv.
877, 885 (1983).
136. See supra note 3.
137. Health care providers argue that the unequal treatment, of the cap on
recoveries, is necessary due to the "crisis." Thus, the legislature can set such limits
even if it denies some plaintiffs full compensation for their injuries. See, e.g., Wright
v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 318, 347 N.E2d 736, 741 (1976). However,
the burden of keeping down health care provider's insurance falls exclusively on those
unfortunate victims who need the most financial protection. See supra note 133 and
accompanying text.
138. Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W2d 125, 135-36 (N. D. 1978). "[T]he very seriously
injured malpractice victim, because of the recovery limitation, might be unable to
recover even all the medical expenses he might incur, in which event he would recover
nothing for any other loss suffered." Id. at 136.
Does the "medical malpractice crisis" justify telling a malpractice victim that
he may not have full recovery of even expenses when if he had been in a "rear-end
collision of a fiery Pinto" he would have received full compensation, as well as pain
and suffering? See Note, Medical Malpractice Act: Limit on Damages for Noneconomic
Losses Held Unconstitutional, 22 ATL. L. REV. 39, 40 (1979).
139. See Note, Medical Malpractice Statute-Medical Malpractice Statute Declared
Unconstititutional, 1977 Wis. L. REV. 203, 224 (1977). The $500,000 limitation on recoveries
of the Illinois Malpractice Act is invalid on traditional equal protection grounds because
there is no reasonable basis for its distinguishing medical malpractice victims with
more than $500,000 damages from those with less than $500,000 damages. Id. See also
Wright V. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n., 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976). The
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on recoveries is a valid solution to keep down the rising costs of
malpractice insurance.14 Victims with valid claims in excess of
$500,000.00 are discriminated against in an unfair and illegitimate man-
ner and there exists, therefore, a violation of the equal protection
clause under "means scrutiny" analysis.
Classifications imposed by the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act
fail to meet the standards of the "means scrutiny" test. These
classifications are the result of statutory limitations prescribed in the
Medical Malpractice Act. Without these limitations the Act cannot
operate as the legislature intended and, therefore, they are not
severable from the Act."' Due to these classifications, the Indiana
Medical Malpractice Act is unconstitutional as a violation of the equal
protection clause.
Classifications resulting from the limitations of the Indiana
Medical Malpractice are a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
right of equal protection under the laws. Actual operation of the Act
also results in a violation of the right to trial by jury. Although the
federal constitutional right to trial by jury has not been extended
to the States, the Indiana Constitution guarantees such a right.""
PANEL DECISIONS AND THE RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY
The Indiana Medical Malpractice Act provides that a review
panel's decision is admissible in later court hearings.1" A plaintiff may
submit his complaint to a court of law and demand a right of trial
by jury once a panel decision is rendered.'" At a trial, the conclusion
initial legislative judgment was a prediction and with the passage of time new informa-
tion about the operation of the Act has shown that what was originally considered
a rational balance is irrational. Therefore, this original legislation should be evaluated
in light of this new information. See Bennet, "Mere" Rationality in Constitutional Law:
Judicial Review and Democratic Theory, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 1049, 1065 (1979).
The insurance industry requested changes in the legislation in order to guarantee
that health care providers could be provided with insurance. They argue that without
such provisions they are unable to determine what the future "payouts" will be and,
therefore, certain health care providers are too risky to insure. See supra note 5.
140. The North Dakota Supreme Court failed to find an insurance crisis and
concluded that the drastic limitation on recovery of $300,000 was a violation of Equal
Protection. See Arneson, 270 N.W.2d at 136.
141. Ind. Educ. Employment Relations Bd. v. Benton Community School Corp.,
266 Ind. 491, 510, 365 N.E.2d 752, 762 (1977). Absence of a severability clause creates
the presumption that legislature intends statute to be effective in its entirety or not
at all. Id.
142. See infra note 145.
143. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
144. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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of the review panel is admissible.1 4 5 Constitutional, as well as eviden-
tiary questions 4 ' are raised by the admission of a panel decision to
the jury. Conclusions of the panel that the health care provider acted
within the appropriate standard of care effectively removes the fact-
finding process from the jury." Therefore, the result is a stripping
away of the patient's right to a trial by jury.'4
A claimant who feels that the panel's decision is improper may
elect that his cause of action be heard by a jury of his peers.'49 This
jury should be composed of members of the community who are not
health care providers.1" As such, they must rely on the testimony
of those who are more familiar with the field of medicine.' The injured
patient-plaintiff will carry the burden of showing that the defendant
was negligent in providing care."' After hearing all of the expert
testimony, the jury must determine whether the plaintiff has met his
burden."
145. See supra note 70.
146. Evidentiary issues are beyond the scope of this Note; however, the
admissibility of panel decisions is essentially a rule of evidence. For further discus-
sion see Quinn, The Health Care Malpractice Claims Statute: Maryland's Response to
the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 10 U. BALT. L. REV. 74, 87 (1980).
147. The jury gives great weight to the panel's decision due to the number
of experts on the panel. Therefore, the factfinding process of the jury is severely
handicapped or totally removed. See infra notes 139-60 and accompanying text.
148. Ind. Const. art. I, S 20, guarantees that every person shall have a right
to trial by jury. The right to a jury trial for personal injury (tort) was triable at com-
mon law and, therefore, is triable by a jury under the Indiana Constitution. Tompkins
v. Erie R.R. Co., 98 F.2d 49, 52 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 673 (1938).
149. IND. CODE S 16-9.5-1-6 (1976). A health care provider does note have the
opportunity to bring an adverse opinion to a trial court. Id.
150. A health care provider would be dismissed for cause or through peremp-
tory challenge from serving on most juries reviewing malpractice claims due to possible
prejudice. Brinkman v. Hovermale, 106 Ind. App. 70, 73, 13 N.E.2d 885, 886 (1938).
151. Due to the complexities of modern day medical technology, persons not
involved in the medical science field do not usually have the background to decipher
the technical evidence presented it.
152. The plaintiff must prove three elements to establish a prima facie case
of medical malpractice. He must first show that the physician owed him a duty. Second,
that the defendant-physician breached that duty by allowing his conduct to fall below
the community's standard of care. Thirdly, that the defendant's breach of duty caused
compensable damages to the plaintiff. Dolezal v. Goode, __ Ind. App. - , - 433
N.E.2d 828, 831 (1982). The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor is applicable if the injury is
of such a nature that it would not occur without an act of negligence. See Carpenter
v. Campbell, 149 Ind. App. 189, 194, 271 N.E.2d 163, 165 (1971).
153. See, e.g., Kranda v. Houser-Norborg Medical Corp., __ Ind. App.
419 N.E.2d 1024, reh'g. denied, 424 N.E.2d 1064 (1981).
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The admission of a negative panel finding" creates a presump-
tion of the defendant's innocence and, thus increases the plaintiffs
burden of proof. 5 5 In order to show liability on the part of the defen-
dant, the patient must prove that the physician's conduct fell below
the community standard of care." Admission of a finding by a panel
of three experts,'57 that the physician's conduct fell within the
appropriate standard of care, will necessarily carry great weight in
the jury's decision." Therefore, the plaintiff is required to prove not
only that the defendant's conduct was below the requisite standard,
but also, that the panel of experts was incorrect.
Proponents of the admissibility of the review panel findings
advance three supportive assumptions. First, the panel decision is
necessary to aid the jury's fact-finding process and help the jury
properly weigh this evidence against other evidence presented it."'
Secondly, they assume that allowing the panel decision to be admitted
into evidence will add more credibility to the review process, thereby
causing the litigants to take the process more seriously and to come
to the panel better prepared." Finally, proponents assume that a
disappointed litigant will be more amenable to settlement knowing
154. The panel can render one or more of the four required decisions. See supra
note 51 and accompanying text. A defendant is found liable by the panel if "defendant
failed to comply with the appropriate standard of care .... IND. CODE § 16-9.5-9-7 (1982).
155. The plaintiff must prove the defendant's guilt by a preponderance of the
evidence. Kiger v. Arco Auto Carriers, Inc., 144 Ind. App. 239, 247, 245 N.E.2d 677,
682 (1969).
156. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
157. The three health care providers are the only voting members of the panel;
the attorney merely sits in an advisory capacity. IND. CODE S 16-9.5-9-3 (1982).
158. In Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 3 Ohio Op. 3d 164, 355 N.E.2d
903 (1976), the Ohio Court of Common Pleas discussed the weight of arbitration deci-
sions on the jury of medical malpractice cases:
However . . . by permitting the decision of arbitrators to be introduced
into evidence, in addition to permitting the individual arbitrators to testify
effectively and substantially, reduces a party's ability to prove his case,
because the party must persuade a jury that the decision of the arbitrators
was incorrect, a task not easily accomplished in view of the added weight
which juries have traditionally accorded the testimony of experts.
Id. at 169, 355 N.E.2d at 908.
159. The Indiana Supreme Court argued that the jury will draw upon its
collective experiences and good sense to try the cause and is fully capable of giving
the panel opinion only the credibility it is justly entitled. Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp.
Ass'n. -Id__ __.. 404 N.E.2d 585, 593 (1980).
160. See Alexander, State Medical Malpractice Screening Panels in Federal Diver-
sity Action, 21 ARIZ. L. REV. 959, 971 (1979).
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that the panel's finding will be admissible in court.'06 These three
assumptions must be analyzed in light of the patient's right to a trial
by an impartial jury.
Opponents of the admissibility of panel findings argue that the
benefits of the panel process and the jury's fact-finding process are
outweighed by the effects on the plaintiff's right to a jury trial."2
Opponents assert that the jury is forced to accept the review panel's
findings of liability, or lack thereof, due to the jurors lack of knowledge
in the complex field of medicine.'6 Acceptance of the panel's findings
effectively deprives the plaintiff of his right to have the jury make
an independent finding of all facts at issue.'" Therefore, the opponents
argue that the admission of the panel findings is an effective denial
of the patient's right to trial by jury.
The patient's right to trial by jury is to be kept "inviolate."''
The right of a jury trial contains two relevant elements. First, the
plaintiffs right to present his case before an impartial jury.'" Second,
is the jury's power to determine any and all issues of fact.6 7 As
admission of the panel's decision has a prejudicial effect on the jury,
the admission violates the patient's right to a full trial by jury.6 " A
jury relies heavily on the testimony of experts. 9 A decision rendered
161. Id. at 971.
162. See Lenore, Mandatory Medical Malpractice Mediation panels - A Constitu-
tional Examination, 44 INS. COUNS. J. 416, 422 (1977).
163. Prejudice on the jury of panel decisions was appropriately discussed in
Comiskey v. Arlen, 55 A.D.2d 304, 390 N.Y.S.2d 122 (1976).
Determinations of physician negligence virtually always involve the resolu-
tion of technical and complex issues. Couched in medical terminology and
buttressed on either side by expert evidence, the burden on the petit
juror to decipher and absorb such information is substantial. Enter now
a recommendation with respect to liability of a panel composed of the
most highly respected members of the community which has predigested
the complexities and technicalities of the case .... one is inexorably led
to the conclusion that the jurors will be passively drawn to adopt this
prize panel's recommendation.
Id. at 308, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 131.
164. Lenore, supra note 159, at 422.
165. For a detailed discussion on the effect of the $500,000 limitation on recovery
and the plaintiff's right to trial by jury, see Note, The Indiana Medical Malpractice
Act: Legislative Surgery on Patients' Rights, 10 VAL. U.L. REV. 303 (1976).
166. IND. CONST. Art. I, S 20.
167. Lenore, supra note 159, at 420.
168. A parties right to a jury trial is "inviolate" means "freedom from substan-
tial impairment." Allowing the review panel decision to be heard by the jury impairs
its ability to find the facts at issue and, thus, impairs the plaintiffs right to trial by jury.
169. See supra notes 155, 160 and accompanying text.
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by three experts will necessarily be afforded greater weight than the
testimony of an individual expert. Therefore, the admission of the
review panel's decision is a violation of the patient's right to have
a jury determine any and all issues of fact.
Indiana's Constitution guarantees each individual the right to a
jury trial in civil cases. 7 ' Admissibility of a panel decision is a viola-
tion of the right to trial by jury. The right to a jury trial is also
violated by excessive delays in completing the review panel process.
RE-EVALUATING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
MEDICAL REVIEW PROCESS
The Indiana legislature designed the review panel process for
the purpose of providing a short and inexpensive summary
proceeding.17' The entire process was structured to require a period
of less than nine months from the request of a panel formation.172 At
the time the legislation was drafted, there was no information available
on the operation of medical malpractice review panels,174 therefore,
the legislature could only speculate as to its actual operation. Eight-
and-one-half years have passed since enactment of the Medical
Malpractice Act, and now there is extensive information available on
the practical application of the review panel process. Thus, it is
necessary to re-evaluate the review panel process and determine
whether its actual operation denies a malpractice victim of his due
process rights.
The operation of Medical Malpractice legislation is an exercise
of the State's police power for the promotion of the health and welfare
of the public.' Courts have upheld the operation of such legislation,
170. Although the Seventh Amendment guarantee of the right to a jury trial
has not been made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, every
state but Colorado and Louisiana provides for a jury trial in civil cases in their statutes
or constitutions. Note, Medical Malpractice Mediation Panels: A Constitutional Analysis,
46 FORDHAM L. REV. 322, 328 (1977).
171. See supra notes 36-53 and accompanying text. See also Aldana v. Holub,
381 So. 2d, 231, 238 (Fla. 1980).
172. See supra notes 36-53 and accompanying text.
173. As a result of the supposed "medical malpractice crisis," many states
enacted similar legislation, protecting health care tortfeasors, in 1975. Prior to 1975,
no state had enacted such legislation and no information was available on practical
operation.
174. The Indiana legislature has inherent power or "police power" to enact
laws, within constitutional limits, to promote health and general welfare. Foreman v.
State ex. rel. Dep't. of Natural Resources, 180 Ind. App. 94, 100-01, 387 N.E.2d 455,
460 (1979). However, the methods or means used by the legislature must have some
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as long as it is a proper exercise of the State's police power. 7 5 A
legislative exercise of the State's police power will not be improper
unless it operates in an arbitrary and unreasonable manner.' Under
the arbitrary and unreasonable test, Indiana courts have found the
review panel provisions to be a proper exercise of the State's police
power.'77 However, these decisions have been predicated on facts
exhibited in the legislative design and not on the statistics of actual
complaints.'78
Actual applications of the review panel process have shown that
the legislative design does not expedite medical malpractice claims
as the legislature intended. Delays in the operation of the review panel
process cause the average complaint to proceed far longer than the
statutory nine month guideline. Causes of these delays can be equally
attributed to "the Act, the plaintiffs' attorneys, defendants' attorneys,
and appointed chairmans,"'I in their attempts to comply with the panel
provisions of the Act.18° Due to the combination of causes the average
complaint takes two years to complete.' 8' Therefore, what the
legislature originally considered to be a rational means of expediting
and screening malpractice claims has resulted in lengthy delays in
processing malpractice complaints.
Florida's Supreme Court discussed the constitutionality of the
Florida Medical Mediation Act based on the results of its actual opera-
tion. Under Florida's Act, the panel is required to have a final hear-
ing on the merits within ten months from the date the claim is filed.'82
reasonable or rational relation to the purpose or ends sought. Id. at 101, 387 N.E.2d
at 461.
175. Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., __Ind_ ___, 404 N.E.2d 585, 598 (1980).
176. Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 133 (N. D. 1978).
177. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 5, 170 and accompanying text.
179. Warnick v. Cha, No. SD 83-163, slip op. at 5 (Cir. Ind. Nov. 2, 1983). The
reasons for the delays were discussed in Sakayan, Arbitration and Screening Panels:
Recent Experience and Trends, 17 Forum 682-89 (1982).
There are several reasons for these delays. One of the major causes is
the panel member selection process. The system has failed to attract
enough willing panelists due to inadequate compensation. In addition, some
nonpopulous states have difficulty finding specialists in the field of health
care practicing within the state. There are concomittant problems of pro-
fessional bias and friendship, failure of attorneys to complete discovery
procedures promptly and scheduling problems when all panelists are prac-
ticing professionals.
Id.. at 688.
180. Warnick, S.D. 83-163 at 5.
181. Id. at 4.
182. FLA. STAT. ANN. 786.44(3) (West Supp. 1983).
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Failure of the panel to meet the ten month limitation results in the
panel's lack of jurisdiction over the cause.1" As practical result, the
parties, through no fault of their own, are forced into court."u Effects
of the loss of jurisdiction fall heavily on the defendant who loses the
protections of the mediation panel process. In its review, the Florida
Supreme Court found that application of this strict ten month limita-
tion period is "arbitrary and capricious" and, therefore, violates the
defendant's due process rights.8 ' Florida's Supreme Court also deter-
mined that an extension of the statutory time period would be an
"effective denial of one's access to the courts." Thus, the Florida Act
was held to be unconstitutional as a result of the Act's inability to
operate as legislatively designed.
A similar medical malpractice evaluation was conducted by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court. In 1978, the Court declared that the
Pennsylvania Health Care Service Malpractice Act was
constitutional.8 7 Two years later, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
overruled its earlier decision and found that the Pennsylvania Act,
as applied, was unconstitutional.' Five years of statistical data was
reviewed by the Court in this later decision.'88 This statistical data
disclosed extensive delays which resulted from the application of the
review system."g In its analysis of the statistical information, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court concluded that "[T]he delays occasioned by
the arbitration system therein does in fact burden the right to a jury
trial.... "" Pennsylvania's Health Care Service Malpractice Act failed
to operate as prescribed and, therefore, its deficiencies were held to
constitute a violation of a patient's constitutional rights.8 2
183. "If no hearing on the merits is held within 10 months of the date the
claim is filed, the jurisdiction of the mediation panel on the subject matter shall ter-
minate, and the parties may proceed in accordance with the law." Id.
184. Aldana, 381 So.2d at 236.
185. Id. at 238.
186. Id.
187. Parker v. Children's Hosp. of Philadelphia, 483 Pa. 106, 394 A.2d 932 (1978).
188. Mattos v. Thompson, 491 Pa. 385, 421 A.2d 190 (1980).
189. The statistical information considered by the Supreme Court was first
presented to the Commonwealth Court. This information is included in the Supreme
Court's opinion. At that time, the act had been in existence for less than five years
and only 27 percent of the cases filed had been completed. The court also noted that
six of the original eight cases had yet to be resolved. Id. at 400, 421 A.2d at 194-195.
190. As a part of its opinion the Supreme Court included parts of the statistical
data it considered. Id. at 400, 421 A.2d at 194-195.
191. Id. at 401, 421 A.2d at 196.
192. The Pennsylvania court stated, "Such delays are unconscionable and
irreparably rip the fabric of public confidence in the efficiency and effectiveness of
our judicial system." Id. at 401, 421 A.2d at 196.
[Vol.19
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 19, No. 2 [1985], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol19/iss2/1
INDIANA MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
Indiana's Supreme Court evaluated the Indiana Medical Malprac-
tice Act without reviewing the actual delays caused by its operation.
In Johnson v. St. Vincent's Hospital,"' the court found that the delays
occasioned by the medical malpractice panel process are like those
to be expected in any malpractice case."" In arriving at this conclu-
sion, the Indiana Supreme Court failed to discuss the delays that had
become inherent in the panel process.'9 5 Instead, the court relied on
the erroneous assumption that the panel process was operating within
the legislative guidelines, and, that the delays involved in the
prescribed process were not uncorxstitutional."'
Indiana's Medical Malpractice Act is burdened with the same
types of unconstitutional delays as both the Florida and Pennsylvania
Medical Malpractice Acts. The Florida Supreme Court found that an
extension of the process far in excess of ten months is a denial of
the parties' right of access to the courts.'97 An average complaint is
in the Indiana panel review process far in excess of the ten months
considered to be unconstitutional in Florida.'9 Pennsylvania's Supreme
Court felt that the fact that six cases had remained in the process
for more than four years was unconscionable, intolerable, and a denial
of the patient's right to a jury trial.'" At the end of 1983, there were
more than eighty malpractice cases still awaiting decision, that had
been pending in the Indiana review process for more than four years.'
The delays found to exist in Indiana are identical to those found to
be unconstitutional in both Florida and Pennsylvania. Thus, the Indiana
193. Ind., 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980).
194. The Indiana Supreme Court explained that the nine month review process
delay was like the "Delay in the commencement of a trial and the expense of
investigating and marshalling evidence are part and parcel of the preparation of any
piece of civil litigation." Johnson, Ind. at -, 404 N.E.2d at 592.
195. The Indiana Supreme Court, in deciding the Act was constitutional,
discussed only those delays involved with the actual provisions of the Medical Malprac-
tice Act. In addition, the court stated that the legislature has great deference in enact-
ing legislation involving the public health and welfare and, therefore, if such legisla-
tion is rational it is not unconstitutional. Id. at -, 404 N.E.2d at 594.
196. Id. at - , 404 N.E.2d at 591.
197. See supra notes 182-83 and accompanying text and charts.
198. An average complaint has been in the panel review process for 24 months.
Warnick, SD 83-163, at 3.
199. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
200. As of December 31, 1983, two cases were in the system for over 7 years.
Over 80 cases have not been closed or received a panel decision in over 4 years. These
figures do not take into consideration cases that took in excess of four years but were
completed prior to 1983 since this information is presently not available. See supra
note 79.
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Medical Malpractice Act is unconstitutional when properly evaluated
in actual practice.
Indiana's Supreme Court must re-evaluate the Indiana Medical
Malpractice Act in light of the information available on the opera-
tional delays. An average complaint is now in the review process
approximately twenty-four months."'1 Indiana's legislature prescribed
a review system that was to be completed in nine months.' However,
complaints may pend for as long as seven years"3 without a review
panel decision. Only half of the claims filed since 1975 had been com-
pleted as of December 31, 1983."' Therefore, Indiana's Supreme Court
re-evaluation should conclude that the panel review process is a denial
of a patient's right to trial by jury and access to the court.
CONCLUSION
Limitations of the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act result in
classifications which violate the equal protection clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Admissibility of the panel's decision may result
in a violation of the patient's right to a trial by jury. Moreover, actual
application of the review panel process result in oppressive delays
in violation of both the patient's right to trial by jury and access to
the courts. The Indiana Supreme Court must reassess the Indiana
Medical Malpractice Act and in light of the excessive delays and con-
stitutional violations must determine that the Act is unconstitutional.
CATHERINE SCHICK HURLBUT
201. See supra note 195.
202. See supra notes 36-53 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 79 and 197.
204. See supra notes 262-63 and accompanying text.
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"FAIR VALUE" DETERMINATION IN CORPORATE
"FREEZE-OUTS," AND IN SECURITY AND
EXCHANGE ACT SUITS: WEINBERGER,
OTHER, AND BETTER METHODS
INTRODUCTION
Objective of Note
Federal and state courts1 have struggled with the task of
establishing an adequate remedy2 for both minority shareholders' in
freeze-out4 situations and for plaintiffs5 in civil actions involving viola-
tions of the Security Acts.' In both freeze-out and civil SEC violation
cases the courts have tested7 the price at which the minority
1. See infra text accompanying notes 120-349, 485-572.
2. A major objective of this note is to propose flexible guidelines which can
assist in providing an adequate remedy in both state freeze-out actions and private
civil actions involving violations of the Security and Exchange Act of 1934. 15 U.S.C.
S 78a-78jj (1976). See also infra text accompanying notes 573-624.
3. For the purposes of this note, a minority shareholder is a shareholder
who owns less than 50 percent of the equity in the company at issue.
4. Some jurisdictions have made the term freeze-out and the term squeeze-
out synonymous:
[Epimination of a minority shareholder is commonly referred to as a 'freeze-
out' or a 'squeeze-out.' It may be defined as the use of corporate control
vested in the statutory majority of shareholders or the board of direc-
tors to eliminate minority shareholders from the enterprise or to reduce
to relevant insignificance their voting power or claims on corporate assets.
Gabhart v. Gabhart, 267 Ind. 370, 383, 370 N.E.2d 345, 353 (1977). In Miller v. Steinbach,
268 F. Supp. 255, 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), the court stated that the term "freeze-out" implies
a forced liquidation of a minority shareholder's stock by the controlling shareholder.
While the courts have viewed freeze-out as a forced sale with no legitimate business
purpose, the Delaware Supreme Court in Weinberger v. UOP Inc., 426 A.2d 1333 (Del.
Ch. 1981), rev'd, 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983), eliminated the "business purpose" require-
ment. See infra notes 238-349 and accompanying text.
5. Parties injured by violations of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj (1976), might have an implied cause of action in the federal courts.
Federal courts have recognized a civil implied cause of action for violations of the
anti-fraud sectinn 10(b) since 1946. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512
(E.D. Pa. 1946). See also infra text accompanying notes 485-572.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 485-572.
7. The courts have tried to first determine whether the transaction was "fair."
If the transaction was not found to be fair, the courts tried to determine the fair
value of the minority shareholder's stock. See infra text accompanying notes 562-72,
577-604.
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shareholder sold his stock against the stock's "fair value."' The courts
have proceeded on a case-by-case basis looking for the elusive fair
value.' Unfortunately, the case-by-case approach has provided few
guidelines for future fair value determinations.'0
The concept of protecting the minority shareholder in freeze-out
situations has recently undergone a substantial change in the Delaware
courts." While the Delaware courts have changed the character of
evidence allowed to prove fair value' 2 and have expanded the concept
of fair value,'3 they have not established guidelines to facilitate the
planning capability of either the corporation, the majority shareholders,
or the minority shareholders.14 On the other hand, the federal courts
in actions under the Securities Acts have established some guidelines
for testing the fairness of a transaction."5 However, the usefulness
of these guidelines are limited. 6
This note develops potential judicial guidelines for determining
"fair value." The guidelines proposed by this note are consistent with
the new Delaware methods for determining fair value. The proposed
guidelines use modern financial analysis and promotes the policies of
both state and federal jurisdictions. Some policy concerns and objec-
tives are illustrated by looking at the historical development of
minority shareholder protection in freeze-out actions.
8. Defining "fair value" is one of the objectives of this note. The earlier
decisions interchanged the terms "fair value," "intrinsic value," and "true value," as
in Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 395 A.2d 730 (Del. Ch. 1978), modified, 413 A.2d 137
(Del. 1980).
9. The note will illustrate the evolution of the concept of fair value from
the earlier notions of intrinsic value to the concept of fair value suggested by this
note. See infra text accompanying notes 573-623.
10. The "fair value" concept evolved through a seemingly structured analysis
termed the "Delaware block" valuation method. See infra text accompanying notes
68-102. However, the final step of the Delaware block valuation procedure consisted
of a subjective weighing process, which cast the entire analysis into a case-by-case
analysis and provided few guidelines for either corporate or shareholder planning. See
infra text accompanying notes 102-08.
11. In 1983, the Delaware Supreme Court eliminated the Delaware block valua-
tion method, modifying the appraisal remedy. The modified appraisal remedy allows
the use of modern financial analysis to determine fair value. Further, the entire con-
cept of "fair value" has been expanded, making the modified appraisal more flexible.
See infra text accompanying notes 238-349.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. The modified appraisal, while more flexible, provides few guidelines. See
infra text accompanying notes 333-49.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 562-72.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 562-72.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 54-349.
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Historically, Delaware courts and the courts of many other
jurisdictions used the appraisal remedy 8 to protect the minority
shareholders' interest. 9 The purpose of the appraisal was to insure
that the minority shareholder would receive a fair value for his stock.'
The structured procedure for conducting the appraisal was termed
the "Delaware block" valuation method.2'
The traditional" remedy of appraisal, which incorporated the
Delaware block valuation method, was replaced by the Delaware
Supreme Court with an expanded, more flexible appraisal remedy. 3
The purpose of the appraisal remedy continues to be the determina-
tion of what constitutes fair value." But the Delaware Supreme Court
subsequently expanded both the procedure used in finding fair value
and the conceptual definition of fair value.25 The new remedy allows
values derived from modern financial analysis to be admitted into
evidence.26 The resulting values are then used to test the fairness
of the proposed price27 advocated by the majority shareholder, cor-
poration, on any potential acquirer.28 Further, the new remedy ex-
pands the restricted "going concern"' concept by allowing the con-
sideration of other possible values that might result from an arm's
length negotiation.' By this new test, Delaware has relaxed the struc-
18. The appraisal remedy is a process of demanding a judicial determination
of fair value for a dissenting shareholder.
The dissenting shareholder's appraisal remedy is essentially a
statutory creation to enable shareholders who object to certain extraor-
dinary matters to dissent and to require the corporation to buy their shares
at the value immediately prior to the approval of such matter and thus
to withdraw from the corporation. In different jurisdictions, the appraisal
remedy often applies to sales of substantially all corporation assets other
than in the regular course of business, mergers and consolidations, more
rarely to certain amendments of the articles of incorporation or
miscellaneous matters, but not to dissolution.
Black's Law Dictionary 92 (5th ed. 1979).
19. The appraisal remedy "was exacted to protect the minority interest, when
the common law rule of unanimity was abolished." Gabhart v. Gabhart, 267 Ind. 370,
382, 370 N.E.2d 345, 353 (1977).
20. See infra notes 338, 339.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 54-119.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 54-119.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 238-349.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 333-49.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 333-49.
26. See infra text accompanying notes 333-42, 348.
27. See infra text accompanying note 337.
28. See infra text accompanying note 337.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 343-49, 424-55.
30. See infra text accompanying notes 424-55.
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tured Delaware block valuation procedure in favor of a more flexible
and expanded remedy.
Scope of Note
First, the procedures used to apply the traditional Delaware block
valuation method will be discussed. 1 The traditional method of valua-
tion used as the basis of the appraisal remedy was a structured
approach with little flexibility. 2 This made the appraisal remedy
suitable only for limited applications.
As the courts attempted to apply the appraisal remedy to new
situations, its limitations became apparent.3 The limitations of the
appraisal remedy will be illustrated by examining its usefulness in
determining the "fair value" of the natural resource companies'
equity.' The three cases examined in this note 5 illustrate the factors
which led to the Delaware courts' change in the appraisal remedy.
In order to make the appraisal remedy more widely applicable, the
Delaware Supreme Court expanded the remedy by making it more
flexible. 7
The flexibility of the appraisal remedy was enhanced by
eliminating its highly structured approach38 and by allowing the use
of modern financial analysis to help test the fairness of the cash out
price. 9 By looking at some of the more widely accepted valuation
31. The note examines the evolution in appraisals and fairness procedures
with respect to natural resource companies where the majority shareholder dealt both
fairly and unfairly with the minority shareholders. From a case analysis, this note
proposes some flexible guidelines for determining fair value by first examining fair
dealing. See infra text accompanying notes 573-624.
32. Under the traditional Delaware block approach, flexibility only existed
in the weighing of the component analysis values; in this area, virtually no guidelines
existed. See infra text accompanying notes 102-08. In addition, no flexibility existed
with regard to what types of component analyses could be considered under the tradi-
tional Delaware block valuation.
33. See infra text accompanying notes 109-349.
34. See infra text accompanying notes 109-349.
35. Bell v.'Kirby Lumber Corp., 395 A.2d 730 (Del. Ch. 1978), modified, 413
A.2d 137 (Del. 1980) (Judgment for defendants); Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 351
A.2d 570 (Del. Ch. 1976) (Judgment for defendants), rev'd and remanded, 383 A.2d 278
(Del. 1978), on remand, 402 A.2d 497 (Del. Ch. 1979); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 426
A.2d 1333 (Del. Ch. 1981) (found for defendants), rev'd, 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
36. See infra text accompanying notes 238-349.
37. Weinberger, 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
38. Id.
39. Id.
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theories," this note points out arguments for and against the
appropriateness of individual valuation theories." However, before any
theory can be helpful in determining fair value, the current definition
of fair value must be established."
The Delaware block method defined fair value as the minority
shareholder's interest in a "going concern."' The new appraisal method
does not retreat from the requirement of a going concern;" rather,
it expands the going concern concept to include values that could result
from arm's length negotiations.45 Four possible values are examined
to delineate the range of possible values: the minority ownership value,
the controlling interest value, the 100% ownership value, and the value
to the acquirer. The note then examines the various methods of deter-
mining these values and the ultimate question of which value is the
"fair value."
Federal jurisdictions have also tested the fairness of the price
paid to a minority shareholder ' when a majority shareholder was
found in violation of the Securities Acts." In testing the fairness of
the price paid to the minority shareholder, some federal courts have
adopted an approach which uses modern financial analysis." However,
the inherent limitations in the underlying theory limit the analysis'
applicability.49
The fairness test proposed is based on the Delaware court's
stated objective of "entire fairness."5 The amount determined to be
the fair value will be an inverse function of the degree of unfair deal-
ing found by the court. This variance in fair value will be limited
40. See infra text accompanying notes 350-423.
41. See infra text accompanying notes 350-484.
42. See infra text accompanying notes 424-55.
43. See infra note 108.
44. See infra text accompanying notes 424-55.
45. See infra text accompanying notes 424-55.
46. See infra text accompanying notes 485-572.
47. See supra note 5.
48. See infra text accompanying notes 562-72. See also Seaboard World Airlines,
Inc. v. Tiger Int'l, Inc., 600 F.2d 355, 361 (2d Cir. 1979), citing, Mills v. Electric Auto
Lite, 552 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir. 1977). The court used the "efficient market theory." For
a discussion of the "efficient market hypothesis." See infra text accompanying notes
360-74.
49. See infra text accompanying notes 571-72.
50. For a definition of entire fairness, see infra notes 576 and accompanying
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by the requirement that fair value should be a possible arm's length
negotiated value.5 1 However, an arm's length price can vary from high
to low, from the value to the acquirer," to the value of a minority
interest in the going concern prior to the merger. The lowest possible
arm's length value is the value of a minority interest, which was the
value sought by the Delaware block method.' The proposed guidelines
provide a basis for determining fair value within the range of possible
arm's length values for both federal Security Acts actions and state
freeze-out actions in the jurisdictions that follow the Delaware lead
of rejecting the traditional Delaware block valuation method.
SECTION I-DEVELOPMENT AND USE OF THE
DELAWARE BLOCK VALUATION METHOD
Under common law, a unanimous shareholder vote was required
to approve a major sale of corporate assets or a corporate merger.'
Since one shareholder could prevent a proposed asset sale or merger,
many state legislatures felt that this was an unreasonable restraint
on corporate activity.' Legislatures, therefore, enacted various statutes
allowing mergers with a less than unanimous consent of the
shareholders.' As a result of a sale of assets or a merger with a less
than unanimous shareholder vote, a dissenting shareholder could be
put into a precarious position.57 The shareholder was forced to either
sell his stock or participate in the merger.' Responding to allegations
51. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710 n.7; citing, Getty Oil Co. v. Skelly Oil Co.,
267 A.2d 883, 886 (Del. 1970) ("Particularly in a parent subsidiary context, a showing
that the actions taken was as though each of the contending parties had in fact exerted
its bargaining power against the other at arm's length is strong evidence that the
transaction meets the test of fairness.")
Further, the Weinberger court preferred arm's length dealing and required entire
fairness when the majority shareholder was dealing with the minority shareholder.
Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710, 711.
52. See infra text accompanying notes 424-84.
53. See infra note 108.
54. See note, Valuation of Dissenters' Stock Under Appraisal Statutues, 79
HARV. L. REV. 1453 (1966) (hereinafter cited as Appraisal Statutes).
55. See Squires, The Diversity Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy Under the Illinois
Business Corporations Act, 53 ILL. B. J. 482, 483 (1965) (hereinafter cited as Squires).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 487-89.
58. This result may be viewed as a private eminent domain action Universal
City Studios v. Francis I. DuPont & Co., Inc., 343 A.2d 629 (Del. Ch. 1975) (The power
of a majority stockholder to override minority dissenters and remit them to the cash
remedy is analogous to the right of eminent domain.) See also Appraisal Statutes, supra
note 54, at 1455.
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of abuse, the legislatures provided the dissenting shareholder some
assurance of receiving a "fair value" for his stock.59
The protection provided was in the form of the appraisal
remedy.' The purpose of the appraisal was to determine the fair value
of the dissenter's stock." If the stock was purchased at a price less
than the determined fair value, the dissenting shareholder received
the difference plus interest.2 Armed with the alternative of an
appraisal remedy, the dissenting shareholder had the option of receiv-
ing a judicial valuation of his equity interest, if he felt the offered
price did not represent his stocks' fair value.' The valuation right
granted by statute" was designed to assure the dissenting shareholder
receipt of the "intrinsic or fair value"6 for his interest. In the course
of shareholder litigation, the Delaware courts developed a structured
valuation method called the "Delaware block"" which ultimately gained
wide acceptance. 7
VALUATION USING THE DELAWARE BLOCK METHOD
The Delaware block valuation method was used in Delaware to
determine the "fair value" of stock owned by minority shareholders
until Weinberger v. Universal Oil Products (UOP). The Delaware block
method consisted of three component values that were each weighted
by the judge according to the attendant circumstances of the case. 9
59. Stock is defined for the purposes of this note as the equity ownership
in a corporation.
60. See supra note 18.
61. See infra notes 337-39 and accompanying text.
62. Appraisal Statutes, supra note 54, at 1453-56.
63. A determination of the value of corporate stock may be commenced by
the surviving corporation or any stockholder who makes a timely demand for an
appraisal. Kaye v. Pantone, Inc., 395 A.2d 369 (Del. Ch. 1978).
64. The Delaware appraisal rights statute does not grant appraisal in all cir-
cumstances. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, S 262(b) (Supp. 1982). This statute specifies when an
appraisal remedy is available. For instance, an appraisal is not available in Delaware
resulting from a sale of assets or for shares which are traded on a national exchange,
unless the facts fall under various exceptions such as a merger under DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, S 253 (1973).
65. See supra note 8.
66. In 1947, the state of Delaware was the first to use this method of valua-
tion which consisted of weighing three valuation methods by the judge to fit the cir-
cumstances of the appraisal. In re General Realty & Utilities Corp., 29 Del. Ch. 480,
52 A.2d 6 (1947).
67. See Appraisal Statutes, supra note 54, at 1457.
68. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
69. See supra note 66. The Delaware block method of valuation was used ex-
tensively until February 1983, when modified by Weinberger. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 238-349.
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The valuation analyses that comprised the Delaware block are usual-
ly labled market value analysis,7" asset value analysis,' and discounted
earnings value analysis.' While other factors may be considered,73 final
determination of fair value was usually based on a weighted average
of the values derived from the component analyses.74 The Delaware
block method can be analyzed by first looking at its three component
analyses followed by an examination of its weighting procedure.
Examination of the Component Analyses
The analytical component, market value, as used in the Delaware
block method, is not necessarily the current market value," but could
be a market value averaged over the time period immediately prior
to such triggering actions as a major asset sale or a proposed merger.76
A few early appraisal statutes stated that the purpose of the appraisal
was to determine market value; and, if a market value existed, it would
be the "fair value."" Some of these statutes were later amended by
deleting the reference to market value and stating that the purpose
of the appraisal was to determine "fair value" or "intrinsic value."7
70. See infra text accompanying notes 75-85.
71. See infra text accompanying notes 86-92.
72. See infra text accompanying notes 93-101.
73. Depending on the facts of the case other factors may be considered such
as: the firm's dividend yield, the firm's industry, the firm's standing in the industry,
and a comparison of the firm's stock price to that of similar companies. The court
in Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Francis I. DuPont, & Co., 312 A.2d 344 (Del. Ch.
1973), affd, 334 A.2d 216 (Del. 1975), considered other factors such as the firm's industry,
but held that since dividends reflect the same value as nonretained earnings, they
should not be considered separately.
The Delaware Supreme Court in Weinberger v. UOP Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 713
(Del. 1983), reaffirmed the holding in Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 31 Del. Ch. 523,
74 A.2d 71 (1950), which requires consideration of all relevant factors that affect the
value of the company.
74. See Appraisal Statutes, supra note 54, at 1468-71. See also infra text
accompanying notes 102-08.
75. Depending on the court, the market value component could be the market
price at the time of the merger or cash-out, as found by the lower court in Weinberger.
Weinberger, 426 A.2d 1333, 1360 (Del. Ch. 1981). If no market value exists, a
reconstructed market value can be considered, if it can be constructed. Chicago Corp.
v. Munds, 20 Del. Ch. 142, 172 A.2d 452 (1934). Further, the court in Francis I. duPont
& Co. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 312 A.2d 344 (Del. Ch. 1973), aff'd, 334 A.2d
216 (Del. 1975) held that the market value, even a reconstructed market value, must
be considered whenever available.
76. See Appraisal Statutes, supra note 54, at 1460, 1461.
77. See Squires, supra note 55, at 484 n.9.
78. Illinois dropped the requirement of market value when the state changed
its 1919 Corporation Act in 1933. See Squires, note 55 at 424. See also supra notes
8, 9, 339.
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In some jurisdictions, recent statutes state that if the stock is traded
on a national exchange, the appraisal remedy is not available."
Federal jurisdictions that make fair value determinations of
publicly traded securities generally attribute at least some weight to
the securities' market value. 0 Jurisdictions using the Delaware block
method of valuation also consider market value an important compo-
nent of the weighted average determination of "fair value."'" The
degree of significance placed on market value is determined by such
factors as the state of the economy," the type of company," and how
widely the company's stock is traded.' Therefore, a jurisdiction using
the Delaware block valuation method considers the stock's market
value when it is available.8 Although market value is an important
element, it is not the exclusive factor in the Delaware block method."8
Earnings value and asset value must also be considered when con-
ducting a Delaware block valuation.
When considering the asset value component, the courts have
been careful to distinguish the value of the company's assets as a
going concern from their liquidation value." Even so, the asset value
analysis generally consists of merely an appraisal of the firm's assets.'
Normally a firm that is ripe for a merger or asset sale owns assets
that are either highly liquid or carried on the books at less than their
market value." Therefore, the firm's asset value can be different from
the firm's book value. Book value is based on acquisition cost less
depreciation, and thus does not reflect the market value of the firm's
assets.' To determine the market value of the firm's assets, the
79. See supra note 64.
80. The federal courts have considered the market value to be almost con-
clusive proof of the value to the firm before the merger transaction. See Seaboard
World Airlines, Inc. v. Tiger Int'l, Inc., 600 F.2d 355, 361 (2d Cir. 1979) (Although Tiger's
asset value exceeded its market value, the market value was found to be the stock's
fair value.); cf. Mills v. Electric Auto Lite Co., 552 F.2d 1239, 1247-48. (7th Cir. 1977)
(The court primarily used the firm's market value to determine "fair value.") See also
infra note 107.
81. See supra note 75.
82. Appraisal Statutes, supra note 54, at 1464.
83. Id. at 1463.
84. Id. at 1460.
85. See supra note 75, 107.
86. See supra note 73.
87. Appraisal Statutes, supra note 54, at 1457.
88. Id. at 1460.
89. Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Control
and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1, 7 n.19 (1978).
90. Appraisal Statutes, supra note 54, at 1457.
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appraiser or financial analyst must examine and evaluate each of the
firm's major assets and liabilities.9' The analyst should then be able
to explain any discrepancies between the firm's net book value and
the market value of its assets.2
The third component analysis of the Delaware block method is
the discounted earnings analysis.9 3 The concept underlying this theory
is that a company's value, as a going concern, is a function of its ability
to generate earnings.' The earnings benefit the shareholders through
stock appreciation or increased dividends. This analysis projects a
stream of future earnings and then discounts the earnings stream.
The discount rate must reflect both the time value of money and the
company's business risks. Therefore, the discounted earnings ap-
proach is a two step procedure usually starting with projected
earnings.
The projected stream of earnings, as used in the Delaware block
method, was normally the average earnings of a number of past
years." However, some jurisdictions adjust past earnings before they
are averaged. 7 The adjustment reflects non-recurring items in either
sales or expenses. After the projected stream of earnings is
established, the appraiser or analyst must determine the proper dis-
count rate.
91. The differences between book value and asset market value might result
from many other factors, such as: uncollectable accounts receivable carried on the books,
long term securities tied into an interest rate which is different than the market rate,
undeveloped patents and other trade secrets, depreciation taken on an asset which
does not correspond to its value, etc. See Appraisal Statutes, supra note 54, at 1457.
92. Id. at 1457-60.
93. Some authors term the discounted earnings approach as an investment
value. The analysis derives the firm's value from the firm's earnings capacity. Ap-
praisal Statutes, supra note 54, at 1464.
94. Id.
95. The formula for making a projection is: V=E E/(l+r)', where:
V= The value of the firm.
E=Projected annual earnings or dividends. (Under the Delaware block
method, as used in Delaware, earnings (E) is equal to the average (mean)
of earnings for five years immediately prior to the triggering action.)
(NOTE: The difference in a value obtained by using earnings rather
than dividends would be compensated for by a different discount rate r.)
n=The number of periods. (usually one year or fraction thereof.)
r=The discount rate reflecting the time value of money and the risk of
the firm. Appraisal Statutes, supra note 54, at 1464-68.
96. Id.
97. The court, in Application of Delaware Racing Assn., 42 Del. Ch. 406, 421-22,
213 A.2d 203, 212 (Del. 1965), did not use the year suggested by the appraiser, 158,
when computing the five year earings average, because the court felt the earnings
during (1958) were abnormally high.
98. Id.
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In order to find the appropriate discount rate, analysts have
generally used earnings multipliers designated as price/earnings
ratios.9 The appropriate price/earnings ratio is determined by com-
paring the price/earnings ratios of other similarly situated publicly
traded companies.190 Once the price/earnings ratio is determined, it
is then multipled by the firm's average earnings.10 The product is
equal to the earnings value of the firm. The analyst, and ultimately
the court, then weights the three values derived from the component
analyses to determine the "fair value" of the minority shareholders'
stock interest.
The Weighting Procedure
The process used to find fair value from the component analyses
is termed weighting. °2 The weighting process is accomplished by
multiplying each value derived from the component analyses by a
percentage, termed weights. The sum of all three percentages must
equal 100%.113 Therefore, if the court decides to give the discounted
earning value a 50% weight and the asset value a 30% weight, the
market value would receive a 20% weight. 104 The decision to assign
99. See infra note 101. The price/earnings ratio is no more than an imprecise
approximation of the capitalization rate.
100. For example, in Swanton v. State Guaranty Corp., 42 Del. Ch. 477, 481,
215 A.2d 242, 246 (1965), the price/earings ratio was determined by use of an industrial
analysis conducted by Professor Dewing and contained in his text, THE FINANCIAL
POLICIES OF CORPORATIONS (5th ed. 1926). The price/earnings ratio was then adjusted
upward to reflect a strong real estate market together with the company's policy of
buying real estate and holding for a return in the form of capital appreciation. Swanton,
at 244.
101. Price/earnings ratio X Earnings = Price. See supra note 99.
102. Appraisal Statutes, supra note 54, at 1468.
103. It is possible to weight a value by a factor of zero. The court in Applica-
tion of Delaware Racing Assn., 42 Del. Ch. 406, 423-24, 213 A.2d 203, 213 (Del. 1965),
found a 10 percent weight to dividends which amounted to 10 percent of zero. The
court in Delaware Racing cited Adams v. R.C. Williams, 39 Del. Ch. 61, 158 A.2d 797
(1960), where the court found a zero value for earnings and ordered a reappraisal.
Delaware Racing, 213 A.2d at 213, Adams, 39 Del. Ch. at 71, 158 A.2d at 803. The
reappraisal resulted in the appraiser giving a 40 percent weight to the zero earnings
value, which was later affirmed by the Chancellor in an unreported opinion. Delaware
Racing, 213 A.2d at 213.
104. For example, assume the values illustrated by the chart below resulted
from the component analyses. Further, assume the court decided to give both dis-
counted earnings and market value a 25 percent weight and asset value a 50 percent
weight. The result would be illustrated by the chart below.
COMPONENT ANALYSES VALUES WEIGHTS RESULTS
Earnings value $100 25% $ 25
Market value 200 25% 50
Net asset value 300 50% 150
"Fair Value" $225
Cox: Ruminations on Statutory Interpretation in the Burger Court
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1985
VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
the various percentages is not made pursuant to definite guidelines.
The court examines each component analysis and decides its
degree of applicability according to the attendant circumstances. While
the courts have on occasion allowed a certain component to be given
a weight of zero percent, they required consideration of all three
analyses."' 5 In Tri-Continental v. Battye,' the Delaware Supreme Court
required consideration of all relevant factors to determine the fair
value of the minority shareholders' stock. Delaware courts have
interpreted the Tri-Continental requirement to mean that basing a
fair value determination on only one component analysis is improper. 7
Further, the Delaware courts have pointed out that, when using the
Delaware block, the fair value must be the value of the business as
a going concern.0 8 In sum, the Delaware block valuation method was
highly structured in terms of which component analysis must be con-
sidered, but guidelines did not exist for the final weighting process.
Application of the "Delaware Block"
Due to the arbitrary weighting process, the structured Delaware
block valuation method provided less than satisfactory results when
valuing natural resource companies such as timber, paper, or oil
companies." 9 Natural resource companies generally have high levels
of undervalued assets.10 Their assets in the form of natural resources
105. See supra note 103.
106. 31 Del. Ch. 523, 74 A.2d 71 (Del. 1950).
107. In Tri-Continental the court stated that since an actual market value did
not exist, the reconstruction of a market value was permissible but not necessary.
Tri-Continental, 74 A.2d at 74. Further, the Delaware Supreme Court stated, "courts
must take into consideration all factors." Tni-Continental, 74 A.2d at 72. In Applica-
tion of Delaware Racing Assn, 42 Del. Ch. 406, 419, 213 A.2d 203, 211 (Del. 1965),
the court stated that even if an actual market value of the shares did not exist, a
reconstructed market value must be given consideration if a reconstructed market
value is ascertainable. Id. Further, the court in Delaware Racing stating that while
market value is an important element, it must not be the sole consideration. Id.
Liquidation value also cannot be the sole factor used to determine fair value. In re
General Realty & Utilities Corp., 29 Del. Ch. at 497, 52 A.2d at 14 (1947) (The Delaware
court noted that the appraisal should not be comprised of only one factor.); Chicago
-Corp. v. Munds, 20 Del. 142, 155, 172 A. 452, 457 (1931) (Neither market value nor
net asset value can be the sole factor in establishing value within the statutes).
108. The "going concern" requirement is required by the Tri-Continental holding.
The concept of value under the appraisal statute is that "the stockholder is entitled
to be paid for that which has been taken from him, viz., his proportionate interest
in a going concern." Tri-Continental, 74 A.2d at 72. The going concern requirement
has been interpreted to mean that asset or liquidation value alone can not be the
sole determinant of fair value. See infra note 146.
109. See infra text accompanying notes 120-349.
110. In the three cases cited infra note 112, which pertained to natural resource
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have market values higher than the values carried on the companies'
books. The Delaware block's "going concern" concept, which required
consideration of all three component analyses, led to the argument
that asset value in natural resource companies did not receive the
proper weight."'
Three cases illustrate the valuation problem of the Delaware
block method both with regard to natural resource companies and to
breaches of fiduciary duty.' In Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp.,11 fair value
was determined by using an appraisal remedy based on the Delaware
block valuation method."' The plaintiff, however, argued that asset
value was not given adequate weight."5 In Lynch v. Vickers Energy
Corp.,"18 a breach of fiduciary duty case, the court held that an
appraisal remedy, using the Delaware block valuation method was
inadequate to establish satisfactory damages."' Finally, in Weinburger
v. UOP Inc.,"8 another case involving a breach of fiduciary duty, the
court eliminated the Delaware block valuation analysis and held that
a new appraisal concept should be adopted; one that will provide
minority shareholders with an adequate remedy."9
Kirby Exemplifies The Weakness Of The Delaware Block Analysis
In Kirby, minority shareholders were cashed out"' by the 95%
owner, Santa Fe Industries, Inc."' Contemplating the acquisition of
companies, the plaintiffs argued that more weight should be given to the net asset
value, because the net asset value was more reflective of the value of a natural resource
company and was considerable above the offered price. See infra text accompanying
notes 120-349.
111. Id.
112. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 426 A.2d 1333 (Del. Ch. 1981) (found for defen-
dants), rev'd, 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983); Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 351 A.2d 570
(Del. Ch. 1976) (judgment for defendants), rev'd and remanded, 383 A.2d 278 (Del. 1978),
on remand, 402 A.2d 5 (Del. Ch. 1979), affd in part, rev'd and remanded, 429 A.2d
497 (Del. 1981); Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 395 A.2d 730 (Del. Ch. 1978), modified,
413 A.2d 137 (Del. 1980) (dealing with a natural resource company).
113. 413 A.2d 137 (Del. 1980).
114. Id. at 146.
115. Id. at 142.
116. 429 A.2d 497 (Del. 19811.
117. Id.
118. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
119. Id.
120. Cash-out is a term used to signify that the minority shareholders were
forced to sell their stock to the majority shareholder for cash, as in Kirby, 413 A.2d
at 139.
121. Kirby's 5 percent minority shareholders' interest consisted of 25,000 shares.
Kirby, 413 A.2d at 139.
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Kirby's minority shareholders' stock"' under Delaware's short form
merger statute,12 3 Santa Fe commissioned both an appraisal of Kirby's
assets and a market value opinion of Kirby's stock. ' The asset
appraisal valued Kirby's assets at $320,000,000 ($640.00 per share).2 5
The market value opinion of Kirby's stock was $125.00 per share. 26
Based on this data, Santa Fe offered the minority shareholders $150.00
per share." Owners of 5,000 of the 25,000 minority shares dissented
and made a formal demand for a stock appraisal.128 For this reason,
the court appointed an appraiser."
The appraiser, using the Delaware block valuation method, deter-
mined that the minority shareholders' stock was worth $254.00 per
share.' The appraiser determined that the asset value was $456.00
per share 3' and the earnings value was $120.00 per share. 2 The
appraiser then assigned a 40% weight to the asset value ($456.00)
and 600/o weight to the earnings value ($120.00), resulting in the overall
"fair value" of $254.00.' Both Santa Fe and the Kirby minority
shareholders objected to the value found by the court-appointed
appraiser."'
122. Id.
123. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, S 253, (1973) short form merger statute.
124. The Morgan Stanley company was commissioned to perform a stock value
opinion. Mr. W. Davis was commissioned to conduct an asset appraisal. However, seven
months later, immediately prior to the merger a second asset appraisal was commis-
sioned. Kirby, 413 A.2d at 139.
125. The second asset appraisal subsequently found Kirby's asset value was
$227,754,000 or $456.00 per share. Id. at 147.
126. Id. at 149.
127. Id. at 139.
128. The dissenters, stockholders who did not think the offered price was ade-
quate, demanded an appraisal under DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, S 262 (1973). Kirby, 413 A.2d
at 139. The court did not deal with the fiduciary aspect because it already had been
litigated in federal court. Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). The
court held that the fair value, determined by an appraisal remedy, was adequate.
Damages, such as rescissory damages, were not appropriate. The court looked to the
entire fairness of the merger. Kirby, 413 A.2d at 140.
129. Kirby, 413 A.2d at 139.
130. Id. at 140.
131. The appraiser used the value derived from the second asset appraisal,
which valued Kirby's net assets at $277,754,000 or $456.00 per share. Id. at 147.
132. Id. at 140.
133. WEIGHT VALUE
ASSET 40% X $465.00 $182.40
EARNINGS 60% X 120.00 72.00
FAIR VALUE $254.40
134. Id. at 139.
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The minority shareholders argued that the parent corporation
owed a fiduciary duty of entire fairness"5 to the minority
shareholders.13 Therefore, damages should have been awarded in the
amount the shareholders would have received based on an arm's length
transaction.137 Santa Fe argued that such a stock valuation would be
based on the sale or the liquidation of the assets, rather than the
traditional "going concern" standard. 8' However, the shareholders
argued that the only dispute concerned the relative weights placed
on the asset and earnings values.'39 Therefore, the minority
shareholders contended that their value was consistent with the con-
cept of the Delaware block and its "going concern" requirement. '
The Delaware Supreme Court held that Santa Fe, with a 95%
ownership, had virtual control over the Kirby company's operation.""
At Santa Fe's option, it could liquidate the company and give the
shareholders $670.00 per share, the company's net asset value."2 Alter-
natively, Santa Fe could cash out the minority shareholders at the
pre-merger going concern value." Further, the court held that because
there was no market price for the stock, " the relevant factor to
establish the market value was a $3.00 per share dividend, which
would result in a low market value as a going concern, thus making
the Kirby company ripe for a cash out. ' The court held that fair
value should be based on the traditional "going concern" concept and
rejected the minority shareholders' argument that fair value should
approximate the company's asset value. 48
135. For a definition of entire fairness, see infra notes 576 and accompanying
text.
136. Id. at 140. See infra note 576.
137. The result of an arm's length transaction would be closer to the market
value of the assets. Kirby, 413 A.2d at 140.
138. The defendant argued that the "going concern" requirement was established
in Tri-Continental and that damages based on an arm's length value would be an
unwarranted extension of the appraisal remedy. Id.
139. The plaintiff argued that asset value should be given a 90 percent weight
and earnings value a 10 percent weight. Id. at 141.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 140.
142. Id.
143. The court rejected the minority shareholders' claim that this was in effect
a private eminent domain action. The plaintiff argued that a cash-out under the short
form merger statute should be viewed as a forced sale at a distressed price. Id.
144. The only market for Kirby's stock was a tender offer for $65 per share
and occasional sales at $85 to $95 per share. Id. at 141.
.145. Id.
146. The court in Kirby quoted Tri-Continental emphasizing that the stock should
be valued as a "going concern" and that "intrinsic" or "true value" can not be deter-
mined by the exclusive acceptance of only liquidation value. Id. at 141.
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The minority shareholders in Kirby then conformed their
arguments to the traditional standards of the Delaware block. They
argued that the asset value should have been given more weight.'
Secondly, they contended that the five year average earnings figure
used to compute the earnings value did not represent the potential
future earnings because of recent pre-merger changes in Kirby com-
pany's product lines and marketing strategy.'48 On the other hand,
Santa Fe argued that earnings should be given more weight to adjust
for lack of marketability of Kirby's stock.'49
The court observed that there was no rule of thumb for assign-
ing weights to the component analyses.""0 While acknowledging that
asset values can be increased in some instances, the court noted that
the lack of stock marketability in this case offset any reason to
increase the asset value's weight.'' Although the court recognized the
appraiser's concern that a large spread between asset values and
earnings value could result in a bargain for Santa Fe, the court did
not inquire into the problem."' Rather, the court found that the
appraiser's assigned weights adequately compensated for any
disparity.'-
The Delaware Supreme Court, affirming the lower court's finding,
found that the weight the appraiser assigned to the asset level was
satisfactory.' Even though Kirby's main asset, its timberland, was
appreciating in value, was saleable on the open market, and was
capable of generating cash,'55 the lower court had found that future
earnings potential was adequately accounted for through the calculated
earnings value."8 Therefore, based on a concern that earnings value
would be given too much weight, the lower court excluded any asset
147. The plaintiff argued that because Kirby was a natural resource company,
asset value must be given additional weight. Id. at 142.
148. The minority shareholder argued that an earnings value based on a five
year average is inappropriate because growth and appreciation are not adequately
considered. This is true especially, because Kirby's investors looked to capital apprecia-
tion of their stock, rather than dividend income. Id. at 144.
149. Id. at 145.
150. Id. at 143.
151. Id. at 146.
152. Id. at 145.
153. Id. at 145-56.
154. Id. at 146.
155. The court acknowledged that: "The investing and trading public ... give
consideration to corporate assets only insofar as they disclose a capability of generating
earnings .. " Id. at 144 (Gibbons v. Schenley Ind., Inc., 339 A.2d 460 (Del. Ch. 1975).
156. Based on a five year average earnings. Kirby, 413 A.2d at 145.
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value that was based on an earnings analysis.'5 7 Further, the Morgan
Stanley stock value opinion commissioned by Santa Fe reinforced the
notion that the earnings potential had been adequately considered."
Finally, the lower court examined the Davies' asset appraisal,5 ' which
was also commissioned by Santa Fe but supported the minority
shareholders' position. The lower court found that the Davies' asset
appraisal could not be used because it determined Kirby's asset value
on a "going concern"' 6 basis and not on the basis of a "willing
seller/willing buyer"'6 ' which is the proper method for determining
a liquidation price.'6 2
The Kirby court strictly adhered to the traditional "going con-
cern" concept,6 ' and thus to the historical constraints of the Delaware
block valuation.' The court refused to allow asset value to
predominate in the determination of "fair value," primarily because
of the court's definition of the "going concern" requirement.'' In
establishing a stream of earnings for the discounted earnings approach,
the court used the traditional standard of examining the five year
average earnings rather than looking to prospective earnings.' 6 6 This
adherence to the Delaware block structure provided what appeared
to be a realistic "fair value," because it fell between the differing
values which the parties requested.'67 However, the strained applica-
tion of the appraisal remedy based on the Delaware block, as used
157. Id. at 144.
158. The Morgan Stanley opinion compared historical earnings trends and
price/earnings ratios with similar companies. The Morgan Stanley opinion then selected
a 15.2 multiplier and applied it to average earnings. The court agreed with this con-
cept and termed the report as an "orderly and logical deductive process in accordance
with approved methodology." Id. at 147.
159. See supra note 124.
160. The Court, while requiring the overall "fair value" to be based on a "going
concern" value, held that asset value should be based on the liquidation value of the
assets. Kirby, 413 A.2d at 141, 148.
161. The term "willing buyer/willing seller" was meant to indicate an asset
liquidation standard, but the Davies asset appraisal used a going concern standard
to determine asset value. Using the Delaware block method, the going concern stan-
dard is proper for the final determination of fair value, but it is not proper for finding
the net asset value. Id. at 147-48.
162. Id.
163. See supra note 108.
164. Kirby, 413 A.2d at 147-48.
165. See supra note 108.
166. Kirby, 413 A.2d at 147.
167. Kirby company had made offers of $150 per share. Id. at 149. The minority
shareholders desired a value of approximately $600 per share, which was a little less
than the asset value of $670.00 per share. Id. The court appraisal using the traditional
standards found a fair value to be $254.00. Id. at 140.
Cox: Ruminations on Statutory Interpretation in the Burger Court
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1985
VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
in Kirby, provided an inadequate remedy in Lynch v. Vickers Energy
Corp.,168 where the court found a breach of fiduciary duty.
The Inadequacy of The Delaware Block Valuation Method
Under Lynch
When the Delaware block was used in Lynch, the method resulted
in a "fair value" that was less than the purchase price."6 9 The Delaware
Supreme Court in Lynch found that the minority shareholders, who
were damaged by a breach of fiduciary duty,7 ' should not be limited
to the Delaware block valuation method in proving damages. 171
Therefore, the court held that the plaintiff could be awarded a dif-
ferent form of damages.171
The controversy in Lynch resulted from a purchase of the
minority shareholders' stock by the majority shareholder, Vickers
Energy Corporation (Vickers), a wholly owned subsidiary of Esmark
Company. 73 Through a tender offer of $12.00 per share, Vickers was
able to acquire a substantial portion of TransOcean Oil, Inc.
(TransOcean).'74 However, after the transaction, the minority
shareholders discovered that Vickers had failed to disclose certain facts
about the tender offer.' In the complaint, the plaintiff76 alleged that
168. 351 A.2d 570 (Del. Ch. 1976), (Judgment for defendants), rev'd and remanded,
383 A.2d 278 (Del. 1978), on remand, 402 A.2d 5 (Del. Ch. 1979), affd in part, rev'd
and remanded, 429 A.2d 497 (Del. 1981).
169. Lynch, 402 A.2d at 12. The purchase price was $12.00 per share, the "fair
value" of the minority shareholders' stock was found to be $11.85.
170. The breach of fiduciary duty resulted from nondisclosures to the minority
shareholders. See infra note 175.
171. Lynch, 429 A.2d at 500.
172. The Delaware Supreme Court allowed damages to be in the form of the
monetary equivalent to rescission, with the objective of putting the parties in the
position they were in before the transaction. Id. at 501.
173. Id. at 499.
174. Lynch, 402 A.2d 5, 6 n.1 (1979). The Vickers company owned 53.5 percent
of TransOcean's stock before the $12.00 tender offer. After the tender offer Vickers
owned 88 percent of TransOcean's stock.
175. The nondisclosures consisted of the following:
a. An asset appraisal by the company valuing the assets at $250,800,000
was omitted. The company in its September, 1974 offer, stated the value of the assets
to be approximately $200,000,000. Lynch, 351 A.2d at 574.
b. Esmark had authorized purchases of the TransOcean stock for a price
up to $15.00 per share. Id. at 575.
The Delaware Supreme Court found item (a) and (b) to be critical factors. Lynch, 383
A.2d at 280; and 429 A.2d at 499.
176. The plaintiff represented herself and the minority shareholders similarly
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Vickers had breached its fiduciary duty as a result of the
nondisclosures.'" The Delaware Chancery court rejected the plaintiffs
claim and found for the defendant.' 8
Reversing the chancery court's decision, the Delaware Supreme
Court found that Vickers had breached its fiduciary duty owed to the
minority shareholders."9 Although the supreme court resolved the
liability issue, it remanded the damages issue.'" On remand, the
chancery court examined three alternative remedies.'81 The plaintiff
argued that she should have been able to choose the alternative
remedy that gave her and the members of her class the greatest
recovery.' 8 In contrast, Vickers argued that the plaintiff did not suf-
fer any injury resulting from a material omission in the proxy state-
ment and therefore was not entitled to recovery.'" The chancery court,
after examining the three possible remedies, found that though the
defendant had breached its fiduciary duty,'84 the breach did not cause
injury to the plaintiff.'85
The chancery court noted that the only fiduciary duty breached
was the duty of complete candor.'88 When dealing with the minority
shareholders, the majority shareholders owe a duty of "entire fairness"
to the minority shareholders.'87 Since the Delaware Supreme Court
had already decided that the information withheld from the minority
shareholders might have affected their individual valuation of Trans-
Ocean's stock, the chancery court was only to determine an adequate
remedy to be accorded the plaintiff." To determine the appropriate
situated. Lynch, 402 A.2d at 6.
177. The chancery court did not find a breach of fiduciary duty, Lynch, 351
A.2d at 575-76, but the supreme court reversed the chancellor's finding that a reasonable
man could use the information not disclosed to value the stock, and found that Esmark,
controlling the majority, had a fiduciary duty to disclose this information to the minority
shareholders. Lynch, 383 A.2d at 281.
178. Lynch, 351 A.2d at 575-76.
179. Lynch, 383 A.2d at 281.
180. Id.
181. Lynch, 402 A.2d at 11, 12.
182. Id. at 7.
183. Id.
184. Further the chancery court did not find fraud or intentional misrepresen-
tation. Id. at 10.
185. Id. at 13.
186. "Vickers as the majority shareholder of TransOcean, owed a fiduciary duty
to the plaintiff, which required complete candor." Lynch, 383 A.2d at 279.
187. Lynch, 402 A.2d at 8.
188. Id. at 9.
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remedy, the chancery court examined Poole v. N.V. Deli Maatchappi,"89
a case involving a greater degree of unfairness than in Lynch.9 '
In Poole, the court found that the defendant had made fraudulent
misrepresentations upon which the plaintiffs had relied and sold their
stock at an inadequate price.' The Lynch chancery court noted that
even in Poole, where fraudulent misrepresentation occurred, the court
looked to the "going concern" standard and applied the structured
Delaware block valuation method in determining the "intrinsic" or "fair
value" of the stock.9 ' Therefore, the Lynch chancery court deduced
that if the Delaware block was an adequate remedy in a case involv-
ing fraud, it was also adequate in a case involving mere breach of
a fiduciary duty. 19 3
The plaintiff in Lynch then conformed his argument to the con-
text of the traditional appraisal remedy.' He argued that the oil
industry was an asset-wasting industry whose value should be based
primarily on the value of its major assets, generally oil reserves. 9'
The chancery court held that the facts in Lynch were analogous to
the facts in Kirby, which also involved a natural resource company.'
The Kirby court applied the appraisal remedy based on the Delaware
block analysis.'97 Although in Kirby the asset value was an important
element in finding the fair value, the Lynch chancery court held that
in applying the Delaware block valuation, asset value cannot be the
sole determinant of fair value. 99
After applying the Delaware block method of appraisal, the
chancery court determined that the "fair value" was less than the
offered price of $12.00 per share.'99 In deriving the fair value, the
chancery court based the asset value component on an asset appraisal
189. Poole v. N.V. Maatchappij, 43 Del. Ch. 283, 224 A.2d 260 (Del. 1966).
190. Lynch, 402 A.2d at 10.
191. Id.
192. The Poole court would not allow "fair value" to be determined exclusively
by the company's net asset value. The court required a Delaware block weighting
of market value, earnings value, and asset value. Lynch, 402 A.2d at 9.
193. Id. at 10.
194. Id.
195. Id. An asset wasting industry is one which consumes or sells its non-
replenishable resources, primarily minerals.
196. Id.
197. Kirby, 413 A.2d at 146.
198. Lynch, 402 A.2d at 11, 12.
199. Id. at 12.
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report2'" commissioned by the defendant.0 ' The market value compo-
nent was based on TransOcean's stock market price two days before
the offer.2 The earnings value component was based on the tradi-
tional five year average earnings, which was then multiplied by 17.4,
the figure found to be the appropriate earnings multiplier. 3 The court
then weighed the values derived from the component analyses.0 '
In determining the proper weight for the asset value component,
the Lynch court considered the Kirby court's analysis. 5 Because both
Kirby Lumber Company and TransOcean were natural resource com-
panies, the Lynch court applied the same 40% weight to asset value
that was applied by the Kirby court. Market value was also given
a 40% weight and earning value was given a 20% weight.0 6 The
resultant fair value was found to be $11.85 per share, a value less
than the $12.00 per share offered.2 7 Therefore, the lower court found
the plaintiff was not damaged by the defendant's omission of material
factors.200 Since the plaintiff could not show any out-of-pocket loss,
200
the chancery court examined the alternative remedy of rescission.
The chancery court held that even if the plaintiffs were entitled
to equitable rescission, which would amount to a return of their stock,
they would have to pay the defendant, Vickers, $12.00 per share plus
reasonable interest of 13.1% or a total price per share of $19.64.211
However, the market value of Vickers' stock as of the 1978 judgment
200. Id. at 8.
201. This report was one of the items not disclosed to the minority shareholders.
Id.
202. Id. at 11.
203. Id. at 12.
204.
COMPONENT ANALYSIS VALUES WEIGHTS RESULTS
Asset Value $17.50 40% $ 7.00
Market Value 9.48 40% 3.80
Earnings Value 5.25 20% 1.05
Fair Value = $11.85
Id. at 12.
205. Id. at 10.
206. See supra note 204.
207. Lynch, 429 A.2d at 499.
208. The court in Lynch held that the plaintiffs were not damaged by the con-
duct of the defendant. Lynch, 402 A.2d at 13.
209. The Lynch court quoted Poole, "Plaintiffs seek to recover the difference
between the actual value of the stock and the price paid, known as the 'out-of-pocket'
measure of damages. ... Poole, 224 A.2d at 262, cited in Lynch, 429 A.2d at 500.
210. Lynch, 402 A.2d at 12. Further, the court found that a "prudent investor"
can get 13.1 percent on his investment..Id. at 12.
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date was approximately $14.31,"' which was below the $19.64 per share
level. 12 Consequently, the chancery court found that the plaintiff and
members of her class would not benefit from an award of rescissory
damages, and thus they were not damaged as a result of any omis-
sion made in the tender offer circular.213
Lynch's Second Appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court
The plaintiff appealed for a second time to the Delaware Supreme
Court. The supreme court, after considering the issue of damages,
reversed the chancery court's decision."4 The court first examined the
applicability of the appraisal as propounded by the court in Poole.1'
Distinguishing Poole, the supreme court noted that the court in Poole
applied the Delaware block appraisal, which the plaintiffs had
specifically requested." However, the plaintiff in Lynch did not ask
for the same appraisal formula that was applied in Poole.217
In determining whether the appraisal remedy was adequate, the
supreme court found that greater weight should be given to Trans-
Ocean's asset value and less weight to TransOcean's market value.
The Lynch supreme court recognized that TransOcean was a natural
resource company whose major asset, oil reserves, was in high demand
and scarce supply. 8 Further, Vickers' dominion, control, and
announced plan to acquire 100% of TransOcean, had adversely
influenced the price of TransOcean's stockY9 Thus, the court held that
TransOcean's stock price should not have been given a 40% weight
in determining TransOcean's intrinsic value.' Consequently, in Lynch,
the supreme court found the structured Delaware block appraisal
211. The price was determined by the following weighting:
COMPONENT ANALYSIS VALUES WEIGHTS RESULTS
ASSET VALUE $14.31 50% $ 7.16
MARKET VALUE 15.06 30% 4.52
EARNINGS VALUE 13.41 20% 2.68
"Fair Value" $14.36
This is a chart representation of the data used to determine market value. Id.
at 13. (NOTE $.06 DISCREPANCY IN THE COURT'S CALCULATION)
212. Id. at 12-13.
213. Id. at 13.
214. Lynch, 429 A.2d at 507.
215. Id. at 499.
216. Id. at 501; Poole, 224 A.2d at 262.
217. Lynch, 429 A.2d at 501.
218. Id. at 505.
219. Id. at 504.
220. Id. at 505.
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remedy did not adequately compensate the plaintiff for her loss. 1 Fur-
ther, the court held that the statutory limitation of appraisal does
not apply in cases of breach of fiduciary duty. 2 Instead, the court
found other remedies such as rescission, or its monetary equivalent,
were applicable in such cases.'
The state supreme court did not order actual rescission because
of the lapse of time since the transaction had occurred," 4 but stated
that the monetary equivalent of rescission should be awarded.' 5 Since
the purpose of rescission is to place the parties where they were
before the transaction,' the monetary equivalent to rescission equals
the gain in value Vickers received as a result of acquiring and holding
TransOcean's stock.' Therefore, the supreme court held that the plain-
tiffs were entitled to receive from the defendant the equivalent value
of TransOcean's stock as of the time of the judgment, less the $12.00
per share already received plus fair interest. 8 The supreme court
then established broad guidelines for determining the monetary
equivalent of rescission.2
221. Id. at 507.
222. In finding breach of fiduciary duty, the Delaware Supreme Court did not
require an actual intent to deceive when one party has an advantageous bargaining
position with respect to the other party. Id at 503. However, in Poole, breach of fiduciary
duty was neither alleged or found. Id. at 501. A strange result since fraud should
also be a breach of a fiduciary duty.
223. Id. at 501.
224. The supreme court stated that rescission would be preferable if at an
earlier stage, but was not possible at this late date because of the corporate changes
that had taken place in Esmark. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 501, 502.
228. The rescissory damages should be measured at the time of the judgment.
Id. at 503. The defendant is entitled to a credit equalling the $12.00 already paid plus
the interest equivalent to what they could have "safely earned" by use of the $12.00.
The supreme court overruled the court of chancery, which allowed a 13.1/o rate. The
supreme court stated that a 70/0 rate would be more fair. The intent is not to reward
the wrongdoer. Id. at 506.
229. The supreme court stated the stock should not be valued at less than
$15.00 per share or more than $41.40 per share. The lower limit was established by
the undisclosed information that Vickers was willing to buy TransOcean's stock from
anyone for $15.00 per share in September, 1974. The supreme court reasoned that
an arm's length transaction with the minority shareholders should not have resulted
in a price less than $15.00 per share. In addition, the supreme court set the high limit
on the basis that $41.40 per share is the most value the plaintiff ever alleged Trans-
Ocean's stock was worth. Id. at 505.
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In conclusion, the supreme court held that if the majority
shareholder breaches its fiduciary duty when dealing with the minority
shareholders for the purchase of their stock, the minority shareholders
are entitled to rescission or its monetary equivalent. ° Although the
appraisal remedy was appropriate in Kirby,23 the concept of fairness
requires rescission or its monetary equivalent when the court finds
a breach of fiduciary duty. 32 Therefore, the use of the structured
Delaware block method to determine fair value did not provide
adequate relief to the minority shareholders, in this instance."
After Lynch, the traditional Delaware block method of valuation
still existed for standard appraisals of dissenting shareholders' equity,
as in Kirby. However, the traditional appraisal remedy, which uses
the Delaware block method, was found inadequate in cases involving
a breach of fiduciary duty.2" The Delaware Supreme Court's
dissatisfaction with the Delaware block appraisal method reached its
peak in 1983, when it eliminated the traditional Delaware block valua-
tion method. 5 In Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,236 the Delaware Supreme
Court made the valuation process more flexible, appropriate, and
justifiable."7
The New Appraisal Remedy Adopted In Weinberger
The controversy in Weinberger involved both the value of a
natural resource company's stock and a breach of fiduciary duty. 8
Therefore, the facts in Weinberger are analogous to both Kirby and
to Lynch.' In 1975, Signal Companies, Inc. ("Signal"), the defendant,
was looking for additional investments because it had just sold a
wholly owned oil subsidiary for $420,000,000 in cash.24 0 After examin-
230. Id. at 501.
231. See supra note 128. No breach of fiduciary duty was found in Kirby.
232. Lynch, 429 A.2d at 501.
233. Id.
234. See supra note 128.
235. See infra text accompanying notes 238-349.
236. 426 A.2d 1333 (Del. Ch. 1981) (found for defendants), rev'd, 457 A.2d 701
(Del. 1983).
237. See infra text accompanying notes 333-49.
238. UOP was a diversified oil company traded on the New York Stock
Exchange. Weinberger, 426 A.2d at 1335. Further, the Delaware Supreme Court found
a breach of fiduciary duty. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 703.
239. Because UOP was a natural resource company, the facts in Weinberger
are analogous to both Kirby and Lynch. However, breach of fiduciary duty was only
found in Lynch, thus the facts in Weinberger and Lynch are the most analogous.
240. Weinberger, 426 A.2d at 1336, 1337.
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ing Universal Oil Products ("UOP"), Signal began friendly negotiations
in 1975 with the hope of acquiring the controlling interest in UOP."
The negotiations began with Signal offering $19.00 per share and
UOP asking $25.00 per share. Arm's length bargaining resulted in a
price of $21.00. Pursuant to the final agreement, a tender offer for
a limited number of shares242 was made to obtain UOP's controlling
interest. Because more than the desired number of outstanding shares
were offered," Signal became the majority shareholder, owning 50.5%
ownership of UOP's stock.244
After becoming the majority shareholder, Signal made board
appointments.2"5 Signal initially appointed only six of the thirteen
directors.246 However, when the president and chief executive officer
retired in 1975, Signal appointed a replacement, Mr. Crawford, giv-
ing Signal control of the board.24 ' Simultaneously, Signal, still with
excess cash, was searching unsuccessfully for additional investments.248
After researching the market for other possible acquisitions,
Signal decided its best investment opportunity was to purchase the
balance of UOP's stock.4 Therefore, in February, 1978, Signal decided
to explore the feasibility of this course of action."' Pursuant to this
decision, Signal's management ordered a feasibility study to be per-
formed by two of Signal's vice presidents. 1 That study indicated that
a purchase price of up to $24.00 per share would provide an acceptable
return for Signal. '52
Based on the information derived from the feasibility study,
Signal's management decided to offer UOP's minority shareholders
241. The purpose of the negotiations was to purchase both issued and unissued
stock, giving Signal 50.5% ownership. Id. at 1336.
242. Signal only needed 5,800,000 shares to obtain the desired 50.5% controlling
interest. The negotiated agreement to buy 1,500,000 unissued shares at $21.00 per
share was contingent upon a successful tender offerof 4,300,000 issued shares at $21.00
per share. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 704.
243. The number of outstanding shares tendered to Signal totaled 7,800,000,
representing 78.2% of the total outstanding shares. Weinberger, 426 A.2d at 1336.
244. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 704.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 705.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
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$20 to $21 per share for their stock." Signal then contacted Crawford
and made the proposal. While Crawford did suggest some modifica-
tion with respect to the employee benefits, he did not object to the
offered price.215 Later Crawford suggested that in order to convince
the minority board members to vote in favor of the cash out, Signal
should offer $21.00 per share, which was still within the proposed
range and was the price of the over subscribed tender offer. 21 Conse-
quently, Crawford and Signal's management both thought the $21.00
per share price was fair, and would be approved by the minority board
members."7 This conclusion was based in part on the over subscrip-
tion of the 1975 tender offer.2
Signal's management, believing UOP's minority shareholders
would accept their offer, authorized negotiations with UOP's direc-
tors, and on February 28, 1978, issued a press release. The press
release announced that negotiations were to begin for the purchase
by Signal of UOP's 49.5% minority ownership."9 At that time, UOP's
stock was selling for $14.50 per share.6 Two days later, on March
2, 1978, Signal issued another press release stating that its offering
price was in the range of $20 to $21 per share.2 11 In order to validate
the fairness of Signal's offer, Crawford started negotiating with an
investment banking firm to provide a fairness opinion. 62
Crawford retained Lehman Brothers, an investment banking firm,
to do the fairness study.2 Crawford chose this firm for three stated
reasons. First, Lehman Brothers had been UOP's investment banker
for years.6 Second, Mr. Glanville, a partner in Lehman Brothers, was
also a director of UOP.265 Third, Crawford thought time was of the
essence and realized that Glanville's present knowledge of UOP's
operations would expedite the analysis..26 After negotiating the price
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. More than the desired amount of stock was tendered. Id. at 706. See also
supra notes 242, 243.
257. Id. at 705, 706.
258. Id. at 705. See also supra notes 242, 243.
259. Id. at 706.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Mr. Crawford was told by Signal's management that time was of an essence.
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for the fairness opinion, Glanville accepted the assignment. Crawford
and Glanville then discussed the value of UOP's stock.6 7
During the same discussions, Glanville indicated that $20 to $21
per share for UOP's stock was a fair value because it represented
a 500/0 premium over the market pricey.26 Believing time was of the
essence, Lehman Brothers used three analysts who completed the
fairness opinion in only three days. 269 By analyzing public information
and interviewing Crawford, Lehman Brothers' team concluded that
either $20.00 or $21.00 per share was a fair price.' Although it became
apparent that the opinion was not needed as urgently as anticipated,
Lehman Brothers performed no further analysis. 2 ' The results of the
fairness opinion were given to the board members who represented
the minority shareholders.' However, Signal never disclosed the hasty
manner in which the study was completed.273
Based on the information provided, the UOP board members who
were not affiliated with Signal voted to accept the offered price of
$21.00 per share. 24 However, the non-affiliated board members voted
without knowledge of either the manner in which the fairness opinion
was conducted, or the existence of the prior study conducted by
Signal's management, which indicated that $24.00 per share was a fair
price and was still profitable for Signal.275 The plaintiff, representing
all the minority shareholders who did not exchange their stock for
the merger price, attacked the validity of the merger seeking to either
set the merger aside or to be compensated monetarily." The chancery
court found for the defendant, Signal; the plaintiff appealed. 7
The Delaware Supreme Court reversed.278 The supreme court
found that Signal had breached its fiduciary duty by not disclosing
to the non-Signal board members either the manner in which Lehman
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 707.
271. A board meeting was convened on March 6, 1978, but the merger was
not submitted to UOP's shareholders until their annual meeting May 26, 1978. Id. at
707, 708.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 708.
274. Id. at 707.
275. Id. at 707-09.
276. Weinberger, 426 A.2d at 1335.
277. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 703.
278. Id. at 715.
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Brothers' fairness opinion was performed or the prior study indicating
that $24 per share was still a fair price." 9 The first study, performed
internally by Signal's management, indicated that Signal should pur-
chase the remaining stock of UOP for a price between $21 and $24
per share."8 The analysis indicated that Signal was projecting a return
on investment of 15.7% if the stock was purchased for $21 per share
and a 15.5% return if purchased for $24 per share. 8 ' The difference
between $21 and $24 per share amounted to a $17,000,000 impact on
the minority shareholders.282 The Delaware Supreme Court indicated
that because the .2% difference in the rate of return on investment
was very small in relationship to the aggregate difference of
$17,000,000, the information should have been given to the non-Signal
board members.2" Therefore, the directors affiliated with Signal, who
owed a fiduciary responsibility to the minority directors, breached
this duty by not disclosing the earlier study which indicated that $24
per share would be a fair price."'
The Delaware Supreme Court in Weinberger held that the direc-
tors affiliated with Signal and UOP had both dual capacities and dual
responsibilities, 285 and thus should have treated the minority
shareholders in a fair manner. 88 Further, the court held that the con-
cept of fairness should be viewed as involving two components: "fairdealing and fair price. ' The Signal affiliated directors had access
to inside information which they did not disclose to the minority
directors.2" Neither the study that was prepared for the exclusive
use of Signal's directors, nor the circumstances surrounding Lehman
Brothers' fairness analysis was disclosed to UOP's minority directors.'
Therefore, the majority directors were not "dealing fairly" with the
minority directors.211
279. "Given these particulars and the Delaware law on the subject, the record
does not establish that this transaction satisfies any reasonable concept of fair dealing
Id. at 712.
280. Id. at 709.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 712.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 710.
286. "When directors of a Delaware corporation are on both sides of a trans-
action, they are required to demonstrate their utmost good faith and the most scrupulous
inherent fairness of the bargain." Id.
287. Id. at 711.
288. The inside information refers to the in-house study conducted by Signal's
management. Id.
289. Id. at 712.
290. See supra note 279.
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The second component of the "fairness" standard is fair price."
Price fairness relates to the "fair value" of UOP's stock.' In deter-
mining the "fair value," the supreme court found that the chancery
court had erroneously used an analysis, propounded by the defendant's
analyst, which applied the concepts of the traditional Delaware block
valuation method." The market value component was determined by
looking at the five year market performance of UOP's stock. 4 Dur-
ing the five calendar year period from 1974 through 1978, the highest
price at which UOP's stock was traded was $18.75 per share in 1974."
The average market price was slightly less than $14.00 per share."6
Finally, the current closing market price on February 28, 1978, was
$14.50 per share.97 Therefore, based on any criteria, the market value
was less than the $21.00 per share offering price.
After analyzing the market value of the stock, the defendant's
analyst examined the firm's earnings value."' 8 Looking at this compo-
nent, the analyst noted that, due to the "nature of UOP's business,"
its earnings were both erratic and unpredictable. 9 The analyst deter-
mined the appropriate earnings multiplier by examining comparable
companies."0 The resulting range of values, from $14.31 per share to
$16.39 per share, was substantially below the $21.00 per share offer-
ing price.31
Signal's analyst then turned to the asset value component.3 02
Although the analysis of the asset value resulted in the highest value,
the value was still less than the offering price of $21.00.30 The analyst
291. Id. at 711.
292. The Delaware Supreme Court stated that fair price includes . . . all
relevant factors: assets, market value, earnings, future prospects, and any other elements
that affect the intrinsic or inherent value of a company's stock." Id.
293. Id. at 712.
294. Weinberger, 426 A.2d at 1364.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 1365.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Further, UOP's dividend policy was erratic with the 1978 first quarter
dividend equal to the 1970 level. Id. However, it should be noted that accepted economic
theory views diversification as a stabilizing force on earnings.
300. The analyst selected comparable companies and found their earnings values
were between 6.5 and 7.0 times that of UOP's 1977 earnings per share and between
80% to 85% of UOP's 1977 book value. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. "The net asset value or book value was $19.86 at year-end, 1977, and $20.69
as of the end of the first quarter of 1978." Id.
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equated asset value with book value and concluded that the asset value
should be given very little weight because Signal was acquiring UOP
as a going concern with no intention of liquidation2"'
Finally, Signal's analyst departed from the traditional Delaware
block analysis by examining the premium paid over the market price
of comparable acquisition transactions. 5 In examining the premium
paid over the market price of comparable firms, the analyst again
concluded that the offered price was fair."° The chancery court held
that this type of analysis proffered by the defendant's analyst was
more in line with the traditional Delaware block method than the
analysis propounded by the plaintiffs analyst2°7
The plaintiff argued that at the time of the merger UOP's stock
had a fair value of $26.00 per share. °8 His expert, Mr. Bodenstein,
used two techniques to prove the stock's value. 09 First, he compared
the premium paid over market price in ten other tender-offer merger
combinations of similar size. 1 Secondly, he computed the fair value
for UOP's stock based on a discounted cash flow approach."' Both
analyses were based on the principle that fair value equals the value
derived from owning 100% of an ongoing company. 12 The 1000/a owner
would be free from constraint"' and could do with the company as
he pleased. 14 The 100% owner could maximize his wealth by chang-
ing the company's dividend policy, its investments, its overall risk,
or even by liquidating its assets. 15 Neither of Bodenstein's analytical
methods conformed to the established principles of the Delaware block
valuation.1
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. He found that the median premium was 41% and the average (mean)
premium was 48%. Comparing the market price of $14.50 (on February 28, 1978) and
the offered price of $21.00, the resulting 44.8% premium was deemed a fair premium
to pay for the acquisition of UOP's minority interest. Id.
307. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 712, 713.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Weinberger, 426 A.2d at 1359.
313. See infra text accompanying notes 449-51, 473-75.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. As seen in Kirby and prior cases, the objective of the Delaware block
valuation method is to determine fair value based on a "going concern" prior to the
merger. See supra text accompanying notes 120-67.
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The plaintiff's first approach determined that based on the
premium in ten comparable transactions, the premium paid for UOP's
stock should have been between 70% and 80%, with the median at
74%.3' By applying these percentages to UOP's stock price on
February 28, 1978, he concluded that the fair value of UOP's stock
should have been in the range of $25.65 to $27.30 per share. 18 The
discounted cash flow analysis also resulted in comparable values.
Bodenstein's discounted cash flow analysis determined the fair
value to be between $25.21 and $30.59 per share.319 The basic concept
of this approach equates fair value to the sum of the net present values
of cash generated from operations and from excess liquidity.' The
first step in this method is to determine the excess liquidity and dis-
count the excess liquidity to present value.4'
In order to perform this first step, the company's assets were
examined and any excess liquidity was assumed to be drained or
reinvested in efficient investments.' The resultant cash flows from
the elimination of the excess liquidity, or the return from the new,
more efficient investments, was then discounted to present value.3
Next, the cash flow from operations was determined and then dis-
counted to its net present value.' The fair market value was the
sum of the cash flows' net present values.3 This figure, however, was
not an exact calculation due to the imprecise determination of both the
cash flows and the discount rate.2 6
The chancellor rejected both the cash flow determination and
the determination of the discount rate.' The court noted that a small
change in the discount rate would make a large difference in the
resulting value.' Further, the lower court held that neither the con-
cept that the fair value is equal to the value of 100% ownership nor
317. Weinberger, 426 A.2d at 1357.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 1358.
320. Excess liquidity as defined by Mr. Bodenstein is "the working capital that
is not required to generate the earnings of the business from its operation." Id. at 1357.
321. Id.
322. Part of the excess liquidity hypothesized to be drained was the value of
the unused timberlands. The analyst hypothesized that the timberland was sold and
considered the funds generated cash. Id. at 1358.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 1358, 1359.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 1359.
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the concept that the fair value is equal to projected discounted cash
flows was the established law in Delaware.'
The chancellor, abiding by precedent, ruled that the proper
method in valuations was the "Delaware Block" method which had
been accepted since 1947.1 Therefore, since the defendant's analysis
was both logical and more closely resembled the concepts of the
Delaware block method, the chancellor relied on the defendant's
analysis and rejected the plaintiffs analysis. 1 However, the Delaware
Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the chancery court. 32
The Delaware Supreme Court ruled that the "Delaware Block"
method was outdated and that the time had come for the acceptance
of modern valuing techniques using accepted financial theories.' The
supreme court held that, with the narrow exception that an increase
in value resulting solely from the contemplation of a merger cannot
be considered in determining fair value,' all other "elements of future
value, including the nature of the enterprise, which are known or
susceptible of proof as of the date of the merger and not the product
of speculation, may be considered." 5 Further, a fair price requires
consideration of all relevant variables.' The court noted that the new
valuation concept would be more widely used and flexible, as well
as reflective of the intent of the Delaware corporation statutes. 7
The Weinberger court held that a more liberal approach to valu-
ing minority interest must be taken so as to reflect the spirit of
Delaware's statutory provisions regulating corporations.338 The
329. The chancellor wrote, "I do not find this approach to correspond with
either logic or the existing law." Id. at 1360.
330. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 712.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 715.
333. Id. at 712, 713.
334. Id. at 713.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. The following quote illustrates Delaware's concern for fairness and flex-
ibility, but is void of guidelines: "In view of the fairness test which has long been
applicable .... [T]he expanded appraisal remedy [is] now available to shareholders, and
the broad discretion of the Chancellor to fashion such relief as the facts of a given
case may dictate . . . " Id. at 715. "[T]he Chancellor's discretion, the monetary award,
if any, should be in the format of monetary damages, based upon on entire fairness
standards, i.e., fair dealing and fair price." Id. at 714.
338. After 1981, the term "fair value" was repeatedly emphasized in 8 Del.
Code S 262. "Clearly, there is a legislative intent to fully compensate the shareholders
for whatever their loss may be, subject only to the narrow limitation that one cannot
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legislative history of sections 262(f) and 262(h) of the Delaware Code
place increased emphasis on determining the "fair value" of the
minority shareholders' interest.39 The legislative intent is to "fully
compensate shareholders for whatever their loss may be, subject to
the narrow limitation that one cannot take speculative effects of the
merger into account."' O Therefore, the court found that the analysis
of the type offered by the plaintiffs analyst must be considered in
determining fair value." Declaring that the determination of fair value
using the structured Delaware block method is no longer the law in
Delaware, 2 the court stated that more flexible techniques must be
used to determine fair value.
The Delaware Supreme Court, by allowing more flexible deter-
minations of fair value, held that damages based on complete monetary
rescission were probably not necessary in Weinberger.' But, the court
did not preclude consideration of "elements" of rescissory damages
if the chancellor determined that they were appropriate." Although
the supreme court found a breach of fiduciary duty as it had in Lynch,
the court found that the expanded concept of fair value determina-
tion makes appraisal an adequate remedy. 5 On remand, the plaintiff
would be able to test the fairness of the $21.00 offer by considering
all of the relevant factors." No longer are the plaintiffs arguments
constrained by the Delaware block valuation method. 7 In summary,
the appraisal remedy, as expounded in Weinberger, expanded both the
use of modern financial analysis"5 to determine "fair value" and the
take speculative effects of the merger into account." Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 714.
339. The old sections of the Delaware Code title 8 S 262 (f) & (h) merely used
the term "value" when referring to the objective of the appraisal remedy. However,
the sections were changed to state that the objective of the appraisal remedy was
to find the "fair value" of the minority shareholders' interest. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 712, 713.
343. Id. at 714.
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 714, 715.
348. The court noted:
We believe that a more liberal approach must include proof of value by
any techniques or methods which are generally considered acceptable in
the financial community and otherwise admissible in court, subject only
to our interpretation.
Id. at 712.
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concept of "going concern" to include consideration of the value of
100% company ownership.- 9
SECTION II-VALUATION THEORIES
The Weinberger court allowed the use of modern financial analysis
to determine the "fair value" of a minority shareholder interest in
freeze-out situations.m This section will explore some modern valua-
tion techniques that are relevant to finding the "fair value" of minority
shareholder interests. This note then examines the range of possible
arm's length values where the "fair value" of minority interests might
lie. 1 The determination of various "values" is a function of economic
theory.
As "positive" micro-economic theory purports," one purpose of
financial theory is to find the relationships and relative effects of real
world variables.' One such relationship is the effect of dividend policy,
earnings, cash flow, information, and numerous other factors on the
market price of stock." If the world consisted of only two variables,
the process would be merely to change one variable and observe the
impact on the other. However, in order to determine these relative
relationships in a world with many variables, it is necessary to hold
constant some variables, while other variables are being tested.' One
method of accomplishing this makes use of several assumptions.
Financial theory is based on assumptions that are necessary both
in its development and operation.' As the various theories were
developed, they have increased in sophistication by incorporating more
variables.' 7 However, as a model becomes more complex, its ability
349. Id. at 714.
350. See supra note 348.
351. See infra text accompanying notes 424-84.
352. For a good discussion of law and economics see: Strasser, Bard, and Arthur,
A Reader's Guide to the Uses and Limits of Economics Analysis with Emphasis on Cor-
porate Law, 33 Mercer LAW REV. 571 (1982). The article describes the concepts of positive
and normative economics. [hereinafter cited as Strasser].
353. J. MAO, QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF FINANCIAL DECISIONS 12 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Mao. Variables may be classified in two broad categories: exogenous
variables, those given by the decision maker; and endogenous variables, whose value
is determined by the model.
354. Smidt, A New Look at the Random Walk Hypothesis, 3 THE JOURNAL OF
FINANCIAL AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 235 (Sept. 1968). [hereinafter cited as Smidt].
355. Strasser, supra note 352, at 576.
356. Id.
357. The complexity of a mathematical model is limited, among other things,
by the number of variables, given the number of equations. C. FRANK JR., STATISTICS
AND ECONOMETRICS 317 (1971) (hereinafter cited as Frank).
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to portray the relationships between its component variables becomes
weakened because of the effects of the interdependence of the
variables. This lessens the model's usefulness in predicting the changes
in its variables. Therefore, in order to be useful, every economic or
financial model must retain a degree of simplicity.3" No single model
or theory can be used to explain all real world variable relationships.
Consequently, every financial theory and resultant model used to
predict the reaction of a number of variables by varying others must
contain certain assumptions, which hold some of the variables at a
constant level. In short, even with respect to the widely accepted
efficient market hypothesis, assumptions are necessary."
Efficient Market Approach
The efficient market hypothesis' main postulate is that given an
array of complex assumptions, the market price of a security is equal
to, or nearly equal to, its intrinsic value." ° The market price might
not reflect the intrinsic value, but the price does reflect all past events
and available information."" Therefore, if the efficient market
hypothesis is valid, a security's market price will at least be a good
358. Strasser, supra note 352, at 576.
359. Fama, Random. Walks in Stock Market Prices, 21 FINANCIAL ANALYST
JOURNAL 55 (Sept.-Oct. 1965) [hereinafter cited as Fama 1965].
360. Professor Fama divided the efficient market hypothesis into three opera-
tional categories. The divisions were based on the amount of information investors
use to evaluate the value of a security. These categories are:
(a) Weak form efficiency: For this, the lowest level of the efficient market
hypothesis, to be valid the hypothesis assumes that most investors utilize historical
price and financial data to value the securities. Therefore, no investor can make ex-
cess returns by using historical data.
(b) Semi-strong efficiency: This level requires the assumption that investors
use all publicly available financial information to value securities. Therefore, no in-
vestor can make excess profits by using any publicly available information.
(c) Strong form efficiency: This form requires that investors know all informa-
tion, both public and inside, which they use to value security prices. Therefore, an
investor cannot make excess returns even using inside information.
Fama's theory as in most empirical studies, does not contend that the strong
form efficiency describes the real world. The strong form is merely an extreme yard-
stick to measure the degree of efficiency that might exist in a capital market. Fama,
Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 THE JOURNAL
OF FINANCE. No. 2, 383 (May 1970) [hereinafter cited as Fama 1970].
However considerable empirical support does exist for both the weak and semi-
strong form of the efficient market hypothesis. Fischel, Eficient Capital Market Theory,
the Market for Corporate Control, and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEX.
L. REV. 1, 3 n.9 (1978).
361. Fama (1965), supra note 359, at 56.
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estimate of its intrinsic value.2 Further, the market price will vary
randomly around this intrinsic value."
Professor Fama developed the "random walks" hypothesis; a
theory that attempts to explain random movements of stock prices.'
The random movement around the intrinsic value of the stock results
from the market participants' different notions of the stock's intrinsic
value." Due to the large number of market participants over-valuing
and under-valuing the stock, their bidding will cause the stock's price
to vary around its intrinsic value . 3 1 However, to reach this conclu-
sion certain assumptions are necessary.
First, the primary premise in the random walk theory is that
the stock market is efficient. An efficient market exists when a large
number of rational profit maximizers with free access to information
concerning both the firm and outside factors attempt to predict the
future market values of the firm's stock. 7 Contained in this defini-
tion are four assumptions:
362. Id. at 59.
363. Id. at 56.
364. Id. at 56-59.
365. Id. at 56.
366. Id.
367. There are assumptions required in various degrees for each level of the
efficient market hypothesis. However, as the assumptions are relaxed, the market,
by definition, will be less efficient. Varying degrees of market efficiency can be
illustrated by first allowing all investors access to all relevant information about the
company, both public and inside information. Each investor, assuming he is economically
rational, will form similar notions of risks and returns. Since risk is still present even
if all investors calculated identical risk parameters, they still might lose money by
purchasing the firm's security.
The analysis does not require seeing into the future. For the efficient market
hypothesis to be valid, it only requires that the investors have access to information.
The information must be relevant to determining the potential returns and the firm's
risk. While a few investors might value the firm extremely high or low, the bidding
for the purchase of the securities will cause the securities price to vary around its
intrinsic value. Further, most securities are held by institutional investors who, with
the same information available, will probably reach similar notions of risks and returns.
If investors perceived only slight variances in risks and returns from an invest-
ment, each investor's expected value of the firm would be similar. However, the
investors' perceived values would show more variance, if their perception of the
investment's risks and returns were different. This might be the result of allowing
some investors complete access to relevant information, while withholding informa-
tion from other investors.
The investor with access to more relevant information could make better
judgments as to the firm's potential returns and risk than the investors without such
information. Therefore, as the information is released to the other investors, they also
will perceive similar risks and returns, reflecting their notions of the firm's value.
[Vol.19
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 19, No. 2 [1985], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol19/iss2/1
"FAIR VALUE" DETERMINATION
1. Market participants are rational profit maximizers. 68
2. Market participants are numerous." 9
3. The market participants have perfect or near perfect
knowledge."'
4. Market competition will both instantaneously cause new
information to be known and affect the intrinsic value of the stock,
which is reflected in this market price. 7' In summary, the implication
of the efficient market theory is that the stock prices are the best
estimators of the intrinsic value of the stock. If the "random walk"
theory372 is valid and the market is efficient, the market price of a
stock is a good estimate of its intrinsic value. 73 However, if informa-
tion not available to the market participants was not discounted by
the market, the stock's price might not be a good estimate of the
stock's intrinsic value. 4
Discounted Cash Flow-Investment Opportunities Approach
The efficient market hypothesis, at least in its weak and semi-
strong form, 7' is generally accepted by the financial community.'
For a good discussion on economics of information see: Hirshleifer and Riley, The
Analytics of Uncertainty and Information-an Expository Survey, THE JOURNAL OF
ECONOMIC LITERATURE 1375 (Dec. 1979).
Further, empirical analysis shows that above average "gross returns" can be
made with the use of information not available to the general market. However, while
gross returns can be increased with additional information, the cost of the informa-
tion offsets the increase. Therefore, the empirical results are consistent with both
the weak and the semi-strong efficient market hypothesis. See Cornell and Roll, Strategies
for Pairwise Competition in Markets and Organizations, THE BELL JOURNAL OF
ECONOMICS 201-13 (Spr. 1981) (Shows that the individual using costly information will out
perform the market, but only in terms of gross returns.)
368. This is the traditional assumption of economic analysis. Strasser, supra
note 352, at 581-85.
369. See supra note 367.
370. Id.
371. Fama, Fisher, Jenson, Roll, The Adjustment of Stock Prices to New Infor-
mation, 10 International Economics Review No. 1, 1-21 (Feb. 1969).
372. Fama (1965), supra note 359, at 58.
373. This is consistent with all three levels of the efficient market hypothesis.
374. See supra note 367.
375. See supra notes 359, 360.
376. The efficient market hypothesis was considered bizarre by many in 1960,
"but by 1970, it was generally accepted by academicians and by many financial
institutions." J. Lorie and R. Brealey, MODERN DEVELOPMENTS IN INVESTMENT
MANAGEMENT 101 (1972).
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However, even among analysts who accept the efficient market model,
its application is limited to situations where a public market price
is available. 77 Therefore, in the case of closely held companies or in
situations where the efficient market model is not applicable, 37 s the
analyst might use the discounted cash flow method of firm valuation.7
The discounted cash flow method is another alternative to valu-
ing a firm or asset as a going concern.3 ' The model consists of the
summation of cash flows projected over a period of time discounted
back to present value. 1 The model's major premise is that the value
of a firm is derived from its ability to generate a return to the investor
over a period of time.3 12 The cash flows can be in the form of either
dividends, earnings, or net cash flows.' These cash flows are pro-
377. The efficient market method would not be applicable where there is a
disparity of information. If an analyst were trying to determine the value of a firm
to someone with undisclosed inside information, he must look somewhere other than
the security's market price. Since the stock market price would not reflect the unknown
information, the stock market price would not reflect the value to the insider. The
same lack of information occurs with respect to closely held companies, only on a broader
scale.
In the case of privately held firms, the discounted cash flow basis can be viewed
as an approximation of the market value. The analysis requires the investor to calculate
the potential return generated by the firm as well as the risks of the returns
materializing. See supra note 367.
378. See supra note 377.
379. This type of analysis is theoretically performed by a large number of
investors with respect to publicly held companies. Their resultant values determine
the market price of the security. Fama (1965), supra note 359.
380. Investors making investment decisions concerning the acquisition of
business assets undergo the same type of analysis. The economic value of an asset
is based on its ability to generate a return. Even jurisdictions using the Delaware
block valuation method, valued leased property on the basis of the lease payments.
Sporborg v. City Speciality Stores, 35 Del. Ch. 560, 123 A.2d 121 (1956).
However, the Delaware court in Francis I. duPont & Co. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 312 A.2d 344, 352 (Del. Ch. 1973), citing Poole, did not allow the market
value of fully amortized films to be determined by discounting the film's projected
income. See also infra note 383.
381. Mathematically the model is the same as the discounted earnings approach
used in the traditional analysis. The major difference between the Delaware block
concept of discounted earning value is not the theory; the difference is in determining
the component parts. Mao, supra note 353, at 464-93.
382. This was one of the approaches used by the plaintiff in Weinberger. See
supra text accompanying notes 319-26.
383. Early cash flow methods valued the firm using either dividends or net
earnings. The dividend model's premise is that the investor's perception of the firm's
value is a result of the firm's ability to pay dividends. The investor perceives a cur-
rent income stream, rather than capital appreciation as the primary way to realize
income. This argument is countered by the analysts who advocate the net earnings
method.
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jected over the life of the investment.' At the termination of the
investor's holding period, the firm's market value is the summation
The net earning advocates point out that capital appreciation is a significant
portion of an investor's expected return. As a result of the income tax structure,
dividends are not necessarily the optimum method of maximizing shareholder's wealth.
The firm's earnings are first taxed on the corporate level. Then the dividends are
again taxed as ordinary income to the investor. However, if the investor obtains his
income by selling a portion of his stock, he incurs some transaction costs, but he might
be able to receive a reduced income tax rate through capital gains. Further, by allow-
ing the corporation to retain earnings, the net earnings can be reinvested and com-
pounded with payment of only one income tax. The significance of retained earnings
reinvestment becomes more pronounced as the investor's tax rate becomes larger.
Most investors in public markets are financial institutions, banks, trust com-
panies, insurance companies, etc., thus their marginal tax is forty-six percent. For ex-
ample, if the corporation has a pre-tax earnings of $100 and a marginal tax rate of
forty-six percent, the after-tax balance left for reinvestment or the payment of dividends
is $54. If the corporation can receive 10 percent on its investments, the $54 invest-
ment would return $5.40 in the first period, which if retained would increase the value
of the firm. Now if the $54 is paid to a stockholder also with a 50 percent marginal
tax rate only $26.00 is left for reinvestment by the stockholder. Therefore, for the
stockholder to receive a return equal to $5.40, he must have investment opportunities
returning 21 percent. An investment returning 21 percent will probably have con-
siderably more risk than one returning 10 percent.
Even if the investor has better investment opportunities than the company, he
can maximize his return by selling his stock to reinvest in the more profitable endeavors.
With proper tax planning, the investor would benefit from capital gains, resulting in
reinvestment of a larger gross amount. This line of argument supports the theory
that investors value a firm by analyzing the firm's expected net earnings, rather than
the firm's dividend payout. See Bhattacharya, Imperfect Information, Dividend Policy
and 'The Bird in the Hand' Fallacy, BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 259-70 (Spring 1979.
Bhattacharya developed a model, which explains why in spite of the tax disadvantage
firms pay dividends. The reason for a dividend payout is the favorable signaling effect
investors perceive.
However, the net-earnings analysis is not without problems. Net earnings are
the result of accounting conventions, which not only can be changed but also might
contain non-cash charges. Cash flow analysis considers changes in accounting conven-
tions that have no effect on the firm's disposable cash. By changing accounting con-
ventions, such as the method of inventory accounting or the rate of depreciation,
reported net earnings may be changed. Unless the tax records are also changed, there
would be no real change to disposable cash.
Two empirical studies show that investors are not misled by changes in account-
ing conventions. These studies indicate that discounting net cash flows are appropriate.
Therefore, cash flow analysis is merely the normalizing of net earnings for changes
in accounting conventions that do not affect disposable cash. Kaplan and Roll, Investor
Evaluation of Accounting Information: Some Empirical Evidence, JOURNAL OF BUSINESS
225-57 (April 1972). Kaplan and Roll examined two types of accounting changes which
increased earnings per share, but had no effect on cash flows. The results indicated
that investors look beyond the effect on earnings per share to the effect on cash flows.
384. The life of the investment is not the same as the investor's holding period.
Rather, the investment life refers to the period of time the investment generates cash,
which could be longer than the investor's holding period.
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of the remaining discounted cash flows, the value at which the in-
vestor could then dispose of his investment. 85 To initiate the cash
flow analysis, projecting the cash flows is required.
Cash flow projections may be based on historical data."' But a
better way to project cash flows is by means of the investment
opportunities approach, which examines the firm's capacity to generate
cash.37 Using this approach, the projected cash flows should be derived
from three sources: first, the current cash flows generated by the
firm's present investments;... second, the cash flows generated from
the firm's expected present and future investment opportunities;389
third, in the case of excess liquidity, excess cash can be considered
the same as generated cash.9 The cash flows are then discounted
by an interest rate reflecting both the time value of money (risk free
rate), and the risk related to the firm's ability to generate the pro-
jected stream of cash flows. 91
The risk free portion of the discount rate is similar to the price
385. Mathematically, the cash flow model is similar to the earnings model.
The equation would be: V = E CF/(1 + O n
V=Value of company.
n = number of periods.
r=discount rate reflecting: (1) time of value money, (2) uncertainty related
to the projected cash flows.
CF=projected cash flows.
If the investor sold at the end of year (period) #2, the value of the firm at the
time of sale would be equal to the projected stream of cash flows starting with the
next period, i.e. year #3.
386. The Delaware block method generally used an average of the firm's
preceding five years earnings to determine the projected earnings used in the dis-
counted earnings approach. Delaware Racing, 213 A.2d at 212. Lynch, 402 A.2d at 12.
See also supra note 97.
387. The firm's record of past cash generations might be indicative of future
performance, but this should not be assumed without examination. The analyst should
explain the basis for the past and expected future cash flows. Questions to be con-
sidered are: What projects and factors allowed the firm to generate its past cash flow?
Are the same projects continuing to generate these cash flows, or will the existing
projects require a substantial increase in capital reinvestment to maintain past levels
of cash flows? Are new or different cash-generating projects being planned? This type
of analysis, together with a statistical analysis of the past record adjusted for future
expectations, should provide a more realistic approximation of the firm's future
performance.
388. Id.
389. Id.
390. Id.
391. The plaintiff in Weinberger used the excess cash as an element of his cash
flow projection. This is not inconsistent when finding the value of 100 percent owner-
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a consumer demands to forego current consumption."' By foregoing
present consumption he is entitled to increased consumption in the
future. 3 The price of foregoing current consumption has been referred
to as the risk free rate or time value of money. 9' This risk free rate
might be approximated by the rate of short term government
securities."3 The portion reflecting the firm's business risk is more
difficult to estimate.
The second portion of the discount rate must reflect the firm's
business risk."' When the portion of the discount rate reflecting the
firm's business risk is added to the first portion, the risk free rate,
the sum equals the firm's cost of equity capital. 9 ' The cost of equity
ship. The 100 percent owner could drain off any excess liquidity to maximize his wealth.
The discount rate, which is the sum of the risk free rate and the rate reflecting
the firm's risk is equal to the company's cost of equity.. The cost of equity is the return
a reasonable investor would expect to receive for investing in a venture given its
risk. Mao, supra note 353, at 466. See also infra note 396.
392. Even in a world of certainty, a person would rather receive money today
than a promise to receive the money in the future. Therefore, money received today
is more valuable than money received at a later date.
393. T. Copeland and J. Weston, FINANCIAL THEORY AND CORPORATE POLICY,
115-18 (2nd ed. 1983) (hereinafter cited as Copeland).
394. Id. at 116.
395. Even United States government securities, which have virtually no default
risk, are susceptible to interest rate risk. For instance, hypothesize an investor who
purchases U.S. government bonds paying 10 percent. But before maturity the effec-
tive yield on similar bonds increases. The investor will not be able to sell his bonds
unless he discounts their price to the extent that the purchaser will receive the new
higher market yield. Therefore, although default risk is minimal, the interest rate risk
can be substantial with long-term securities. So to approximate the risk free rate, the
yield of very short-term government securities such as 90-day treasury bills should
be used.
396. The concept of total firm risk is generally subdivided into two categories;
systematic and unsystematic risk. Systematic risk is the risk of the market. If an
investor held and equal investment in every market security, his return would fluc-
tuate as the market return fluctuates. This fluctuation of return is caused by systematic
risk. However, a single firm or an investor who holds less than a full market portfolio
will also experience unsystematic risk. Unsystematic risk reflects the particular
characteristics of the firm.
A firm's unsystematic risk reflects on the firm's ability to generate revenues
and to control expenditures. The level of unsystematic risk is, among other things,
a function of the firm's efficiency and its level of fixed expenses, both operational
and financial. Unsystematic risk can be reduced by diversification. An investor who
owns a equal share of all market securities only encounters systematic risk. He does
not encounter unsystematic risk. Therefore, the more securities held by an investor,
the less unsystematic risk he will encounter. But systematic risk will still remain.
For a good discussion of systematic risk see Copeland, supra note 393, at 191-94.
397. Id.
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can also be viewed as the rate an investor requires for an equity in-
vestment in the firm, given the firm's level of risk.398 Assuming in-
vestors are risk adverse, if the investor felt firm A was more risky
than firm B, he would require a greater return from firm A to com-
pensate him for accepting the additional risk.3
The following factors are generally believed to result in an
increase or decrease in the perception of the firm's business risk."'
The investor views the volatility of the firm's cash flows as an in-
dicator of the firm's business risk level." 1 That is, an investor will
require a chance for a higher return if more uncertainty is associated
with the return. Therefore, a firm that has highly volatile cash flows
must show more potential for gain to maintain its value than a firm
with stable cash flows."0 2 Anything that affects the variance of the
firm's earnings will be detrimental to the firm's value, unless the in-
crease is associated with a proportional increase in the firm's expected
return."3
The firm's debt level is one such factor that can increase the
volatility of the firm's earnings without decreasing the firm's value.0 4
Increased debt level has the effect of increasing the fixed costs of
the firm. As fixed expenses are increased, whether from operations
or from financing requirements, the firm's cash flows become more
volatile given a change in sales volume." 5 However, within limits, the
398. See supra notes 391, 396.
399. Most economic analysis assumes investors are risk adverse. The risk
adverse investor prefers certainty and will pay for certain investments by accepting
lower expected returns. The magnitude of an investor's risk adverse trait will vary,
and can best be measured by utility theory. For example, an investor might have
more disutility from losing $3.00, than positive utility from gaining or winning $5.00
in a game of coin toss. Therefore, to induce him to buy a chance to win, to play the
game, the prize must be increased or the possible loss decreased. Copeland, supra
note 393, at 84-92.
400. See supra note 396.
401. Empirical evidence indicates that increasing the dividend payout might
act as a favorable signal to stockholders and investors about the firm's risk. See Ross,
"The Determination of Financial Structure" The Incentive Signaling Approach, BELL
JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 23-40 (Spring 1977) (hereinafter cited as Ross).
402. Id.
403. Although debt increases the firm's risk by increasing the level of the firm's
fixed cost, the market views an increase in debt as a positive signal. Assuming the
firm is not close to cash insolvency, the market generally perceives that the increase
in risk from an increase in the debt level is offset by the potential increase in cash
flows. However, an adverse signal regarding the firm's risk might result from increas-
ing both debt levels and dividend levels. See Ross, supra note 401.
404. Id.
405. Id.
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increase in risk is offset by a perceived increase in investment oppor-
tunities. Therefore, an increase in the firm's debt level can result in
an increase in the firm's value.0 The problem then is that given the
firm's debt structure, past earnings performance, and future invest-
ment expectations, the financial analyst must develop both projected
cash flows and an appropriate discount rate.
The analyst has at least a few analytical methods at his disposal.
First, the analyst might use the firm's past performances along with
annual reports and projections to predict the future cash flows. ' While
most empirical evidence now shows that past cash flows alone are
not good indicators of future cash flows,' historical data might indicate
the firm's risk performance." Unless the firm has recently changed
its risk parameters, the appropriate discount rate may be determined
from the historical data.
Second, the projections derived directly from the firm's plans,
if available, might provide a good basis for projecting future cash
flows.410 They will at least indicate the cash flows the firm is planning
to generate. Further, the projections would indicate the type of
investments contemplated by the firm, which would indicate the
investment's risk, and therefore the firm's risk.4"
The accuracy of the cash flow projection is accounted for in the
discount rate.412 To determine the appropriate discount rate, the
analyst might examine other firms with similar product lines, similar
investments, or similar volatility of earnings."' Therefore, industrial
classification or pseudo-industrial classification can provide forms with
similar risk parameters that could be used to determine the
appropriate discount rate.44 Once the projected cash flows are
established and the appropriate discount rate is determined, the result
406. Id.
407. For a good example see Copeland, supra note 393, at 526-31.
408. Id.
409. Elton and Gruber, Improved Forecasting Through the Design of Homogeneous
Groups, 44 JOURNAL OF BUSINESS I, 75 (Oct. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Elton]. This article
describes procedures for estimating each of the variables which play a role in stock
valuations using earnings. See also Alers, SEM: A Security Evaluation Model, reprinted
in E. ELTON AND M. GRUBER. SECURITY EVALUATION AND PORTFOLIO ANALYSIS 227 (1972).
410. Id.
411. Id.
412. See supra note 391.
413. See Elton, supra note 409.
414. See Elton, supra note 409.
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is the value of the company under the discounted cash flow method. '15
The tangible asset analysis is a valuation approach less theoretical
than the discounted cash flow analysis.
Tangible Asset Analysis
The concept of tangible asset analysis states that the firm's value
is equal to the sum of its net tangible asset values."8 Tangible asset
analysis can be divided into two categories: (1) tangible book value417
and (2) liquidation value. ' Tangible book value is almost universally
found to be a totally inappropriate method of valuing a firm.4"9 Assets
on the firm's books amy be drastically over or under stated.4 0 The
market value of assets such as patents, natural resources, real estate,
and physical assets, are especially susceptible to wide divergence from
the book value. Even if an asset's market value is accurately por-
trayed by its book value, book value never includes the cost of
disposal.
Liquidation value, or net asset market value, examines each
major asset and determines what it can be sold for on the market.
Therefore, the asset value analysis is equivalent to the sum of the
net market values of the firm's liabilities and assets.4" If large blocks
of land or assets exist, the disposal cost must be factored into the
analysis. The major drawbacks to this type of analysis are its expense
and time consumption.4" However, net asset value can accurately por-
tray the minimum "fair value" of 100 percent ownership in a "going
concern."
4
415. After the elements of the model are determined, the final step is the
mathematical calculation. See supra note 385.
416. Net tangible asset value is the net of the tangible assets' market value,
less liabilities. Intangible assets such as goodwill are not included in the calculation.
417. Book value is the value of the assets as shown on the company's books.
418. Liquidation or market value is the value that net assets have on the open
market, i.e. the price a willing buyer and a willing seller under no compulsion to buy
or sell would pay for the assets.
419. Investors value assets by looking to the cash flows which the assets are
capable of producing, not the book value, which results from a variety of accounting
principles. See supra note 155.
420. Because book value is typically on a cost basis, it is related to the length
of time the asset has been held, which might not be relevant to the asset's market
value. This is true because depreciation or appreciation schedules are generally
unrealistic.
421. Once the component values and liabilities are found, the process becomes
merely arithmetic balancing.
422. Appraisals of assets such as land, equipment, and inventory are both time
consuming and expensive.
423. See infra text accompanying notes 473-75.
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SECTION III-EXPANDED FAIR VALUE CONCEPT
In order to decide which valuation theory is most useful with
respect to a given set of facts, the question of what is "fair value"
must first be considered. Is fair value the value to a minority
shareholder before the merger; the "going concern" concept of the
Delaware block as in Kirby? Or, is fair value the value of 100 percent
ownership in the company, as the plaintiff argued in Weinberger? The
Delaware Supreme Court in Lynch resorted to a remedy other than
appraisal.4 The bounds of the rescissory remedy used in Lynch are
greater than the traditional "going concern" constraints of the
Delaware block.
4 25
Although the Delaware Supreme Court in Lynch chose rescissory
damages, the later Weinberger decision, also involving a breach of
fiduciary duty, did not use the rescissory damages approach." Rather,
the Weinberger court looked to a middle ground in the form of an
expanded valuation remedy, which contains elements of rescissory
damages. Therefore, in expanding the appraisal remedy, the Delaware
Supreme Court not only allowed the use of modern valuation techni-
ques, but also expanded the traditional definition of "going concern"
value to encompass consideration of the value of 100 percent
ownership." This section will first examine the possible arm's length
"going concern values," which after Weinberger may now be considered
in freeze-out "fair value" determinations." This section will then ex-
amine some methods used to determine the various possible arm's
length values, using the types of financial analyses previously
discussed."
The Range Of Possible Arms Length Values
As previously detailed, the Weinberger decision not only expanded
the appraisal remedy to include modern valuation techniques, but also
expanded the concept of "going concern" value. 4 ' The Delaware
Supreme Court in Weinberger placed the burden of proving fairness
on the party breaching the fiduciary duty, because the majority's direc-
tors were not dealing with the minority directors at arm's length.431
424. The Delaware Supreme Court in Lynch resorted to rescissory damages.
See supra text accompanying notes 214-37.
425. Id.
426. See supra text accompanying notes 333-49.
427. See supra text accompanying notes 238-349.
428. See infra text accomapanying notes 430-55.
429. See infra text accompanying notes 456-84.
430. See supra text accompanying notes 333-49.
431. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 703.
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The court's holding arguably expands the fair value concept, where
breach of fiduciary duty is found, from the narrow "going concern"
value, the value of the minority ownership, to any value in the range
of possible arm's length values supportable by modern financial
analysis.' The plaintiff in Weinberger argued that the fair value should
be the value based on 100 percent company ownership.' The Delaware
Supreme Court held that the plaintiff could test the fairness of the
offered price against the value representing 100 percent company
ownership.4"
Under the Weinberger analysis, the fair value could equal the
value to a 100 percent owner in cases where a breach of fiduciary
duty is found. However, the 100 percent ownership value is but one
value which could result from an arm's length acquisition of a minority
shareholder interest.' Therefore, an examination of the possible values
resulting from an arm's length transaction is appropriate. To facilitate
this analysis, four levels of value, spanning the range of possible arm's
length values, will be considered. Ranging from a low value to a high
value, the four values considered are: (1) the value of a minority
interest,"' (2) the value of a controlling interest,437 (3) the value of a
100 percent owner,4 and (4) the value to an acquirer. 39
Value Of A Minority Interest (The Lowest Value Considered)
The value of a minority ownership interest in a company is the
lowest value on the spectrum of possible arms length values
considered. 4 The minority owner's value is derived from his propor-
tional share in the cash flows, which might result from both dividends
482. Id. at 712-15.
433. Weinberger, 426 A.2d 1359.
434. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 714.
435. Conceivably, an infinite number of possible arm's length values can result
between the value limits of each party. However, the maximum arm's length value
would be the value to the buyer. Likewise, the lowest arm's length value would be
the value to the seller.
436. Since this note is concerned only with the purchase of the stock from
the minority shareholders, the value to the minority shareholder, who is the seller,
is the lowest possible arm's length negotiated value.
437. This note will illustrate that the value of the controlling interest is higher
than the value of a minority interest.
438. The value of 100 percent ownership was the value argued for by the plain-
tiff in Weinberger. This section will point out where the value to a 100 percent owner
lies on the spectrum of arm's length values.
439. Due to the possibility of synergy, the value to the acquirer, or buyer,
is the highest possible arm's length negotiated value.
440. The value of a minority interest in a going concern was the objective
of the Delaware block valuation method. See supra note 108.
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and value appreciation of the company." However, the minority owner
is at the mercy of management's ability and policies. " 2 On occasion
the minority owner will not agree with management's policies or effi-
ciency, in which case his most viable alternative is to sell his stock."'
However, the market in which he sells his stock, will be aware of
the firm's level of management efficiency.' Therefore, the arm's length
value of a minority interest will reflect the potential buyer's limited
control over both management's decision making ability and manage-
ment's level of efficiency. Further, the value of the minority's equity
is the lowest possible arm's length transaction value, because the
minority owner does not have any control over the company other than
his ability to organize other investors in order to achieve a controlling
block.
Value of Controlling Interest
The value of the controlling interest is greater than the value
of a minority owner, because of the controlling interest's power to
change management. While the minority owner generally must accept
management's decisions, the controlling interest can force management
to change undesired policies, or can simply change management."5 The
value of control is derived from the potential of improving manage-
ment efficiency, thus increasing the value of the company. However,
the controlling interest still has limits.
The controlling shareholder, through his directors, owes certain
fiduciary responsibilities to the minority shareholders."6 For example,
441. See supra text accompanying notes 375-415.
442. H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS 95 (2d ed. 1970) (hereinafter cited as Henn).
443. Although this area is beyond the scope of this note, the writer recognizes
that special veto provisions, giving the minority shareholder more authority, exist in
corporations. However, the general rule in public corporations is that of majority
shareholder rule. Id. at 358-405, 525.
444. Unless a new investor in the same security has additional stock, or con-
trol of additional stock, his voting, and therefore control over the corporation, is on
the same level as the previous shareholder. Id.
445. The controlling interest is limited in a number of ways. These include,
for example, when meetings can be called, certain fiduciary duties, etc. However, for
the purpose of this note, it is sufficient to point out that the controlling interest has
the authority to effectuate a management change, which makes his ownership interest
more valuable than a minority shareholder's interest. For limits on control see Henn,
supra note 442.
446. Lynch, 402 A.2d at 7 (Directors representing the controlling shareholder
failed to disclose material facts concerning a tender offer); Weinberger, 457 A.2d at
703 (The majority shareholder was cashing out the minority shareholders, but failed
to disclose relevant information to the directors representing the minority shareholders).
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the controlling shareholder cannot expropriate funds and assets from
the company for his own interest."7 If the controlling shareholder has
investments in other companies, he must be careful not to divert
business or otherwise take advantage of his dual position with both
companies at the expense of the minority owners."" Consequently, the
controlling owner, while having more power and value than the
minority owner, is not free to exercise unlimited discretion as is the
100 percent owner.
Value of 100 Percent Owner
Absent any restriction from debt covenants, the 100 percent
owner is free to do with a company as he pleases."9 If the 100 per-
cent owner owns more than one economic entity, he does not have
to be concerned with a conflict of interest with respect to any minority
ownership. The 100 percent owner has complete and ultimate control
of the company.4" He can liquidate the company, pay dividends, pass
through tax savings, retain the earnings sheltered by a lower cor-
porate tax, maximize his wealth, or give the company away. The value
of 100 percent company ownership is therefore greater than the value
of the controlling interest." ' Although the value of 100 percent owner-
ship is greater than the value of controlling interest, the highest
possible value might be the value to the acquirer.
Value to the Acquirer
A particular shareholder might have a special use for 100 per-
cent ownership of a company which both enhances the value of his
present firm, or economic entity, and the value of the acquired firm.42
447. Id.
448. Henn, supra note 442, at 457.
449. The 100 percent owner does not owe a fiduciary duty to any other equity
member. However, he may owe some duties to debt holders via loan covenants.
450. Id.
451. How much more valuable 100 percent ownership is than controlling interest
depends upon the individual attributes of the parties. The value of the controlling
interest and 100 percent ownership could be very close if the shareholder would not
greatly benefit from 100 percent ownership. See infra note 453.
452. This increase in value could be the result of factors such as:
1. Economies of scale in management, operations, accounting, etc,
2. Monopolistic profits, either vertical or horizontal,
3. Replacement of inefficient management,
4. Tax considerations,
5. Undervalued company -asymmetrical information,
6. Reduction of unsystematic risk through diversification.
Copeland, supra note 393, at 561-69.
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The increase in value to both entities is commonly referred to as
synergy.4" As a result of synergy, the value of a firm can be more
than the value to a 100 percent owner. For example, assume the value
of firm A is equal to $100, and the value of firm B is equal to $50.
If the firms merge to form firm C, its value without synergy will
be $150. However, if the resulting value of firm C is equal to $200,
the transaction resulted in the creation of synergy equal to $50. The
preceding example could result if, for instance, firms A and B were
the only two firms in a particular industry. Therefore, by merging
into one firm, C, they will enjoy monopoly profits, which will increase
C's value in excess of the individual values of the component firms,
A and B. The value of firm B is only $50 to any firm in another
industry, but due to the possibility of monopoly profits, firm A con-
siders the value of firm B greater than $50. Consequently to a par-
ticular acquiring company, the value of a company might be greater
than the value to a 100 percent owner due to the effect of synergy.
453. Cox, Acquisitions and Mergers, 1 CORP. L. REv. 48 (1978).
The Cox article examines Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 485-572. More specifically, the article considers the application of Brudney
and Chirelstein's valuation of the minority stock's "fair value" in Mills. The article
states that synergy is found in most mergers, but more often in conglomerate mergers
rather than horizontal or vertical mergers. Cox notes that there are many more reasons
why intra-industry mergers should result in a synergy value. These reasons include
the following: economies of scale, operating efficiency, market expansion, monopolistic
power, administrative and managerial efficiencies, and complementing operations in
areas such such as technology, marketing, and research.
Cox notes that there is a major source of synergy in conglomerate mergers
called financial synergy which includes: "instantaneous synergy," "latent debt capacity,"
"defensive diversification," or "bargain purchase."
(1) "Instantaneous synergy" Cox defines as an increase in the con-
glomerage's earnings per share, accompanied by an increase in the con-
glomerate's "price-earnings" ratio.
(2) "Latent debt capacity" Cox defines as an increase in the conglomerate's
debt capacity resulting from merging with a firm that has a lower debt
to equity ratio.
(3) "Defensive diversification" is defined as the stablizing of the con-
glomerage's earnings fluctuations, which generally are considered an
indicator of the conglomerate's risk. The more volatile the conglomerate's
earnings the more risk, therefore, the more return it must provide to
maintain or increase its price. Such diversification not only increases income
but also reduces risk.
(4) "Bargain purchase" is defined as buying the firm for less than what
it is worth. Cox discounts this theory. He assumes the market is efficient
with perfect information and adequate breadth. Therefore, any "bargain"
would probably be bid out of existence.
The final aspect to his article restates the finding in Mills, which holds that
the proper procedure to find fair value is to first find the synergy value, and then
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In sum, the spectrum of possible values that can result from arm's
length negotiations between companies contemplating a merger range
from the low value, the value of a minority interest, to the high value,
the value to the acquiring firm. 4 The analyst and the lawyer must
know how to determine these four values through the use of the finan-
cial valuation techniques previously discussed.'"
SECTION IV-DETERMINING POSSIBLE
VALUES RESULTING FROM ARM'S LENGTH NEGOTIATIONS
Determining The Value Of A Minority Interest
The value to a minority shareholder reflects both the minority
shareholder's right to a proportional share in the firm's present and
expected future profits and the minority shareholder's lack of control
over the decisions of management."' In the case of publicly traded
companies, this value is directly reflected in each company's market
price.'57 Most economists would apply the efficient market hypothesis
in this case.'- The efficient market hypothesis states that given the
information available to the minority shareholder, the market price
reflects the risks and returns of minority ownership.' However, the
market price might not reflect undisclosed information relevant to the
firm's future expected profits.'"
If a court found that management owed a duty to disclose this
relevant information, a discounted cash flow approach could be used
to establish the value of the information."' The value of the informa-
tion would then be added to the market price to establish the value
of the minority ownership.'" To determine the components of the dis-
counted cash flow analysis, the best source would be the actual plans
of management.'" However, if the actual plans are not available, the
divide it between the interests on a proportional basis. He considers this to be a "fair
allocation," but states that the proportional division of the synergy value may depend
in part on why the synergy came about.
454. See supra note 435.
455. See supra text accompanying notes 350-425.
456. See supra notes 443-45.
457. See supra text accompanying notes 360-74.
458. See supra text accompanying notes 360-74.
459. See supra text accompanying notes 360-74.
460. See supra note 367.
461. See supra text accompanying notes 375-415.
462. In effect the market price is adjusted as if the information were disclosed.
463. The plaintiff in Weinberger used UOP's five year business plan to project
cash flows. Weinberger, 426 A.2d at 1362.
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analyst could look to similar projects or product lines implemented
by other companies.'64 The comparison to other firms which
implemented similar projects would also determine the appropriate
discount rate.' 5 Therefore, with both components, the expected cash
flows and the discount rate, the value of the undisclosed information
can be determined.
By multiplying the value of the undisclosed information by the
percentage of equity owned by the minority shareholder, the propor-
tional distribution is determined. 6 The minority owner is entitled to
a proportional interest in the return of the net expected cash flows'6
adjusted for the project's risk. After the proportional value of the
undisclosed information is determined, it should be added to the
market price.4 " The result is an approximation of the market value
of the minority shareholder's interest after the undisclosed informa-
tion becomes public. Moreover, this adjusted value should be the
minimum value in an arm's length negotiation. 9 As stated above the
value of a minority interest reflects the minority shareholders' lack
of control over management. Of course, if a shareholder can control
management, the value of his stock would be enhanced.
Determining The Value Of Controlling Interest
The value of the controlling interest is difficult to quantify
through financial analysis. For instance, if the investment opportunities
approach was used, an analysis of all the company's possible invest-
ment opportunities would be required.7 ' Since the controlling interest
can change both the direction of investments and the level of risk,
a cash flow analysis would have to consider virtually every known
investment opportunity.
However, for the situations examined in this note, the problem
464. Elton, supra note 409, at 78.
465. Id.
466. This step is necessary to give the minority shareholder his proportional
share of the value of the undisclosed information. See supra note 367.
467. Net expected cash flows equals the projected returns minus the projected
cash invested and minus projected expenses to be encountered.
468. See supra note 367. Also this assumes the market has not already dis-
counted the undisclosed information.
469. See supra text accompanying notes 440-44.
470. Since the owner of the controlling interest can change the direction of
the company, the analysis would have to relate to how he proposes to change the
company. The projected risks and returns relating to such a change, or a comparison
of the industry, would be appropriate. See Elton supra note 409, at 78.
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of valuing the controlling interest through financial analysis does not
arise. This note considers only instances where the controlling interest
is already purchased by the majority shareholder. Therefore, an ap-
proximation of controlling interest value might be the actual cost to
the majority shareholder.47' However, for the purposes of this note
it is enough to point out the relative value of the controlling interest.
The value of the controlling interest is greater than the value of a
minority interest, but less than the value of 100 percent ownership.472
Determining The Value Of 100 Percent Ownership
The value of 100 percent ownership depends on the efficiency
of the 100 percent owner or his management, but at a minimum it
is the net market value of the firm's assets. 3 If the 100 percent owner
or his management is highly efficient, the market price of the com-
pany's equity would be more than the net market value of the firm's
assets.4 However, the 100 percent owner might manage the company's
assets less efficiently than other firms. In this case, the market value
of his 100 percent interest becomes the net market value of the firm's
assets. 75 Consequently, without evaluating the efficiency of manage-
ment, the minimum value of a 100 percent ownership is the net market
value of the firm's assets less its liabilities. Further, the value of 100
percent ownership is the maximum value resulting solely from the
attributes of the firm. Any value above the value of the 100 percent
ownership results from the expected synergistic value to the acquirer.
Determining The Value To The Acquirer
Since the value to the acquirer is the result of expected synergy,
its dollar amount is a function of the factors causing the synergy. 7"
471. Brudney and Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers,
88 HARV. L. REV. 297 (Dec. 1974) (hereinafter cited as Brudney).
472. See supra text accompanying notes 445-48.
473. The 100 percent owner can increase management efficiency or simply sell
the company's assets. The market values of the assets are based on their ability to
generate cash. Therefore by selling the assets, the 100 percent owner is accepting
the general efficiency of the market's management.
474. If the 100 percent owner can increase the management of his firm to a
level greater than the market efficiency, the market value of his company as a "going
concern" will be greater than the market value of the firm's net asset value.
475. See supra note 473. Also the assets might have an operating synergy;
thus the market value of the assets would be greater if they are sold as a block,
rather than individually.
476. See supra notes 452, 453.
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The value of the expected synergy can be approximated by looking
to the reason for the acquisition. '77 Usually the determination of the
value to the acquirer is not necessary, unless the court perceives "fair
value" as including the complete benefit of the bargain.7
In summary, the Delaware Supreme Court in Weinberger opened
up a range of possible values for consideration as the fair value. '79
The Weinberger court held that, where a breach of fiduciary duty was
found, the plaintiff would be allowed to test the fairness of the offered
price against the 100 percent ownership value.4" Further, at the discre-
tion of the chancellor, the court could consider elements of rescissory
damages.48 Delaware has recognized that arm's length negotiations
could result in a value equivalent to the value of a 100 percent
owner.482 Consequently, the Delaware Supreme Court does not preclude
the use of the value to a 100 percent owner in determining "fair
value."9 " State freeze-out actions are not the only situations which
require finding "fair value." The issue of finding "fair value" has also
been an essential element of civil actions involving violations of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. 4"'
SECTION V-THE LIMITED FEDERAL APPROACH USED
To DETERMINE "FAIR VALUE"
The issue of fair value determination has also arisen in cases
involving proxy statement nondisclosures which constitute violations
of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. 48" Like state courts, the
federal courts have had problems in fleshing out the elusive "fair
477. See supra text accompanying notes 452, 453.
478. See supra notes 337-39.
479. See supra text accompanying notes 238-349.
480. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 714.
481. Id.
482. Id.
483. While the court does not define fair value as the value of 100 percent
ownership, the court certainly does not preclude fair value from equaling the value
of 100 percent ownership.
484. See infra text accompanying notes 485-572.
485. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 [hereinafter cited as "the 1934 Act"] This
section of the note will deal with section 14(a) (and the Rule promulgated thereunder):
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or by
any means or instrumentality of interestate commerce or of any facility
of a national securities exchange or otherwise, in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors, to
solicit or to permit the use of his name to solicit any proxy or consent
or authorization in respect of any security (other than an exempted
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value" concept. ' Some circuits have adopted the "efficient market"
approach of valuation analysis.487 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
has used the efficient market hypothesis as a starting point for the
fair value analysis; the resultant fair value was based in part on a
sharing of the synergy.482 The analysis in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite
Co.489 is a good example of this approach.
Auto-Lite was a diversified company engaged primarily in the
sale of auto parts.49 Mergenthaler, which primarily produced type-
setting equipment, began purchasing Auto-Lite's stock in 1957."9' By
March of 1962, Mergenthaler owned 54.2 percent of Auto-Lite, and
thus was able to obtain control of Auto-Lite's board of directors.
49 2
In early 1963, Mergenthaler attempted to merge Mergenthaler and
Auto-Lite into a new company named Eltra Corporation.493 On May
28, 1963, Auto-Lite's board of directors, controlled by Mergenthaler,
voted to accept the proposed merger.4" Proxies including a proxy state-
ment were sent the next day to Auto-Lite's shareholders.495 An addi-
tional thirteen percent vote from Auto-Lite's minority shareholders
security) registered pursuant to section 781 of this title.
15 U.S.C. 178n(a) (1976).
Rule 14a-9 promulgated thereunder.
(a) No solicitation subject to this regulation shall be made by means of
any proxy statement, form of proxy, notice of meeting or other communica-
tion, written or oral, containing any statement which, at the time and
in the light of the circumstances under which it is made, is false or
misleading with respect to any material fact, or which omits to state any
material fact necessary in order to make the statements therein not false
or misleading or necessary to correct any statement in any earlier com-
munication with respect to the solicitation of a proxy for the same meeting
or subject matter which has become false or misleading.
17 C.F.R. 240.14a-9.
486. Seaboard World Airlines, Inc. v. Tiger Int'l, Inc., 600 F.2d 355 (2d Cir.
1979). The court in Mills used the efficient market hypothesis to establish fair value.
Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 281 F. Supp. 826 (N.D. Ill. 1967), rev'd on causality
issue, 403 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1968), rev'd, 396 U.S. 375 (1970); on remand, 552 F.2d 1239
(7th Cir. 1977).
487. We hold that when market value is available and reliable, other factors
should not be utilized in determining whether the terms of a merger were fair. Although
criteria such as earnings and book value are an indication of actual worth, they are
only secondary indicia. Mills, 552 F.2d at 1247. See also supra note 486.
488. Mills, 352 F.2d at 1249.
489. 281 F. Supp. 826 (N.D. Ill. 1967), rev'd on causality issue, 403 F.2d 429
(7th Cir. 1968), rev'd, 396 U.S. 375 (1970); on remand, 552 F.2d 1239 (1977).
490. Mills, 552 F.2d at 1240.
491. Id.
492. Id.
493. Id.
494. Id.
495. Id.
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was necessary in order to obtain the required two-thirds vote.49 The
merger was approved on June 27, 1963."9' As a result, the minority
shareholders of Auto-Lite instituted a class action suit challenging the
corporate merger.
498
The plaintiffs filed suit in district court on June 26, 1963, alleg-
ing that the proxy statement did not disclose that Auto-Lite's board
of directors was controlled by Mergenthaler.'4' Therefore, they argued
the proxy statement was in violation of section 14(a) of the 1934 Act.'0
The minority shareholders requested that the merger be set aside.
The district court found for the plaintiffs, but the appellate court
reversed on the issue of causation.
5 0
'
The United States Supreme Court reversed, stating that the
plaintiffs had made a sufficient showing of causation by proving that
the necessary proxies had been obtained by means of material
misrepresentations.0 Further, the Supreme Court stated that the
lower court was not required to set aside the merger, but could look
to other remedies, such as monetary relief .' The Supreme Court sug-
gested two possible methods of determining potential monetary
relief.0 4 First, the minority shareholders might be compensated for
a reduction in their stock's earnings potential as a result of the
merger." However, if the plaintiffs could not show such a reduction
in earnings potential, an award could be based on the "fairness" of
the merger terms at the time of the merger. 6 The district court, on
remand, decided not to rescind the merger, rather it applied the second
method of determining damages, as suggested by the Supreme Court.'
496. Id.
497. Id.
498. Id.
499. Id.
500. See supra note 485.
501. Mills, 403 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1968).
502. Mills, 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
503. The Supreme Court then stated that since, "the misleading aspect of the
solicitation did not relate to terms of the merger, monetary relief might be afforded
to the shareholders only if the merger resulted in a reduction of the earnings poten-
tial of their holdings." However, if this decrease in earnings potential could not be
determined, because of the commingling of assets, a "fairness" approach might be us-
ed. The fairness approach envisioned an award based on the "fairness" of the merger
terms at the time of the merger. Further, the Supreme Court noted that the two
methods illustrated for determining monetary relief were not to be considered ex-
clusive. Mills 396 U.S. at 388-89.
504. Mills, 396 U.S. at 389.
505. Id.
506. Id.
507. Mills, 552 F.2d at 1243.
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The district court determined the merger terms were unfair and
awarded damages of $1,233,918.35 plus interest."' Both parties
appealed.'
No Reduction In Earnings Potential
On the second appeal, the primary issue was to determine what
damages, if any, could be awarded as a result of the proxy
nondisclosure. ° The appellate court examined both suggested methods
of determining monetary damages." First, as to whether the plain-
tiff was entitled to compensation for a loss in potential earnings power,
the appellate court compared Auto-Lite's dividend policy with the divi-
dend policy of the newly formed firm.2 The analysis began by look-
ing at the exchange ratio of the merger offer." 3 For every one share
of Auto-Lite stock, the minority shareholder was to receive 1.88
"preferred" shares of Eltra's stock, the new company." 4
After examining the exchange ratio, the amount of dividends was
calculated.5 At the time of the merger, Auto-Lite was paying a divi-
dend of $2.40 per share and Mergenthaler was paying $1 per share. 1
Under the merger agreement Eltra was to pay dividends of $1 per
share for common stock and $1.40 per share for preferred stock. 17
The appellate court determined that the proposed dividends to Auto-
Lite's minority shareholders would increase by $.23 per share from
$2.40 per share to $2.63 per share. 8 Eltra's preferred stock was more
valuable than Auto-Lite's common stock, because the stock paid higher
dividends, was more secure, and was convertible into common shares."'
Therefore, the appellate court concluded that the earnings potential
of Auto-Lite's minority shareholders' stock was enhanced, rather than
weakened, by the merger.2
508. Id. at 1244 n.4.
509. Id. at 1241.
510. Part of this major issue is choosing the proper method of determining
fairness of merger terms when the solicitor of the merger both controls the board
and fails to disclose such control.
511. Mills, 552 F.2d at 1242-50.
512. Note the assumption that the company's value is reflective of the com-
pany's dividend policy.
513. Mills, 552 F.2d at 1241.
514. Id. at 1242.
515. Id.
516. Id.
517. Id.
518. Calculated by the following: (1.88 X $1.40=$2.63) Id.
519. Id.
520. Id.
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Next the appellate court looked at the subsequent performance
of Eltra's stock and determined that Auto-Lite's shareholders received
more than a fair price for their stock in Auto-Lite.2 ' Eltra's preferred
stock was being sold in the month following the merger for $31.06.52
Eltra's common stock sold for $25.25 during the same period." Due
to the 1.88 exchange ratio afforded Auto-Lite's minority shareholders,
they received a cash equivalent of $58.39 per share.52 ' Because
Mergenthaler's stock was exchanged at a 1 to 1 ratio, Auto-Lite's
minority shareholders received 2.31 times the value of Mergenthaler's
stock.25
Finally, with respect to proving a reduction of potential earn-
ings, Auto-Lite's minority shareholders alleged that Eltra appropriated
liquid assets from the old divisions belonging to Auto-Lite and shifted
the liquid assets to other divisions."' The appellate court pointed out
that after the merger the divisions became one economic entity.527
Therefore, Eltra's management was merely increasing the efficiency
of the company by transferring assets to where they would be most
productive. 2' This action would benefit both Auto-Lite's minority
shareholders and Mergenthaler's shareholders."s Auto-Lite's minori-
ty shareholders then noted that post merger operations of the divi-
sion associated with Auto-Lite produced almost 5 times more profit
than the divisions associated with Mergenthaler.1 The minority share-
holders contended that this disparity in profitability proved that the
price paid for Auto-Lite, which was 2.31 times Mergenthaler's stock
value, was inadequate."'
However, the appellate court noted that use of post-merger per-
formance assumes the divisions operated independently from each
other." Therefore, the profits could have resulted from the input of
Mergenthaler's talent, economies of scale, or quality of management.
521. Id.
522. Id.
523. Id.
524. Calculated by the following: ($1.88 X 31.06 = $58.39) Id.
525. Calculated by the following: ($58.39 + $25.25 2.31) Id.
526. Id.
527. Id.
528. Id.
529. Id.
530. Id. at 1243.
531. Id.
532. Id.
533. Id.
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Since the assets were commingled, post-merger performance could not
be indicative of the fairness of the merger.'
Even without the commingling of assets, the appellate court held
that post-merger evidence could at best create only a rebuttable
inference of unfairness.535 It was impossible to know whether the
increase of earnings of one partner to a merger was predictable at
the time of the merger."' The court found that the plaintiff did not
prove that the defendant should have known Auto-Lite's business
would become more profitable than the rest of the company.
No Justifiable Damages Based On Unfairness
After finding no reduction in earnings potential, the court
reviewed the fairness question."7 The appellate court first looked to
the analysis of the district court.' The district court based its damages
on the assessment of fairness at the time of the merger.3 9 Five fac-
tors were considered: (1) The market value of the companies' stock;
(2) The companies' earnings; (3) The companies' asset book value; (4)
The dividends paid by each company; (5) Other qualitative factors.4
The district court found that earnings and book values
demonstrated that the merger was unfair."1 The court determined that
a fair exchange ratio would be 2.35 shares of Eltra's stock for each
share of Auto-lite's stock." The district court further found that Auto-
Lite's minority shareholders actually received an equivalent of 2.25
shares of Eltra common stock for each share of Auto-Lite stock."3
Therefore, the court awarded damages of $1,233,918.35 based on the
.10 difference."4 Further, the district court found that market value
was unreliable and discounted the importance of dividend policy.45
534. Id.
535. Id. at 1244.
536. Id.
537. Id.
538. Id.
539. Id.
540. Id.
541. Id.
542. Id.
543. This calculation of a 2.25 exchange ratio is incorrect. Id. at 1244 n.6.
544. Id. at 1244.
545. The district court discounted the significance of the comparative market
values of Auto-Lite and Mergenthaler, because in the preceding five years there were
purchases of Auto-Lite's stock by both Auto-Lite and Mergenthaler and purchases of
Mergenthaler's stock by American Manufacturing Co. The appellate court dismissed
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The appellate court held that the market price nearest to the
merger was reliable and reflected the value of the companies.54
However, to account for any short term price fluctuations, an average
price for a period of six months prior to the merger date was used."7
The court found the ratio between the average stock prices was 2.1
and was fairly stable over a two year period.u8
The appellate court then compared the before merger stock prices
and the effective exchange ratio. The 2.119 ratio of premerger stock
prices was compared to the 2.31' ratio calculated from the ultimate
price"6 1 of Eltra's preferred stock times the 1.88 exchange ratio given
to Auto-Lite's minority shareholders divided by the price of Eltra's
the assessment of unreliability due to the small nature of the purchases in question
when compared to the total stock sales of either company. Id. at 1245. Further, a
greater number of purchases of Auto-Lite took place during the last three years prior
to the merger, which if affecting the stock price at all would tend to inflate the price. Id.
546. We hold that when market value is available and reliable, other
factors should not be utilized in determining whether the terms of a merger
were fair. Although criteria such as earnings and book value are an
indication of actual worth, they are only secondary indicia. In a market
economy, market value will always be the primary gauge of an enter-
prise's worth. In this case thousands of shares of Auto-Lite and Mergen-
thaler were traded on the New York Stock Exchange during the first
part of 1963 by outside investors who had access to their full gamut of
financial information about both corporations, including earnings and book
value. If we were to independently assess criteria other than market value
in our effort to determine whether the merger terms were fair, we would
be substituting our abstract judgment for that of the market. Aside from
the problems that would arise in deciding how much weight to give each
criterion, such a method would be economically unsound.
Id. at 1247-48.
The plaintiff argued that Mergenthaler used its control over Auto-Lite to force
it to pay high dividends, thus depressing its price, i.e., draining Auto-Lite's capital
while raising the price of Mergenthaler by giving Mergenthaler funds in the form
if dividends?. The appellate court stated that increased dividends should have made
Auto-Lite's stock more attractive. Id. at 1247.
Because of this dividend policy and a change in the industry, Auto-Lite minority
shareholders claimed that only during the period between 1958 and 1960 did the market
value reflect an accurate value. The appellate court found this argument unacceptable.
The market value in 1961 reflected the uncertainty of Auto-Lite's future and continued
to do so until the merger. Id.
547. Id. at 1246.
548. Id. at 1246 n.10.
549. See supra note 525.
550. Eltra's preferred stock price X 1.88 + Eltra's common stock price = $31.06
X 1.88 + $25.25 = 2.31.
551. Mills, 552 F.2d at 1246.
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common stock. 2 Since the ratio comparison assumes that the value
of the ultimate company, Eltra, was merely the sum of the two com-
panies' values, it did not take into account synergy.553 However, the
appellate court held that fair value should include an element of the
synergy created by the merger."
Effect Of Synergy On Fair Value
The appellate court accepted and applied the analysis propounded
by Professor Brudney and Chirelstein, which requires consideration
of synergy in finding fair value.' Therefore, the court found that ratio
analysis alone might lead to incorrect results.5" Professors Brudney
and Chirelstein argued that the minority shareholder should be com-
pensated for not only the market value of his stock, but also a por-
tion of the increase in the value of the ultimate company resulting
from the synergy created by the merger.5 7 The proportion the
minority shareholder should receive is directly related to their pro-
porational share of ownership.'
552. Id.
553. Id. at 1248. See also supra notes 449, 450 and text accompanying notes.
Since the ratio's incorporated post merger values, the values already accounted for
any synergy resulting from the merger. In short, the post merger values represent
the value of a minority equity interest of the post merger concern. Since the Mills
Court chose a value greater than that based on the post merger market prices, the
court was defining "fair value" as a value larger than the value of a minority interest
in the post merger firm.
554. Mills, 552 F.2d at 1248.
555. Brudney and Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers,
88 HAR. L. REV. 297, 308-09 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Brudney].
556. Id.
557. Id.
558. The appellate court applied Professors Brudney and Chirelstein's approach
through the following calculations:
GIVEN: (AT THE TIME OF THE MERGER)
1. 532,550 share of Auto-Lite were held by the minority shareholders;
2. 2,698,822 shares of Mergenthaler were outstanding;
3. During the first part of 1963 Auto-Lite's average per share price was $52.25;
4. During the first part of 1963 Mergenthaler's average per share
price = $24.875;
5. POST MERGER VALUES (one month after merger) Eltra's com-
mon = $25.25; Eltra's preferred stock = $58.39 (to Auto-Lite's minority
shareholder based on the 1.88 exchange ratio).
CALCULATIONS:
1. 532,550 X 52.25 = $27,825,737 (PREMERGER VALUE OF Auto-Lite)
2. 2,698,822 X 24.875 = $67,133,197 (PREMERGER VALUE OF Mergenthaler)
3. SUMMATION (1. + 2.) = $94,958,934 (POST MERGER VALUE, NO
SYNERGY)
4. The minority shareholder owns 29.3 percent of Eltra
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Applying the Brudney and Chirelstein approach, the appellate
court found that the minority shareholders received more than a fair
price for their stock. 59 Auto-Lite's minority shareholders received in
excess of the proportion of synergy they were entitled to receive.56
Therefore, the minority shareholders could not show damages as a
result of the "unfair" merger terms."'
Summary Of The Approach Adopted By The Court In Mills
The approach adopted in Mills defines "fair value" as the market
value of the minority shareholder's stock plus a proportional share
of any synergy that may result from the merger.' It follows that
the value sought is greater than the minority value, but less than
the value to the acquirer. 6' In determining the fair value, the federal
approach begins by using the efficient market hypothesis. 4 The effi-
cient market hypothesis states that the traded price is equal to the
minority value of the firm.6 This federal approach then examines the
synergy"6 which might have resulted from the transaction.67
ACTUAL POST MERGER VALUE
1. 532,550 X 58.39 = $31,095,594
2. 2,698,822 X 25.25 = $68,145,255
3. SUMMATION (1. + 2.) = $99,240,894 (POST MERGER VALUE WITH
SYNERGY)
SYNERGY = $99,240,894-$94,958,934 = $4,281,915 X 29.3%) + $27,825,737
$29,080,338. $29,080,338 is equivalent to 1,151,696.5 shares of Eltra at $25.25 per share
or a 2.16 ratio.
The Auto-Lite minority shareholders actually received $31,095,594 which is
$2,015,256 more than $29,080,338. The court held that 2.16 shares of Eltra common
per share of Auto-Lite would have been fair, when in fact the minority shareholder
received an equivalent of 2.31 of Eltra's common.
559. Id. at 1249.
560. Id.
561. Id.
562. Mills, 552 F.2d at 1248.
563. The Mills court used the efficient market hypothesis to establish the market
value of the stocks. By definition, this value objective is the value of a minority interest
in a going concern prior to the merger or transaction. The court further added a por-
tion of the synergy that resulted from the merger. Because the market price should
already reflect synergy, the court might be using the concept of synergy to reflect
an objective value greater than the value of the minority shareholder, which would
be the market price. However, only a proportional amount of the synergy was awarded
to the minority shareholders; thus the resultant value must be less than the value
to the acquirer. The value to the acquirer would include all the synergy value.
564. See supra notes 487, 546.
565. See supra text accompanying notes 360-74.
566. See supra note 453.
567. Mills, 552 F.2d at 1248.
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If synergy did result, the fair value should be based on a pro-
portional split of the synergy between the majority shareholder and
the minority shareholders." 8 Consequently, if the price paid for the
minority shareholder's stock is less than the stock price plus his pro-
portional share of the synergy, he will be able to prove damages." 9
If, on the other hand, as in Mills, the stock is acquired by the majority
shareholder at a price in excess of the market price plus the minori-
ty shareholder's proportional share of the synergy, the minority
shareholder will not be able to show damages.70 Therefore, the Mills
court established certain guidelines for finding damages based on the
value of a minority shareholder's interest, plus a proportional share
of any synergy created by the transaction.71
Although Mills established a concept of fair value, the guidelines
established in finding fair value have limited usefulness. The analysis
used in Mills requires a market value hindsight approach where two
publicly traded companies merge using an exchange of stock to form
a third, publicly traded company. In a cash out transaction or in a
situation where the resulting companies are no longer publicly traded,
the Mills analysis would not be useful. However, as in most areas
of the law, legal guidelines eliminating uncertainty and providing fair
notice even in limited areas are desirable." This note suggests a
methodology to establish guidelines in determining "fair value" that
are both more flexible and have more applications. The proposed
guidelines can be used in both SEC violations and state freeze-out
actions.
SECTION VI-A NEW APPROACH TO AN OLD
PROBLEM: DETERMINING "FAIR VALUE"
The proposed guidelines utilize the modern valuation principles
previously discussed,57 which are allowed in Delaware freeze-out
actions subsequent to Weinberger and are used in civil actions under
the federal securities laws.57 The proposed objective of the valuation
is to determine fair value within the spectrum of possible arm's length
values.7 The analytical guidelines link the concept of fairness in deal-
568. See Brudney supra note 555.
569. Mills, 552 F.2d at 1248.
570. Id. at 1249.
571. Id.
572. Brudney, supra note 555, at 345-46.
573. See supra text accompanying notes 350-423.
574. See supra text accompanying notes 238-349, 485-572.
575. See supra text accompanying notes 424-84.
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ing with the dissenting or minority shareholder to the concept of find-
ing a fair value."' Utilizing the proposed guidelines, the degree of
unfair dealing determines the level of fair value to the minority
shareholder. Therefore, the proposed analysis starts with a fairness
determination in dealing with the minority shareholder.
Step 1: Determining The Degree Of Fair Dealing
The determination of fair dealing is currently the necessary first
step in both state freeze-out actions as well as actions under the 1934
Securities Act. In federal courts, to sustain an action alleging a viola-
tion of section 10(b) under the 1934 Act, 77 the plaintiff must allege
a high level of culpability or unfair dealing in the form of reckless
or intentional misrepresentation."7 In the private civil actions such
576. This is consistent with the entire fairness concept propounded by the
Delaware Supreme Court in Weinberger. "However, the test of fairness is not a bifur-
cated one as between fair dealing and price. All aspects of the issue must be examined
as a whole since the question is one of entire fairness." Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711.
577. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 S 10(b); 15 U.S.C. S 78j (1976).
It shall be unlaw for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of
any facility of any national securities exchange-
(a) To effect a short sale, or to use or employ any stop-loss order in
connection with the purchase or sale, of any security registered on a
national securities exchange, in contravention of such rules and regula-
tions as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors.
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale, of any
security registered on a national securities exchange, or any security not
so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in con-
travention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe
as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection
of investors.
Rule 10b-5, promulgated thereunder:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the
mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange-
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5.
578. The United States Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, holding that to maintain a civil cause of action under the SEC Rule
10b-5, the plaintiff must allege a scienter, or an "intent to deceive, manipulate or
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as Mills which involved violations of section 14(a) of the 1934 Act,
the required culpable conduct is merely the negligent preparation of
a proxy statement which contains material misrepresentations or
omissions."9 Therefore, in order to determine whether the standards
of culpability required under section 10(b) and section 14(a) have been
met, the court must inquire into the defendant's level of unfair
dealing."'
In actions involving violations of the anti-fraud provisions of the
1934 Act, section 10(b) and Securities Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder, the court must first determine whether the
defendant had the requisite scienter 81 It then must find either a
misrepresentation or omission of a material fact with respect to the
purchase or sale of a security.5 The United States Supreme Court
in Santa Fe Industries v. Green," an action brought under Rule 10b-5,
held that the plaintiff must allege more than breach of fiduciary duty;'
he must allege that the defendant possessed the scienter required
under Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder.5"5 Although the fundamental pur-
pose of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 is "to substitute a
defraud." Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976). Some lower court
cases have held that reckless conduct by the defendant might be enough to sustain
a civil cause of action. However, Ernst holds that more than mere negligence must
be found to sustain a 10b-5 cause of action. Ernst, 425 U.S. at 201. See also infra note 579.
579. The issue of culpability with respect to civil actions under SEC 14(a) has
not yet been decided by the United States Supreme Court. However, courts, such
as Mills, have allowed actions involving misleading statements or omissions which might
have resulted from mere negligence. See supra note 485, and text accompanying notes
485-572.
580. See supra note 578.
581. Id.
582. The plaintiffs met the requirement that they purchased, or in this case
sold, their stock relying on the information disclosed. Superintendent of Insurance v.
Banker's Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12-13 (1971), but the nondisclosure was found
to be immaterial. Santa Fe Industries v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977), on remand,
562 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1977).
583. 430 U.S. 462 (1977), on remand, 562 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1977).
584. Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 473-74. The facts in Santa Fe are the same as the
facts in Kirby. See text accompanying notes 485-563. The plaintiff brought a federal
cause of action against Santa Fe for violation of section 10(b) of the 1934 Act. However,
the court did not find either "deceptive or manipulative" conduct by the plaintiff.
Although the plaintiffs alleged a breach of fiduciary duty, they did not allege any
deception, misrepresentation or material nondisclosure. Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 476. See
also supra note 578.
585. 425 U.S. 185 (1976). To maintain a 10b-5 cause of action the plaintiff must
allege deceptive or manipulative conduct on the part of the defendant. Santa Fe, 430
U.S. at 473-74. See also supra note 578.
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philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor,
... ."I" The court requires more than unfair fiduciary conduct before
a cause of action can be maintained under the anti-fraud provisions
of the 1934 Act.587
Therefore, the first step in a federal action under section 14(a)
or 10(b) of the 1934 Act is to determine whether the defendant was
negligent in misrepresenting or omitting a material fact for section
14(a), or whether the defendant had the requisite scienter for section
10(b). Either finding requires the court to determine what level of
unfair dealing, if any, was conducted by the defendant, and what, if
any, remedy is adequate. State freeze-out cause of actions also require
a determination regarding fair dealing.
58
In state freeze-out actions, unlike federal civil actions under the
1934 Act, the courts must consider all levels of fairness." 9 The
Weinberger court mandated an examination of the degree of fair deal-
ing in order to determine whether the plaintiff is merely dissatisfied
with the price offered, or whether a breach of fiduciary duty occurred,
or whether an intentional misrepresentation occurred.5 When direc-
tors with dual responsibilities deal with the minority shareholders,
the Weinberger decision dictates a two part fairness analysis which
explicitly examines first "fair dealing" and then "fair value."59'
The Weinberger court noted that the directors affiliated with the
majority shareholder, Signal, possessed dual responsibilities. 5"9 The
directors owed a fiduciary duty of complete candor, or entire fairness,
to both parties. The directors' dual function precluded arm's length
dealings with the minority shareholders. 93 Therefore, when dealing
586. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972), quoting,
SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963).
587. The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that "once full and fair disclosure
has occurred, the fairness of the terms of the transaction is at most a tangential con-
cern of the statute." Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 478. Cf, Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.,
396 U.S. 375, 381-85 (1970). See also supra note 578.
588. See supra note 576.
589. A shareholder may be able to demand an appraisal without alleging any
unfair dealing. His appraisal right might be granted by statute. See e.g., DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, S 262 (1981).
590. See supra note 576.
591. Id.
592. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710.
593. The court in dictum suggested that arm's length negotiations might have
been possible if UOP would have appointed an independent committee comprised of
its outside directors to negotiate with Signal's directors. Id. at 709 n.7.
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with the minority shareholders the directors, representing the majority
shareholder, have a primary obligation of "fair dealing. 5 9' The court
further noted that an arm's length negotiated price was the objective
of such "fair dealing."55 In both Weinberger and Lynch, the court found
the majority did not deal fairly with the minority shareholders.5 In
both cases the majority shareholder was in breach of its fiduciary
duty. 97 Thus, both courts at least considered damages beyond those
available from the traditional appraisal concept. In Lynch, the court
found rescissory damages were the appropriate remedy, 99 while in
Weinberger the court left the application of rescissory damages to the
discretion of the chancellor on remand.5
Unlike Lynch and Weinberger, the courts in the earlier Kirby
and Santa Fe cases did not find any major unfair dealing between
the majority shareholder and the minority shareholders. 00 Therefore,
the application of a traditional appraisal remedy was deemed adequate
to assure the minority shareholder would receive the premerger value
of a proportional interest in the going concern."1 This value, the lowest
on the spectrum of possible arm's length values, was the objective
of the traditional appraisal remedy. 2 In summary, while earlier
Delaware cases, such as Kirby, recognized a fiduciary duty of entire
fairness by the majority shareholder,' the Weinberger court, in a situa-
tion where unfair dealing was found, expanded the fairness concept
to a two step analysis which requires an examination of both "fair
dealing" and "fair value."'"
Step 2: Link Fair Dealing With Fair Value
The second part of the proposed analysis links fair dealing with
fair value; a variation of the theory "let the punishment fit the
594. "When directors of a Delaware corporation are on both sides of a trans-
action, they are required to demonstrate their utmost good faith and the most scrupulous
interest in fairness of the bargain." Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710.
595. Id. at 711.
596. See supra text accompanying notes 168-349.
597. See supra text accompanying notes 168-349.
598. See supra text accompanying notes 225-34.
599. See supra text accompanying notes 338-49.
600. Kirby, 413 A.2d at 140. See also supra note 587.
601. See supra text accompanying notes 163-67.
602. The court's objective was to find the minority shareholder's interest in
the premerger value of a going concern. Kirby, 413 A.2d at 141.
603. Id.
604. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711.
[Vol.19
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 19, No. 2 [1985], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol19/iss2/1
"FAIR VALUE" DETERMINATION
crime."6"5 If a high level of unfair dealing is found by the court, the
fair value for the minority shareholder should be found within the
spectrum of possible arm's length values, but at a high level. However,
if no unfair dealing is found, the fair value for a minority shareholder
should likewise be found on the spectrum of possible arm's length
values, but at a low level. Although an infinite number of fairness
levels exist, this note considers the fair value concept under the follow-
ing situations:
1. Complete fairness level-Where the majority
shareholder dealt fairly with the minority shareholders, but
the dissenting shareholder merely viewed the consideration
for his stock as too low.
2. An unfair level-Where the majority shareholder
breached a fiduciary duty in his dealings with the minority
shareholders.
3. A highly unfair level-Where the majority shareholder
either recklessly or intentionally misled the minority
shareholders.
Using the proposed guidelines, the objective under the first level
is to determine the fair value at the lowest level of possible arm's
length values, the value of a minority interest. 6 Determination of this
value was also the objective of the traditional Delaware block valua-
tion method. 07 In Delaware and jurisdictions which follow Delaware's
lead, modern analysis can now be used to determine this value as
previously described. 6 The objectives of the corporation statutes are
promoted by finding a fair value at the lowest level in cases where
fair dealing is found. 9 The result of such a policy should be to pro-
mote mergers and cash-out transactions with full disclosure and
fairness, while providing the minority shareholders an incentive for
not demanding an appraisal merely in hopes of reaping a windfall
profit. 1 However, a higher level of unfair dealing would necessitate
605. Weinberger stated that fair dealing and fair value are not bifurcated tests.
See supra note 576. Therefore, a balancing approach to the components of entire fairness
is appropriate.
606. The proposed guidelines are consistent with the Kirby holding. Where
fair dealing is found, the appropriate value would be the value of a minority interest.
607. See supra notes 18, 108.
608. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 712.
609. One purpose of the corporation statutes is to "fully compensate shareholders
for whatever their loss may be." Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 715. However, the analysis
proposed in Weinberger is couched in terms of fairness, implying just results.
610. If the minority shareholder knows approximately the price he could expect
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a finding of fair value on a higher level of possible arm's length values.
In situations where the majority shareholder breached a fiduciary
duty, the fair value should be found at a higher level of value than
the value of a minority interest. This value, while difficult to deter-
mine precisely, should reflect the degree of unfair dealing which
occurred. 1 ' If a serious violation of fiduciary duty is found, a high
arm's length value of an 100 percent owner, would be appropriate."1 2
In contrast, if the breach of fiduciary duty or the nondisclosure, though
material, was not serious, a lower value should be considered such
as the value of a minority interest adjusted for the undisclosed infor-
mation, or, as in the case of a two-step merger, the value of controll-
ing interest. 1 '
By proportionally increasing the finding of fair value to compen-
sate the minority shareholder for the majority shareholder's practice
of unfair dealing, the majority shareholder is deprived of any wind-
fall profits resulting from his unfair practices. The majority
shareholder should, therefore, be deterred from dealing unfairly with
the minority shareholder. At the same time, because the minority
shareholder may benefit from stopping (or slowing them down by filing
suit) the majority shareholders' unfair practices, he is encouraged to
bring a suit when the majority shareholder does deal unfairly. " ' To
effectuate this objective, if the unfair dealing reaches an extreme,
the highest level of damages would be required to justify "fair value." '
If the majority shareholder recklessly or intentionally misled the
from the courts, he would be discouraged from bringing frivolous appraisal actions
when the majority shareholder dealt fairly with him.
611. At the judge's discretion, he would compensate the minority shareholder
in terms of fair value for the level of unfair dealing attained by the defendant.
612. Where a breach of fiduciary duty was found, the Weinberger court allowed
the value of 100 percent ownership ownership to be tested as a fair value. The court
stated that the chancellor at his discretion could include elements of rescissory damages,
if he found "fraud, misrepresentation, self dealing, deliberate waste of corporate assets,
or gross and palpable overreaching. ... Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 714.
613. A two-step merger is one where the acquiring entity first purchases con-
trolling interest, then shortly thereafter purchases the balance of the firm's equity.
Brudney and Chirelstein advocate giving the minority shareholder the value of the
controlling interest at a minimum when two-step mergers are involved. Brudney, supra
note 555, at 340-41.
614. Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), was the
first private cause of action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. See supra note 577.
This "private attorney general" concept is encouraged as a means of enforcing the
SEC rules.
615. Complete rescission or depriving the wrongdoer of the benefit of the
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minority shareholders, the appropriate remedy would be to value the
minority interest at the highest possible arm's length value, the value
to the acquirer." ' This value is greater than rescissory damages
because it includes value which is solely related to the acquiring com-
pany, or majority shareholder. The value to the acquirer includes the
value of synergy, a characteristic unique to the acquiring company."7
The acquiring company might have been able to realize this synergy
value by acquiring another similarly situated company. Therefore, by
giving this portion of value to the minority shareholder, he is receiv-
ing something which was not part of his ownership interest in the
firm. Consequently, the minority shareholder actually benefits from
the wrongful or fraudulent activity of the majority shareholder, if he
institutes legal action. The benefit received will encourage private
civil actions against fraudulent activities, while deterring such
activities by the majority shareholder."8
Summary And Benefits Of The Proposed Analysis
The approach advocated by this note defines fair value as a value
within the range of possible arm's length values,"1 " but bases the level
of fair value on the degree of unfair dealing by the majority
shareholder." This concept is consistent with the objectives and find-
ings of fair value in both the federal and state jurisdictions. The
guidelines resulting from the proposed concept will reduce uncertainty,
and thus promote merger and cash-out activities, but on a fair basis.
Adoption of any guidelines would be beneficial because some
uncertainty will be removed from the market.21 Companies and
bargain would be appropriate when extreme unfairness occurs.
616. This would require the calculation of the value to the acquirer. Therefore,
the reason for the merger would have to be given or hypothesized so that the value
of synergy could be determined. See supra notes 452, 453.
617. Id.
618. Professor Winters argues that the various jurisdictions, in trying to attract
new incorporations within their state, will not gravitate to the bottom; that is, pro-
vide little or no protection for the minority shareholder in order to protect the firm's
management. Rather, each jurisdiction will provide minority shareholder protection
because such protection eliminates risk, which enhances the value of the company's
stock. An increase in stock value reduces the firm's cost of equity, thereby increasing
the value of the firm. Management will, therefore, incorporate in states that provide
some management protection, as well as some minority shareholder protection. Winters,
State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. L. STUD.
251 (1977).
619. See supra text accompanying notes 424-84.
620. See supra text accompanying notes 573-618.
621. By reducing uncertainty, planning is facilitated.
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majority shareholders will have fair notice regarding the possible con-
sequences resulting from their failure to deal fairly with the minority
shareholders. The proposed guidelines facilitate planning by reliev-
ing some uncertainty about the costs of acquisitions, therefore
promoting additional acquisitions and efficient use of available capital.
The minority shareholder will also benefit from definite guidelines.
The minority shareholder will know what he can expect from
his investment, and will be encouraged to sell his stock if treated
fairly or to pursue relief if he is treated unfairly. 22 If the majority
shareholder deals fairly and offers a price that represents the value
of a minority interest, the minority shareholder will be discouraged
from pursuing the expensive and time consuming appraisal remedy.
On the other hand, if a majority shareholder deals unfairly with a
minority shareholder, the minority shareholder will know he can
receive an adequate remedy through the courts, thus promoting
private attorney general actions. In sum, the proposed analysis will
promote the policies of the state and federal statutes and encourage
their enforcement.
SECTION VII- CONCLUSION
In the 1983 Weinberger case, the Delaware Supreme Court
eliminated an outmoded, misleading, and restrictive valuation analysis
termed the "Delaware block." The Delaware Supreme Court has
opened the door to the use of modern financial valuation analysis and
expanded the traditional restriction of the "going concern value" to
other possible arm's length values such as the value of 100 percent
ownership. While the court has not clarified whether it is defining
fair value in light of possible arm's length values or is merely allow-
ing additional elements to be weighed in determining fair value, it
has held the majority shareholders more accountable to the minority
shareholders. No matter what form the future appraisals take in
Delaware, the wide range of arm's length values can now be considered
in the valuation analysis.
Delaware has taken a giant step toward protection of the
minority shareholder, a step which should benefit all parties: the
minority shareholders, the majority shareholders, the corporations and
the state. However, the next important step to be taken is the adop-
tion of a flexible set of guidelines expounding the "fairness" concept.
Guidelines such as those propounded by this note will facilitate
622. See supra note 612.
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planning and provide fair notice through increased consistency in the
holdings. They will further the aims of the federal and state statutes,
facilitate corporate planning, and provide additional minority
shareholder protection.
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